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Problem 
The works of Jon Levenson and Terence Fretheim highlight the problem of 
determining which interpretations of the biblical worlds of meaning around the text are 
congruent with the text of the Aqedah (also known as the Sacrifice of Isaac, Genesis 22: 
1-19) and which should be disclaimed. A hermeneutical model is needed for Abraham’s 
test that provides a text-based paradigm for sound interpretation of the narrative world (in 
  
 
the text), the historical world (behind the text), the theistic world (above the text), the 
cosmological world (below the text), and the present world (in front of the text). 
Method 
Four steps were taken to create and apply a hermeneutical model for 
understanding the Aqedah test. First, Levenson’s and Fretheim’s interpretations of the 
Aqedah were compared to test the usefulness of a tri-level hermeneutic analysis. Second, 
a tri-level (micro-meso-macro) spiral hermeneutical model was created that integrated the 
biblical text as the long central axis of the model and related the five biblical worlds of 
meaning to the text. Third, this model was tested by the Aqedah narrative of Genesis 
22:1-19 and a new interpretive hypothesis was perceived. Fourth, the hermeneutical 
model and the interpretive hypothesis were evaluated.  
These four functional tasks were accomplished through six chapters. Chapters one 
and two introduced the issues and compared the interpretations of two theologians on the 
Aqedah. Chapters three to five paired sequential construction of the three levels of the 
hermeneutical model to their Aqedah application. The final chapter evaluated the two 
products of this study. 
Results 
Two conceptual products have emerged from this dissertation project: the Axial 
Model of hermeneutics and the Covenant Hypothesis for the Aqedah.  
The Axial Model embeds the biblical text as the central long axis of a 
hermeneutical spiral. This text axis emanates the five biblical worlds of meaning (in, 
  
 
behind, in front of, above, and below the text) and norms any and all interpretations of 
those worlds. The spiraling ramp of the Axial Model slices through these worlds of 
meaning, depicting the features that are accessible for the particular interpreter. The 
interpreter progresses through the micro, meso and macro levels of hermeneutics (micro: 
exegetical and biblical hermeneutics, meso: theological and dogmatic hermeneutics, 
macro: philosophical and metaphysical hermeneutics) in a sequential fashion in order to 
grasp deep understanding of the text. 
 Within the Axial Model, the interpretive principle of Sola Scriptura is 
represented by the central long axis of the biblical text that emanates the biblical worlds 
of meaning and norms all interpretations of those worlds. Tota Scriptura is embodied in 
the canonical worlds of meaning behind and in front of the text which clarify and test all 
interpretations. Prima Scriptura extracts from the worlds of meaning above and below the 
text the biblical metaphysical framework for interpretation, and Viva Scriptura 
recognizes the Holy Spirit’s transformative work through the fusion of horizons between 
the interpreter’s personal and the text’s biblical worlds of meaning. The rolling path of 
the interpreter on the spiral ramp of the Axial Model integrates three hermeneutical 
circles (parts to a whole, fusion of horizons, projective-integrative) in achieving 
comprehensive understanding. This Axial Model was then activated by the Aqedah. 
From the micro-hermeneutical level of exegesis, God’s final speech (vv. 15-18) in 
the Aqedah was recognized as an emphatic divine interpretation (“By Myself I have 
sworn, says the Lord”) of Abraham’s test response (“because you have done this thing”). 
Six of the seven Abrahamic covenant revelations were then evoked by God in retrograde 
  
 
sequence through covenant themes and blessings. Therefore, the Abrahamic covenant 
appears to be the divine test norm for evaluating Abraham’s test response.  
On the meso-hermeneutical level, based on the covenant as the test norm, a 
logical interpretation was constructed and tested that saw the Aqedah, not as a test 
requiring mute compliance to destroy the covenant as embodied in Isaac but as a 
covenant crisis test to be solved by Abraham embodying the covenant. In other words, 
God’s purpose was to test Abraham’s covenant identity by eliciting a compassionate 
response of integrated covenant revelations (Gen 12:1-3, 12:7, 13:14-17, 15, 17, 18, 
21:12-13). Had Abraham actualized all seven covenant lessons in his test response, it 
could have culminated in covenant-driven intercession for Isaac at the altar site, a 
mediation appealing to God’s character of justice and mercy (the covenant lesson of Gen 
18). In that scenario, the discovery of God’s provided ram was set up to be the climax of 
Abraham’s test as the grace-filled divine test solution (“God will provide”) given as the 
anticipated answer to Abraham’s prophetic mediation.  
This ideal possibility was not perfectly actualized by Abraham. Hence, the divine 
interpretation that alluded to only six of the seven covenant lessons was an accurate 
assessment of Abraham’s historic test response. Abraham’s faith-filled (“Now I know 
you fear God”) but imperfect response still passed the test because he remained open 
(hinneni) to mid-test divine correction and did not sacrifice Isaac, but accepted and 
  
 
sacrificed the ram as God’s provided solution. This theocentric Covenant Hypothesis 
rests on a linear, non-retracting alignment of God’s actions as the Tester in the Aqedah.  
Finally, on the macro-hermeneutical level, the Covenant Hypothesis revealed the 
Aqedah to be a summative (achieving the incorporation of past elements), evaluative 
(accountable to a standard or norm), diagnostic (revealing any hidden problems or flaw) 
and formative (assessing for improvement) test of Abraham. Abraham’s test obedience is 
revealed by God’s final speech to be an integrative, correctable, healing and dynamic fear 
of God that exceeds traditional anthropocentric interpretations of Abraham’s obedience 
as a literalistic, uncomprehending, yet hopeful compliance. 
Conclusion 
The tri-level Axial Model reveals the Aqedah test narrative holds higher moral 
consistency and rational complexity than has been traditionally assumed. Most 
importantly, the Covenant Hypothesis demonstrates that the enigmatic Aqedah text is 
fully capable of unbinding itself by making sense of its own parts. In conclusion, the 
Axial Model appears to be a text-normed hermeneutical model that can unearth deeper 
understanding of biblical texts. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
TOWARD A HERMENEUTIC FOR THE AQEDAH BEYOND  
 
JON LEVENSON’S AND TERENCE FRETHEIM’S MODELS 
 
Introduction  
One of the most famous and controversial narratives in the Bible is the Aqedah or 
the Binding of Isaac.1 This enigmatic and evocatively styled test2 is constituted by three 
dialogues in a literary chiastic structure.3 In the first exchange, Abraham is commanded 
by God to sacrifice Isaac, the covenant bearer, as a burnt offering (Gen 22:1-2).4 The 
                                                 
1 The biblical narrative is called Sacrifice of Isaac in Christianity and referred to as the Aqedah in 
Judaism. The term Aqedah refers to the act of binding Isaac in Genesis 22:1-19. A more narrow use of the 
term Aqedah is recommended by Phillip Davies and Bruce D. Chilton who propose it be reserved for “the 
haggadic presentation of the vicariously atoning sacrifice of Isaac in which he is said, e.g., to have shed his 
blood freely and/or to have been reduced to ashes.” This suggestion is because this term relates to a 
mishnaic usage describing the tying of the Tamid Lamb, a context of cultic and sacrificial theology. Philip 
R. Davies and Bruce D. Chilton, “The Aqedah: A Revised Tradition History,ˮ The Catholic Biblical 
Quarterly 40, no. 4 (1978): 514-546. See also Shalom Spiegel, The Last Trial, trans. Judah Goldin (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1967), xxiii-xxiv. 
2 Erich Auerbach famously described the Hebrew literary style of the Aqedah where “time and 
place are undefined and call for interpretation; thoughts and feelings remain unexpressed, are only 
suggested by the silence and the fragmentary speeches; the whole, permeated with the most unrelieved 
suspense and directed toward a single goal (and to that extent far more of a unity), remains mysterious and 
‘fraught with background’. . .  The Scripture stories do not, like Homer’s, court our favor, they do not 
flatter us that they may please us and enchant us—they seek to subject us, and if we refuse to be subjected 
we are rebels.” Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), 9, 12. 
3 Jacques Doukhan, “The Center of the Aqedah: A Study of the Literary Structure of Genesis 22:1-
19,ˮ Andrews University Seminary Studies 31, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 17-28. 
4 All biblical verses referenced in this dissertation will be from the Revised Standard Version 
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second dialogue is the center of the chiastic structure where the father and son discuss the 
need for a sacrificial lamb (Gen 22:7-8). In the last dialogue Abraham is forbidden to 
consummate his act of obedience (Gen 22:11-12) and is provided with a ram. After 
Abraham sacrifices the ram in place of Isaac, God commends Abraham for obeying the 
His voice (Gen 22:16-18). This narrative has elicited a multiplicity of interpretations on 
the complex meaning of Abraham’s greatest and final test.5 
Background 
Historically, this narrative has been interpreted with overlapping but different 
emphases by the three religious traditions that reference Abraham as their spiritual father.  
Because Abraham obeyed both commands and was commended for “the fear of God” 
(Gen 22:12) and for “obeying my [God’s] voice” (Gen 22:18), many Jews have accepted 
the virtue of meticulous obedience as the main point of the test without excluding 
Abraham’s faith in God.6 On the other hand, because God thwarted Abraham from fully 
                                                 
except for chapter three, which will use Robert Alter’s translation of Genesis for its narrative faithfulness to 
the style of the original Hebrew. 
5 JoAnn Davidson, with many other Christian theologians, suggests that in addition to the testing 
of Abraham, the Aqedah offered prophetic typological lessons from the sacrifice of the ram that pointed to 
the Messiah. Abraham’s personal suffering prefigured and impressed upon Abraham the love of God the 
Father who later gave up his Son for mankind (Rom 8:32). Jo Ann Davidson, “Abraham, Akedah and 
Atonement,ˮ in Creation, Life, and Hope: Essays in Honor of Jacques Doukhan, ed. Jiri Moskala (Berrien 
Springs, MI: The Old Testament Department, Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary, Andrews 
University, 2000), 63-64. 
6 Jon Levenson says, “Abraham’s willingness to heed the frightful command may or may not 
demonstrate faith in the promise that is invested in Isaac, but it surely and abundantly demonstrates his 
putting obedience to God ahead of every possible competitor.” Jon D. Levenson, The Death and 
Resurrection of the Beloved Son: The Transformation of Child Sacrifice in Judaism and Christianity (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 126. Jacob Licht concurs, “The deeply significant theme of the 
story is that Abraham withstood the cruel last test of obedience by carrying out without murmur God’s 
command to sacrifice Isaac.” Jacob Licht, Storytelling in the Bible (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1986), 115- 
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consummating his obedience (Gen 22:12), Christians tend to focus on Abraham’s faith, 
while acknowledging that it was his actions or works (Gen 22:16) which demonstrated 
this inner state.7 Most Muslims accept the overarching virtue of submission as the 
primary religious meaning of the narrative.8 The interactive dialogue that has historically 
existed between these three religions on the meaning of the Aqedah has contributed to the 
richness and depth of their religious interpretations.9 
In addition to these religious traditions, more recent hermeneutical approaches 
have contributed various interpretations of the Aqedah test. One of them, the historical-
                                                 
116. See also Louis A. Berman, The Akedah: The Binding of Isaac (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1997), 
115. 
7 The Christian New Testament praises Abraham’s actions as exemplary in demonstrating his 
faith: “By faith Abraham, when he was tested, offered up Isaac, and he who had received the promises was 
ready to offer up his only son of whom it was said ‘Through Isaac shall your descendants be named.’ He 
considered that God was able to raise men even from the dead; hence, figuratively speaking, he did receive 
him back.” (Heb 11:17). See also Jon Balserak, “Luther, Calvin and Musculus on Abraham's Trial: 
Exegetical History and the Transformation of Genesis 22,ˮ Reformation and Renaissance Review 6, no. 3 
(2004): 361-373; Ellen G. White, The Story of Patriarchs and Prophets, The Conflict of the Ages Series, 
vol. 1 (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1958), 154; Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary 
(Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1972), 244; John Calvin, Commentaries on the First Book of Moses 
Called Genesis, trans. John King, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1948), 560-561; Augustine through 
the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), s.v. “Abraham.ˮ 
8 The Quran records the turning point of the narrative: “When they had both submitted to God and 
he had laid his son down on the side of his face, We called out to him, ‘Abraham, you have fulfilled the 
dream.’ This is how We reward those who do good—It was a test [to prove their true characters]—We 
ransomed his son with a momentous sacrifice and we let him be praised by succeeding generations, ‘Peace 
be upon Abraham!’ This is how we reward those who do good: truly he was one of Our faithful servants.” 
Sura 37:103-111 as translated in The Qur'an: English Translation with Parrallel Arabic Text, trans. Abdel 
Haleem (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
9 For an engrossing discussion about the historical dialogue and cross pollination of ideas between 
the Jewish, Christian and Moslem traditions on the Aqedah, see Jacques Doukhan, “The Aqedah at the 
Crossroads: Its Significance in the Jewish-Christian-Muslim Dialogue,ˮ Andrews University Seminary 
Studies 32, nos. 1-2 (1994): 20-40. See also Yvonne Sherwood, “Binding-Unbinding: Divided Responses 
of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam to the ‘Sacrifice’ of Abraham's Beloved Son,ˮ Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 72, no. 4 (2004): 821-861. While acknowledging the debt to Moslem scholars that 
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critical method,10 which has profoundly influenced biblical interpretation for much of the 
twentieth century, aimed at a scientific diachronic study of the text. The historical search 
for the original text and the history behind it may put into question the text in its present 
actuality.11 For example, the historical-critical method as used by Omri Boehm 
interpreted Abraham’s actions in response to God’s test as ethical disobedience.12 Boehm 
bracketed out the angelic messages as later redactions of the text, leaving a storyline 
where Abraham in ethical defiance disobeyed God by offering the ram instead of Isaac.13 
Because no divine directive was given regarding the ram substitution, Boehm suggests 
that it is Abraham’s demonstration of reactionary morality that characterizes the chosen 
people and saves Isaac.14 
In sharp contrast to this interpretation of ethical disobedience is an existential 
philosophical interpretation of the test by Søren Kierkegaard who calls Abraham the 
                                                 
Christian theology on the Aqedah owes, this study will not pursue the Moslem tradition due to language 
limitations. 
10 The historical-critical method is a diachronic study of the biblical text that refers to the historical 
phenomena of the linguistic features of the text. For the strengths and weaknesses of the historical-critical 
method see Bruce Corley, Steve W. Lemke, and Grant I. Lovejoy, eds., Biblical Hermeneutics: A 
Comprehensive Introduction to Interpreting Scripture, 2nd ed. (Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman, 
2002), 377; Jon D. Levenson, The Hebrew Bible, the Old Testament, and Historical Criticism (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1993); and Gerhard Maier, Biblical Hermeneutics (Wheaton, IL: 
Crossway Books, 1994), 247-307. 
11 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, The Biblical Commission's Document “The Interpretation of the Bible in 
the Churchˮ: Text and Commentary (Rome, ITL: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1995), 26-44. 
12 Omri Boehm, The Binding of Isaac: A Religious Model of Disobedience (New York, NY: T&T 
Clark International, 2007). 
13 Boehm, The Binding of Isaac, 23-33. 
14 According to Boehm, “In contrast to the pagan myth, the monotheistic people exist, not because 
the father of monotheism sacrificed his ‘beloved son,’ but because he refused to do so. Indeed, the Binding 
 5 
 
“Knight of Faith.”15 The existential approach to the Bible focuses on the reader, in front 
of the text, as the subject who comes to a personal understanding of reality and 
internalizes the indirect meaning of the Bible or word of God as his or her personal 
authority.16 According to Kierkegaard, true religion requires direct individual 
accountability to God. In Kierkegaard’s interpretation, Abraham passes God’s test by 
relinquishing Isaac in a “teleological suspension of the ethical.”17 In other words, all 
ethical and universal norms are transcendently bypassed by a true fear of God.18 
Two prominent and contemporary scholars, Jon Levenson and Terence Fretheim, 
demonstrate additional hermeneutical approaches that continue the trajectories of 
                                                 
does not so much test Abraham as present him as a model of faith.” Boehm, The Binding of Isaac, 123. 
15 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (London, UK: Penguin Group, 1985), 99. Much has 
been written about Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the Aqedah. See Jerome Gellman, Abraham! Abraham! 
Kierkegaard and the Hasidim on the Binding of Isaac (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2003); Edward 
F. Mooney, “Abraham and Dilemma: Kierkegaard's Theological Suspension of the Ethical Revisited,ˮ 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 19, no. 2 (1986): 23-41; R. Zachary Manis, “Kierkegaard 
and Evans on the Problem of Abraham,ˮ Journal of Religious Ethics 39, no. 3 (2011): 474-492; Brian 
Stiltner, “Who Can Understand Abraham? The Relation of God and Morality in Kierkegaard and Aquinas,ˮ 
Journal of Religious Ethics 21, no. 2 (1993): 221-245. 
16 Existential hermeneutics does not characterize a specific method but is rather an “existential 
analytic of being” utilizing a phenomenological approach to scripture or literature. The role of history and 
language in existential hermeneutics has become more vital to extracting the meaning of the text but this 
method remains centered on the reader as the text’s final interpreter and focus. J. C. Robinson, ”Existential 
Hermeneutics,” Dictionary of Biblical Criticism and Interpretation (2007), 105-106.  
17 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 85. 
18 Kierkegaard believes it is Abraham’s faith-filled fear of God—defined as his unreserved 
responsiveness to God’s command—that is being tested. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 144. Jerome 
Gellman believes Kierkegaard’s singular focus on the connection between God and man that subjugates 
everyone and everything else was a reaction of existential self-actualization against the Hegelian ideal of 
Kierkegaard’s day where self-actualization occurs only within “social structures that embody the ethical.” 
Gellman, Abraham! Abraham!, 32. But Georg Friedrich Hegel did not see Abraham as a Hegelian hero but 
as an anti-hero. For Hegel, the Aqedah was the epitome of Abraham’s consistent detachment from others: 
“Even this love [for his son] he once wished to destroy; and his heart was quieted only through the certainty 
of the feeling that this love was not so strong as to render him unable to slay his beloved son with his own 
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historical and existential approaches to interpreting the Aqedah test. The first trajectory is 
evident in Jon Levenson’s book, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, which 
illuminates the hermeneutical benefits of studying the socio-historical background behind 
the Aqedah in search of the world behind the text.19 Levenson traces the historical 
transformation of the religious impulse to donate the precious firstborn male to a deity 
and concludes that the Aqedah was part of a historical continuum that eventually 
sublimated the ritual of child sacrifice into a “sublime religious paradigm”20 in front of 
                                                 
hand.” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Early Theological Writings, trans. T. M. Knox (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1948), 187. Both Kierkegaard and Hegel interpreted the meaning of the 
Aqedah test as human relinquishment and detachment. This is a common interpretation. See Jo Milgrom, 
The Binding of Isaac, the Akedah: A Primary Symbol in Jewish Thought and Art, ed. Duane L. Christensen, 
Doctoral Dissertations of Graduate Theological Union (Berkeley: BIBAL Press, 1988), 29, 60; Phyllis 
Trible, “Genesis 22: The Sacrifice of Sarah,ˮ in “Not in Heavenˮ: Coherence and Complexity in Biblical 
Narrative, eds. J. Rosenblatt and J. Sitterson (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 170-191; 
Paul Borgman, Genesis: The Story We Haven't Heard (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 101. 
Gerhard von Rad takes the theme of relinquishment even further, “It [the Aqedah] concerns something 
much more frightful than child sacrifice. It has to do with a road out into Godforsakenness.” Von Rad, 
Genesis, 244. 
19 “There is no such thing as the text in and of itself or the text as a world unto itself, and no 
possibility of standing before the text without also, in some measure, getting behind it. The question is not 
whether we make historical judgments; the question can only be whether we do so poorly or well.” Jon 
Levenson, The Hebrew Bible, the Old Testament, and Historical Criticism, 110. Carmody explains what 
lies behind the text: “The world behind the text refers to the world that generated the text. Primarily this 
means the author, who had a reason and a purpose for writing the text. . . . The social, historical, religious 
world in which the author lived is also an important feature of the world behind the text. . . . Another aspect 
of the world behind the text is the language of the time.” Timothy R. Carmody, Reading the Bible: A Study 
Guide (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2004), 11. 
20 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, x. 
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the text that has been embraced and applied by Christianity to the crucifixion of Jesus 
Christ.21 
Terence Fretheim is aligned with the existential trajectory that centers the 
interpretive focus of the Aqedah test on the present reader and his or her worldview. In 
his book, Abraham: Trials of Family and Faith, Fretheim engages and challenges both 
modern life issues and traditional theological assumptions of God22 through the Aqedah 
test. To the extent that he focuses on the reader’s response, Fretheim situates the meaning 
of the Aqedah test in the reader's world in front of the text.23 To the extent that he focuses 
                                                 
21 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 200-219. Another interpretation for the historical social 
background of sacrifice is given by René Girard who suggests that ‘mimetic’ (imitative) desire leads to rivalry 
and aggression, which were sublimated by many communities into the sacrifice of a scapegoat. This act 
served to restore peace and the scapegoat was then venerated as an object of worship by the community for 
its efficacy in restoring stability. Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred (New York, NY: Continuum, 2005), 
4-7.  
22 Terence Fretheim does not claim to be an open theist, but his hermeneutical method of 
interpreting biblical metaphors has been used by open theists to challenge classical theistic propositions. 
For instance, in contrast to the classical theistic belief that God’s omniscience means that God has no lack 
of knowledge and does not learn or change, Fretheim asserts, “While God no doubt knew what was likely 
to happen given the intimate knowledge of Abraham, God in fact gains new knowledge with respect to 
Abraham (as does the reader). This is a hard, even offensive word about God for many, and readers are 
advised not to follow their instincts and seek to interpret their way out of it.” Terence E. Fretheim, 
Abraham: Trials of Family and Faith (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 2007), 136. Jerry 
Harmon discusses how Terence Fretheim’s hermeneutics have been adopted by open theists in his 
dissertation, “Exodus 34:6-7: A Hermeneutical Key in the Open Theism Debate” (PhD dissertation, Mid-
America Baptist Theological Seminary, 2006). 
23 “It is possible to separate out three loci of meaning, or to find in the discourse three different 
players who contribute to the meaning of the text. These are the author, the text, and the reader. . . . The 
three players or three loci of meaning are: the world behind the text, the world of the text, and the world in 
front of the text.” Carmody, Reading the Bible, 10; “The [reader’s] imagination is involved primarily in the 
hermeneutical task of explicating the referent. . . .The referent is the meaning ‘in front of’ the text, ‘that 
way of perceiving reality, that mode of being-in-the-world which the text opens up for the intelligent 
reader.’” Edgar V. McKnight, Post-Modern Use of the Bible: The Emergence of Reader-Oriented Criticism 
(Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1990), 106. Acknowledgment of inherent biases and contemporary 
assumptions that the reader brings to the text may actually enhance the rigor of a study of the text by 
allowing the reader to read and interpret “with greater awareness and self-consciousness.” Robert M. 
Fowler, Let the Reader Understand: Reader-Response Criticism and the Gospel of Mark (New York, NY: 
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on the reader’s discovery of insights about the nature of God, Fretheim situates that 
meaning in the metaphysical world above the text.24 The anthropological aspect is 
included in the cosmological presuppositions of both Levenson and Fretheim which are 
accepted implicitly as the essence of our natural world below the text.25  
Both scholars engage in the literary analysis of the text to bring out the narrative 
world within the text. This relationship of characters and events to each other in a 
presumed temporal world can be referred to as the world of meaning in the text. To sum 
up, a hermeneutical model is needed that is anchored in the text as the controlling norm 
                                                 
Bloomsbury Academic, 1991), 81. 
24 “What is ‘above’ the text? If the text is semantic process, encoded in the lexicogrammatical 
system, what is it the encoding of in its turn? What is ‘above’ depends on one’s perspective, on the nature 
of the enquiry and the ideology of the inquirer.” Macmillian A. K. Halliday, Linguistic Studies of Text and 
Discourse, ed. Jonathan Webster, Collected Works of M. A. K. Halliday (New York, NY: Continuum, 
2002), 48. Since for the believing theologian the ultimate reality of the text and sole source of biblical 
revelation is God, the phrase above the text in biblical studies refers to theocentric theology or metaphysical 
assumptions about God. Thus, the text functions as the normative channel for perceiving the wider range of  
significance regarding the divine Author of the Bible, which may exceed the original intention of the 
human writer and the intended original audience. Even if there is not “total identity between the meaning of 
the divine and human authors, there is total identity (by divine choice) between God’s words and theirs.” 
Ramesh P. Richard, “Methodological Proposals for Scripture Relevance, Part 2: Levels of Biblical 
Meaning,” Bibliotheca Sacra 143, (April 1986): 125. 
25 Below the text is an uncommon term and I was unable to find prior reference to it in the 
literature surveyed. Yet, if above the text refers to theocentric theology and metaphysical assumptions 
about God then underlying metaphysical assumptions about the essential nature of the cosmos, including 
man, would be what is designated by the phrase below the text. While both the author and the reader may 
hold different assumptions about the nature of the cosmos, ultimately the biblical text must also function 
here as the norm for believers in revealing the biblical understanding of the world and human nature. 
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in order to faithfully illuminate the interpretation of the multiple worlds of meanings of 
the Aqedah.26 
Problem Statement 
The works of Levenson and Fretheim highlight the problem of determining which 
interpretations of the worlds around the text are congruent with the text of the Aqedah 
and which should be disclaimed. A hermeneutical model is needed for Abraham’s test 
that provides a text-based paradigm for sound interpretation of the narrative world (in the 
text), the historical world (behind the text), the theistic world (above the text), the 
cosmological world (below the text), and the present world (in front of the text).27 
Purpose Statement 
 The purpose of my dissertation is to respond to the works of Jon Levenson and 
Terrence Fretheim by forming and applying a hermeneutical model that institutes the text 
of the Aqedah as the norm for a comprehensive interpretive paradigm. The goal of this 
model is to elucidate the test of the Aqedah and to illuminate its multiple worlds of 
                                                 
26 One example of the role of the text functioning as a norm over multiple possibilities of meaning 
is demonstrated by Ricoeur’s hermeneutical use of plenitude and fittingness. “The principle of plenitude is 
especially operative at the first stage as the rule that opens up the text to all its possible connotations, 
allowing the text to mean all that it can mean; the principle of fittingness, on the other hand, restricts the 
range of connotations in the text by an appeal to the congruence between these connotations and the text’s 
subject matter.” Ricoeur cited by Mark I. Wallace, The Second Naiveté: Barth, Ricoeur, and the New Yale 
Theology, 2nd ed. Studies in American Biblical Hermeneutics, vol. 6 (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 
1990), 65.  
27 Beardsley points out that only by positing a rational methodological control, i.e., a 
“nonrelativistic logic for explication,” to test subjective conjectures, can there be any credible criteria of 
meaning. For Beardsley, the phrase “nonrelativistic logic” refers to a hermeneutical method that must be 
structured and substantiated. Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism 2nd 
ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1981), 134.  
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meaning which are figuratively described as in the text, behind the text, above the text, 
below the text and in front of the text. 
Justification Statement 
The rationale for a text-defined hermeneutical paradigm is to avoid the problem of 
forced eisegesis and unbalanced exegesis. Without the text functioning as the norm, 
multiple considerations outside the text may dominate, impose onto or distort the 
meaning of the narrative. For instance, when Levenson concludes, “The aqedah, in short, 
tests whether Abraham is prepared to surrender his son to the God who gave him,”28 
Levenson’s belief that the ancient urge for sacrificial “donation” of the firstborn to a deity 
as constituting the historical-social background of the text, directs Levenson’s 
hermeneutic to focus on Abraham’s willingness to donate his son through death.29 
On the other hand, Fretheim holds the presupposition that God “lacks a certain 
kind of knowledge,”30 thus, a test was necessary in order to fulfill a divine need to know. 
Fretheim points out that in the Aqedah “the only one said to learn anything from the test 
is God.”31 Because of Levenson’s and Fretheim’s presuppositions, the test of the Aqedah 
is interpreted in different ways that may or may not demonstrate coherence with each 
other or with the text. 
                                                 
28 Levenson, Death and Resurrection,126. 
29 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, ix, 3, 4, 8. 
30 Fretheim, Abraham, 136. 
31 Fretheim, Abraham, 36.  
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It is widely acknowledged, and I concur, that the text of the Aqedah offers its own 
paradigm of divine testing as an anchoring hermeneutic in the introductory verse; “After 
these things, God tested Abraham” (Gen 22:1). Fretheim acknowledges, “This [test] 
theme is central to understanding all that follows.”32 Levenson concurs with Fretheim and 
calls this event “YHWH’s greatest test of his servant Abraham.”33 However, the general 
recognition of this narrative as a divine test has not led to consensus on the meaning. 
Most often, the interpretive focus of the test has been anthropological: What in Abraham 
is being tested? Or why does Abraham need to be tested? This anthropocentric focus has 
elicited various responses as the Jewish, Christian and Muslim and other hermeneutical 
interpretations demonstrate. Redirecting the focus in the opposite direction, that is, theo-
centrically, the question becomes: What is the divine intent of this test? Or more textually 
articulated, what is the intentional direction of this test? 
Ascertaining the divine intentionality of Abraham’s test remains a challenge due 
to perceived tensions in the test such as (1) God’s test command to immolate Isaac 
appears to nullify all previous commands and covenant promises, (2) the two divine 
commands (to offer him up and to not do anything to him) concerning Isaac appear to 
contradict each other, (3) the apex of the chiasm echoes Abraham’s response toward his 
human son—not God, and (4) God clearly praises Abraham for obeying the voice of the 
                                                 
32 Fretheim, Abraham,132. 
33 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 12. 
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Lord yet the actual solution to the test and the final obedient act of sacrificing the ram in 
the place of Isaac does not match a verbal substitutionary command in the text. 
A close application of a text-based hermeneutical paradigm of divine testing to 
this narrative, through the historical grammatical method that recognizes the multiple 
worlds of meaning derived from the text, may elucidate some of the paradoxes mentioned 
above by systematically explicating the Aqedah, the Binding of Isaac. 
Conceptual Framework 
The divine test of the Akedah will be unpacked through a hermeneutical paradigm 
composed of micro, meso, and macro-levels in a spiral model. While other theologians 
have found the three levels of “micro, meso, and macro” to be helpful in theology,34 these 
terms as applied to hermeneutics by Hans Küng35 and Fernando Canale36 suggest useful 
                                                 
34 See Christopher R. Baker, Entering the New Theological Space: Blurred Encounters of Faith, 
Politics and Community (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013), and Johannes Van der Ven, Ecclesiology in 
Context (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996), 481. 
35 Küng described the three levels of “micro,” “meso,” and “macro” as referring to discrete 
theological ideas, comprehensive concepts of doctrinal theology and broad schools of theological thought, 
respectively. Hans Küng, Theology for the Third Millenium, trans. Peter Heinegg (New York: Doubleday, 
1988), 134. Hans Küng’s three levels of interpretation were adaptations from Thomas Kuhn’s scientific 
components of a “disciplinary matrix”: examples, models, and symbolic generalizations. Thomas S. Kuhn, 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 182-186. 
However, Küng neglects to mention the fourth and deepest of Kuhn’s scientific components, namely, 
values. Values “are more widely shared among different communities than either symbolic generalizations 
or models and they do much to provide a sense of community to natural scientists as a whole.” In the 
present dissertation, deeply held intuitive values and symbolic generalizations will be addressed at the 
macro-level of hermeneutical principles. 
36 Canale described the three levels as micro-hermeneutics (biblical/textual principles of 
interpretation), meso-hermeneutics (theological/doctrinal principles of interpretation), and macro-
hermeneutics (the most inclusive ontological, epistemological, and articulation principles of interpretation). 
Fernando Canale, “Evolution, Theology, and Method, Part 3: Evolution and Adventist Theology,ˮ Andrews 
University Seminary Studies 42, no. 1 (2003): 172-173. See also Fernando Canale, “Deconstructing 
Evangelical Theology?ˮ Andrews University Seminary Studies 44, no. 1 (2006): 104, and Fernando Canale, 
 13 
 
models for Bible interpretation. Specifically, Canale calls for a conscious re-construction 
of the macro-hermeneutical principles directly from the scriptural text—instead of from 
extra-biblical culture37—as necessary for biblical coherence in the hermeneutical 
endeavor.38 
If the macro-level is normed by the same text that provides the foundational data for 
the micro and meso-level of analysis and is then used to provide the philosophical 
framework to re-examine the linguistics of the text with a refreshed perspective, the 
hierarchical model of micro, meso and macro levels is transformed into a continuous 
hermeneutical circle as the process undergoes another turn.39 Further incorporation of the 
                                                 
“Paradigm, System, and Theological Pluralism,ˮ The Evangelical Quarterly 70, no. 3 (1998): 195-218. 
37 Hellenistic philosophical concepts of the timeless, spaceless nature of ultimate truth have 
colored the picture of God since early Christianity and were imported into the belief system but not tested 
against the implicit ontology of the Bible. See Fernando Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time 
and Timelessness as Primoridal Presuppositions, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation 
Series (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1987), 399-409. 
38 Fernando Canale, “A Biblical Epistemology for Adventist Scholarshipˮ (paper presented at the 
Fourth Symposium on the Bible and Adventist Scholarship sponsored by the Foundation for Adventist 
Education; Institute for Christian Teaching, Department of Education, General Conference of Seventh-day 
Adventists, Riviera Maya, Estado Quintana Roo, Mexico, 2008), 15. 
39 Circular models of interpretation contrast with linear or uni-directional models by implying a 
more dynamic dialectical method. Circular hermeneutics is understood as the utilization of both inductive 
and deductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning moves from observations of specific text details to the 
formation of larger concepts, the parts to the whole, while deductive reasoning is the application of 
previously formed paradigms (the whole) to the texts (the parts) under study. Grant R. Osborne, The 
Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2006), 385-386. Benedictus Spinoza, one of the earliest thinkers to recognize this 
hermeneutical relationship between the parts and the whole, advocated for historical and literary contextual 
sensitivity (the whole) in interpreting biblical data (the parts). Benedictus de Spinoza, Theological-Political 
Treatise, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2001), 86-104. Friedrich Schleiermacher 
inserted the reader/interpreter into the hermeneutical process as an important determinant and demonstrated 
that understanding a text requires certain assumptions of the human from outside the text in order for the 
text to be intelligible for them. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Schleiermacher: Hermeneutics and Criticism and 
Other Writings, ed. Andrew Bowie, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 232; Anthony Thiselton, Thiselton on Hermeneutics: The Collected 
Works and New Essays of Anthony Thiselton, Ashgate Contemporary Thinkers on Religion: Collected 
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biblical understanding of ultimate reality as temporal instead of timeless40 suggests a bi-
directional hermeneutical model of a spiral may be preferable to the model of a closed 
circle.41 Yet some models of the hermeneutical spiral demonstrate other conceptual 
weaknesses. Grant Osborne’s model of a hermeneutical spiral starts by being grounded in 
the biblical text but the subsequent levels of interpretation and contextualization spiral 
away from the original platform of the text.42 The alternative suggested by this study is to 
incorporate the biblical text into the hermeneutical spiral model as the definitive central 
shaft, that is, as the long axis of the spiral. A textual axis links every level of the 
                                                 
Works (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 452-453. Martin Heidegger, however, broke new 
ground when he broadened the hermeneutical task from the reader, text and literary context to the human 
being who finds him/herself already “thrown” into the world which is their context and asserted that the 
hermeneutical circle which leads to understanding reality (the whole) and self (the part) is the existential 
task of meaning facing every human being. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 127; Anthony Thiselton, New Horizons in 
Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
1992), 279. Heidegger’s student, Hans Georg Gadamer, recognized the inescapable role of history in that 
both the text and the reader confront each other as end products of long cultural tradition (the text 
represents the larger world of established authority with thousands of years of tradition behind it, and the 
reader represents his or her personal tradition) which then requires a “fusion of horizons” for meaning to 
occur. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York, NY: Continuum, 1989), 305. 
40 See Canale, “Deconstructing Evangelical Theology,ˮ 115-124. 
41 One weakness of the hermeneutical circle model is that it is perceived as relative and viciously 
self-referential because it has no input outside itself, suggesting that the boundaries of current human 
comprehension limit it. A temporally determined or closed circle suggests that authority, even of the text, is 
inherently relative, non-objective, non-binding, and unescapably dependent on the interpretive language, 
tradition and past experience of the human beings encountering it. “What Heidegger described as 
‘preunderstanding’, and Gadamer as ‘effective history’—being immersed in temporality and its effects—is 
a hermeneutical circle always present in interpretation.” Stephen Curkpatrick, “Authority of the Text: The 
Hermeneutical Question,ˮ Colloquim 33, no. 2 (2001), 140. Opening up the circular ends of this model to 
time, thus transforming the hermeneutical circle into a temporal hermeneutical spiral, reflects the 
interpreter’s anticipation of future insights and their willingness to be interpreted and transformed through 
time by their ongoing engagement with the text. 
42 Osborne, Hermeneutical Spiral, 25-26. 
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hermeneutical principles (micro, meso, and macro) to the text without widening the 
authority-gaps relative to the levels.  
In such a model the connection between the levels and the text becomes crucial. For 
this study the overall principle for linking to the text is Sola Scriptura43 while the 
methodology is the historical-grammatical-literary method. But where can one enter this 
hermeneutical spiral? Since the biblical text is the long axis that norms all levels and is 
recognizably the most objective aspect of the hermeneutical spiral, it seems reasonable to 
enter the hermeneutical spiral from the micro-level beginning with a literary analysis of 
the text of Genesis 22:1-19.44 From this entry point, the Sola Scriptura principle 
undertakes an analysis of the literary aspects of the text by paying attention to its 
morphology, syntax, rhetoric and structure. Schematically, this entry point of micro-level 
hermeneutics corresponds to a close reading analysis of the narrative world in the text, 
the literary text is therefore the first step and central anchor for the other four worlds of 
meaning (behind the text, in front of the text, above the text and below the text). 
The next level, meso-hermeneutics, extracts from these micro-hermeneutical 
findings the logic or theological concepts which undergird the details of the text. Meso-
                                                 
43 Sola Scriptura (“Scripture alone”) was a Reformation principal that asserted Scripture to be the 
only infallible and sole basis of doctrine and church teaching above all church tradition and the control for 
testing subjective understandings of theology. Walter A. Elwell, Evangelical Dictionary of Theology 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2001), 58, 151, 571, 721; Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Craig G. 
Bartholomew and Daniel J. Treier, Dictionary for Theological Interpretation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Book House, 2005), 96, 368; William A. Dyrness and Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, eds., Global Dictionary of 
Theology (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2008), 60, 734. Infallible is not the same as inerrant. 
44Another reason for the micro-level as the entry point into the hermeneutical spiral is its ready 
accessibility for biblical scholars of differing persuasions, thus providing a common ground for starting the 
hermeneutical journey together. 
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hermeneutics therefore seeks to understand the original theological concept from the 
world of the author (the meaning behind the text) for which the text acts as a window, 
enriched by the theological reflections of the other canonical writers which increase the 
transparency of the glass,45 that critiques the theological constructs from the world of the 
reader (the meaning in front of the text) as a reflecting mirror. The methodology on this 
level includes historical,46 inter-textual47 and typological analysis48 which incorporates the 
canonical breadth of the Tota Scriptura49 principle. 
                                                 
45 This refers to the way the Bible interprets itself, intertextual analysis helps to clarify difficult 
texts by comparing them to corresponding but less ambiguous texts.   
46 There are two approaches to the method of historical analysis. The original approach, as 
conceived by Johann August Ernesti, was to recognize that the biblical narrative itself as a textual history 
of past events. In contrast, the modern approach to historical analysis “shifts the focus from the biblical 
narratives, as historical accounts of real events, to the events themselves (res) lying outside the narratives.” 
Thus, growing knowledge of ancient history is used to fill in the missing context and details of the 
biblically events. John Sailhamer, The Meaning of the Pentateuch: Revelation, Composition, and 
Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009),100-102. This study will accept the biblical 
narratives as actual past events interpreted with a theological purpose, this stance respects and recognizes 
the selective process that is inescapable in every written work of history. 
47 According to James Metzger, intertextual analysis recognizes the “profoundly dialogic” nature 
of all texts which can be appreciated from three different viewpoints: the author who is influenced by prior 
and contemporaneous material, the “implied authors” i.e., later editors/redactors that “beckon” the reader to 
consider the wider literary context of the final product, and “committed readers” who cannot avoid 
choosing or suppressing other texts in the endeavor to make sense of what they are studying. Metzger 
suggests “mapping one’s intertextual decisions” is one way to enforce critical discipline for responsible 
hermeneutics. This dissertational study will map intertextual decisions by submitting interpretive 
hypotheses of the Aqedah to canonical testing at the meso-hermeneutical level. James A. Metzger, 
Consumption and Wealth in Luke's Travel Narrative, Biblical Interpretation Series, (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 
2007), 51-56. 
48 Typology is defined by Edward Ellis as “historical correspondence and escalation or 
heightening (Steigerung), by which the divinely ordered prefigurement finds a complement in the 
subsequent and greater event.” E. Earle Ellis, The Old Testament in Early Christianity: Canon and 
Interpretation in the Light of Modern Research, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 
(Tübingen, GE: J.C.B. Mohr, 1991), 62-63. Because this dissertation will focus on the interpretation of the 
Aqedah and typological insights are contingent on that, a serious treatment of typology itself will be 
deferred to a future study. 
49 Tota Scriptura (“Total Scripture”) was the concept that all of Scripture demonstrates unity as 
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   The third level, macro-hermeneutics, then attempts to systematically synthesize 
the theological constructs of the previous meso-level in order to trace the implications 
about God (the meaning above the text) and His cosmos (the meaning below the text) that 
the text has revealed. Ultimately, this level extracts a biblical philosophy by submitting to 
the Prima Scriptura50 principle in adopting the metaphysical presuppositions indicated by 
the text as the biblical framework for continuing exegesis.  
Once these three levels have been traversed, the tentative conclusions of the 
macro-hermeneutical level can be employed as the biblical metaphysical framework for a 
another re-reading of the Aqedah, which re-examines the micro-hermeneutical level in 
order to test the biblical metaphysical framework for continuing congruence with the 
literary characteristics of the text. Then the tested metaphysical and literary findings 
interact for the second time at the meso-hermeneutical level of Aqedah meaning and 
logic and it is anticipated that the historical interpretations (both behind and in front of 
the text), and the vacuoles of narrative expression may gather added layers of 
significance because God’s test of Abraham has now been biblically re-framed. 
                                                 
the Word of God, suitable for doctrine in its entirety. This contrasts with holding one part of Scripture over 
another in terms of truthfulness or inspiration, which is referred to as a canon within a canon. Vanhoozer, 
Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible, 88; John Calvin, The Calvin Handbook, ed. Herman 
J. Selderhuis (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 380. 
50 Prima Scriptura (“Scripture first”) historically referred to the priority of Scripture as divine 
revelation over other sources of revelation, which implied other sources of revelation such as nature, 
experience and reason were valid.  N. Clayton Croy, Prima Scriptura: An Introduction to New Testament 
Interpretation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011), 130-134. This study asserts the priority 
property of Prima Scriptura in a fundamental manner–that Scripture is to establish normative 
presuppositions for biblical philosophy. In other words, Scripture is to continuously norm the foundational 
assumptions necessary for biblical metaphysics, logic, ethics, epistemology and aesthetics.    
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Synthesizing the enriched meso-hermeneutical insights and deeper comprehension of the 
micro-hermeneutical constructs, the reader reassesses the biblical metaphysical 
framework again in the macro-hermeneutical level (above and below the text) and is open 
to revision before continuing the spiral another time. Thus, each re-visiting of the 
narrative through the interlinking levels of hermeneutics leads to testing and developing 
the hermeneutical skills that uncover sequentially more facets of the worlds of meaning 
in the text. 
In summary, the three spiraling levels of micro, meso, and macro hermeneutics 
build upon one another continuously with each level simultaneously normed by the 
textual axis through the overarching principle of Sola Scriptura. The principle of Sola 
Scriptura includes the textual emphasis of Sola Scriptura in the micro-level, the canonical 
influence of Tota Scriptura in the meso-level, and the metaphysical depth of Prima 
Scriptura in the macro-level and on the interpreter’s personal worlds of meaning.51 A 
tentative methodology of how this conceptual framework can be realized through an 
application to the Aqedah will now be presented. 
Methodology 
In order to unbind (interpret) the test of the Aqedah, four steps will ensue. These 
steps will be accomplished over six chapters.  
                                                 
51 This study does not presume to do a comprehensive study of all three levels but will 
demonstrate enough of the three levels to illustrate the inter-relationships between them and the benefit of a 
more comprehensive hermeneutical approach in acknowledging the multiple spheres of meaning as normed 
by the text.  
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 In chapter two, I will do a comparative analysis of Jon Levenson's The Death and 
Resurrection of the Beloved Son and Terence Fretheim’s Abraham: Trials of Family and 
Faith using the tri-level hermeneutical model for clarity. The analysis will uncover their 
micro, meso, and macro-hermeneutical concepts in relation to the text. This prepares the 
study for the application of the hermeneutical model to the Aqedah using the historical-
grammatical52 method in the subsequent chapters of this project. 
In chapter three I will embark on a micro-level analysis of the Aqedah itself, 
examining the text directly to identify its grammatical, syntactical, stylistic and structural 
characteristics in order to uncover the necessary postulates that constitute the divine test 
of Abraham. The focus will be on grappling with the narrative details, their literary roles 
and linguistic relation to each other as directed by the text’s own structure. 
In chapter four, integration of the previous micro-hermeneutical findings will be 
sought using tenets of meso-hermeneutical principles necessary to illuminate the 
historical world behind the text and biblically correct the world of meaning in front of the 
text in the person of the reader.53 Once again, the text itself will direct and norm the 
fusion of questions and answers for understanding. Resulting theological constructs or 
hypotheses will then submit to canonical testing in a systematic manner.54 
                                                 
52 Corley, Biblical Hermeneutics, 21-38. 
53 All the meanings that exist between the reader and the text are impossible to map within one 
study. This study will present examples of personal and existing theological meanings that readers may 
bring to the task of interpretation and show how these meanings can be corrected by a text-based 
methodology in chapter three on meso-hermeneutics.  
54 The canon tests the theological constructs of the meso-level of hermeneutics by providing the 
broader biblical background for divine tests, sacrifice, substitution, worship, and other themes found in the 
Aqedah. Valid theological constructs will be congruent with the canonical exposition of that particular 
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In the fifth chapter, implications for a biblical macro-hermeneutic will be 
explored through a systematic synthesis of the previous two interpretive levels revealed 
by the text. This level of macro-hermeneutics will elucidate theistic and cosmological 
assumptions of the text, the meanings above and below the text. Special attention will be 
given to the divine intentionality of the test as the theo-centric perspective is what holds 
the parts of this complex narrative together and establishes its significance in the canon.  
Throughout this study the interdependent relationship between the micro, meso, 
and macro hermeneutical levels for interpreting the Aqedah test will be explored. The 
complimentary roles of the meanings behind and in front of the text and the meanings 
above and below the text will also be evaluated. Finally, in the sixth chapter, an 
assessment of the hermeneutical model and the Aqedah with recommendations for 
continuing the hermeneutical process will be discussed. 
Scope and Delimitations 
For this present study, my investigation of the works of Jon Levenson and 
Terence Fretheim will focus on their treatment of the Aqedah. Other works by the authors 
will be consulted if needed to clarify their interpretation of the Aqedah. Due to the two-
fold intentions of this project, to create and apply a hermeneutical model to the Aqedah, a 
comprehensive survey of the theological history of the Aqedah will not be included in 
this dissertation as the chosen perspective of the study is not historical theology but 
hermeneutical analysis and application. Nevertheless, the major strains of theological 
                                                 
theme for the biblical canon assumes coherence in the character of God. 
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reflection on the Aqedah will be referenced appropriately on the three hermeneutical 
levels. 
Scripture holds many overt and implicit allusions to the Aqedah throughout the 
canon. In order to keep this study manageable, from the New Testament I have chosen to 
limit myself to the insights of Jesus and Paul on Abraham’s sacrifice. From the Old 
Testament, verses dealing with child sacrifice will be included for primary relevance 
though this study cannot provide a comprehensive coverage of many other interesting and 
related themes. Regarding issues of historical-critical, social-historical, and reader 
response methods, these approaches to interpretation will be explored only as far as is 
necessary to demonstrate the advantages of the historical-grammatical-literary approach 
to the Aqedah.
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF LEVENSON”S AND FRETHEIM’S INTERPRETATIONS  
 
OF THE AQEDAH 
 
Introduction 
“Not all Hebrew narrative is a version of the Binding of Isaac, with its stark 
conjunction of fire, wood, knife and impending sacrifice, its breathtaking violation of 
human conceptions in man’s terrible exposure before God.”1 The Aqedah or Binding of 
Isaac (Genesis 22:1-19) is one of the most dramatic and gripping narratives in the Bible 
where a father is called upon to sacrifice his only son to God. Yet, even the most moving 
stories passed down over long periods of time can start to lose their potency for the 
religious community and lapse into a telling that is “uneventful, bland, routine, and 
entirely unremarkable. . . biblical writings, in such a situation become assimilated into the 
function of creeds: they become primarily institutional mechanisms to ensure continuity 
of corporate belief and identity.”2 If the Aqedah risks being assimilated by the religious 
                                                 
1 Robert Alter, “Biblical Imperatives and Literary Play” in Jason P. Rosenblatt and Joseph C. 
Sitterson Jr., “Not in Heaven”: Coherence and Complexity in Biblical Narrative (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press 1991), 18. 
2 Anthony Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 8. The same process happens in personal 
narratives. Wittgenstein writes, “The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of 
their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one’s 
eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all! Unless that fact has at some time 
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community into an ancient mantra of unquestioning obedience to the highest moral 
authority, it will be dismissed by a postmodern generation suspicious of metanarratives 
manipulated for ideological control.3 Since this is a genuine possibility, how can a reader, 
centuries later, encounter and hear a familiar biblical work as a living text again?4 
Paul Ricoeur provides an answer, “It is by interpreting that we can hear again,”5 
and Anthony Thiselton underscores that “Luther and Calvin argued that the word of God 
encounters readers most sharply when it addresses us as adversary, to correct and to 
change our prior wishes and expectations.”6 If they are right, the Aqedah is a worthwhile 
                                                 
struck him.—And [sic] this means we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most 
powerful.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, UK: 
Basil Blackwell, 1986), sect. 129. 
3 Jean Lyotard famously described the skeptical postmodern mindset toward the genre of a 
totalizing meta-narrative: “Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward 
metanarratives. . . . The narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, its great 
voyages, its great goal.” Jean-François Lyotard, “The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge,” in 
A Postmodern Reader, ed. Linda Hutcheon Joseph P. Natoli (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1993), 72. The reason for skepticism is that historically, groups have tried to control, unify and 
legitimize their existence through narrative systems. Linda Hutcheon, “Incredulity toward Metanarrative: 
Negotiating Postmodernism and Feminisms,” in Collaboration in the Feminine: Writings on Women and 
Culture from Tessera, ed. Barbara Godard (Toronto, Canada: Second Story Press, 1994), 186. 
4 Barthes distinguishes between a work, which is a concrete object like a book occupying book-
space in a library or store, and the text which is a methodological field of study. “While the work is held in 
the hand, the text is held in language: it exists only as discourse.” Roland Barthes, “From Work to Text,” in 
Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism, ed. Josue V. Harari (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1979), 74-75. 
5 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 
1967), 351. 
6 Thiselton, New Horizons, 9. Thiselton goes on to agree with Barthes that a text requires active 
collaboration in order to come to life, much like the performance of a musical score. Barthes reminds his 
readers that there are two roles filled by different groups to a musical work; one group interprets/executes 
the work and the other listens or accepts the interpretation. The modern critic assimilates both roles in 
analysis. Refusal to listen and critique or being merely content to “consume” it—leads to boredom if the 
work is not easily ingested. Barthes, “From Work to Text,” 80.  
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hermeneutical challenge due to its spare ancient style7 and daunting moral content.8 
Consistent with its self-declared nature as a divine test, the Aqedah test is a genuine 
“text” which is “not so much a ‘given’ as an invitation to activity.”9 
This study begins by analyzing two contemporary scholars who are exemplary in 
their field and bring different hermeneutical approaches to the Aqedah. Jon Levenson’s 
and Terence Fretheim’s explications of the Aqedah in The Death and Resurrection of the 
Beloved Son and Abraham: Trials of Family and Faith, respectively, will be analyzed 
through the filter of three hermeneutical levels, namely, micro, meso, macro-
hermeneutics. Each eminent scholar brings fresh insights and utilizes source materials 
differently. 
Levenson’s explication of the Aqedah in The Death and Resurrection of the 
Beloved Son happens to be an excellent example of the historical critical method10 
                                                 
7 “The fact that the text is ancient and that its characteristic narrative procedures may differ in 
many aspects from those of modern texts should not lead to a condescending preconception that the text is 
therefore bound to be crude or simple.” It is only under the imposition of aesthetic laws such as “the law of 
stylistic unity, of noncontradiction, or nondigression” and “nonrepetition,” that ancient texts were 
sometimes deemed “composite, deficient, or incoherent.” Robert Alter objects mightily to this prejudice 
based on assumed modern literary criteria, “If just these four laws were applied respectively to Ulysses, The 
Sound and the Fury, Tristam Shandy, and Jealousy, each of those novels would have to be relegated to the 
dustbin of shoddily ‘redacted’ literary scraps.” Improved narrative scholarship has uncovered complexity, 
subtlety, and unique structures of formal organization previously unrecognized in the Aqedah. For literary 
analysis, see Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1981), 21; aesthetic 
laws are mentioned in Tzvetan Todorov, The Poetics of Prose, trans. Richard Howard (New York, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1977), 53-65.  
8 The moral tension of the Aqedah is heightened by other verses in the Pentateuch such as “You 
shall not do so to the Lord your God; for every abominable thing which the LORD hates they have done for 
their gods, for they even burn their sons and daughters in the fire to their gods. Everything that I command 
you, you shall be careful to do; you shall not add to it or take from it,” Deut 12:31-32. 
9 Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 57.  
10 The historical-critical method is the diachronic study of text formation. It is included in the 
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enriched by sociological insights on the diachronic development of religious belief. The 
canon of the Hebrew Bible (Old Testament for Christians) comprises his context for 
exegesis at the micro-hermeneutical level while historical critical methods are employed 
at the meso-hermeneutical level for reconstructing the historical-social background 
behind the text. The New Testament, and second temple rabbinic sources are referenced 
in intertextual dialogue for illuminating the meso-hermeneutical level of the world in 
front of the text. As an observant Jewish scholar,11 Levenson handles the Christian 
community’s New Testament (NT) as another mishnaic interpretation.12 In his exposition 
                                                 
critical or analytical phase of an interpretive process, often the second phase of a sequence of three. Karl 
Barth’s three phrases of interpretation were Observation (Beobachtung, explication, sensus), Reflection 
(Nachdenken, meditation), and Appropriation (Aneignung, application, usus). Karl Barth, Church 
Dogmatics, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, G. T. Thomson, and Harold Knight, 14 vols. (New York, NY: 
T&T Clark, 2010), 1:2, 736; Paul Ricoeur explained his three-phased hermeneutical arc as (Mimesis1) pre-
understanding—the reality that the reader brings to the text, (Mimesis2) configuration or emplotment—the 
ordering and transformation by the text of particular aspects of reality into a coherent whole, and 
(Mimesis3) intersection—the effect or change of the hearer’s reality from reading the text. Mark I. Wallace, 
The Second Naivete', 52, 55-56; Paul Ricouer, Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David 
Pellauer, 3 vols. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1:52-87; David Klemm coined 
Ricoeur’s three stages as “first naiveté,” “critique,” and “second naiveté.” David Klemm, The 
Hermeneutical Theory of Paul Ricoeur (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell Press, 1983), 69. 
11 Levenson describes himself as “an observant Jew, I teach Hebrew Bible at a liberal Protestant 
divinity school in a university of Puritan origin and I am a member of the Catholic Bible Association and 
have contributed repeatedly to its journal.” Jon D. Levenson, The Hebrew Bible, 34. 
12 Levenson critiques Gerhard von Rad and Soren Kierkegaard’s tradition driven interpretation of 
the Aqedah for focusing almost exclusively on Abraham’s faith in contrast to his obedient act. “In 
subscribing to this view, von Rad, like Kierkegaard a Lutheran, replicates the most basic paradigm 
movement in the theology of his own tradition, the Pauline paradigm that affirms faith in contradistinction 
to deeds as the supreme and defining element in spiritual authenticity. Abraham is not rewarded so much 
for his act of slaughtering his beloved son—an act halted only after he has gone so far as to pick up the 
knife (v 10)—as for his faith in the promise that Isaac shall live. . . .The Aqedah, in short, tests whether 
Abraham is prepared to surrender his son to the God who gave him. To say, with Kierkegaard and von Rad, 
that he is prepared so to do [sic] because through faith he expects to receive Isaac anew (as indeed happens) 
is to minimize the frightfulness of what Abraham is commanded to do. It is also, I hope to show, to miss 
one of the key ambiguities and energizing tensions of the story.” Jon D. Levenson, The Death and 
Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 126.  
To be fair, von Rad’s commentary on Genesis 22 is more nuanced and includes multiple loci for 
meaning. Von Rad argues, “one must from the first renounce any attempt to discover one basic idea as the 
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of the Akedah, Levenson does not directly address the philosophical implications of the 
world above or below the text which constitute the macro-level of hermeneutics. 
However, from the justifications given for choices on the other two levels, some 
implications may be traced to his macro-hermeneutical assumptions. 
The second theologian for comparison, Terence Fretheim, includes the New 
Testament as part of the Christian canonical context for exegesis at the micro-
hermeneutical level. On the meso-hermeneutical level, Fretheim takes very seriously the 
present-day reader’s concerns elicited by this ancient but troubling narrative, these 
address the world of meaning behind and in front of the text.13 Finally, on the macro-
hermeneutical level, Fretheim’s close reading of the Aqedah text drives him to probe 
                                                 
meaning of the whole. There are many levels of meaning, and whoever thinks he has discovered virgin soil 
must discover at once that there are many more layers below that. . . . The exposition is much more 
accurate when it discovers in the narrative above all the idea of a radical test of obedience. That God, who 
has revealed himself to Israel, is completely free to give and to take, and that no one may ask ‘What doest 
thou?’ (Job 9.12; Dan 4.32), is without doubt basic to our narrative. . . . But one must be careful not to 
interpret the story in a general sense as the question about Abraham’s willingness to obey. . . it concerns 
something much more frightful than child sacrifice. It has to do with a road out into Godforsakenness. . . 
.Yahweh often seems to contradict himself, that he appears to want to remove the salvation begun by 
himself from history.” Gerhard von Rad, Genesis, 243-244. 
13 Fretheim believes it is appropriate to address modern day concerns to an ancient text because in 
the existential approach, the ancient text challenges the present reader in an immediate and confrontational 
manner. Fretheim invites the reader to ponder, “Should every parent wonder: Might my child be 
endangered by God? Is the God whom we worship a God who might force us to choose between the love of 
our children and the love of God? . . . Why the praise for God’s providing? If God set up the test in the first 
place, why should God be praised for a resolution?” Terence E. Fretheim, Abraham, 119.  
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traditional assumptions about divine epistemology, an aspect of the world of 
metaphysical meaning above the text.  
Since Levenson’s and Fretheim’s canons differ, micro-hermeneutical contexts for 
literary analysis are not aligned.14 In addition, the relative weight of authority given to 
different sources and the scope of context at the meso-hermeneutical level are not 
justified with explicit criteria.15 Like other interpreters who adopt the nest-like 
paradigms16 of their faith or scholarly communities without being aware of all the 
implications,17 each scholar speaks without clarifying their deepest philosophical 
foundations. Unacknowledged, these presuppositions at the macro-hermeneutical may 
powerfully and invisibly influence the conceptual tasks at the micro and meso-
                                                 
14 Since the number of contexts available for any interpretation of a biblical text are “legion” and 
“never self-evident”: the “work of the author,” “redacted pericope,” “biblical book,” “subsection of the 
Jewish canon,” “entire Hebrew Bible,” “Christian Bible,” “exegetical traditions of the church or rabbis,” 
etc., Levenson finds it “disingenuous and shortsighted to accuse proponents of any one of them of ‘taking 
the passage out of context.’” Levenson, The Hebrew Bible, 56.  
15 Instead of justification, subjective techniques are sometimes used to situate the reader’s 
expectations. One is to mention extremes as parameters and recommend balance, implicitly suggesting the 
author’s proposed stance as being that. For example, “while the reader ought not to discount the unusual, 
frightening character of God’s command [in the Akedah], it ought not be exaggerated either.” Terence 
Fretheim, “God, Abraham and the Abuse of Isaac,” Word and World 15, no. 1 (1995), 50.  
16 Wittgenstein referred to the paradigm of beliefs built or absorbed over time as a “nest of 
propositions.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1969), Section 225. 
17 For instance, Levenson writes, “Another principle Christians are tempted to use is the 
Christocentric principle, ‘The boldest statement of this theology is Luther’s own remark in derogation of 
the epistle of James: “What does not teach Christ is not apostolic, even though St. Peter or Paul taught it: 
again, what preaches Christ would be apostolic, even though Judas, Annas, Pilate and Herod did it.”’” 
Levenson astutely points out that full assumption of this principle would pre-emptively dismiss all non-
Christocentric insights from Jewish scholars as theologically invalid. Levenson, The Hebrew Bible, 73.  
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hermeneutical levels. Our discussion of Levenson and Fretheim should begin, then, with 
their stance toward their scholarly communities. 
Levenson and the Historical-Critical Method 
Jon Levenson identifies himself as a historical critical scholar18 but rejects 
exclusive reliance on any one interpretive methodology for scripture. His critique of the 
domination of biblical scholarship by the historical-critical method is penetrating and 
worth reviewing. Theoretically, Levenson points out that no “self-consciously 
universalistic and rationalistic method” can adequately “serve as the vehicle of any 
particularistic religious confession.”19 Methodologically, the historical-critical method 
privileges the historical context while shortchanging the literary context of the completed 
work that ultimately grounds the beliefs of a religious community. Pragmatically, the 
exclusive academic focus on historicism and empiricism neglects the “transhistorical 
value” of “suprahistorical truth” which sustains “the faith and belief upon which all 
learning—and not only biblical studies—depends.”20 In other words, the historical-critical 
method ends up undermining its own base.  
                                                 
18 “Were we historical critics to be classed as a religious body, we should have to be judged a most 
miniscule sect indeed—and one with a pronounced difficulty relating to groups that do not accept our 
beliefs.” Levenson, Hebrew Bible, 120. 
19 And since historical-critical methods are preferred tools of Christianity, “the practical 
consequence has been the development of a host of historical-critical interpretations that are really only 
rewordings or recastings of traditional Christian views.” Levenson, Hebrew Bible, xiii.  
20 “The Bible (under any definition) cannot survive methods that are themselves unable to 
transcend the limitations of historicism and empiricism. For such methods can at best only describe a range 
of canons and cultures but can never explain why we should concentrate on one rather than another. Indeed, 
a historicism afraid to acknowledge normative judgments about suprahistorical truth eventually deteriorates 
into historical relativism and experiences mounting difficulty articulating the transhistorical value of 
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However, the gifts of historical criticism are not to be dismissed:  
Historical criticism has indeed brought about a new situation in biblical studies. The 
principal novelty lies in the recovery of the Hebrew Bible as opposed to the Tanakh 
and the Old Testament affirmed by rabbinic Judaism and Christianity, respectively. 
Jews and Christians can, in fact, meet as equals in the study of this new/old book, but 
only because the Hebrew Bible is largely foreign to both traditions and precedes 
them. This meeting of Jews and Christians on neutral ground can have great value, for 
it helps to correct misconceptions each group has of the other and to prevent the 
grievous consequences of such misconceptions, such as anti-Semitic persecutions.21 
Indeed, historical critical insights can “add vitality to an exegetical practice that 
easily becomes stale and repetitive” but too often, the methodology has been used as a 
tool to dissect, not improve understanding.22 Therefore, Levenson’s hermeneutical 
approach to the Bible includes a broad spectrum of historical, sociological, literary, 
                                                 
historical study itself.” Levenson, Hebrew Bible, xiv, 4.  
21 Levenson, Hebrew Bible, 105. Historical-critical methods can also be melded with literary 
analysis: “It may actually improve our understanding of the Torah to remember that it is quoting 
documents, that there is, in other words, a purposeful documentary montage that must be perceived as a 
unity, regardless of the number and types of smaller units that form the building blocks of its composition. 
Here, the weight of literary interest falls upon the activity of the final redactor, whose artistry requires far 
more careful attention than it has hitherto been accorded.” Joel Rosenberg, “Meanings, Morals, and 
Mysteries: Literary Approaches to the Torah,” Response 9, no. 2 (Summer 1975): 67-94. 
22 Levenson, Hebrew Bible, 105. “I repeat that I am convinced that the restoration of historical 
context to the Bible can help bring it alive and add a vast depth and meaning to our study of it. The problem 
to which I am pointing is that much biblical scholarship is not pursuing its historical-critical work as part of 
any such hermeneutic of retrieval. Instead its operative technique is too often a trivializing antiquarianism, 
in which the bath water has become more important than the baby, and the enormous historical and 
philological labors are not justified by any reference to any larger structure of meaning.” Levenson, 
Hebrew Bible, 99. This observation is echoed by other scholars. Robert Alter, Genesis, 39-41; J. P. 
Fokkelman, Narrative Art in Genesis: Specimens of Stylistic and Structural Analysis (Eugene, OR: Wipf & 
Stock, 1991), 1-3. Some of the historical-critical features are addressed in footnote 177, pgs. 226-228.  
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textual criticism and also embraces the insights and exegetical tools of traditional 
interpretation, including the rich heritage of rabbinic literature.  
He argues, “Though fundamentalists will not see the value [of historical 
criticism], nor historicists the limitations, intellectual integrity and spiritual vitality in this 
new situation demand the careful affirmation of both.”23 This is necessary because 
historical critics “challenge the historicity of the foundational events (e.g., Sinaitic 
revelation, the resurrection of Jesus), traditional ideas of authorship,” and tend to 
“concentrate on contradictions which they then allow to stand.” But once they dismember 
the text, according to Levenson, “they lack a method of putting it back together again.” It 
is the traditionalists who have developed methods to harmonize these known 
contradictions; it is they who attempt to “preserve the unity of the text and its religious 
utility.”24  
Thus, Levenson urges biblical scholars to master multiple methodological 
approaches, utilize them fruitfully and remain prudently cognizant of their limitations. 
Methodologically, “the dignity of both traditional interpretation and of modern criticism 
depends on a careful separation of the two and a reengagement on new terms.”25 Moberly 
sees Levenson’s own “position within a historically rooted, living, transformative, and 
                                                 
23 Levenson, Hebrew Bible, 105.  
24 Levenson, Hebrew Bible, 2. 
25 Levenson, Hebrew Bible, 15. 
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critically aware religious community offers great potential for insight and 
appropriation.”26 
Biography of Jon Levenson 
Jon Levenson is the Albert A. List Professor of Jewish Studies at Harvard 
Divinity School.27 He obtained his B.A. in English at Harvard College in 1971, his M.A. 
and Ph.D. from the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at Harvard 
University in 1974 and 1975, respectively .28 His areas of expertise include theological 
traditions in ancient Israel (biblical and rabbinic periods); literary interpretation of the 
Hebrew Bible, midrash, history of Jewish biblical interpretation, modern Jewish theology 
and Jewish-Christian relations. 
From 1975-1982, he was Assistant Professor of Religion and Biblical Studies at 
Wellesley College. This was followed by six years as Professor of Hebrew Bible in the 
Divinity School of the University of Chicago from 1982-1988. Since 1988 to the present, 
he has been the Albert A. List Professor of Jewish Studies at the Divinity School and an 
                                                 
26 Walter Moberly, Book Review of “Levenson, Jon D. The Death and Resurrection of the 
Beloved Son: The Transformation of Child Sacrifice in Judaism and Christianity,” Journal of Religion 75, 
no. 2 (April 1995), 262.  
27 Levenson, Hebrew Bible, back cover.  
28 Jon Levenson, “Curriculum Vitae,” accessed 2 January 2017, 
http://hds.harvard.edu/files/hds/files/levenson_cv_july2013.pdf.  
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Affiliate Member of the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, both 
of Harvard University.  
His prolific writings have garnered prestigious awards. His book Resurrection 
and the Restoration of Israel: The Ultimate Victory of the God of Life won the National 
Jewish Book Award and the Biblical Archeology Society Publication Award in the 
category of Best Book Relating to the Hebrew Bible published in 2005 or 2006. The 
American Library Association listed as one of the Outstanding Academic Titles for 2013, 
his book Inheriting Abraham: The Legacy of the Patriarch in Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam. The book examined in this study, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son: 
The Transformation of Child Sacrifice in Judaism and Christianity was praised by Walter 
Moberly as “the rare experience of a fresh, insightful, and thought-provoking thesis that 
combines the probing of fundamental religious issues with detailed exegesis of the 
biblical texts, and it is lucidly written.”29 
Levenson’s Interpretation of the Aqedah 
Levenson’s interpretation of the Aqedah in his book The Death and Resurrection 
of the Beloved Son progresses through three sets of texts related to the concept of 
firstborn sacrifice.30 With the first set, he posits that the literal sacrifice of the first sons to 
YHWH was within religious practice parameters in the early history of Israel and in the 
nations around her. He cites Exod 22:28-29 (“You shall give me the firstborn among your 
                                                 
29 Moberly, “Book Review of Levenson’s Death and Resurrection,” 262. 
30 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 3-17 
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sons” commanded here without any mention of animal redemption), Mic 6:7 (“Shall I 
give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for my sins?”), Gen 22:1-19 
(The Aqedah), Judg 11:29-40 (Sacrifice of Jephthah’s daughter), and 2 Kgs 3:26-27 
(Sacrifice of the son of the king of Moab) as supportive evidence.31  
Second, the sacrifice of the firstborn could be fulfilled by redemption through 
substitution of an animal or another favored child in its place. In Genesis, the motif of the 
death and resurrection of the firstborn or designated favored child was either literally 
(Abel) or symbolically (Isaac, Jacob, Joseph) experienced by key characters in the book. 
Corporate instructions for the newly formed nation later allowed substitutions for the 
beloved son by a paschal lamb, Levitical service, monetary ransom, or even 
Nazaritehood.32  
The third and last cluster of texts reject ritual child sacrifice as a legitimate part of 
the religion of Israel. According to Jeremiah, YHWH denounces these as rituals “which I 
never commanded, never decreed, and which never came into my mind” (Jer 19:5).33 
Levenson argues that the intensity of adamant disavowals ironically implies there was an 
existing tradition to attack, one that had presumed “that YHWH desires it.”34 In fact, 
Ezekiel discloses that YHWH did give them “laws that were not good and rules by which 
                                                 
31 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 5, 16.  
32 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 4, 21, 46-51, 55-81. 
33 See also Jer 7:31, 32:35. 
34 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 5, 15.  
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they could not live; when they set aside every first issue of the womb, I defiled them by 
their very gifts—that I might render them desolate” (Ezek 20:25).  
Levenson believes the Aqedah was not a sacrificial punishment or atonement 
sacrifice for either Isaac or Abraham’s sins, but belonged in the category of first fruit 
offerings with the firstborn male from the womb.35 The meaning is “God’s portion must 
be the first and the best.”36 If this paradigm is accepted, then Isaac is the natural choice 
for sacrifice and what is being tested in Abraham through the Aqedah becomes clearer. 
The test announced in v.1, then, is a test of which is stronger, Abraham’s fear of God 
or his love of Isaac, and once the answer is in, the sacrifice therein commanded can 
be called off . . . . It may also be the case that Abraham’s fear of God, that is, his 
reverential obedience to YHWH, has altogether overwhelmed his love of Isaac in the 
sentence structure no less than in the event, so that ‘the one whom you love, Isaac’ is 
no longer at issue. The only point is that which the entire trial aims to prove that 
Abraham’s obedience is absolute and uncompromising. Just as the trial begins with 
‘God[‘s] put[ting] Abraham to the test” with no mention of Isaac, so does it end with 
God’s acknowledgment that Abraham fears him without any mention of Isaac’s name 
or the countervailing force of his paternal affection for the beloved son whom he has 
refused to withhold (v 12).37 
Levenson claims that over time as the role of the son became more prominent in 
Israelite consciousness, Isaac’s voluntary obedience in the Aqedah provided an 
archetypal model for “a race exemplary for its martyrs.”38 The Aqedah was then seen as 
an initiation rite of sacrificial surrender for father and son where Abraham, “in order to 
                                                 
35 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 15. 
36 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 59. 
37 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 137. 
38 Levenson, Death and Resurrection,134. 
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play his role in the providential drama, must surrender his son to God so that the son may 
assume his own foreordained role.”39 A chosen, elected son must thereby accept “the 
costly nature of God’s choice”40 if he is to enjoy the unique relation to God that comes 
with it. 
Analysis of Levenson’s Hermeneutics 
Micro-Hermeneutic 
The exegetical discussion of the Aqedah found in chapter twelve discusses textual 
details that constitute the micro-hermeneutical level of analysis: the scope of meaning for 
terms (test,41 hinenni,42 worship43), structure (four designations of sacrificial victim,44 
parallels to Gen 12:1-245), repetition (abbreviated denotations of Isaac,46 father-son 
relation emphasized,47 obedience matches commands,48 intensification: two walked as 
                                                 
39 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 142.  
40 Moberly, “Book Review of the Death and Resurrection,” 262. 
41 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 125-126. 
42 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 126-127, 137. 
43 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 130-131. 
44 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 127. 
45 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 128, 140-141. 
46 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 128-129, 137. 
47 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 129 
48 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 129. 
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one,49 two angelic affirmations50), stylistic technique (fragmentary speeches support 
silence and ambiguity51), reversal (wood on Isaac then Isaac on wood52), pace (slow start-
sudden rescission53), and near-homophonies (nissâ,54 yĕrē55). 
Levenson seamlessly weaves the explication of micro-hermeneutics to their meso-
hermeneutical implications for theology. The benefit of tying the two levels closely 
together is that the relevance of the micro-hermeneutical details is made immediately 
apparent to the reader. Close linkages of these two levels reveal the natural affinity of 
hermeneutical levels to co-interpret and illuminate each other.56 Since hermeneutics is 
also interested in the logic and rationale for interpretive decisions, three examples on the 
scope of meaning and literary structure will demonstrate the way Levenson argues for 
interpreting the text. 
Exegetes do not always agree on the scope of meaning for a particular term. 
Gerhard von Rad hears in the narrator’s initial framing of an imposed construct from a 
                                                 
49 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 134 
50 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 138 
51 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 131-132 
52 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 136 
53 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 137 
54 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 139 
55 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 139 
56 Fluid movement from an exegetical detail in the text to a theological meaning and to its 
philosophical implications is sometimes presented to support a preferred meaning. If ambiguity or 
inconsistency exists between the levels, this is often overlooked or glossed over.  
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godly source (“God tested Abraham”), a literary hint to the reader that “God does not 
desire the death of Isaac.”57 Levenson disagrees, “Nothing in the verb used (nissa) 
implies that the act commanded will not be carried to completion, that Isaac will only be 
bound and not sacrificed on the altar.”58 Levenson has narrowed the scope of meaning for 
test (nissa) to an operational term without the implication that it is not meant to be taken 
literalistically to the end.59 Both interpreters therefore argue their interpretation from pre-
suppositions on what a test is and is not, without disclosing those premises to the reader.60  
In contrast to his stringent position above, Levenson accepts an expansive scope 
of meaning for hinneni in the Akedah. He prefers E. A. Speiser’s “one-word translation 
‘Ready’”61 over the more common translation “Here I am,” and the literal translation of 
the Hebrew “Behold me.”  Levenson’s reasons, “in none of these verses is there an 
                                                 
57 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 125. Von Rad characterizes the test as a temptation 
(Anfechtung): “The reader is told in advance, however, that the story concerns a temptation given by God, a 
demand which God did not intend to take seriously. . . . He [the narrator] has not caused his reader any 
premature excitement regarding a horrible experience.” Von Rad, Genesis, 239. Nahum Sarna agrees with 
such implications for this test; “the reader is informed in advance that God is only testing Abraham and 
does not want the sacrifice for His own needs.” Nahum Sarna, The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis (New 
York, NY: The Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 393.  
58 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 126. 
59 A test is often an artificially imposed stress in the form of a question or command that does not 
necessarily reflect the ignorance or direct need of the tester regarding those points. On the other hand, a test 
can also be set up to satisfy the tester’s lack of knowledge or arise from a genuine need (of the tester, testee, 
or prevailing circumstances).  
60 The narrator of the Aqedah does not specify what a test is, what kind of a test this is, or how a 
divine test might differ from a human test. The term itself was not used before this point in the book of 
Genesis. Because Levenson does not share his underlying rationale for the boundaries of his scope of 
meaning, the reader has to make a choice between competing arguments of exegetes, arbitrarily.  
61 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 126 
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inquiry about the Patriarch’s location. What is at stake, is his readiness to act upon a 
command from God (vv 1, 11) and to face the human consequences (v 7).”62 Levenson’s 
argument for expanded psychological openness and accountability is supported twice by 
Abraham’s full physical compliance after answering “Ready (hinneni)” to God.   
However, in Abraham’s conversation with Isaac, his response “Ready (hinneni)” 
(v 7) again appears, but here Levenson admits that Abraham “is not at all ready to tell 
Isaac the blunt truth about the sacrifice he is prepared to carry out on God’s instructions” 
[italics added].63 Did Abraham pull back after expressing ready accountability to his son? 
Or is the scope of meaning for hinenni not as psychologically broad as Levenson had 
initially proposed?64 A reader may wonder about the underlying hermeneutical principle 
that motivates Levenson to argue for a restriction of the scope of meaning for one term 
(nissa) and a broadening of the scope of meaning for another (hinneni). 
In addition to semantic scope, literary form also elicits exegetical judgment. 
Levenson illustrates how the structural “effect of the four designations of the person to be 
sacrificed is beautifully brought out in a famous midrash.” 
“Your son.” He said to him, “I have two sons. Which son?” he answered him, “your 
favored one.” He said to him, “Each is the favored one of his own mother.” He 
replied, “the one whom you love.” He said, “Is there a limit to the affections?” He 
                                                 
62 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 127 
63 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 137. 
64 When Isaac is old and blind, this pattern of dialogue (Jacob: My father? Isaac: Here I am 
[hinneni], my son) is repeated. In that scenario, Jacob the son is inauthentic and Isaac is trusting and open, 
ready to act and face the consequences when he replies with hinneni. Gen 27:18.  
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answered, “Isaac.” And why did He not reveal it to him immediately? In order to 
make him more beloved to him and to give him a reward for each utterance.65 
Levenson believes the Aqedah requires Abraham to place “obedience to God not 
above ethics, as Kierkegaard would have it, but above his love for Isaac—in some ways a 
more daunting task. . . . As the midrash suggests, each of these terms underscores the 
preciousness of Isaac, the beloved son marked for sacrifice, and yet Abraham does not 
flinch but goes forth to slaughter the boy whose specialness has never been made so clear 
as it is at that moment.”66 Abraham’s paternal love for Isaac has just been heightened by 
the multiple designations and now that stirred up love is pitted against Abraham’s fear of 
God. Levenson has linked the literary form of the text on the micro-hermeneutical level 
to an extra-biblical source of midrash interpretation then brings the reader to a theological 
conclusion about the nature of the test as the choice between Abraham’s love for Isaac 
versus Abraham’s obedience to God, a meso-hermeneutical proposition.  
Meso-Hermeneutic 
The preceding is one example of how Jon Levenson’s expertise in the “‘rewritten 
Bible’ of Second Temple Judaism” provides a rich context for textual explorations at the 
meso-hermeneutical level. Utilizing “internal literary analysis, ancient near eastern 
parallels, and rabbinic and Christian midrash to develop a series of profound insights,”67 
                                                 
65 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 127. 
66 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 128. 
67 David Blumenthal, “Jon Levenson, the Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son,” Revue des 
études juives 160, no. 1-2 (January 2001): 265. 
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Levenson skillfully delves into intertextual analysis (Ex 22,  Ex 34, and the prophets’ 
horrified disavowals of child sacrifice),68 etiological hypotheses (Aqedah as etiology for 
animal substitution, eventual site of the Israelite Temple, common sayings),69 thematic 
development (Isaac, Joseph, and the Israelite nation experience chosenness and “firstborn 
status” as God’s “absolute claim” by enduring a death-like ordeal),70 typology (Christian 
application to Jesus),71 and historical socio-political transformation (during the 2nd cent 
B.C.E. the Aqedah was the definitive symbol of Abraham’s life, connected to the paschal 
lamb, then to all lamb offerings; the self-sacrifice of Isaac became the Aqedah focus in 
the 1st cent C. E.,72 then was applied to Jesus by Christians with an anti-semitic twist—
“Paul’s Jesus does not manifest Isaac. He supersedes him”73). 
Since one of the goals of meso-hermeneutical analysis is to analyze the logic and 
theological concepts behind the use of interpretive methods, two examples of Levenson’s 
engagement with the historical critical method will be discussed. First, Levenson’s 
primary hypothesis in the book The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son is that the 
                                                 
68 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 4-5. 
69 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 111-124. 
70 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 60. 
71 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 213. 
72 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 198-199. 
73 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 213.  
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“myth of the death (and often the resurrection as well) of the beloved son”74 remains a 
viable myth throughout Israel’s history. His evidence includes the books of Jeremiah and 
Ezekiel in the 6th cent B.C.E. that denounce child sacrifice to YHWH in absolute terms. 
But Exod 12-13 which is dated to the P source in 5th cent B.C.E., and Christian materials 
in 1st cent C.E continue to refer to the theme of substitutionary firstborn sacrifice in the 
paschal lamb. For Levenson, this suggests the persistence, at least in concept, of the 
firstborn sacrifice.75  
The possibility of incorrect source dating undermining Levenson’s hypothesis is 
countered by canonical critique: “Even if P is dated earlier than the sources critical of the 
substitutionary etiology of the paschal lamb, the fact that Exodus 12-13 was preserved, 
included in the Pentateuch, and taken as normative in some sense in both Judaism and 
Christianity speaks to the same point: the mythic-ritual complex that I have been calling 
“child sacrifice” was never eradicated; it was only transformed.”76 Both the historical 
critical method and canonical criticism are employed to ground his thesis.77   
The second example addresses the fact that historical critical source explanations 
of the divine names in the Aqedah threaten its integrity as a narrative unit. The narrative 
                                                 
74 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 43. 
75 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 43-45. 
76 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 45. 
77 The exclusive use of the historical critical method for interpretation is a “fundamentalist denial 
of historical change” which ignores the multicontextuality of the Hebrew Bible by extreme reduction of the 
context to the historical one at the formation of the writing. Levenson insists that both the literary (or 
canonical) context as well as the entire tradition of the religious community including the reader’s own 
religious experience must be taken into account. Levenson, Hebrew Bible, 4-5. 
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is usually ascribed to the northern source called the Elohist (E) because Elohim is the 
initial designation of the divine tester. However, five times (vv 11, 15, 16, and two times 
in v 14) the tetragam (YHWH) or J name presumably from the southern Judean tradition 
is also used. Historical critical scholars usually “excise the YHWHistic features” from the 
story in favor of the E source as original storyline.78 However, Levenson points to a 
theological paradox in the Aqedah, why would a northern source endorse a southern 
tradition? The phrase “God will see to the sheep” in verse 8 ties the theological 
significance of the sacrifice to the southern Judean temple site, but clearly employs the 
name Elohim. Thus, Levenson favors theological integrity over linguistic vivisection, 
“The classical source-critical assumption that the variations between YHWH and ‘ĕlōhîm 
must be explained by the Documentary Hypothesis is, at least in this instance, much to be 
doubted. Rather than to eliminate the tetragrammaton from vv 11 and 14, it is preferable 
to retain it at the cost of the classical source-critical presupposition.”79 In the end, 
Levenson tends to favor theological, canonical and sociological consistency over 
linguistic dating for meso-hermeneutical conclusions.  
Macro-Hermeneutic 
Macro-hermeneutics attempts to elucidate the philosophical concepts of the text. 
Because it is speculative to analyze a category that Levenson’s book on the Aqedah does 
                                                 
78 See R. W. L. Moberly, “The Earliest Commentary on the Akedah,” Vetus Testamentum 38, no. 
3 (1988). 
79 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 122.  
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not address directly, this section of analysis must remain tentative. At the same time, all 
interpreters hold philosophical assumptions albeit with varying degrees of self-awareness 
or acknowledgement. Scholarly and religious communities must share a nest of 
presuppositions in order to communicate80 and theologians implicitly hold a theocentric 
metaphysics that can be referred to as a world of meaning above the text.  
Starting with macro-methodology, Levenson is not interested in abstract 
philosophical harmonization of contradictory Biblical texts. He is interested in rational 
explanations of shocking paradoxes, especially if it faithfully preserves the particularities 
of the text. Ezekiel 20:25-26 refers to God giving bad laws, namely, requiring firstborn 
human sacrifices. Levenson wryly comments that this text has “most exegetes running for 
cover.”81 In contrast, he boldly accepts the literal interpretation as the true intention of the 
verse. Explanatory proposals of receptive misunderstanding or corrupted hermeneutics by 
the addressed community are dismissed by Levenson as looking for answers in the wrong 
                                                 
80 Collective habits of mind bind a community of scholars or scientists together. They may be 
philosophical concepts, deeply held values, prevailing theories, or procedures. It is the only way they can 
recognize who is in the community and who is not, to evaluate new information, to cross-communicate 
meaningfully to each other. Howard Margolis, Paradigms and Barriers: How Habits of Mind Govern 
Scientific Beliefs (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 23. 
81 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 6. 
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direction of the audience. There is no escaping the literal truth, “God did indeed ordain 
child sacrifice,” Levenson asserts unequivocally.82 
For him, this verse must be resolved at its origin. “The only explanation for this 
that preserves the continuity of YHWH’s will is the one that Ezekiel, in fact, offers: 
YHWH’s command and Israel’s obedience to it were the way of punishment, a means to 
bring about the death of those who had turned away from the means to abundant life,” 
(emphasis added).83 Levenson’s proposal assumes continuity in the Absolute will. This 
seems to be one presuppositional concept that anchors his macro-hermeneutical 
harmonization without altering the plain meaning of the text.  
Divine continuity, however, is not to be confused with uniformity. Levenson 
believes the Passover ritual reveals that YHWH has a darker side to avoid. “The 
Destroyer is YHWH in his aspect of slayer of the first-born son. This is not an aspect of 
the Deity that the biblical tradition is inclined to celebrate, and for obvious reasons. . . . In 
the P theology, Passover is not only the story of YHWH’s victory over Pharaoh. It is also 
the story of YHWH’s victory over himself, and it stands as a continual reminder of just 
how narrow that victory was: but for the blood of the lamb, the Israelites would have 
suffered the same catastrophe as the Egyptians.”84 Levenson accepts both aspects of the 
divine, as a firstborn slayer and a firstborn redeemer to accentuate the crucial partnership 
                                                 
82 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 6. 
83 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 8. 
84 Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 46. 
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between divine and human action that propels Israel’s history forward. Which side of 
God will be revealed, is contingent on human choices. 
Levenson’s macro-hermeneutical theistic principles are (1) continuity in the 
divine will, (2) opposite aspects in the use of divine power, and (3) correlation of human 
and divine actions in history. If these concepts are applied to the Akedah, unity in divine 
will, diversity in divine action, and divine responsiveness in relation to humans become 
the foundational presuppositions for the divine tester in the Akedah. The divine 
intentionality embedded in the test could be fruitfully unpacked through such lenses if the 
cycle of micro-meso-macro-hermeneutical analysis were embarked on again.  
The main interpretive focus of Levenson’s book is in illuminating the meso-
hermeneutical level of the ancient world behind the text and in front of the text through 
the historical period of the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament. Our next theologian, 
Fretheim, is complementary to Levenson for Fretheim focuses on the present needs of the 
modern reader in front of the text and the implications of the text on traditional theistic 
presuppositions above the text. The existential approach of Fretheim brings the personal 
world of the interpreter into the interpretation of the Aqedah.  
Fretheim and the Existential Approach 
Existentialism is not a formal method of interpretation like the historical critical 
method referred to above, but a philosophical mode of accessing the meaning of the text 
by internalizing it in a personal, intensely authoritative manner that penetrates the reader 
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in the present.85 Reading the text becomes a compelling event that confronts and calls on 
the reader to individuate in the present by making an authentic decision. Historically, 
existentialism was a reaction against subject-object dualism, reason as an absolute norm, 
human objectivity, distancing as the necessary stance for understanding, and 
philosophical academics as the arbiters of truth.86 In existentialism, authenticity is the 
norm of truth and commitment is the fruit.87 
Søren Kierkegaard, as a Christian, championed authenticity as an inner subjective 
and individual response that refused to cave into communal norms but anchored the self 
in the infinite call of the Divine.88 He believed Christian authenticity or being “true to 
oneself” was not synonymous with solipsism for the believer acknowledges an absolute 
                                                 
85 Thiselton, New Horizons, 563-565. “Historically, the roots of existential philosophy can be 
traced to the nineteenth-century writings of Soren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky. Central to the work of these figures was an emphasis on the existing individual, and a call for 
consideration of man in its concrete situation, including his culture, history, relations with others, and 
above all, the meaning of personal existence.” David Stewart and Algus Mickunas, Exploring 
Phenomenology: A Guide to the Field and Its Literature (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1990), 63.  
86 “This temper [existential mood] can be described as a reaction against the static, the abstract, the 
purely rational, the merely irrational, in favor of the dynamic and concrete personal involvement and 
‘engagement,’ action, choice and commitment, the distinction between ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ 
existence, and the actual situation of the existential subject as the starting point of thought.” The Worlds of 
Existentialism: A Critical Reader, ed. Maurice Friedman (New York, NY: Random House, 1964), 3-9.  
87 Heidegger explained authenticity as a resolute owning of one’s potential to become uniquely 
itself, recognition of death as inevitable heightens the need to be passionately self-aware in the present.  
“Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility to 
be itself, primarily unsupported by concerned taking care of things, but to be itself in passionate anxious 
freedom toward death which is free of the illusions of the they, factical, and certain of itself.”[sic] Martin 
Heidegger, Being and Time, 245.  
88 Kierkegaard referred to societal norms as the “ethical” or “universal,” and contrasted the mores 
of the crowd vs the inner subjective commitment of the individual. According to Kierkegaard, an authentic 
Christian was one who chose to live in direct, unmediated responsibility to his/her singular God. 
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 83-88. 
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origin and source of meaning outside themselves in God.89 Thus Kierkegaard’s definition 
of authenticity was not rooted in self, but in relation.90 Abraham is silent in the Aqedah 
test because trusting commitment transcends man-made rules and arises from the deepest 
interior of a human being like love, it is an inexplicable gift beyond and above 
rationality.91 Kierkegaard’s final conclusion on the Aqedah is: “So either there is a 
paradox, that the single individual as the particular stands in an absolute relation to the 
absolute, or Abraham is done for.”92 
Terence Fretheim resonates with Kierkegaard in his existential treatment of the 
Aqedah and enlarges it. Fretheim does not limit himself to the authentic response of the 
human being Abraham to the divine test, but also considers God as a subjective being, 
engaged and deeply affected by the Aqedah. Fretheim believes divine authenticity is also 
at stake in this test. Kierkegaard’s line of testing between God and Abraham becomes 
                                                 
89 In contrast to Kierkegaard’s theistic grounding for authenticity, Martin Heidegger, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, and Jean-Paul Sartre chose to accept human finiteness and temporality, freedom to express one’s 
inherent nature, or the freedom to choose, as nontheistic themes for authenticity. Radical human freedom is 
championed by Sartre’s famous assertion, “existence precedes essence.” Sartre states, “What do we mean 
here by ‘existence precedes essence?’ We mean that man first exists: he materializes in the world, 
encounters himself, and only afterwards, defines himself. . . . he will be what he makes of himself.” Jean-
Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism, ed. John Kulka, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2007), 20, 22. 
90 “The paradox can also be put by saying that there is an absolute duty to God; for in this tie of 
obligation the individual relates himself absolutely, as the single individual, to the absolute.” Kierkegaard, 
Fear and Trembling, 98.  
91 “So Abraham’s story contains a teleological suspension of the ethical. He has, as the single 
individual, become higher than the universal. . . . he who walks the narrow path of faith no one can advise, 
no one can understand it. Faith is a marvel, and yet no human being is excluded from it; for that in which 
all human life is united is passion, and faith is a passion.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 95.  
92 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 144. 
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triangulated by Fretheim in a sense, suspending both covenant participants as objects of 
the same test. “The test no longer involves simply Abraham’s trust in God, it has become 
a test of God’s faithfulness in providing.”93 The reader is drawn centripetally into the plot, 
captured by the existential dilemmas brought up by Fretheim’s exploration.  
Biography of Terence Fretheim 
Terence Fretheim is an emeritus professor at Luther Seminary in St. Paul, 
Minnesota. His previous roles at Luther Seminary included dean of academic affairs 
(1978-1988), chair of Old Testament Department (1977-1978), chair of curriculum 
committee (1976-1977), Professor of Old Testament since 1978, Assistant professor of 
Old Testament (1968-1978), and teaching fellow in Greek (1958-1960). He has also 
taught Old Testament at Augsburg College and Seminary (1961-1963) and at Princeton 
Theological Seminary (1966-1967). 
Fretheim is a recipient of the Fulbright Scholarship, the Lutheran Brotherhood 
Seminary Graduate Scholarship, the Martin Luther Scholarship, the Fredrik A. Schiotz 
Fellowship Award, and the ATS Scholarship for Theological Research. He obtained his 
M.Div. from Luther Seminary (1960) and his Th.D. is from Princeton Seminary (1967). 
Among his numerous publications are The Pentateuch (Abdingdon, 1996); Proclamation 
(Fortress, 1997); The Bible as Word of God in a Postmodern Era (Fortress, 1998, with K. 
Froehlich); In God’s Image: A Study of Genesis (Augsburg, 1999); A Theological 
                                                 
93 Fretheim, Abraham, 133. 
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Introduction to the Old Testament (Abingdon, 1999); Abraham: Journeys of Family and 
Faith (University of South Carolina Press, 2007). 
As an author, Fretheim writes for the reader. They are to be challenged, invited 
and intrigued by the dialogical questions that Fretheim draws from the biblical text. This 
existential approach makes his work engaging and provocative. The image of God that 
Fretheim believes is supported by the Hebrew Bible is existential in that God voluntarily 
opens himself to risk, limits his omnipowers in order to share power with his creation and 
engages in authentic relationships that require self-limitation and being affected by the 
free choices of his creatures.94 In short, “God makes God’s self vulnerable.”95 This divine 
self-limitation, the voluntary sacrifice of one’s omnipowers for authentic interaction with 
his creatures is one of the keys to Fretheim’s interpretation of the Aqedah. 
Fretheim’s Interpretation of the Aqedah 
Fretheim’s interpretation of the Aqedah nests within the larger themes of the 
universal creator who wants to bless the whole world and God’s promissory role of love 
and faithfulness toward the inhabitants of the earth through Abraham’s family line. The 
                                                 
94 “Moreover, any relationship of integrity will entail a sharing of power. Each party to the 
relationship must give up any monopoly on power for the sake of the relationship. Neither party to the 
relationship can be overwhelmed for the relationship to be a true one. For the sake of the relationship, God 
gives up the exercise of some power. This will in turn qualify any talk about divine control or divine 
sovereignty. Total control of the other in a relationship is no relationship of any integrity.” Terence 
Fretheim, The Suffering of God: An Old Testament Perspective, Overtures to Biblical Theology 
(Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1984), 37. 
95 Terence Fretheim, Creation Untamed: The Bible, God and Natural Disasters (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker Academic, 2010), 133, 58, 29; Terence Fretheim, God and the World in the Old Testament: A 
Relational Theology of Creation (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Publishing, 2005), 269-284.  
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patriarchal narratives (Gen 12-50) are connected to primeval texts (Gen 1-11) by the 
“fulcrum text” of 12:1-3 which holds both the blessed “universal frame of reference” and 
the promise of greatness.96 But God doesn’t restrict his blessings to one family. 
God’s continuing independent activity on and for others outside the elect family 
in the promised land is amply represented by the stories of Melchizedek, Hagar and 
Abimelech. It is unmistakably clear that these and other characters who are “unchosen” 
have “experienced God, even if they have not realized that it was God.”97 At the same 
time, by working with Abraham’s finite and imperfect family line, God “reveals a deep 
vulnerability, for it links God with people whose reputations are not stellar and opens 
God’s ways in the world to sharp criticism.”98 
One event open to moral criticism is the final test of Abraham. Fretheim is quick 
to make a distinction between morality and religion in this test. He writes, “It is striking 
that God’s testing of Abraham (Genesis 22) does not entail a moral issue; rather, a 
specifically religious issue of trust is raised. Indeed, it may be claimed (at least in modern 
                                                 
96 Fretheim, Abraham, 5. 
97 Fretheim, Abraham, 6. 
98 Fretheim, Abraham, 13. 
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terms) that God calls upon Abraham to violate a certain ‘moral value’ to demonstrate a 
religious value.”99 
According to Fretheim, the religious value of the test is to measure Abraham’s 
faithfulness (Genesis 22:15-19) after he has received the fulfillment of the promise of 
progeny. Thus “the test is focused precisely on the point of fulfillment, namely, Isaac.”100 
Had Abraham not shown continuing faithfulness, “God’s promises and purposes for the 
world would not finally be stymied by Abraham’s resistance” but Abraham’s resistance 
would have cut himself out of the blessing of participation in God’s plan.101 
Abraham’s demonstrated obedience during the test becomes incorporated into the 
promise as a motivating factor for God’s unprecedented swearing of the covenant “by the 
divine self,” an action prefigured in Genesis 15 where God enacted a “self-binding ritual” 
on the covenant.102 Fretheim ties it all together by explaining “the promise takes shape in 
the actual lives of people, whose own words and deeds are centrally involved in its 
transmission. . . . The continuing transmission of the promise is placed in the hands of 
                                                 
99 Fretheim, Abraham, 13.  
100 Fretheim, Abraham, 139.  
101 Fretheim, Abraham, 139.  
102 Fretheim, Abraham, 138. 
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those who are faithful, and the importance of their witness ought not to be discounted.”103 
God and man are linked by a faith-filled relationship with tangible consequences. 
Analysis of Fretheim’s Hermeneutics 
Micro-Hermeneutic 
Fretheim’s close reading of the Aqedah starts by acknowledging the shift of 
scholarly interest from the text’s historical-critical composition to issues of literary 
criticism. He acknowledges, “Genesis consists of traditions from various historical 
periods, but little consensus exists regarding the way in which they were brought together 
in their present form.”104 In regard to the Abrahamic stories, “P is often understood to be 
the redactor of the Abrahamic cycle, drawing upon JE and other materials and putting 
them together essentially as we now have them. ”105 But now, “new strategies focus on 
issues of literary criticism rather than literary history.”106  
Literary criticism turns on “matters such as language and style, surface and deep 
structures of the text, rhetorical devices, narratological features such as repetition, irony, 
plot, depiction of characters, and especially point of view (of the narrator and the 
characters). These newer literary approaches have contributed significantly to our 
                                                 
103 Fretheim, Abraham, 136.  
104 Fretheim, Abraham, 19 
105 Fretheim, Abraham, 20. 
106 Fretheim, Abraham, 20 
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understanding of these texts.”107 Fretheim’s literary comments of the world in the text pair 
textual details with exegetical discussions of their significance in brief readable sections, 
for example, the phrase after these things elicits a quick review of the previous nature of 
the relationship between God and Abraham in order to set up a discussion of why God 
felt it necessary to test Abraham.108 Other literary details discussed are the five sets of 
phrases repeated in the pericope,109 the structural center of the story being Abraham’s 
response of “Here I am, my son” to Isaac’s call,110 and the noted silence of the narrator in 
regard to Abraham and Isaac’s inner motives. Regarding the absence of psychological 
and emotive details, Fretheim advises, “given the utter lack of interest in the motives of 
Abraham on the part of the narrator, readers should accept the force of his statements 
unless and until the narrative gives a clue to the contrary.”111 
Narrative dissonances are also explored, such as the haunting aftermath of the test 
where “the return of Isaac with his father is not reported in verse 19 (though Abraham 
                                                 
107 Fretheim, Abraham, 20.  
108 They are (1) parallels between the initial call and present test command, (2) the ups and downs 
of their relational journey together, exhibiting both deep faith and mistrust, (3) the parallels and contrasts 
with the banishment of Ishmael that precedes this test. Fretheim, Abraham, 127-128. 
109 The phrases are: (1) “the mountain I will show you” (Gen 22:2: cf.12:1), (2) “Your son, your 
only son” (vv. 2, 12, 16), (3) “seeing” (“lifts up his eyes” vv. 4, 13, ra’ah vv. 4, 8, 13, 14), (4) “Here I am” 
(vv. 1, 7, 11); (5) “The two of them walked on together” (vv. 5,8), Fretheim, Abraham, 129-130. 
110 Fretheim, Abraham, 130. Fretheim describes Abraham’s response to Isaac’s question this way: 
“Abraham’s response to Isaac does not tell him everything (what God has commanded)—in any case, he 
does not know everything. But he does answer Isaac’s question directly and conveys what he believes is the 
truth about Isaac’s future: God will provide.” Fretheim, Abraham, 131. 
111 Fretheim, Abraham, 131. 
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had so assured his servants in verse 5).”112 Fretheim’s exegetical discussions set the 
groundwork for the theology on the next level of meso-hermeneutics where he examines 
the narrative from the point of view of the narrator, Abraham, God, and the imagined 
reader.113  
Meso-Hermeneutic 
Since the text functions as a biblical window into past religious practices on the 
meso-hermeneutical level, Fretheim calls attention to the fact that the family-life context 
of the Abrahamic stories is notable for the absence of religious institutions (central 
temple, dietary regulations, priesthood, Sabbath) that were so important to later Israel. 
Abraham’s world of meaning behind the text is a pre-cultic world.  
The Genesis texts exhibit no concern whatsoever that Abraham, the founder of 
Israelite faith, is so nonobservant regarding such practices. . . . his worshipful activity 
presupposes practices in place before his call. His journey through the land seems not 
to be associated with the founding of sanctuaries, but, rather, building altars at known 
sacred places (without personnel or buildings), marked by trees (12:6-7; 13:18; 21:33; 
cf. 35:4—Moreh is probably a well-known site), pillars or stones (28:18, 22). The 
later association of these natural markers with idolatry (cf. Exod. 23:24; 34:13; Deut. 
12:2; 16:21) is not evident in these texts.114 
It is in this context that Fretheim revisits Levenson’s reference to Isaac as a “burnt 
offering,” the ram as a “substitute” sacrifice, and the test as a first-born son offering 
                                                 
112 Fretheim, Abraham, 132. 
113 Fretheim, Abraham, 132-139. 
114 Fretheim, Abraham, 27. 
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“within the context of the sacrificial system.”115 Levenson had argued, “‘in the biblical 
text, sacrifice is not deemed unethical or irrational’ and so it requires no more an act of 
faith to adhere to such demands than to ethical demands.”116 While Fretheim concurs that 
within the historical context of Abraham his intent to sacrifice Isaac may not have been 
unusual, Fretheim insists present evaluative judgments still ought to be made on 
patriarchal practices.117 Fretheim understands other compassionate minded interpreters 
may be tempted to turn this “story of sheer horror”118 into a spiritual metaphor in order to 
evade such judgments,119 but he feels those attempts end up trivializing the experience of 
the sacrificial victim. He asks, “Whatever Abraham’s (and God’s) intent, is it not likely 
that Isaac was traumatized by the threat of imminent and violent death at the hands of his 
                                                 
115 Fretheim, Abraham, 124. 
116 Fretheim, Abraham, 125. Levenson is adamant that Abraham is not an unethical child abuser 
and believes “it is a symptom of acute myopia and mind-numbing parochialism to think that this must also 
have been the case in a society that practiced sacrifice (even, on occasion and for a while, child sacrifice) 
and did not confuse it with murder.” Jon Levenson, “Abusing Abraham: Traditions, Religious Histories, 
and Modern Misinterpretations,” Judaism 43, no. 3 (Summer 1998), 271.  
117 Fretheim, Abraham, 125. 
118 Fretheim, Abraham, 127. 
119 He cites Levenson and Moberly’s metaphorical understandings: the sacrificial death is 
symbolic for the son returns alive and this is a metaphor for Israel who is the one to make the sacrifice (as 
Abraham) and to be the sacrifice (as Isaac). Fretheim, Abraham, 126. 
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father?”120 In conclusion, “The text does not finally enable one to sit comfortably with the 
obvious abuse that Isaac undergoes,”121 the plight of the son must not be overlooked. 
Fretheim reminds readers that testing is not new to the patriarch Abraham. The 
Aqedah is not an isolated event but instead, a window itself that reveals Abraham life has 
been all along a series of challenges. Fretheim holds up testing as a common facet of all 
significant relationships:  
Testing must be understood relationally rather than legalistically; it is characteristic of 
all relationships of consequence. . . .What constitutes testing in one situation or 
another will be determined by the nature of the relationship and the expectations the 
parties have for it. As a relationship matures and trust levels are built up, faithful 
responses to the testing of the relational bond will tend to become second nature. And 
yet, there may be moments, even in a mature relationship, where sharp, even absurd 
moments of testing present themselves. This may be the kind of moment with which 
Abraham is faced.122 
 
Notice how the reader is invited to appropriate the Aqedah by acknowledging that 
testing is a common thread of relationships in everyone’s life, this is existential 
application at its best. Fretheim then addresses the reader in front of the text who has now 
identified with Abraham, “Abraham, and the readers, might learn from such experiences 
that receiving promises from God does not entail being protected from times where those 
                                                 
120 Fretheim, Abraham, 126.  
121 Fretheim, Abraham, 132; Because this issue remains pertinent to modern day concerns, it 
affects the reading of this text by contemporary audiences. “Is God (and by virtue of his response, 
Abraham) guilty of child abuse in this text? There is no escaping the question, and it raises the issue as to 
the continuing value of this text.” Fretheim, “God, Abraham and the Abuse of Isaac,” 49.  
122 Fretheim, Abraham, 132.  
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promises are called into question. Will God be trusted in such moments?”123 In this way 
the reader is invited to make an existential commitment in the present, to enter the mode-
of-being that the text projects for its audience.  
Macro-Hermeneutic 
On the macro hermeneutical level, Fretheim probes the divine Tester’s motive 
above the text for testing Abraham. As he sees it, the Aqedah is to satisfy a vital question 
God has,124 “The question for God is: Is Abraham the faithful one who can in fact carry 
that purpose along? Or does God need to take some other course of action, perhaps even 
look for someone who would be more faithful? The faithfulness of Abraham is not an 
option for God and for God’s purposes in the world.”125  
Understandably, this view of divine knowledge contrasts with the traditional view 
of omniscience never needing to question or test.126 But Fretheim’s close reading of the 
text of the Aqedah has led him to conclude, “The only one said to learn anything from the 
test is God. The climactic verse 12 states this clearly: ‘Now I know.’ . . . The issue here is 
                                                 
123 Fretheim, Abraham, 132-133. 
124 Here, Fretheim takes the test as a way to fill what is missing in divine knowledge. The test is 
like a final entrance exam to go to the next level of increased responsibility.  
125 Fretheim, Abraham, 136. 
126 Fretheim recognizes that “The normally unexamined assumption is that all such divine 
questions are rhetorical, asked by God for effect in one situation or another, and not ‘real’ questions 
seeking to elicit an answer. . . . Yet, as we have seen, metaphoric language must have some reasonable 
relationship to reality. . . . by the questions, God indicates that the divine moves into a future which is as 
yet unknown; there can be no certainty in respect to what will happen as God pursues this new direction. 
The clear implication is that the future will bring new knowledge for God, as well as for the people; this 
will affect what God says and does.” Fretheim, The Suffering of God, 45-59. 
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not what God teaches Abraham, but what God learns about Abraham.”127 Fretheim does 
not relegate this phrase to anthropomorphism and cites other scholars who have arrived at 
the same conclusion. Fretheim quotes Brueggemann who writes that the Aqedah “is not a 
game with God; God genuinely does not know. The flow of the narrative accomplishes 
something in the awareness of God. He did not know. Now he knows.”128 Crenshaw is 
also quoted: “The fundamental assumption lying behind divine testing is that God lacks a 
certain kind of knowledge, that is precisely how men and women will act in trying 
circumstances. Of course, such ignorance arises from human freedom, which is itself a 
gift from the transcendent one. Therefore, the divine act of self-limitation has created the 
necessity for such testing.”129 Fretheim presses the point home by considering the moral 
implications of the alternative, “If God knew absolutely or precisely how Abraham would 
respond to the test, then God was just playing with Abraham.”130 
For Fretheim the text reveals a God above the text, who is omniscient and 
omnipotent but may voluntarily self-limit his omni-powers and his absolute freedom, for 
the sake of genuinely relating to others with whom he graciously shares power, 
knowledge and freedom.131 This is especially true for those in the covenant for He intends 
                                                 
127 Fretheim, Abraham, 136. 
128 Fretheim, Abraham, 136; Walter Brueggemann, Genesis, Interpretation: A Bible Commentary 
for Teaching and Preaching (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2010), 187. 
129 Fretheim, Abraham, 136; James Crenshaw, A Whirlpool of Torment (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1984), 2. 
130 Fretheim, Abraham, 136. “God is not so in control of the situation that it ceases to be a test,” 
139.  
131 “As in any relationship of integrity, God will have to give up some things for the sake of the 
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to be faithful to it. In the Aqedah when Abraham puts his complete trust in divine 
providence “it puts God on the spot. The test of Abraham has now become a test for 
God.”132 The agency of Abraham who has the power through his choices to affect God 
reveals the anthropological presuppositions below the text regarding creation.  
What started out as a test of Abraham’s obedience has now expanded into a test of 
God’s providence.133 The conclusion of the test is the testimony that both parties were 
found faithful, not just the human participants. It is clear “God has passed the test; God 
has responded to Abraham’s trust and kept the divine commitment to Abraham. May the 
praise be also due to what God has put the divine self through? For the sake of the future 
of the divine purposes, God has had to pass though this valley of endangered 
promises.”134  
In brief, Fretheim’s macro-hermeneutical principles include the conviction that 
divine omnipotence and omniscience are self-limited for authentic relationships to His 
creation and in timely response to his creature’s choices, God knowledge changes—the 
                                                 
relationship. Thus, God will have to give up some freedom. Any commitment or promise within a 
relationship entails a limitation of freedom. By such actions, God has decisively limited the options God 
has for speaking and acting. God has exercised divine freedom in the making of such promises in the first 
place. But in having freely made such promises, thereafter God’s freedom is truly limited by those 
promises.” Fretheim, The Suffering of God, 36. 
132 Fretheim, Abraham, 134. 
133 Fretheim goes on to speculate, “If God does not provide, and Isaac is sacrificed, then 
Abraham’s trust that God will provide is placed in severe jeopardy. Such an eventuality would constitute 
another kind of test for Abraham, a test at a much deeper level than the one that initiated this journey.” 
Fretheim, Abraham, 134.  
134 Fretheim, Abraham, 137.  
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future has changed. The last word in the test of the Aqedah is not human, but reveals a 
deeper divine existential commitment: “God swears by the divine self for the first time in 
the narrative, though it recalls the self-binding ritual of God in Genesis 15.”135 Fretheim 
makes it clear that “human activity can shape the future, though it cannot finally stymie 
God’s purposes.”136 
Summary 
Levenson’s and Fretheim’s interpretive works on the Aqedah are brilliant and 
insightful. On the micro-hermeneutical level both acknowledge historical-critical points 
but focus their exegetical skill on the literary critique of the text in final form. The 
meaning in the text’s linguistic details are highlighted, though some minor exegetical 
disagreements over nuance, scope of meaning, and significance are settled in a 
fragmentary manner.  
At the meso-hermeneutical level a predictable divergence stemming from their 
interpretive methodology is revealed. Levenson’s socio-historical-critical skills 
masterfully excavate the world behind the text to trace the eventual historical sublimation 
of the persistent child sacrifice motif as first fruit offering in front of the text for 
Christians on the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. Fretheim’s existential approach pulls the 
contemporary reader in front of the text into identifying with the real-life dilemmas and 
challenges of the characters in the Aqedah. Thus, Levenson attempts to normalize the 
                                                 
135 Fretheim, Abraham, 138.  
136 Fretheim, Abraham, 140. 
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Aqedah by placing it in an early cultic setting which is familiar with child sacrifice as 
first fruit donations; Fretheim’s interpretation of the Aqedah remains disturbing for the 
abuse of Isaac and the use of divine testing as necessary to inform God on whether man 
can be trusted.  
The implied macro-hermeneutical tenets of Levenson were (1) continuity in the 
divine will, (2) opposite aspects of the use of divine power, (3) correlation of human and 
divine actions in human history. Fretheim’s tenets were (1) self-limitation of divine 
omniscience and omnipotence for authentic relationship, (2) correlation of human and 
divine actions in shaping a future, but (3) divine purposes cannot be thwarted. Both 
focused on theocentric meanings above the text while recognizing the same tenet for 
anthropological meaning below the text—that of human agency impacting God. 
Conclusion 
The filter of micro, meso, and macro-hermeneutical levels assists in critically 
comparing Levenson’s and Fretheim’s interpretive studies of the Aqedah because it 
differentiates between their exegetical, theological and philosophical findings.137 As we 
have seen, most scholars and commentators intermingle hermeneutical levels together as 
they progress through the text verse by verse. This method of arguing on multiple levels 
while inching forward inevitably supports the interpreter’s biases because it allows the 
interpreter to emphasize and trace preferred conceptual threads vertically through 
                                                 
137 This fulfills one goal of hermeneutics which is to find a fair and effective method of comparing 
interpretations.  
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multiple hermeneutic levels, buttressing favored viewpoints with depth. Interpreters may 
dismiss opposing viewpoints as less grounded138 and gloss over textual ambiguity in order 
to convince the reader to their own stance.139 Thus, the vertical model of interpretation 
forces the reader to read through multiple works of interpretation to gain exposure to the 
wider range of meanings in the text.  
If the text is unpacked through the micro-meso-macro hermeneutical levels one 
level at a time, this allows (1) the richness and nuances of the whole text to be heard at 
each level, possibly offsetting the agenda of any one interpreter,140 (2) the whole text to 
steer the study by allocating appropriate weight to its constituent parts through a careful 
analysis of the text’s inherent literary structure, (3) the whole text to norm the conclusions 
at each hermeneutical level by the criteria of internal coherence and (4) the reader to be 
able to critique a proposed hypothesis from the conclusions of the other hermeneutical 
level of analysis. This is not advocating for a flat horizontal model141 but a graduating 
                                                 
138 Interpreters commonly argue for their own viewpoint against others, amassing their case for a 
reductive singular conclusion. In hermeneutics, a different approach is recommended. Bridge-building 
between opposing points of view leads to understanding the underlying motives and journeys they 
represent. This is an important facet of hermeneutics as the science of understanding. This doesn’t require 
adopting or relinquishing one’s own stance, thought it may lead to that, it means deeper understanding of 
the reasons why other viewpoints exist is a worthwhile goal. Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 6.  
139 Ambiguity in the text may even be theologically purposeful. Alter specifically mentions two 
characteristics of purposeful ambiguity in narratives—when the text exhibits selective reticence or a sudden 
breaking off of dialogue. Both of these are found in the Aqedah. Why would ambiguity be purposeful? It 
may be that “these ancient writers, like later ones, wanted to fashion a literary form that might embrace the 
abiding complexity of their subjects.” Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, 153-154.  
140 The whole text as used here refers to the broad, not the exhaustive aspect of the text.  
141 A purely horizontal model is impossible for the micro-meso-macro hermeneutical levels are 
inherently interdependent and can only be isolated by willful blindness to the inescapable existence of the 
other levels. 
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spiral model that works through the whole text on each hermeneutical level, building on 
the findings of each level as it continues with anticipation of possible meanings going 
forward with reflection on past understandings already encountered.142 
In addition to each hermeneutical level, as we have seen in our analysis of 
Levenson’s and Fretheim’s interpretations of the Aqedah, the perceived worlds of 
meaning in, behind, in front of, above and below the text are used to fill in perceived gaps 
of the text.143 This happens intuitively in constructing human understanding but 
recognizing these implicit processes and clarifying them is a worthy hermeneutical goal. 
A schematic attempt to combine the three hermeneutical levels of micro-meso-macro 
hermeneutics to the five worlds of meaning in-behind-in front of-above-below the text 
and norm the process by the biblical text will be proposed in the following chapter.  
                                                 
142 This is how human speech also works. The speaker and listener both anticipate a cloud of 
potential direction for future meaning and follow the path of spoken vocabulary through it while 
continually integrating the next word with already spoken words in order to construct full understanding. If 
confusion or ambiguity is encountered, careful re-tracing of the hermeneutical path already traversed (the 
previous loops) is usually the first step undertaken. 
143 For instance, we recognize that Isaac’s question regarding the whereabouts of the lamb implies 
that he was familiar with animal sacrifices and had not been informed by Abraham that this pending 
sacrifice was to be any different. This meaning is from the world of the narrative in the text because it is 
conveyed as a trusting question from son to father.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
A MODEL AND A MICRO-HERMENEUTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
FOR THE AQEDAH TEST 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter the initial outline of a hermeneutic model will be proposed that 
incorporates the text as the norming long axis for the three hermeneutical levels and the 
five worlds of meaning. This model will be tested by practical application to the Aqedah 
at the micro-hermeneutical level through the historical-grammatical-literary method. The 
findings will then be summarized and evaluated for faithfulness to the text, hermeneutic 
breadth and depth, and possible new insights. 
A Model Hermeneutic 
The model of a hermeneutical circle conveys the recognition that the 
interpretation of a text requires both inductive and deductive reasoning on how the parts 
relate to the whole.1 This means that understanding is enhanced when a text is analyzed 
                                                 
1 Understanding speech as parts related to the whole was first attributed to Socrates: “Every 
speech must be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own; it must be neither without head 
nor without legs; and it must have a middle and extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the 
whole work.” Plato, Phaedrus, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr., (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 
264. Heinrich Bullinger was one of the first to grasp the hermeneutical circle concept by suggesting the 
details of a written text were better understood if the reader first grasped where the argument was leading. 
Anthony Thiselton, New Horizons, 194-195. Inductive and deductive reasoning in theology is discussed by 
Grant Osborne in The Hermeneutical Spiral, 385-386. 
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(1) in relation to its literary context,2 (2) in relation to the pre-conceptions of the reader 
from outside the text,3 (3) in relation to the reader’s existential world,4 (4) in relation to 
the historical consciousness of the reader,5 and (5) in relation to the reader’s projected 
hypothesis for understanding.6 Since the temporality of the interpreter (points 2, 3, 4 & 5) 
is assumed in the process of understanding, the model of a hermeneutical circle is better 
                                                 
2 James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2004), 
139; George W. Reid, ed., Understanding Scripture: An Adventist Approach, Biblical Research Institute 
Studies, vol. 1 (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 2005), 117-118; Osborne, 
The Hermeneutical Spiral, 94; Benedictus de Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 86-104.  
3 Chladenius recognized a variety of viewpoints (Sehe-Punkt) was inevitably brought by 
interpreters themselves: “Different people perceive that which happens in the world differently. . . . It is 
generally accepted that there can be only one correct representation for each object and that if there are 
some differences in description, then one must be completely right and the other completely wrong. This 
principle is not in accordance with other general truths or with the more exact perceptions of our soul.” 
Johann Martin Chladenius, “Introduction to the Correct Interpretation of Reasonable Discourses and 
Writings,” in The Hermeneutics Reader, ed. Kurth Mueller-Vollmer (New York, NY: Continuum, 1990), 
65. Schleiermacher found that some pre-understanding was necessary for true understanding, for 
understanding “presupposes a familiarity with both the contents and the language of the text. Assuming 
such familiarity, difficulties with particular passages of a text arise only because the easier ones have not 
been understood.” Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher from “Compendium of 1819” in The Hermeneutics 
Reader, 73. 
4 Heidegger saw hermeneutics as the larger disclosure of the existential reality of Being-in-the-
World: “In every understanding of the world, existence is understood with it, and vice versa.” Martin 
Heidegger, Being and Time, 142. 
5 Gadamer defined historical consciousness to be the self-awareness of our historical situation and 
traditions. This recognition of pre-existing prejudices, biases, and desires comprises one’s “horizon.” This 
horizon is the “range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point.” 
Only when our horizons “fuse” with the horizons (historical traditions) of the text, does true understanding 
occur. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Historicity of Understanding” in The Hermeneutics Reader, 266-273. 
6 The projection of a possibility is the imaginary scaffold that understanding can be built upon: 
“Meaning, structured by fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception, is the upon which of the project in 
terms of which something becomes intelligible as something.” Heidegger, Being and Time, 142. 
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depicted as a three dimensional hermeneutical spiral indicating a progression through 
time.7  
This study suggests adapting the hermeneutical spiral model for biblical study by 
incorporating four sets of hermeneutical concepts, namely, the biblical text as the norm, 
three hermeneutical levels of micro-meso-macro, Christian principles of Scripture as the 
basis for faith and belief,8 and five worlds of meaning. But first, the geometric depiction 
of what a spiral is, must be clarified. The term spiral in the English language can refer to 
two different geometric configurations: (a) a curve in a two-dimensional plane winding 
away from a central point with expanding radius (i.e. a spiral galaxy), and (b) a three-
                                                 
7 Strasser was the first to suggest the hermeneutical circle should be visualized as a spiral.  Trying 
to synthesize three images of progress and synthesis (Heidegger’s hermeneutical circle, Dilthey’s “flight of 
steps”, and de Boer’s “ladder”) Strasser described what he called “the spiral of understanding” as 
analogous to a “spiraling flight of stairs.” Stephan Strasser, Understanding and Explanation: Basic Ideas 
Concerning the Humanity of the Human Sciences (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 32-
33. 
8 From the Protestant Reformation, biblical principles of sola-tota-prima Scriptura will be 
referenced as they are incorporated into the hermeneutical model. See footnotes 12, 21, and 22 in this 
chapter.  
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dimensional helix with a constant (cylindrical) or variable (conical) radius to its central 
axis. 
 
   a.                                     b.                                    c.                                       
 
Figure 3.1 Three geometric spirals. a. A two-dimensional spiral with an expanding radius. 
b. A three-dimensional spiral with a constant radius. c. A three-dimensional spiral with a 
variable radius. 
 
For instance, Grant Osborne’s hermeneutical spiral model9 is described as a three-
dimensional cone that reaches “from its [Scripture’s] original meaning to its 
contextualization or significance for the church today” with ever-widening curves.10 This 
depicts a process of contextualization that moves away with increasing distance from its 
textual base of Scripture which implies lessening authority and fidelity in meaning.11 The 
                                                 
9 Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral, 25-26.  
10 Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral, 22.  
11 In other words, as Osborne observes, it moves both vertically and horizontally “from the text to 
context [the context of the receiver].” He has three hermeneutical levels: Level one—what it meant 
(exegesis), Level two-what it means for me (devotional), Level three--how to share with you what it means 
to me (sermonic). Osborne recognized the problem of increasing distance from scriptural authority in the 
process. Thus, he urges preachers to “wed our application as closely as possible to our interpretation and to 
make certain that our interpretation coheres with the thrust of the text.” Osborne’s proposed solution is 
closer proximity of the spirals to each other. Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral, 22-23, 26, 417-419.   
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alternative model proposed by this study incorporates the biblical text as the controlling 
long axis within the hermeneutical spiral, aligning all the loops in constant radius to it. 
With the biblical text as the norming long axis of this model, biblical authority as 
expressed by the Principle of Sola Scriptura12 need not diminish over time or with 
progression through the loops. As this is the most important aspect of the hermeneutical 
spiral model for theology, the model will be referred to as the Axial Model from now on. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Biblical text as long axis (Z) of Axial Model = Sola Scriptura. 
 
Delineation of the hermeneutical loops is needed. For disciplined theological 
study and to help compare interpretive methods, the coils of the hermeneutical spiral 
                                                 
12 Principle of Sola Scriptura: “(1) Scripture is the uniquely infallible source of divine revelation 
that is available to contemporary humans collectively; (2) Scripture alone provides a sufficient and fully 
trustworthy basis of theology; and (3) Scripture is the uniquely authoritative and final norm of theological 
interpretation that norms all others.” John C. Peckham, Canonical Theology: The Biblical Canon, Sola 
Scriptura, and Theological Method (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2016), 141. 
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which represent subsequent steps in exposition require a simple yet comprehensive 
scheme to grasp the full meaning of the text. Fernando Canale’s set of three 
hermeneutical levels is both comprehensive and elegantly simple for biblical scholars. 
They are: 
A. Micro-hermeneutics (biblical/textual principles of interpretation) 
B. Meso-hermeneutics (theological/doctrinal principles of interpretation) 
C. Macro-hermeneutics (the most inclusive ontological, epistemological, and 
      articulation principles of interpretation).13  
 
Biblical fidelity requires all three levels to be normed by the biblical text, and not 
by imported secular paradigms.14 A cylindrical hermeneutical spiral which orders all the 
                                                 
13 Fernando Canale, “Evolution, Theology, and Method,” 21. 
14 Fernando Canale, “A Biblical Epistemology for Adventist Scholarship,” 15. 
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methodological coils to the long axis of the biblical text within a constant radius, fulfills 
that need for all three levels of hermeneutics. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Three hermeneutical levels of the Axial Model: Micro-Hermeneutics—Sola 
Scriptura, Meso-Hermeneutics—Tota Scriptura, and Macro-Hermeneutics—Prima 
Scriptura. 
 
Where are the worlds of meaning in the Axial Model? The recognition that a text 
carries and channels worlds of meaning is incorporated into this model as filling the 
space between the spirals in the hermeneutical model.15 In literary analysis the phrase 
                                                 
15 “Every word causes the whole of the language to which it belongs to resonate and the whole 
world-view that underlies it to appear. Thus, every word, as the event of the moment, carries with it the 
unsaid, to which it is related by responding and summoning.” Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 
474.  
 71 
 
“behind the text” refers to the world that produced the text, including the social, 
historical, linguistic, religious world of the author and the author’s reason and purpose for 
the text.16 In a narrative, the world “in the text” refers to the configured world of the plot, 
which includes the characters, actions, space, time and relations between them.17 The 
world in “front of the text” indicates the viewpoint of the text, in other words, the “mode 
of being-in-the-world” that the text invites the reader to appropriate as their own.18 The 
world “above the text” in biblical studies refers to theocentric theology or metaphysical 
assumptions about ultimate reality.19 The world “below the text” refers to the fundamental 
nature of the cosmos, and in particular—the human self as the intended recipient of the 
text.20  
All five worlds of meaning emanate from the text (see Figure 3.4 below) and can 
be related to the principles of biblical interpretation. The Z axis which intersects the other 
                                                 
16 Anthony Thiselton, Thiselton on Hermeneutics, 607-624. 
17 Aristotle’s concept of emplotment in Poetics referred to a creative re-presentation of life-like 
temporal experiences in a coherent fashion. It usually had three main parts, a beginning, a middle and an 
end. Paul Ricouer, Time and Narrative, 34. 
18 Paul Ricoeur saw meaning as possibilities for a way of being that unfolds in front of the text as 
grasped by the reader; “the essential question is not to recover, behind the text, the lost intention, but to 
unfold, in front of the text, the ‘world’ which it opens up and discloses.” Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and 
the Human Sciences: Essays on Action, Language and Interpretation, ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 111. 
19 God is understood by theists as the original source, ultimate Author, guarantor of meaning, and 
final illuminator of the Bible as revelation. Reading the biblical text is understood as being addressed by 
God and requires “obedient attention to God’s address through his Word.” Craig G. Bartholomew, 
Introducing Biblical Hermeneutics: A Comprehensive Framework for Hearing God in Scripture (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2015), 12. Non-theists’ presuppositions about ultimate reality will also affect 
their study of the Bible (i.e., as literary reflections of a human community on history, symbolic metaphors 
for existential meaning, or religious illusions of reality). 
20 Anthropological presuppositions factor into every reading of historical narrative. From 
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axes as their origin and source, is the anchoring text which norms the whole Axial Model 
using the Principle of Sola Scriptura through exegesis. The worlds of meaning behind and 
in front of the text are oriented along the X axis to the left and right side of the central 
origin chronologically and include the canon to represent the Principle of Tota Scriptura21 
that provides the theological framework for the meso-hermeneutical level of theology. 
The worlds of meaning above and below the text are oriented vertically along the Y axis 
above and below the origin; they refer to biblical metaphysical foundations which are 
accepted through the Principle of Prima Scriptura22 for unfolding the macro-
hermeneutical level of philosophy. All five worlds of meaning (in the text, behind and in 
front of the text, above and below the text) are present and function on every level (micro-
meso-macro) of the Axial Model yet the target focus of each hermeneutical level23 will be 
on illuminating one of the three axes. 
                                                 
Augustine’s rational mortal animal to Martin Heidegger’s Dasein, from Max Scheler’s loving being to 
Ernst Cassirer’s symbolic animal, the understanding of self that a reader holds gets projected onto the 
human characters of the text as a lens. John Berry, “What Makes Us Human? Augustine on Interiority, 
Exteriority, and the Self,” Scientia et Fides 5, no. 2 (2007), 95; Heidegger, Being and Time, 39-48 (42-52); 
Max Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, trans. Bernard Noble (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1960), 
74; Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1944), 24. 
21 The Principle of Tota Scriptura “holds that all of Scripture together functions as the infallible 
source of revelation, sufficient basis of theology, and authoritative and final norm of theological 
interpretation (2 Tim 3:16; cf. Matt 4:4).” Peckham, Canonical Theology, 141 
22 The Principle of Prima Scriptura recognizes that “although Scripture is the uniquely infallible 
source of revelation that is collectively available, it is not the only source of revelation . . . Scripture itself 
recognizes general revelation (Rom 1:18-23), extracanonical prophecy (Acts 2:17; 1 Cor 14:29), and the 
apostolic tradition of the first generation (2 Thess 3:6) . . . whereas the Trinity is the source of all legitimate 
revelation, the canon of Scripture is the uniquely infallible medium of revelation collectively available 
today is thus the prime revelation by which any other purported source of theological data must be judged.” 
Peckham, Canonical Theology, 142-143. 
23 In other words, the micro-hermeneutical level of exegesis focuses on the biblical world of 
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meaning in the text that emanates from the Z-axis (Sola Scriptura), the meso-hermeneutical level of 
theology focuses on the biblical world of meaning behind and in front of the text, the canon and world 
history, that comprises the X-axis (Tota Scriptura), and the macro-hermeneutical level of philosophy 
focuses on the biblical world of meaning above and below the text, metaphysical presuppositions about 
God and the cosmos, that constitutes the Y-axis (Prima Scriptura). 
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Figure 3.4 Axes of the Worlds of Meaning: Cross Section of Axial Model. 
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There are no peripheral limits to the worlds of meaning, but there are individual 
limitations to accessing the fullness of these worlds.24 The sector of the worlds of 
meaning that are logistically accessible to an interpreter at a given time are represented 
by the coils of the hermeneutical spiral. Since the worlds of meaning permeate the spiral, 
the Axial Model is not an empty cylinder but more accurately, a filled-in helicoid.25 In 
other words, the three-dimensional hermeneutical Axial Model is a spiral ramp. 
To summarize, the worlds of meaning radiating from the biblical text are sliced 
through by the analytical loops of the spiral ramp. Every turn of the ramp goes through 
all the five worlds of meaning. Yet, the focus of a hermeneutical level is to explicate 
more fully one of the three axes X or Y or Z. For example, the micro-hermeneutical level 
discloses the world in the text—focusing on the rotational area around the Z or long axis 
of the helicoid, drawing from the horizontal worlds behind and in front of the text (X 
axis) and the vertical worlds above and below the text (Y axis) as needed. 
Given these modifications to the Axial Model, two questions arise: Is this 
hermeneutical model appropriate for Scripture and how does one enter it?26 Tentative 
                                                 
24 Historical traditions add to the worlds of meaning along these axes. These worlds are not a 
closed system and will continue to accumulate through time, but individual interpreters may encounter 
logistical limitations due to their life background, resources, and skills. 
25 A helicoid is “a surface generated by a plane curve or a twisted curve which is rotated about a 
fixed line as axis and also is translated in the direction of the axis in such a way that the ratio of the two 
rates is constant.” R. C. James, Mathematics Dictionary, 5th ed. (1992), s.v. “helicoid.”  
26 Heidegger once said about the hermeneutical circle, the precursor to the hermeneutical spiral, 
“What is decisive is not to get out of the circle, but to get in it in the right way.” Heidegger, Being and 
Time, 143. Heidegger was concerned about anticipatory presuppositions which control the investigation so 
that the circle (not the circle of whole and parts, but the circle of understanding and interpretation) ends up 
confirming what was anticipated by the interpreter. His recommendation for avoiding this was to sort 
through one’s anticipations, making them clear (especially if they arise from common notions outside the 
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application is one way to test a model’s appropriateness to the study object. Only when a 
model is tried on, can the fittingness of a new model to the substance be evaluated for 
whether it increases or decreases respectful understanding and transforms its target 
recipient.27  
As for the second question about entering the spiral, since the Axial Model is a 
continuous spiral ramp that is continually readjusting the provisional understanding of the 
interpreter through time, what becomes critical is no longer where the spatial point of 
entry into this model is, but how one enters—the attitude of willing openness on the part 
of the interpreter, to continually listen and self-correct based on the textual evidence.28 As 
it is, systematic theologians may choose to enter the spiral at the macro-hermeneutical 
level, apologists will enter at the meso-hermeneutical level and exegetes will want to 
enter at the micro-hermeneutical level.  
For this study, I have chosen to enter the hermeneutical spiral model at the micro-
hermeneutical level and proceed to the macro-hermeneutical level inductively.29 This 
                                                 
object of study) in order to reject what is scientifically unsupportable by the object of study. See Jean 
Grondin’s article, “What Is the Hermeneutical Circle?” in The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, eds. 
Niall Keane and Chris Lawn (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2016). 
27 “We too determined that application is neither a subsequent nor merely an occasional part of the 
phenomenon of understanding, but codetermines it as a whole from the beginning.” Gadamer, Truth and 
Method, 333; Jean Grondin, “Gadamer's Basic Understanding of Understanding,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Gadamer, ed. R. Dostal (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 36-51. For 
legal or moral texts, the test of understanding is in the application or use of it. This is also true for working 
models.  
28 Ricoeur believed the best way into the circle of faith and understanding was by having a vital 
connection to the world of meaning of the writer: “one must understand to believe, but one must believe to 
understand.” Ricoeur, as quoted by Grondin, “What is the Hermeneutical Circle?” 299-305.  
29 This is not to say that any interpreter can discount the contextual presuppositions of their 
existence, namely, his/her faith community, personal history, ethnic, political or cultural background in 
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allows the hermeneutical journey to begin in conjunction with as many scholars as 
possible due to the universally accessible platform of Scripture. It also underlines the 
importance of looking at the text afresh as the normative long axis for the Axial Model. 
Paul Ricoeur also recommended listening carefully to the text under study without 
suspicion as the first step of interpretation.30 Insightfully, he asked “whether there is, 
before the philosophical-theological interpretation, an interpretation that would not be an 
interpretation of the text or an interpretation about the text, but an interpretation in the 
text and through the text.”31 Hence, the micro-hermeneutical level of analysis that 
elucidates the world of meaning in and through the text of the Aqedah, the area around 
the long Z axis, will be unpacked in this chapter through three steps. These three steps are 
                                                 
coming to the text. These accompany the interpreter regardless of where they enter the interpretive process. 
However, there are some advantages to starting with the text (micro-hermeneutical analysis) as discussed 
above, and my background as a physician predisposes me to respect the inductive method when confronted 
with an object of study. 
30 Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical arc consists of (1) explanation—what it says or the internal world 
of the text, (2) interpretation and understanding—what it is about or the new understanding in the world of 
discourse, (3) appropriation—making it one’s own or the new world of the interpreter. M. Taghinejad A. 
Ghasemi, A. Kubiri, M. Imani, “Ricoeur's Theory of Interpretation: A Method of Understanding Text,” 
World Applied Sciences Journal 15, no. 11 (2011), 1624-1627. 
31 Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, ed. Mark Wallace, 
trans. David Pellauer (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995) 140. 
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derived from the historical-grammatical-literary method: (1) morphological-syntactical, 
(2) narrative, and (3) literary-structural analysis. 
Micro-Hermeneutical Analysis of the Aqedah 
Morphological-Syntactical Analysis 
Morphological-syntactical analysis is one of the necessary first steps in analyzing 
the details of the text through the grammatical-historical-literary method of exegesis.32 A 
focus on the words and sentence structure allows a study to “not yield in its first steps to 
allowing denominational confessions of faith, ecumenical creeds, or preferred systems of 
theological thought, such as Calvinism or Arminianism, to structure the work of this 
discipline.”33 However, this level of minute analysis never remains exclusively within the 
text, because determining “the meaning of a word, the syntax of an utterance, the 
possibilities of stylistic variation, the dividing line between idiomaticity and metaphorical 
force” requires “an analysis of the underlying system.”34 The underlying language system 
reflects the historical world of the author, the world of meaning behind the text. In 
                                                 
32 Grammatical-historical exegesis was a term for the “honored method of the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century interpreters” that focused on the historically contextualized literal meaning of the text 
by unpacking the grammar and historical backgrounds of the author to recover the original meaning. 
“When Karl A. G. Keil used this term in 1788, his term grammatico approximated what we mean by the 
term literal, by which he meant the simple, plain, direct, ordinary, or natural sense of the passage. He was 
not referring simply to the ‘grammar’ that was used.” Walter C. Kaiser, Jr. and Moisés Silva, Introduction 
to Biblical Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2007), 35. It is recognized that in order to 
determine the scope of meaning and the meaning of atypical syntax, the historical world “behind the text” 
must be considered. The third term, literary, refers to literary analysis which has become an important tool 
to perceive the writer’s vision in constructing the text in a certain manner or genre. 
33 Kaiser and Silva, Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics, 75.  
34 Meir Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1985), 11.  
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addition, the scope of meaning including typological and allusive inferences may also be 
affected by the final literary context, with the original text nested within a canon of latter 
texts originating from the chronological world of meaning in front of the text. At the 
same time, for a narrative text to make sense as a plot, the assumption that the characters 
are natural human beings in the same temporal-spatial earth as the reader and dealing 
with the same concept of God that the reader has access to, relies upon the implied 
worlds of meaning below and above the text. Thus, this hermeneutical spiral model 
recognizes that all the worlds of meaning are implicated on every hermeneutical level and 
has incorporated that understanding into its schematic representation. But for this chapter, 
the micro-hermeneutical level will be unpacked by focusing on the world of meaning in 
the text.  
In order to study the text exegetically, each verse of the Aqedah in italics will be 
followed by a morphological-syntactical analysis of it. Robert Alter’s English translation 
of the Aqedah will be used (for this chapter only) as the text for the verses due to its 
recognized literary and stylistic faithfulness to the dynamics of the Hebrew text.35 The 
goal of this chapter is not an exhaustive treatment of the Aqedah, but a horizontal 
engagement of the first level of the hermeneutical spiral model with the case text of the 
                                                 
35 A respected literary scholar of the Bible, Alter’s aim in translation was to present Genesis “in a 
language that conveys with some precision the semantic nuances and the lively orchestration of literary 
effects of the Hebrew and at the same time has stylistic and rhythmic integrity as literary English.” Robert 
Alter, Genesis: Translation and Commentary (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1996), ix, 103-107.  
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Aqedah so that the text, Genesis 22:1-19, can test and norm the Axial Model even as the 
model adds to our understanding of Abraham’s test. 
 
Genesis 22:1-19 
1. And it happened after these things that God tested Abraham. And He said to him, 
“Abraham!” and he said, “Here I am.” 
The phrase and it happened after these things is a temporal marker “that often 
marks a new section in narrative” (found six times in Genesis: 15:1, 22:1, 22:20, 39:7, 
40:1, 48:1) while placing it within the framework of preceding events.36 This is an 
                                                 
36 GKC, 111g; Gordon Wenham, Genesis 16-50 (Waco, TX: Word, 1995), 98; Nahum Sarna, 
Genesis, 112. It is used seven more times in the Hebrew Bible (Josh 24:29; 1 Kgs 17:17; 21:1; 2 Chron 
32:1; Ezra 7:1; Esth 2:1, 3:1). “Its function is always to insert a single event into a broader context. It 
presupposes a stage when the Abraham story was already known as a coherent unit, as in the case of the 
Joseph story.” Claus Westermann, Genesis 12-36: A Commentary (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 
1985), 356. For an extended discussion on the meaning of the Hebrew root dabar as word, event or matter, 
see Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language, 129-140. 
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unmistakable indication from within the text for the reader to look at the literary world of 
meaning behind the text.37 This is how the text channels its own worlds of meaning.  
Next, God (Elohim)38 as the subject precedes the verb “tested” and is also marked 
with a definite article (the God)39 so syntax and morphology point to God Himself with 
intentional emphasis as the divine source of the test.40 From within the text the God of 
Abraham is invoked and the reader’s presuppositions from the world of meaning above 
                                                 
37 Behind the text can refer to two levels (at least). The literary world of meaning refers to written 
texts staged as chronologically preceding this story while the literal world of meaning refers to the writer’s 
existential background. 
38 Source critics ascribe Gen 22:1-13, 19 to E as the original story, due to style, composition and 
use of Elohim as the divine name. This leaves verses 14-18 as a later interpolation with YHWH as the 
preferred name for God. Omri Boehm points out that verses 11-12 also employs YHWH as God’s name, 
mimics the style of the second angelic speech and is not necessary for logical plot development. If both are 
removed, Boehm sees the original story as revealing Abraham’s disobedience to the divine command. On 
the other hand, G. W. Coates and J. van Seters believe the second angelic evaluation is indispensable to the 
story if the purpose of the test was to test Abraham’s obedience. Omri Boehm, The Binding of Isaac, 23; 
George W. Coats, “Abraham's Sacrifice of Faith: A Form-Critical Study of Genesis 22,” Union Seminary 
Review  (Oct., 1, 1973), 395; J. Van Seters, Abraham in History and Tradition (New Haven,CT: Yale 
University Press, 1975), 239; see also R. W. L. Moberly, “The Earliest Commentary on the Akedah,” 302-
323. Wenham adds two more arguments for including the last speech: sequential divine speeches are 
present in Gen 16, 17 and Gen 22 matches Gen 12:2-3 in literary style so correspondence in blessings at the 
end of both is fitting. “This is not to say that at one stage there may not have been a simpler, shorter 
account of the sacrifice of Isaac, but to identify the original account with vv 1-14 is too simple. . . . 
identifying the limits and content of earlier versions of the story is elusive.” Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 103. 
39 Because the verb nissah is in the Perfect form, the subject comes before it. Jacques B. Doukhan, 
Hebrew for Theologians: A Textbook for the Study of Biblical Hebrew in Relation to Hebrew Thinking 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), 178. The definite article before Elohim “may also 
imply possession, ‘his God.’” Victor Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, Chapters 18-50 (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1995), 100. 
40 “The word [nissah] occurs only here in Gen. with God as subject; see Ex. 15:25; 16:4; Deut. 
8:2, hr16; 13:4; 33:8; Judg. 2:22; 3:1, hr 4; Ps. 26:2; 2 Chron. 32:31. Apart from the late passages, Ps. 26:2; 
2 Chron. 32:31, the object of God’s testing in every case is Israel; they are concerned with the testing of 
Israel on the way through the desert and during the process of settling in Canaan.” Though themes of 
obedience (Exod 16:4; Judg 2:22) and the fear of God (Exod 20:20) resemble Abraham’s test, Westermann 
argues for a late dating for the Aqedah kind of test, because it is the testing of the individual. “The closest 
parallel in content to Gen. 22:1, the prolog to Job, is also a late text.”  Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 356. If 
the tables are turned and humans test God, “the testing is negative, uncalled for, and out of place.” 
Hamilton, Genesis, 101.   
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the text are about to be severely tested by what follows. Next, the direct object marker 
points to the object of the test, Abraham himself.41 As the archetype of the covenant-
believer, what the test reveals about the ethics of human creatures in relationship with 
God will test the presuppositions of the world of meaning below the text. What ties God 
to Abraham in this narrative is the test event. But what does the immediate verse tell us 
about this test? “Test” (nissah)42 is in the Perfect piel form which heightens its intensity. 
                                                 
41 In the Aqedah, no divine rationale for the test is initially given. The only modifying phrase 
directly connected to the divine test is “after these things.” Abraham’s obedient compliance, fearing God, 
and not withholding his son are divine accolades contingent on Abraham’s test response. The temptation to 
be reductive (even in the face of the three commendations) and narrow the initial purpose of this divine test 
to only one or two attributes of Abraham uncovers the hidden presumption that the narrator’s designation 
of Abraham as the object is inadequately nonspecific, so some interpreters go further by asking, “What is 
being tested in Abraham?” This path of reductive questioning then leads interpreters from the three 
Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) to highlight their own preferred virtue (obedience, 
faith, submission, respectively) against other options. 
On the other hand, the Charity Principle of Interpretation recommends that an “interpretation that 
proposes the most value to the practice—which one shows it in the better light, all things considered” is the 
one to be preferred. If this principle is applied to the thematic framing of the Aqedah and the narrator’s 
specific words regarding the test are accepted as rationally and intentionally complete —“God tested 
Abraham”—means the whole being of Abraham, all that he is, knows, and is capable of, after years of 
interactions with God (“after these things”) was being tested. For literary and aesthetic considerations to the 
logical criteria of the Principle of Charity see Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, CT: Harvard 
University Press, 1986), 52-53; W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, CT: M. I. T. Press, 1960), 
59. The logical Principle of Charity as applied to the narrator’s wording “requires us to see others as much 
like ourselves in point of overall coherence and correctness—that we see them as more or less rational 
creatures mentally inhabiting a world much like our own.” Donald Davidson, “Expressing Evaluations 
(1984),” in Problems of Rationality (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), 35-36. 
42 Two meaningful concepts are tied to divine testing: God’s divine judgment of the inner heart 
(Deut 8:2; cf. Ps 139:1, 23-24; Eccl 12:14) and the promise of atonement for the tested one (Exod 20:20 
“Moses said to the people, ‘Do not fear; for God has come to test [nissah] you, and that His fear may be 
before you, so that you may not sin’”). The Angel of Yahweh’s reference to the Fear of God in Gen 22:12 
ties Abraham’s test to Israel’s testing experience at Mt. Sinai (Exod 20:18). Doukhan writes, “The common 
words (“test,” “fear of God”) and the same threat of death shared by the two passages suggest that the same 
theology of “test” is implied. Instead of being an arbitrary and cruel act directed against the one tested, the 
divine testing brings the positive and promising perspective of divine judgement and atonement on behalf 
of the tested and is therefore to be understood in connection with the covenant of grace.” God’s covenant of 
grace culminated in the Jewish calendar on the Day of Atonement, where multiple linguistic connections 
are seen between the Aqedah and the description of the Day of Atonement in Leviticus 16. “More than any 
other biblical passage, this one shares the language with the test of the ‘aqedah. We find the same 
association of the words ‘olah ‘burnt offering’ (22:13; cf. Lev 16:3, 5), ra’ah ‘appear,’ in the same passive 
form (niphal) (22:14; cf. Lev 16:2), yiqqakh ‘he took’ (22:13; cf. Lev 16:5), and the ‘one ram’ (22:13; cf. 
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Lev 16:6).” Doukhan, Genesis, 275, 285. Shalom Spiegel explains how the term nissah was considered as 
linking the Aqedah to the experience of Job, “The Talmudic Sages related nissah, ‘put to the test,’ of 
Gen.22:1 to ha nissah (if one try, venture, might one exchange) of Job 4:2; cf. B. Sanhedrin 89b: Satan got 
to the road ahead of him. He said to Abraham: ‘If one venture a word unto thee, wilt thou be weary?’ (Job, 
ibid.). Said Abraham to him: ‘But as for me, I will walk in mine integrity’ (Ps. 26:11).” Shalom Spiegel, 
The Last Trial, 145.    
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Nissah can be translated to try, prove or attempt.43 God sets up the test of Abraham 
through dialogue: God called his name, “Abraham!”44 and Abraham responded, “Here I 
am.”45  
2. And He said, “Take, pray, your son, your only one, whom you love, Isaac, and go 
forth to the land of Moriah and offer him up as a burnt offering on one of the 
mountains which I shall say to you.” 
A particle of entreaty or exhortation, na (Alter translates it as “pray”)46  is inserted 
right after the imperative “take” and followed by four designations with increasing 
                                                 
43 S. R. Driver Francis Brown, Charles A. Briggs, James Strong, Wilhelm Genesius, The Brown-
Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1996), 650. Three 
verbs with origins in the refinement of metals by heat, including nissah, are bundled as parallels in Psalms 
26:2 “Probe me, Yahweh and try me, test my heart and mind.” From metallurgy, the core meaning of 
exposure for judgment and improvement arises. Thus, in testing, the relationship between man and God can 
be affected positively. 
44 Abraham was the divinely designated covenant name for Abram (Gen 17:5), given along with 
the ritual of circumcism (Gen 17:10) and promise of Isaac (Gen 17:16, 19, 21). Abram and Abraham both 
refer to fatherhood, Abram meaning exalted/great father and Abraham, perhaps father of nations. There is 
some debate among scholars on whether significant change of meaning occurred or whether the new name 
was a dialect variation without meaningful difference. See Alter, Genesis, 73; Doukhan, Genesis, 237; Von 
Rad, Genesis, 199; Sarna, Genesis, 124; Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 21.  The one thing that is clear is that the 
name Abraham signals the covenant. Thus, covenantal fatherhood may be indicated by God’s call as the 
theme for the test. If so, the test may hinge on the difference between a covenantal father and a non-
covenantal father, perhaps testing the difference between Abram from Ur and Abraham of Canaan.  
45 Hinneni is literally “behold, me.” The meaning of the word which usually embodies 
responsiveness and attentiveness has been translated as “Ready” (Speiser and Levenson), “Here I am” 
(Alter, Sarna, Westermann), “Here am I” (Von Rad), and simply “Yes” (Hamilton, Crenshaw). Sarna 
points out that “this is the only word Abraham utters to God in the entire episode.” E. A. Speiser, 
“Genesis,” in The Anchor Bible (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1964), 162; Levenson, The 
Death and Resurrection, 126; Alter, Genesis, 103; Sarna, Genesis, 150; Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 352; 
von Rad, Genesis, 237; Hamilton, Genesis 16-50, 97; James Crenshaw, A Whirlpool of Torment, 19. It is 
the open response to God’s momentous call: of Abraham (Gen 22:1, 11), Jacob (Gen 31:11, 46:2), and 
Moses (Exod 3:4). It is also a verbal response to family members: of Abraham (Gen 22:7), Isaac (Gen 
27:18), Esau (Gen 27:1), Joseph (Gen 37:13). 
46 Na’ is a “deferential particle of entreaty.” Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, 44. Hamilton 
agrees that na’ can be translated as “please” or “I beg you.” It may also have a strengthening function, as in 
admonition, exhortation or emphatic emphasis. Though it occurs more than sixty times in Genesis, it is only 
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specificity—“your son, your only son, whom you love, Isaac.”47 They are to “go forth” 
lek-lekha,48 or literally “go-for/to-you”) to the land of Moriah49 and offer Isaac as a burnt 
                                                 
used five times in the Hebrew Bible when God is addressing a person (Gen 13:14, 15:5; 22:2; Exod 11:2; 
Isa 7:3). “Each time God asks the individual to do something staggering, something that defies rational 
explanations or understanding. Here, then, is an inkling at least that God is fully aware of the magnitude of 
his test for Abraham.” Hamilton, Genesis 16-50, 101; Crenshaw, Whirlpool of Torment, 14. According to 
Sarna, adding the particle na’ to a command usually softens it to an entreaty. Sarna, Genesis, 151. 
However, Abraham used this term na’ in begging Sarah to present herself as a sister and not a wife, in 
order to save his life (Gen 12:13). Abraham’s use of na’ in that situation may have softened his demand 
into a request but can hardly be taken lightly if she refused him, thereby putting his life at risk. 
47 Of the four appositional phrases, three are preceded by the direct object marker et- and one 
starts with the relative pronoun (“whom you love” in present tense). In appositions the et is repeated “when 
the noun in apposition is more precise or more determinate than the first noun.” Joüon, A Grammar of 
Biblical Hebrew, §112aA, §132g. Levenson has argued that yahid translated here as “only” can also mean 
“unique” or “favored one.” Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 127. The verb “love” encountered in the 
Bible for the first time in this verse, is in the Perfect form. “Note that the meaning of the Perfect here is not 
so much to express a past event or a finished action, but rather to indicate the perfection of his love; the 
idea is that Abraham loved, has always loved, still loves and perfectly loves his son Isaac.” Doukhan, 
Hebrew for Theologians, 81. The next use of this term for love (Gen 24:67) will be in Isaac and Rebekah’s 
husband-wife relationship. Sarna, Genesis, 151. 
48 Lek-lekha: When the preposition connects to a pronominal suffix that refers to the same person 
as the subject of the verb, it means “for whom, to whose advantage (or disadvantage) something is done. 
This indirect reflexive nuance can be translated as a reflective verbal nuance. Joüon, A Grammar of 
Biblical Hebrew, §133d; Doukhan brings up three nuances of meaning for this unique term: emphasis, 
reflexive, and dative of interest. The dative of interest may also imply “the exclusion of anyone else from 
sharing this test.” Doukhan, Hebrew for Theologians, 81-82. These nuances can be conveyed by “go-(yes), 
you!” “get-yourself-and-go,” and “go-for-your-own-sake,” respectively. Outside of Genesis, it is found in 
SOS 2:10, 13. 
49 Moriah could be related to the verbs “to see” or “to fear.” Jewish tradition identifies the “mount 
of the Lord” in Gen 22:14 with the site of the Temple at Jerusalem on “mount Moriah” (II Chron 3:1); 
Samaritans believe the site was Mt. Gerizim near Shechem; Muslims believe it was Mt. Marwah, close to 
Kaaba in Mecca. The Vulgate translates the land of Moriah as the “land of the vision”; the Septuagint 
translates it as “the high land.” Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 98. 
 86 
 
offering on one of the mountains there.50 God then promises to verbally communicate 
later to designate the mountain chosen.51  
3. And Abraham rose early in the morning and saddled his donkey and took his two lads 
with him, and Isaac, his son, and he split wood for the offering, and rose and went to 
the place that God had said to him. 
Because Abraham gets up early in the morning to carry out the command, the 
implication is that the command was given the previous night.52 Single-handedly, 
Abraham enacts all six verbs of this verse53 surrounded by his human companions: two 
                                                 
50 “Offer him up, there, for offering” is one literal translation. Doukhan, Hebrew for Theologians, 
84. The dominant understanding is that Abraham is to cause Isaac to “go up, be offered up” –( ְל) “for” (to 
become, as) a burnt offering. This is what Abraham does in the story. But another meaning of  ְל is “for” (in 
reference to, in regard to) offering, i.e. for him to perform or do the burnt offering. If this minority option is 
taken, the translation would read “Make him go up, there, in regard to a burnt offering.” See BDB  ְל 5ib-
Gen 22:2 (in reference to verbs of motion). In conclusion, the meaning of  ְל is to be deduced from the 
context and requires careful judgment. Curiously, Genesis Rabbah has a remark on Genesis 22:2 that refers 
to the root of olah (“that which goes up to heaven” –whole burnt offering) as alah (to go up): “When I said 
to you, ‘Take,’ I was not altering the utterance of My lips. I did not say to you, ‘Slaughter him,’ but, ‘Bring 
him up.’ You have brought him up; [now] take him down.” Jacob Neusner, Genesis Rabbah (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 2001), 56:8. 
51 The test is not fully contained in the initial command but remains open-ended and ongoing with 
a promise of further direction and verbal engagement. Whereas the initial call to Abraham in Gen 12:1 
referred to a large territory— “to a land I will show you,” the test of Gen 22:2 is very specific–“one of the 
mountains [in the land of Moriah] that I shall say to you.” The first call referred to visual confirmation, the 
test refers to auditory confirmation. And yet, in the Aqedah, there is no divine verbal confirmation of the 
exact site, but visual confirmation is specifically mentioned (v. 4). 
52 The phrase getting up early in the morning and saddling his donkey may also portend anxiety 
and danger. After prolonged negotiations with the Lord, Abraham got up early only to see the smoke 
billowing up from the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen 19:27); getting up early and saddling his 
donkey are enacted by Balaam (Num 22:21) as he set out to curse Israel; saddling his donkey is connected 
to Ahithophel’s intent to commit suicide at home (2 Sam 17:23) and to Shimei’s sure death when crossing 
his imposed boundary (1 Kgs 2:40). 
53 The gender and number of the subject of all the verbs is masculine singular with Abraham as the 
agent. All the verbs are in qaal form except one. The splitting of the wood is in the intensive piel form; 
Abraham, by himself, was chopping vehemently. 
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lads and Isaac, his son.54 The endings of vv. 2 and 3 match: v. 3 “which God had said to 
him” fulfills the promise of v. 2 “which I shall say to you.”55  
4. On the third day Abraham raised his eyes and saw the place from afar. 
Bereft of a transitioning conjunction and separated from the ensuing action, the 
phrase “on the third day” jumps out. Temporally, it can refer to the third day of the 
journey which was about 75 kilometers (45 miles)56 from Beersheba but it may also 
indicate a pending momentous event.57 It is followed by a recognized metaphor for 
                                                 
54 A string of phrases tied together by waw (“and”) is common in Hebrew. What stands out is 
when “a chain of coordinated terms may be split by an intruding element” such as “he took two of his 
servants with him and Isaac, his son.” Joüon, Grammar, §177t. The terms “son” or “father” appears 12 
times in this narrative of 19 verses, signifying this relationship as critically meaningful for the test. 
55 The promise was given in imperfect tense, the reference to it is in perfect tense. Was there a 
communication of God to Abraham between these verses? If so, we are not told about it. 
56 J. Davidson, “Abraham, Akedah and Atonement,” 236. 
57  Syntactically, it is rare to have a new paragraph begin without a conjunction. Francis I. 
Andersen, The Sentence in Biblical Hebrew (Hague, NL: Mouton Publishers, 1974), 37. It is also odd to 
have a waw conjunction right after ‘on the third day’ unless there is an introductory phrase before it such as 
‘and it happened.’ Joüon, Grammar, §176hN. These suggest the phrase “on the third day” is to be taken as 
more than a temporal introduction. It may exhibit the qualities of a metaphor rooted literally in the third day 
as the chronological setting for the rest of the pericope, indicating the significant spatial/distance from all 
that precedes and follows, and figuratively presaging a consequential event (references to three-day units 
are plentiful: Gen 30:36; 31:22; 34:25; 40:20; 42:18; Exod 3:18; 5:3, 8:27, Num 10:33; Jonah 3:3). 
Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 358-359; Sarna, Genesis, 361.  
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insightful recognition, literally “he lifted up his eyes and he saw the place from afar 
off.”58 
5. And Abraham said to his lads, “Sit you here with the donkey and let me and the lad 
walk ahead and let us worship and return to you.” 
Abraham commands his servants to remain behind with the donkey for their own 
sakes.59 Separating himself with his son from the servants with the donkey, Abraham 
shares his resolve to go, worship60 and return together with his son.61 
6. And Abraham took the wood for the offering and put it on Isaac his son and he took in 
his hand the fire and the cleaver, and the two of them went together. 
A second preparation is described with Abraham, again the sole actor for the first 
three verbs (took, put, took)62, places the designated wood63 on the designated victim, 
                                                 
58 Joüon, Grammar, §125ia. See Gen 13:10, 18:2, 22:13, 24:63, 33:1, 33:5, 43:29, Num 4:2, Josh 
5:13. Literal translation from Doukhan, Hebrew for Theologians, 92-93. Joann Davidson mentions that this 
phrase occurs over 860 times in the Hebrew Bible; “over 240 times in the Pentateuch; and almost 100 times 
in Genesis alone. Forms of ‘to see’ also occur seven times within the 15 verses of Genesis 22. Thus, it 
becomes tantalizing to notice the few times when the rare phrase ‘lifting up the eyes’ is tagged to the 
already obvious word for ‘seeing.’ Could this possibly imply more than mere physical sight?” J. Davidson 
points to passages above as biblical events where vertical spatial direction is not the main point of this 
phrase, but emotional or intelligent comprehension is suggested. Davidson, “Abraham, Akedah, and 
Atonement,” 62. See also Gudmundur Olafsson, “The Use of NS in the Pentateuch and its Significance for 
the Biblical Understanding of Forgiveness,” (PhD diss., Andrews University, 1988), 148-154 and C. S. 
Reif, “A Root to Look Up: A Study of the Hebrew nasa’ ‘ayin,” Vetus Testamentum Supplements 36 
(1985): 230-244. 
59 The reflexive nuance of ל dativus commode is recognized here, especially because it follows a 
verb in the imperative. “(You) Sit for yourselves with the donkey.” P. Joüon, Grammar, 133d. Doukhan 
adds that it may, instead, carry the emphatic nuance “Abraham does not want to be followed.” Doukhan, 
Hebrew for Theologians, 94.  
60 The core meaning of worship is to “bow down” or “prostrate.” A more recent explanation is 
based on the root הוח, meaning “to prostrate, to wind (like a serpent).” Doukhan, Hebrew for Theologians, 
96. 
61 The three verbs (walk, worship, return) are in the cohortative form, indicating the volitive sense 
of desire or determination, not a flat announcement of an action that will be undertaken. Wilhelm Genesius, 
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Isaac. Then with his hand, he grabs the brazier64 and a large butchering knife.65 Literally, 
“and they went, the two of them, together.”66 
7. And Isaac said to Abraham his father, “Father!” and he said, “Here I am, my son.” 
And he said, “Here is the fire and the wood but where is the sheep for the offering?” 
Isaac attempts to ask a question, but wayy’omer (and he said) is awkwardly 
repeated twice suggesting hesitation, before his voice finally breaks out. A more literal 
translation would be, “And he said, Isaac to Abraham his father—and he said, ‘My 
Father!’”67 Abraham responds to Isaac in the same way he responded to God, hinenni 
(“Here I am,”) adding the possessive vocative beni (“my son”). Alter captures the verbal 
                                                 
Genesius' Hebrew Grammar and Davidson's Hebrew Syntax (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2007), §108. 
Alter correctly translates the nuance as “Let us” but since Abraham is not asking really asking permission 
of his servants to carry out his plans, it could also be translated as “We are determined” or “We want to.” 
62 These verbs are all in the masculine singular form. 
63 Hidden in the Hebrew morphology is increasing specificity on the event that will require the 
wood: in verse three it was wood for an offering, in verse six it is wood for the offering. Joüon, Grammar, 
§139a. 
64 Fire is a literal translation, but since that is unlikely, others suggest it may be referring to tinder, 
firestone, fire-flint, or a brazier with hot coals in it. BDB, 77; Speiser, Genesis, 163; Hamilton, Genesis 16-
50, 98; Sarna, Genesis 152, respectively. 
65 This kind of knife is identical to the one used to cut up the Levite’s concubine in Judges 19:29 
and is mentioned in parallel with swords in Proverbs 30:14. “E. A. Speiser notes, quite rightly, that the 
Hebrew term here is not the usual biblical term for knife, and makes a good argument that it is a cleaver. 
Other terms from butchering, rather than sacrifice, are used: to slaughter (verse 10) and to bind (verse 9-a 
verb occurring only here but used in rabbinic Hebrew for binding the legs of animals).” Alter, Genesis, 105. 
66 This phrase is repeated (v. 6, 8) then modified at the end of the test—“and they rose and went 
together” (v. 19). 
67 Jacques Doukhan analyzes this verse in detail, noting both the grammar and implied silences to 
masterfully capture the grammatical chiastic center of the narrative. See Doukhan, “The Center of the 
Aqedah,” 17-28. 
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resemblance between Abraham’s response and Isaac’s question by having “Here I am, 
my son” followed by “Here is the fire.”68 Isaac sees the fire and the wood but wonders 
about the lamb69 for the offering.70  
8. And Abraham said, “God will see to the sheep for the offering, my son.” And the two 
of them went together. 
Elohim as the subject precedes the imperfect verb in Abraham’s response, 
emphasizing God as the source of the solution.71 The verb yir’eh is an idiom and can 
mean visualizing or providing, both meanings are coupled in Abraham’s later naming of 
the site, YHWH-yir’eh in v.14. Due to the Hebrew lo “to/for/in regard to” that follows the 
verb yir’eh “to see,” Abraham’s answer may be heard different ways: intensive “God, 
Himself, will see to the sheep”, emphatic “God will certainly see to the sheep”, or 
reflexive “God will see for Himself, the sheep.”72 There is no direct object marker before 
the sheep so “the word ‘lamb’ can be heard as in apposition to the phrase ‘He will see 
                                                 
68 In Hebrew, Abraham’s hinneni (literally, “Behold, me”) is echoed in Isaac’s question that starts 
with hinneh (“Behold”). The meaning is translated as here in English. 
69 The Hebrew term here is seh meaning, a “four-legged animal” or “small livestock- a general 
term for a sheep or goat.” BDB, s.v. “חשׂ”. Some translations use the term “sheep.” Most English 
translations use “lamb” here since it alludes to Isaac and the scope of meaning for seh does include the one-
year old Passover lamb or goat (Exodus 12:3-5) which was a substitute for the firstborn son. In Ezekiel 
34:17 seh refers to both rams and male goats. 
70 It is clear from this verse that animal sacrifices were already a customary ritual for this family. 
71 The usual word order for imperfect verbs is that the subject follows the verb. In this verse, the 
subject precedes the imperfect verb, emphasizing “God” as the focus of Abraham’s answer. Hamilton, 
Genesis 16-50, 109. Syntactically, God was emphasized as the source for this test (v. 1) and God is 
emphasized as the source for the solution (v. 8). 
72 Hamilton, Genesis 16-50, 109; Doukhan, Hebrew for Theologians, 102.  
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Himself,’ meaning He will see Himself, (as) the lamb.”73 Then, this one and only 
recorded dialog between Abraham and Isaac in the Bible ends with the touching “my 
son.”74 Once again, the two resume walking together. 
9. And they came to the place that God had said to him, and Abraham built there an 
altar and laid out the wood and bound Isaac his son and place him on the altar on top 
of the wood. 
After the two arrive75 at the divinely designated location,76 Abraham carries out 
the last preparations alone77 and binds his son78 before placing him on top of the wood79 
                                                 
73 Doukhan, Genesis, 280. Doukhan also suggests one reflexive possibility: “God will see the 
lamb, [namely] Himself, my son.”  
74 “My son” can be understood either as a vocative (Abraham addressing his remarks to his son, as 
above) or as an appositive, rendering this sentence meaning as “God will provide…for a burnt offering, i.e., 
you, my son.” Hamilton, Genesis 16-50, 110; Crenshaw, Whirlpool of Torment, 23; Sternberg, The Poetics 
of Biblical Narrative, 192.  Midrash Gen. Rabbah 56:4 comments on this verse: “‘At all events, God will 
provide himself the lamb, O my son ; and if not, Thou art for a burnt-offering, my son.’ So they went both 
of them together — one to slaughter and the other to be slaughtered.”   
75 The arrival—“and they came”—fulfills the test command to go in v. 2. 
76 Consistently throughout this narrative the sacredness of the site hangs solely on the word of 
God: “the place that God had said to him.” No physical or inherent qualities justify that place as holy. 
77 The verbs built, laid, bound, placed are all in the masculine singular. Abraham remains the main 
actor throughout this test. 
78 This verse is the basis for the Jewish name of the narrative “Aqedah” (Binding [of Isaac]). Isaac 
is bound before he is laid on top of the wood by Abraham. According to Leviticus, for a burnt offering, the 
animal is usually killed first, cut into pieces, then the pieces are laid upon the already burning wood. See 
Lev 1:10-13. Abraham’s procedural order does not match the sanctuary sacrifice ritual for animal burnt 
offerings, perhaps because this is a human victim and not an animal.  
79 Of the non-living implements needed for the sacrifice, wood is the most mentioned item (wood- 
5x, altar-2x, fire-2x, knife-2x) and the one most manipulated (chopped, took, placed on Isaac, Isaac notes it, 
laid out on altar, Isaac is placed over it). At the sacrificial site, Abraham carefully lays out (ya’arok—to lay 
out, set in rows, to get ready, set out in order) the wood on the altar.  
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on the newly built altar.80 This verb ‘aqad (to bind, to tie up) appears only here in the 
Bible.81 
10. And Abraham reached out his hand and took the cleaver to slaughter his son. 
Previously, Abraham simply “took in his hand the fire and the knife” (v. 6) but 
here, the meticulous and drawn-out depiction of “stretching out or sending out” his hand82 
precedes the taking of the butchering knife. Then Abraham’s unspoken intention—“to 
slaughter his son”—is revealed.83 
11. And the Lord’s messenger called out to him from the heavens and said, “Abraham, 
Abraham!” and he said, “Here I am.” 
Messenger is the correct meaning for mal’ak.84 Like the messenger of Elohim that 
rescued Ishmael in the previous chapter (Gen 21:17), Isaac is rescued by the messenger 
                                                 
80 Altars could be built from earth or unwrought stone. Exod 20:24-25. 
81 ‘Aqad appears as an adjective in the story of Jacob to describe “striped, streaked” animals of the 
flock. Genesis 30:35, 39, 40; 31:18. This verse (Gen 22:9) is the only time it is used as a verb in the 
Scriptures. It refers to the binding of Isaac. One may wonder, if Isaac is a willing victim, why would he 
need to be bound? It may have been a customary step for burnt offerings. Levinson, Inheriting Abraham, 
79. The sages surmised it could have been Isaac’s wish: “Targum Jonathan and Targum Jerushalmi ad 
Gen. 22:9: ‘Bind me properly lest I start suddenly, and there (will) occur a blemish in your offering.’” 
Spiegel, The Last Trial, 21, note 14. 
82 It is to be noted that the angelic prohibition of v. 12 retracts this exact movement of Abraham’s 
hand reaching out, the actual grasping of the knife by the same hand is not mentioned. Stretching out of the 
hand is a common description pending action, both positive and negative (Gen 8:9, 19:10, 38:28, 48:14, 
Exod 4:4, 7:5, 19, 8:6), but because of the context here, the action is laden with trepidation. 
83 Even while Abraham’s actions march toward completion, Abraham’s mental state has been 
ambiguous until this exact moment. The word sehot “slaughter” is the term for cutting up animals for 
sacrifice or food. 
84 Mal’ak can mean a “messenger (Gen 32:4), a prophet (Isa 42:19), a priest (Mal 2:7),” or “a 
heavenly being (I Chr 21:15).” Doukhan, Hebrew for Theologians, 108. In this case, “the meaning of the 
genitive group is indeterminate even though the nomen rectum is a proper noun.” Joüon, Grammar, 
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of YHWH85 who calls86 Abraham’s name twice from heaven. Abraham readily responds 
in the same manner as at the beginning of the test, “Here I am.”87 
12. And he said, “Do not reach out your hand against the lad, and do nothing to him, for 
now I know that you fear God and you have not held back your son, your only one, 
from Me.” 
The initial action singled out for retraction is the stretching out of Abraham’s 
hand against the lad, but then the prohibition is broadened to any action in order to 
ensure total safety for Isaac.88 The reason for countermanding the test is: for now I know89 
                                                 
139c11. The phrase here is usually translated an “angel of Yahweh.” 
85 YHWH has the root hawah meaning “to be” or “to speak.” Existence and word are related 
concepts in Hebrew. “The form, הוהי, is probably to be analyzed as a hiphil, Imperfect, third person, 
meaning ‘he will cause to be.’ The approximate original pronunciation is Yahweh.” Doukhan, Hebrew for 
Theologians, 108.  
86 The messenger of YHWH loudly calls from a distance to Abraham, repeating his name—
suggesting urgency. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 361. To restrain a father about to slaughter his son, the 
messenger calls out, ironically, “Abraham! Abraham!” [Great Father of Nations! Great Father of Nations!]. 
Abraham, in loyal opposition, had reminded God of His role as the Judge of all the Earth. Was God 
returning the favor here by reminding Abraham that he was to be an exemplary Father of a covenanted 
nation?  
87 This is the third and last time Abraham responds with hinneni. “First to God, then to Isaac, now 
to the divine messenger” (who identifies with God in the next verse). Alter, Genesis, 106. 
88 The jussive שעת “you do anything” with the negation לא “not” expresses strong prohibition. 
Doukhan, Hebrew for Theologians, 110; Joüon, Grammar, §147b. 
89 Temporality is connected to divine knowledge in this verse. Whether this is an 
anthropomorphism, or a characteristic of divine epistemology will be discussed more fully in chapter 4 that 
follows. Doukhan offers two notes on its meaning here: “1) The meaning of the Perfect implying complete 
knowledge [and] 2) The word עדי “to know” implies intellectual, as well as physical knowledge. This word 
is used to express the intimacy and the experience of the conjugal relationship (Gen 4:1).” Doukhan, 
Hebrew for Theologians, 111. This verb root in the perfect form was used by God in Gen 18:19 “For I 
know him, that he will command his children and his household after him and they shall keep the way of 
the Lord” and more recently in regard to Abimelech in Gen 20:5, “I know that you have done this in the 
integrity of your heart.” Abraham used it in regard to Sarah’s beauty in Gen 12:11.  
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you are God-fearing90 for91 you have not withheld92 your son, your unique son93 from 
Me.94 
13. And Abraham raised his eyes and saw and look, a ram was caught in the thicket by its 
horns, and Abraham went and took the ram and offered him up as a burnt offering 
instead of his son. 
Once again in this narrative the visual idiom for insight is used, “Abraham raised 
his eyes and saw,”95 but it is intensified here with the interjection of surprise, “and 
behold,” the solution is seen! Whether the ram is located behind Abraham, seen 
afterwards, or is identified as one animal depends on whether the next term is read as 
(רחא) “behind, afterwards” or (דחא) “one, a,” differing by a stroke on the last letter.96 In 
                                                 
90 Yare “fearing” is a participle in the absolute state in construct with the accusative—God, it is 
functioning as a verbal adjective here. Joüon, Grammar, §121l. Within the two verses of 11 and 12 the 
divine names (Yahweh and Elohim) are intermingled synonymously by several references to divine 
identity. The Messenger of YHWH calls Abraham a fearing [one] of Elohim, then refers to itself as divine 
“You did not withhold your son…from Me.” 
91 The context indicates this waw should be translated as a causal relation, “for.” Joüon, Grammar, 
§170c.  
92 ךשח “to withhold, to keep back” was used by God just two chapters previous to this in His 
explanation of how He withheld Abimelech (Gen 20:6).  
93 Only the first two appellations in the test command for Isaac in v. 2 are repeated here. The last 
two, “whom you love, Isaac,” are dropped in both v. 12 and in v.16.  
94 In Gen 16:7-14, the angel of YHWH saves Hagar who refers to him as “the Lord that spake unto 
her.” In Gen 31:11-13 the angel of Elohim tells Jacob, “I am the God of Bethel.” In Exod 3:2-6 the angel of 
YHWH appears to Moses in the burning bush and says, “I am the God of thy Father.”  
95 Just as in v. 4, J. Davidson notes it is rare to tag the phrase “lifting up the eyes” to the “already 
obvious word for ‘seeing.’” Davidson, “Abraham, Akedah, and Atonement,” 62-64. 
96 Ancient manuscripts support both variant readings (Septuagint, Syriac, Vulgate, and the Targum 
support ʼekhad; most of the Masoretic texts support ʼakhar). Hamilton translates ʼakhar as “another” and 
Wenham translates it with the sense of “immediately after” as in “just caught.” Victor Hamilton, Genesis 
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age, the ram is mature—horns signaling at least three years old, and Abraham fulfills all 
three verbs of the initial command (go, take, offer) on the ram (went, took, offered as a 
burnt offering) instead of his son.97 
14. And Abraham called the name of that place YHWH-yireh, as is said to this day, “On 
the mount of the Lord there is sight.” 
The name of that “very place”98 focuses attention, not on the test subject 
Abraham, but on God.99 “God-will-See/Provide” captures Abraham’s previous reply to 
Isaac’s question, “God will provide.” The next phrase in the text points to the present 
time of the narrator, somewhere in the world of meaning in front of the event, but within 
the writing of the text,100 where the verb now carries a passive niphal sense, “On the 
mountain of YHWH, He/he/it will be seen.” Who or what the subject of the verb is 
whether God will appear and be seen by the believer, whether the believer will be seen by 
                                                 
16-50, 133; Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 99 (note 13a). Sarna supports his translation of “a ram,” by pointing 
to Gen 10:4 as another example where the ד dalet was substituted for a ר resh. Sarna, Genesis, 153, 71.  
Daniel 8:3 matches with “And I lifted up my eyes and saw, behold, one ram.” This suggests that “one ram” 
may be the appropriate phrasing for both, especially since they both share themes of the Day of Atonement 
(Yom Kippur). For an excellent discussion of the grammatical/syntactical/textual reasons for preferring 
ʼekhad over ʼakhar see Doukhan, Genesis, 285. 
97 “The drama of this substitution is also emphasized through the phrase ‘behold, a ram’ answering 
Isaac’s earlier question: ‘behold . . . where is the lamb?’ v. 7.”  Davidson, “Abraham, Akedah, and 
Atonement,” 64.  
98 The Hebrew puts extra emphasis on the “very place.” Literally: “And Abraham called the place, 
the it—YHWH-yireh.” Doukhan, Hebrew for Theologians, 116.  
99 Hamilton wryly remarks, “He does not call this site ‘Abraham-shama’ (‘Abraham obeyed’). . . . 
The name highlights only the beneficent actions of Yahweh.” Hamilton, Genesis 16-50, 113. 
100 The world of meaning in front of the text refers to the literal world of meaning after the Aqedah 
event, as captured by the literary world of meaning in the text. 
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God, whether the divine provision is what is seen (ram), all three subjects are allowed by 
the grammar.101 Alter preserves the original ambiguity with his translation: “there is 
sight.”  
15. And the Lord’s messenger called out to Abraham once again from the heavens, 
The messenger of YHWH calls a “second time” from the heavens.102 The 
messenger prefers to remain out of sight, limiting his presence to words.103 
16. And He said, “By my own Self I swear, declares the Lord, that because you have done 
this thing and have not held back your son, your only one,  
Of all the oaths in Genesis, only here does YHWH swear by himself.104 The causal 
clause that follows the strongly nuanced ןעי (“because”) has two parts, with the emphasis 
                                                 
101 The root of the verb see, האר in the niphal “is regularly used of the Lord appearing to men (cf. 
12:7; 17:1; 18:1), thus making a link backward with Abraham’s past experience and forward to Israel’s 
future experiences on the mountain of God (Exod 3:1-2, 16; Lev 9:4, 6, etc.).” Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 
111. 
102 The next four verses were commonly believed to be a later addition by historical-critical 
scholars. But the very word that caused the most doubt is now seen as a significant ‘glue’. Senit “second,” 
far from signaling an awkward insertion, may be the literary marker for the pattern of repetition called 
“build-up and climax” (BUC) a pattern seen in other Ugaritic texts and found in ancient Hebrew narratives 
(cf. I Kgs 19:7). 
The identifying characteristics of BUC are “(a) the repeated events require two steps to reach the 
given event’s conclusion. Since the first step, build-up, fulfills only one part of the event’s expected goal, it 
anticipates a second step, which is decisive in leading to the narrative climax. (b) The presence of the 
adverb ת֨נש, ‘a second time’ (or דוא ‘again’) in the second episode’s introductory statement implies that a 
previous parallel event had taken place and demonstrates that the repeated events form a unit. (c) The 
characters in each repetition of the BUC are identical both characteristically and in number.” Esther H. 
Roshwalb, “Build-up and Climax in Jeremiah's Visions and Laments,” in Boundaries of the Ancient Near 
Eastern World: A Tribute to Cyrus H. Gordon, eds. Meir Lubetski, Claire Gottlieb, Sharon Keller, Journal 
for the Study of the Old Testament Supplemental Series 273 (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1998), 111 fn; Gary A. Rendsburg, “Variation in Biblical Hebrew Prose and Poetry,” in Built by Wisdom, 
Established by Understanding: Essays on Biblical and Near Eastern Literature in Honor of Adele Berlin, 
ed. Maxine L. Grossman (Bethesda, MD: University Press of Maryland, 2013), 214-215; C. H. Gordon, 
“Build-up and Climax,” in Studies in Bible and Ancient Near East Presented to Samuel E. Lowenstamm, 
eds. J. Blau, Y. Avishur (Jerusalem, IL: E. Rubinstein’s, 1978), 29-34. 
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on the first—“you have done this thing” over the second “and not held back your son, 
your only one.”105 
17.  I will greatly bless you and will greatly multiply your seed, as the stars in the 
heavens and as the sand on the shore of the sea, and your seed shall take hold of its 
enemies’ gate. 
The results from Abraham’s actions are emphatic106 blessings from God, including 
the increase of his progeny that spills beyond the imagery of stars in Gen 15 to the sands 
of the seashore. Initially seed (zera’) is used in the multiple sense of one becoming many 
                                                 
103 The first angelic position of calling to Abraham from the heavens may not indicate haste, for 
after Abraham has finished sacrificing the ram on the altar, the messenger still chooses to remain out of 
sight, calling from the heavens with the final, elaborately longer speech. Why, in a narrative that highlights 
sight, does the divine messenger remain out of sight? Chapter four offers an interpretive covenant 
hypothesis that provides a possible reason for God’s physical and visual distance during Abraham’s test, 
see specifically fn. 106 on page 194.  
104 This formula comes up in the later prophets (Isa 45:23, Jer 22:5; 49:13, Amos 4:2). Moses 
reminds God of the oath to the patriarchs where He swore by himself (Exo 32:13). The form qatal is used 
for the verb “I swear” where the “instantaneous action which, being performed at the very moment of the 
utterance, is assumed to belong to the past whereby the actor is, as it were, acting out his utterance. Hence 
this use of the perfect is sometimes called ‘performative.’” Joüon, Grammar, §112 f, g. Doukhan adds the 
nuance that the perfect tense here indicates “completeness of God’s swearing; it is definitive.” Doukhan, 
Hebrew for Theologians, 119. 
105 Joüon, Grammar, §170n.  
106 The infinitive absolute followed by the imperfect (to bless I will bless) is used to emphasize 
the intensity and certainty of the statement—“I will certainly bless you.” This can also be heard as 
affirmation or asserveration. Joüon, Grammar,§123e; Doukhan, Hebrew for Theologians, 122.  
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offspring but the masculine singular mode is used for the seed gaining victory over his 
enemies.107 
18. And all the nations of the earth will be blessed through your seed because you have 
listened to my voice.” 
The families or clans of the ground were mentioned in Abraham’s first set of 
blessings in Genesis 12. Now the verbiage has shifted to nations of the earth blessing 
themselves108 through his seed, all because Abraham listened (obeyed)109 God’s voice.  
19. And Abraham returned to his lads, and they rose and went together to Beer-sheba, 
and Abraham dwelled in Beer-sheba. 
As promised (v. 5), Abraham comes back to his servants, but alone.110 The next 
phrase, “they rose and went together” includes Abraham and his servants,111 who go to 
Beersheba where Abraham stayed. 
  
                                                 
107 See Jack Collins, “A Syntactical Note (Genesis 3:15): Is the Woman's Seed Singular or 
Plural?” Tyndale Bulletin 48, no. 1 (1997). When Rebecca’s family wishes her well on her departure to 
become Isaac’s bride, two of these blessings were also commended to her. Gen 24:60 “Our sister, may you 
increase to thousands upon thousands; may your offspring possess [masculine singular verb] the cities of 
their enemies.” Since the Book of Ruth reveals legal transactions were done at the gate (Ruth 4), gaining a 
hold of the enemies’ gates implies dominating control of the city. 
108 The hitpael form of the verb of blessing “conveys the idea of reflection, denoting a nuance of 
participation in the blessing.” Doukhan, Hebrew for Theologians, 126.  
109 When עםש “hear” is followed by ּ ְב, it means to obey. This verb happens to be in the Perfect 
form which “suggests that Abraham heard, obeyed completely.” Doukhan, Hebrew for Theologians, 127. 
110 The verb for returning is in the third person masculine singular form, “and he returned.” The 
promise Abraham gave to the servants in verse 5 was clearly in the first person masculine plural form: “we 
will return.” This discrepancy has raised speculation regarding Isaac’s ‘absence.’ However, “Abraham 
stayed in Beer-sheba” also uses a masculine singular verb but is understood to include his encampment as a 
corporate unity. 
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Narrative Analysis 
“Between ‘analyzed fragments’ and ‘larger views’ is the ‘literary middle ground’ 
of narrative art,” says Alter.112 The art of a narrative is the creative telling of a story, the 
rhetoric113 of the story. If a story is defined as “an account of characters and events in a 
plot moving over time and space through conflict toward resolution,”114 close reading of 
                                                 
111 Here, the third person plural verbs are expected since they journey home as one group.  
112 Alter, Art of the Biblical Narrative, 17. Unlike the historical-critical source-oriented inquiry, 
narrative art requires a discourse-oriented analysis: “Looking to the text itself as a pattern of meaning and 
effect” and “making sense of the discourse in terms of communication, always goal-directed on the 
speaker’s part and always requiring interpretive activity on the addressee’s.” Sternberg, Poetics, 15. 
113 Rhetoric is the art of effective or persuasive speaking or writing. On rhetorical criticism see the 
landmark article of James Muilenburg, “Form Criticism and Beyond,” Journal of Biblical Literature 88, 
no. 1 (March, 1969), 1-18; Jim A. Kuypers, ed., Rhetorical Criticism (New York, NY: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2009); Jack R. Lundbom, Bible Rhetoric and Rhetorical Criticism (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield 
Phoenix Press, 2013).  
114 Gabriel Fackre, “Narrative Theology: An Overview,” Interpretation 37, no. 4 (1983), 341. 
Aristotle defined a plot (muthos) as “the organization of the events.” So, the story plot “‘grasps together’ 
and integrates into one whole and complete story multiple and scattered events, thereby schematizing the 
intelligible signification attached to the narrative taken as a whole.” “Emplotment” imitates (mimesis) 
human action, intimating symbolic cultural significance to those actions, and presenting a way of being 
“within” time through temporal structure. Ricouer, Time and Narrative, x, 54-64.   
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the rhetorical details imbedded in the text allow the story’s intent115 to be heard through 
its own voice.116  
An astute reader “hears” the voice of the text by scrutinizing how the literary 
aesthetics in the Bible relate to each other and relate to the historiographic and 
ideological functions of the particular narrative.117 Robert Alter offers a list of repetitive 
narrative markers that link literary details to biblical ideology ranging from the “smallest 
and most unitary elements to the largest and most composite ones”: leitwort, motif, 
theme, sequence of actions, and type-scene.118 Narrative theology recognizes that 
                                                 
115 “Bible texts address a directed goal which may rightly be identified as its author’s intention, 
provided that intention is understood only ‘adverbially.’” Recognizing authorial intent through careful 
analysis of the text’s “directedness” or “intentional directedness” is a valid method of ascertaining authorial 
purpose. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 560. Authorial original intent had been powerfully 
dismissed as a psychological standard for critically judging poetry in the noted article “The Intentional 
Fallacy” by W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley who wrote, “We argued that the design or intention of 
the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art.” 
Both did, however, admit, “In this respect poetry differs from practical messages, which are successful if 
and only if we correctly infer the intention.” W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Intentional 
Fallacy,” in The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky 
Press, 1954), 3-18. In short, objective indicators of direction in the text has replaced the reader’s intuitive 
presumptions regarding authorial intent, as a more stable locus of analysis. 
116 Ricoeur refers to this as an interpretation “through” the text. The temptation to impose 
unrelated, modern, western, secular filters prematurely on the Bible must be avoided. Barr recommends 
instead, “Let the Scriptures to speak to us in terms of themselves, and allow a synthetic approach to gather 
up the results of analysis. The resulting solidity and unity of the biblical teaching withdraws it from our 
control. In this situation the Word of God controls us, and presses upon us a deeper theological 
understanding of the Scriptures.” Barr, Semantics of Biblical Language, 5-6. 
117 Sternberg, Poetics, 43. Coats categorizes the Aqedah in the genre of literary legend: “By 
definition legend functions as a narrative designed to edify subsequent generations by emphasis on virtues 
displayed by the central figure.” He supports this by noting that in the telling of the tale, inner tensions are 
not shared, “God’s character is not an issue. Isaac is relatively unimportant. Even Abraham’s inner tensions 
carry no weight. The entire scope of the legend falls on Abraham’s obedience.” Coats, Abraham’s Sacrifice 
of Faith, 397. Coats is commenting on the literary characteristics as he categorizes them. I will address the 
question of the historical reality of the Aqedah later in chapter 5 in the section: Ontology of the Aqedah 
Event, pages 306-310. 
118 Alter, Art of the Biblical Narrative, 95-96. Each marker will be defined in the footnotes as they 
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narrative is “discourse about God in the setting of the story.”119 However, this section will 
try to limit theological discussion to brief implications from narrative analysis because 
the next level of meso-hermeneutics in the following chapter will focus on theology. The 
following dramatic analysis of the Aqedah will follow George Coat’s delineation of 
narrative plot tension: exposition (Gen 22:1-2), execution of instruction (Gen 22:3-10), 
resolution (Gen 22:11-14), conclusion (Gen 22:15-18), and itinerary (Gen 22:19).120  
Exposition 
And it happened after these things that God tested Abraham. And He said to him, 
“Abraham!” and he said, “Here I am.” And He said, “Take, pray, your son, your only 
one, whom you love, Isaac, and go forth to the land of Moriah and offer him up as a 
burnt offering on one of the mountains which I shall say to you.”  
With the temporal phrase121 “it happened after these things,” the narrator refers 
back to the sweep of Abraham’s history as one collective unit and relates it to what 
                                                 
are identified in the narrative analysis. 
119 “Truth” in the story setting is conveyed narratively by “depiction of reality, ultimate and 
penultimate, in terms of plot, coherence, movement, and climax.” Insights gleaned can be organized around 
the three foci of narrative theology, “canonical story, life story, and community story. The first makes 
extensive use of literary analysis of biblical material, the second draws heavily on psycho-social resources 
in the exploration of personal experience, and the third is shaped by communal lore and the sedimentations 
of tradition.” Fackre, Narrative Theology, 343; See also Gary L. Comstock, “Two Types of Narrative 
Theology,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 55, no. 4 (Winter, 1987), 687-717. 
120 Coats notes that unlike most tests, in the resolution, the original task is retracted and revoked 
(vv. 11-12a), yet Abraham is told he has passed the test (v. 12b), and the rest of the story hinges on the 
retracted test. Coats, Abraham’s Sacrifice of Faith, 390-391. I do not agree that the test is retracted and will 
discuss the angel’s prohibition of vv. 11-12 in chapter 4 on meso-hermeneutics, on pages 197-208.  
121 Surprisingly, this temporal marker is not tied chronologically to Abraham’s age. The 
Abrahamic cycle is marked by “13 explicit designation of times . . . .The exceptional aspect of this string is 
that it consists of exact specifications of age, mainly pertaining to the hero and his wife.” They are Gen 
12:4; 16:3, 16; 17:17, 24, 25; 21:5; 23:1; 25:7, with the ages of Terah (Gen 11:32) and Ishmael (Gen 25:17) 
as bookends. But there are also notable gaps in the timeline. Fokkelman notes two significant time gaps 
(Gen 16:16-17:1 and Gen 21:34-Gen 22:1) in the cycle that refer to very important events for Abraham’s 
two sons. The thirteen years of the first gap may suggest a similar length of time for the second gap. Isaac 
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comes next.122 But the ambiguity of these things naturally elicits the query of which 
things?123 How far back should the reader remember?124 The previous chapter contained 
the birth of Isaac, a restoration of family priorities, establishment of political peace, 
property rights to a life-sustaining well, the rooting of a tree, worshipping God Eternal, 
and a settling down for “a long time in the land of the Philistines.” Surely, the covenant 
journey has come to a blessed end with the number seven infused through this last event, 
what could possibly disturb the sense of peaceful narrative completion?125 
                                                 
is already weaned (3-5 years old) before the end of Genesis 21, but when he reappears in the next story, 
Gen 22, he is suddenly about the age of two servants (na’ar suggests an age nearing the twenties), carrying 
wood up the mountain and asking astute questions. If the narrative gaps roughly correlate, tentative 
calculations would place him about 16-20 years old. J. P. Fokkelman, Reading Biblical Narrative: An 
Introductory Guide (Louisville, KY: Westminster Knox Press, 1999), 41-43. These are the kinds of insights 
derived from taking the preface phrase after these things to refer to the documented events of Abraham’s 
life as a significant background for understanding the test that follows. 
122 In a literary manner, “with the narrator as interpreter, continuation and surprise begin the 
story.” All of Abraham’s previous trials and events are to be kept in mind, but a new twist is introduced. 
Trible, “Genesis 22,” 171. 
123 Even before Abraham appears on the scene, the reader is hooked by the cryptic rhetoric of the 
narrator to ask questions. Rhetorically, “everything serves to ‘summon’ the reader to enter the world of the 
text.” Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 481. 
124 Thematically, the Aqedah “is organically connected with the preceding chapter. Abraham has 
lost one son and now seems about to lose the other.” Sarna, Genesis, 150.  Martin Buber goes further and 
ties all seven of God’s revelations to Abraham under the leitmotif of seeing culminating in the Aqedah: (1) 
Gen 12:1-3—God will let him see the land, (2) Gen 12:7—“God also ‘lets him see’ Himself,” (3) Gen 
12:14—“Again ‘seeing’ is mentioned, and now it is a matter of seeing the entire land,” (4) Gen 15—Sees 
the heavens and given prophetic sight into the future, (5) Gen 17—God allows Himself to be seen, (6) Gen 
18—Abraham looks up and sees God as a man standing by him (7) Gen 22—The hidden God sends 
Abraham to “see” the land, the place, the lamb (Isaac), then Abraham “lifts up his eyes and sees the ram. . . 
. God sees man and man sees God.” Martin Buber, On the Bible, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer, trans. Harold 
Bloom (New York: Schocken, 1968), 37-43. 
125 Not only by artistic depiction, but through artful composition, the event that precedes the 
Aqedah is resonant with the number of completion and final wholeness—the number seven. “Each of the 
two names of the two principal characters, Abraham and Abimelech, occurs exactly seven times; there are 
seven ewe lambs; both the verb “to swear” (vv. 23 ff.) and the name Beer-sheba contain the same Hebrew 
stem as the word for “seven” (sh-v-׳).” Sarna, Genesis, 148. 
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An unexpected thunderbolt—“God [Elohim]126 tested Abraham.” More 
emphatically, “God, indeed God, tested Abraham.”127 The privileged narrator128 discloses 
the divine intent to the reader, bypassing Abraham, creating dramatic irony129 within the 
                                                 
126 Six of Abraham’s seven previous epiphanies were initiated by YHWH, not Elohim. This one is 
initiated by Elohim. This name, Elohim, links this narrative to two previous stories: the Abimelech incident 
in Genesis 20 shares common elements (Elohim in nocturnal communication with main protagonist, the 
threat of death, morally innocent yet culpable protagonist, God restraining the protagonist, return of victim, 
done this thing, see, fear of God), and the banishment of Ishmael in Genesis 21 holds even more 
similarities, see below:  
                “God orders Ishmael’s expulsion (21:12-13) // God orders Isaac’s sacrifice (22:2) 
Food and water taken (21:14) // Sacrificial material taken (22:3) 
Journey (21:14) // Journey (22:4-8) 
                                 Ishmael about to die (21:16) // Isaac about to die (22:10) 
  Angel of God calls from heaven (21:17) // Angel of the Lord calls from heaven (22:11) 
                                        “Do not fear” (21:17) // “fear God” (22:12) 
                           “God has heard” // “You have obeyed (heard) my voice (22:18) 
             “I shall make into a great nation” (21:18) // “Your descendants will be like stars, sand,” etc. (22:17) 
God opens her eyes and she sees well (21:19) // Abraham raises his eyes and sees ram (22:13) 
       She gives the lad a drink (21:19) // He sacrifices ram instead of son (22:14)” 
Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 99-100. 
127 Because of the definite article before God and the syntactical position of “God” before the verb 
here, Trible’s translation powerfully conveys the certainty that this was a divine test. Trible, Coherence and 
Complexity, 171. This emphatic identification prescribes to God, and God alone, the responsibility for 
imposing this test. J. Davidson, “Abraham, Akedah and Atonement,” 52. 
128 Alter explains the motif of the “omniscient narrator” as alluding to the epistemological status of 
the narrator who “is presumed to know, quite literally, what God knows, as on occasion he may remind us 
by reporting God’s assessments and intentions, or even what He says to Himself.” Alter, Art of the Biblical 
Narrative, 157; See also Wesley A. Kort, Story, Text and Scripture: Literary Interests in Biblical Narrative 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988), 41.    
129 There are many kinds of irony. Dramatic irony is the situation where the audience knows 
something that the characters in a play or story do not. “Dramatic irony has a variety of functions, such as 
expressing criticism, stressing a shocking event or emphasizing a tragic situation, to name but a few.” It 
may be that all of these functions coexist in the Aqedah. Shimon Bar-Efrat, Narrative Art in the Bible (New 
York, NY: T&T Clark, 2008), 125. Situational irony is when there is a discrepancy between what is 
expected and what happens, e.g., Abraham’s literal obedience is thwarted at the last minute by God. Verbal 
irony is the intentional use of words to mean something different from their literal meaning. Multiple forms 
of irony abound in the Aqedah. See Carolyn J. Sharp, Irony and Meaning in the Hebrew Bible 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 243. Even a historical form of irony continues in the 
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very first verse: God, the narrator, and we know it is a test—Abraham does not. But we 
remain ignorant about what is behind the test: Why does God test Abraham? What kind 
of God needs to test humans? And what will happen if Abraham fails? The proffered verb 
test which sounds out the tie between the world of meaning above and below the text, 
suggests more problems than answers.130 We may even wonder if the narrator knows but 
is purposely refusing to tell us.131 Hence, the overarching theme132 of a test affects both 
the reader and Abraham for the limits of our knowledge are made visible. 
God initiates the test with a name “Abraham!” Then, there is an implied pause for 
Abraham’s acknowledgment. That this opening dynamic is unusual is only seen if it is 
carefully compared to previous commands which are behind this text,133 for God always 
                                                 
historical employment of the religious Aqedah as a national trope by modern secular Zionism. Yael S. 
Feldman, Glory and Agony: Isaac's Sacrifice and National Narrative (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2010), 20. 
130 Trible, Genesis 22, 171. 
131 “The omissions of biblical narrative are as cunning as its repetitions.” Alter, Art of the Biblical 
Narrative, 98. The absence of Sarah, non-mention of Abraham or Isaac’s inner thoughts or feelings, and 
omission of Isaac’s name at the end all work to heighten the reader’s sensitivity to the few details provided. 
132 “It begins with a heading or statement of theme (v. 1a) which synthesizes what follows in a 
pregnant expression: God is testing Abraham.” Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 354. “Theme. An idea which 
is part of the value-system of the narrative—it may be moral, moral-psychological, legal, political, 
historiosophical, theological—is made evident in some recurring pattern. It is often associated with one or 
more Leitwörter but it is not co-intensive with them; it may also be associated with a motif. (For example, 
the reversal of primogeniture in Genesis; obedience versus rebellion in the Wilderness stories; knowledge 
in the Joseph story; exile and promised land; the rejection and election of the monarch in Samuel and 
Kings.)” Alter, Art of the Biblical Narrative, 95. The theme of the Aqedah on which the moral-
psychological-theological-ethical value system hinges is the concept of a divine test. 
133 “Only this time does God address Abraham by name first—perhaps singling out the solemnity 
of this moment.” J. Davidson, “Abraham, Akedah, and Atonement,” 53. Francis Landy writes, “Primarily it 
also invokes Abraham as a speaking subject. The abstract distanced representation that encompasses the 
story (God—test—Abraham) is replaced by an Abraham who declares his presence and a voice that meets 
him.” Francis Landy, “Narrative Techniques and Symbolic Transactions in the Akedah,” in Signs and 
Wonders: Biblical Texts in Literary Focus, ed. J. Cheryl Exum, The Society of Biblical Literature Semeia 
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started his verbal interactions with imperatives and self-assertions: (1) Gen 12:1 “Go,” 
(2) Gen 12:7 “To your offspring, I will give,” (3) Gen 13:14 “Lift up your eyes,” (4) Gen 
15:1 “Fear not,” (5) Gen 17:1 “I am God Almighty,” (6) Gen 18:5 “Do as you have said,”  
(7) Gen 21:12 “Be not displeased.” In striking contrast, God initiates this final test of 
Abraham utilizing dialogue.134  
Why is this important for narrative analysis? Alter explains the significance of 
narrative beginnings, “From all I have said about the primacy of dialogue, several general 
rules suggest themselves for the alert reading of biblical narrative. In any given narrative 
event, and especially, at the beginning of any new story, the point at which dialogue first 
emerges will be worthy of special attention, and in most instances, the initial words 
spoken by a personage will be revelatory, perhaps more in manner than in matter, 
constituting an important moment in the exposition of character.”135 In regard to matter, 
since this is the first time God calls him by his covenant name Abraham, God may have 
intended Abraham to take the test from a stance of self-awareness as the covenant Father 
                                                 
Studies (Atlanta, GA: The Society of Biblical Literature, 1989), 10-11.   
134 God did not verbally invite dialogue in Gen 15, where Abraham and God have their first 
recorded conversation. Abraham’s protest started that conversation. Alter remarks on how revealing 
Abraham’s first words to God are: “Until this point, all of Abram’s responses to God have been silent 
obedience. His first actual dialogue with God—in this, too, prophetic precedents may be relevant—
expresses doubt that God’s promise can be realized: this first speech to God reveals a hitherto unglimpsed 
human dimension of Abram. . . . God remains impassively silent in the face of Abram’s brief initial 
complaint forcing him to continue and spell out the reason for his skepticism about the divine promise.” 
Alter, Genesis, 63 n2, 3. 
135 Alter, Art of Biblical Narrative, 74.  
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of nations.136 In regard to manner, because the form was deliberately dialogical, it may 
suggest God’s desire for Abraham to dialogue with Him during this test.137 
Though Abraham’s prompt response may seem a bit impersonal compared to his 
warm response to his son “Here I am, my son” and his previous addresses to God (“My 
Lord Yahweh” 15:2, 15:8, and “My Lord” 18:3),138 hinneni “Here I am” (literally 
“Behold, I”) does communicate Abraham’s open and willing attitude. It also introduces 
the Aqedah leitmotif (key-idea) of seeing which is referenced continually through related 
words of meaning or phonetic resemblance (hinneni, Moriah, eyes, saw, behold, 
see/provide, fearing) a total of thirteen times (Gen 22:1, 2 [2x], 4 [2x], 7 [2x], 8, 12, 13 
[2x], 14 [2x]). According to Alter, “it is one of the most powerful means for conveying 
meaning without expressing it.”139 
                                                 
136 From the time God had given him the covenant name Abraham in Gen 17, God had used that 
name while talking to himself (Gen 18:17-19) but had never addressed Abraham by this covenant name 
until now (Gen 22:1).  
137 There is one possibility that God may have set up Abraham for dialogue once before through 
body language in Gen 18:22. “It has been suggested that the phrase Abraham stood still before the Lord 
(18:22b) is a tiqun soferim ‘scribal correction’ to avoid irreverence, which would have been implied in the 
reverse sequence ‘God stood before Abraham.’” Doukhan, Genesis, 248. If this is taken as true, it would 
depict a scene where two left for Sodom, but God remained behind and stood quietly in front of Abraham, 
creating a safe space for Abraham’s reaction. Such a physical hint may have been taken by Abraham as an 
invitation to draw nearer to God to express his concerns, to negotiate and press for mercy (Gen 18:22). 
Alter, Genesis, 81. On the other hand, if Abraham was standing before the Lord in a humble but troubled 
attitude, God, who is sensitive to human emotions and expressions (See Gen 4:6) may have lingered behind 
to hear his servant’s burden and waited for him to speak his mind. 
138 The choice of context affects how one “hears” the text. How God and Abraham “heard” each 
other can only be determined from comparing present interactions with previous patterns and future 
repetitions. “The authors of the biblical narrative astutely discovered how the slightest strategic variations 
of the pattern of repetitions could serve the purposes of commentary, analysis, foreshadowing, thematic 
assertion, with a wonderful combination of subtle understatement and dramatic force.” Alter, Art of Biblical 
Narrative, 91. It is certainly too early in the story to surmise Abraham’s mood from his first response, 
except to note its brevity, but as the story progresses, his silence comes across as unusual. 
139 Alter, Art of the Biblical Narrative, 93. Leitwort is a root word that captures the smallest unit of 
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By saying hinneni, Abraham invites God to visualize him as he presents himself 
in readiness. The test reveals Abraham is consistently open and obedient. His triple 
hinneni fulfills the criteria for a “sequence of actions”140 that marks the movement of the 
plot. This also happens to be “Abraham’s only response that is really a response: 
hinneni.”141  
A horrific, yet artfully constructed command accosts Abraham’s ears. Comparing 
it to previous divine commands from Abraham’s world of meaning behind the text helps 
the reader to “hear” it as Abraham might have heard it,142 emotively, stylistically, and 
                                                 
“repetitive structuring and focusing devices in biblical narrative. . . . Through abundant repetition, the 
semantic range of the word-root is explored, different forms of the root are deployed, branching off at times 
into phonetic relatives (that is, word-play), synonymity, and antonymity; by virtue of its verbal status, the 
Leitwort refers immediately to meaning and thus to theme as well. (For example, go and return in the Book 
of Ruth, the verb to see with its poetic synonyms in the Balaam story.)” Alter, Art of Biblical Narrative, 95. 
In the Aqedah, the leitmotif (key-idea) is seeing playing on the leitwort (key-word) ra’ah “to see” by 
extending to word-relatives either by meaning or phonetic resemblance: behold (hinneh), Moriah (if from 
either root ra’ah “to see” or yere’ “to fear”), fear (yare). Bazalel Porten, “The Root Pair בשי—בוש in 
Jeremiah,” in Hamlet on a Hill: Semitic and Greek Studies Presented to Professor T. Muraoka on the 
Occasion of His Sixty-Fifth Birthday, eds. W. Th. Van Peursen and M. F. J. Baasten (Leuven, Belgium: 
Peeters Publishers, 2003), 375-376.   
140 “Sequence of Actions. This pattern appears most commonly and most clearly in the folktale 
form of three consecutive repetitions, or three plus one, with some intensification or increment from one 
occurrence to the next, usually concluding either in a climax or reversal. (For example, the three captains 
and their companies threatened with fiery destruction in 2 Kings 1; the three catastrophes that destroy Job’s 
possessions, followed by a fourth in which his children are killed; Balaam’s failure to direct the ass three 
times.)” Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, 95-96. In the Aqedah, the triple pattern of Abraham’s hinneni 
to Elohim, Isaac, and the messenger of YHWH (Gen 22:1, 7, 11) marks the apices of the linguistic-
syntactical chiastic structure. The only other candidate for this pattern in the Aqedah are the triple divine 
communications (Gen 22:1-2, 11-12, 15-18). The following subsection on literary structure will try to 
synthesize both sets of triple sequences in the structural analysis of the final form in the canon, see pages 
144-153.  
141 Doukhan, “Center of Aqedah,” 24. 
142 Variable repetitions is a narrative methodology that translates to the reader how a narrative 
character “hears” a new communication. These are under the direct control of the narrator. “What we find, 
then, in biblical narrative is an elaborately integrated system of repetitions, some dependent on the actual 
recurrence of individual phonemes, words, or short phrases, others linked instead to the actions, images, 
and ideas that are part of the world of the narrative we ‘construct’ as readers but that are not necessarily 
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linguistically. Emotively, the test command moves pleadingly (na) in four steps from 
“kinship, ‘your son,’ through the exclusivity of relationship, ‘your only one,’ through the 
intimacy of bonding, ‘whom you love,’ to climax in the name that fulfills promise, the 
name of laughter and joy, the name yishaq (Isaac).”143 This rhetoric inevitably elicits and  
intensifies Abraham’s paternal feelings for his son Isaac, who is to accompany him on 
this journey.144 In stark contrast, God’s previous command for Ishmael’s banishment from 
Abraham (Gen 21:12-13) had rhetorically dampened Abraham’s paternal attachment to 
his firstborn son: Ishmael wasn’t named but referred to as “the lad” and Hagar as “your 
slavegirl” whereas Sarah and Isaac were prominently named, Ishmael was also called 
“the slavegirl’s son” though the last mention of him in God’s speech tied him to Abraham 
biologically as “your seed.” Clearly, God’s command rhetoric for relinquishing Ishmael 
was consistent with enabling relinquishment in matter and manner, but the command 
rhetoric regarding Isaac’s sacrifice is unexpectedly paradoxical.145 Even the narrator 
chimes with God’s rhetorical strategy by emphasizing Isaac’s relationship to Abraham as 
                                                 
woven into the verbal texture of the narrative.” Alter, Art of Biblical Narrative, 95. 
143 Trible, “Genesis 22,” 172. J. Davidson suggests the increasing specificity may be to avoid 
possible confusion since Abraham had previously suggested Ishmael and Eliezer as his heirs. J. Davidson, 
“Abraham, Akedah, and Atonement,” 54. Licht argues that the serial delays in the tender phrasing increases 
dramatic tension. Jacob Licht, Storytelling in the Bible, 120. 
144 J. Davidson, “Abraham, Akedah, and Atonement,” 54-55. 
145 Many scholars interpret the tension between matter and manner as expressing divine empathy, 
i.e., God’s tender words show that He recognizes how painful this request is for Abraham and the difficult 
magnitude of the test. Doukhan, Genesis, 276; Von Rad, Genesis, 239. The reverse would sound 
blasphemous, that God is intensifying the pain on purpose to magnify the test. Yet Kierkegaard will argue 
this very point because he believes it is giving up what one loves that defines a sacrifice. Kierkegaard, Fear 
and Trembling, 101.  
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his son repeatedly; the narrator “does not miss a chance in the story to refer to Isaac as 
‘his son’ and Abraham as ‘his father’ thus sharpening the edge of anguish that runs 
through the tale.”146 Clearly, the son motif147 is a repeating element of relationship 
deliberately suppressed in Ishmael’s banishment but clearly underscored in the Aqedah. 
Stylistically, the three increasingly specific designations of the divine command 
rhythmically parallel the three concentric designations in Abraham’s initial call (Gen 
12:1) suggesting a similar experience of sacrificial obedience.148 However, a new element 
is introduced, the first biblical mention of love (“whom you love”) interrupts the 
sequence of biological, numerical, linguistic designation of the victim. Why does the test 
juxtapose love and sacrifice? Is this test about priorities (love versus sacrifice), 
Abraham’s love for Isaac pitted against his love for God?149 Is it about constancy (love 
                                                 
146 Alter, Genesis, 104n3. As in the story of Amnon and Tamar, “these terms serve to present the 
actions of the characters in the light of family relationships between them, thereby expressing an implicit 
judgment: either these actions are appropriate to these family relationships or they are not.” Bar-Efrat, 
Narrative Art of the Bible, 245. 
147 “Motif. A concrete image, sensory quality, action, or object recurs through a particular 
narrative; it may be intermittently associated with a Leitwort; it has no meaning in itself without the 
defining context of the narrative; it may be incipiently symbolic or instead primarily a means of giving 
formal coherence to a narrative. (For example, fire in the Samson story; stones and the colors white and red 
in the Jacob story; water in the Moses cycle; dreams, prisons and pits, silver in the Joseph story.)” Alter, 
Art of Biblical Narrative, 95. There are at least four motifs in the Aqedah: son, burnt offering, wood, and 
place. 
148 “The three designations of the sacrifice Abraham was asked to offer . . . parallel the three 
designations of the place he was asked to leave” in Gen 12:1. Doukhan, Genesis, 276. 
149 Levenson believes it is. For him, the Aqedah sacrificial command was in line with the ancient 
first fruit offering of the son to God, demonstrating obedience to God as a priority over love of progeny. 
Later, the firstborn was divinely ordered to be redeemed in Exod 13:13 and Num 18:15. Levenson, Death 
and Resurrection, 46-51. 
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and sacrifice), requiring steadfast love for Isaac even as he obeys God to sacrifice him?150 
Or is the test about engaging paternal love (“whom you love”) to solve the sacrificial test 
command?151  
Linguistically, the lexeme152 of lek-lekha (“walk/go-for-yourself”) decisively links 
the God’s first and last commands to Abraham together like bookends, for external 
journeys also connote an internal journey.153 Whereas the first lek-lekha commanded 
Abraham to leave his physical and religious past, the second lek-lekha “points to the 
future, his son Isaac and the land of Moriah, with all that it implies of hope and 
promise.”154 Go to yourself, God says, once again, but this time take Isaac with you, and 
go “to the Land of Moriah and offer him up as a burnt offering on one of the mountains 
                                                 
150 If pain is the “currency” i.e., the main value of a sacrifice, sacrificing the most precious item 
while continuing to love it would maximize the value of the act. Firstborn child sacrifice capitalizes on the 
love/pain of new parents. 
151 The ram as the test solution should align with the divine purpose behind the test command. The 
discussion about which of these solution paradigms is the correct one will be addressed in chapter 4 on 
theological meso-hermeneutics, see figure 4.5 on page 224.  
152 A lexeme is the small unit of lexicon in a language that bears meaning. It is one notion that 
may consist of one or more words with inflected meanings. As one word, they are the headings in a 
dictionary. As a phrase unit they carry one meaning, i.e., “take off,” “put up with.” 
153 Augustine says Abraham was given this test in order that “Abraham may discover himself; this 
testing is none other than a space offered to freedom, it is a way to fulfillment.” Augustine quoted by 
Robert Davidson, The Courage to Doubt: Exploring an Old Testament Theme (Eugene, OR: Wipf and 
Stock, 1983), 50. 
154 Doukhan, Genesis, 276. Because the ל of the “dativus commodi” can mean “to whose 
advantage (or disadvantage) something is done,” is this second lek-lekha implying the mode of 
disadvantage to Abraham, as a bookend to the first usage? Perhaps that is ruled out by God’s benevolent 
character, but then again, everything hinges on Abraham’s response. 
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which I shall say to you.”155 It would seem “as Abraham once broke with the past, so now 
he must destroy the future”156 by offering it up in sacrifice. 
The whole burnt offering (‘olah) which requires everything except the skin to be 
annihilated in flames is repeated ominously six times in the test (Gen 22:2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 
13).157 Doukhan writes, “Strangely and perhaps ironically, God’s language in describing 
this human sacrifice, a Canaanite practice that was prohibited by Him (Lev 18:21; 20:2-5) 
and even called an ‘abomination’ (Deut 12:31), is the same as in the description of the 
tabernacle sacrifice (Exod 29:38-45; Lev 1:3; Num 15:1-10). The contradiction is even 
more disturbing as the two sacrifices express opposite theologies of salvation. While the 
pagan sacrifice implies the human ascent and work towards God, the Israelite sacrifice 
signifies, on the contrary, the divine descent and grace on behalf of humans.”158 Rife with 
rhetorical and ritual paradox, the test command ends with a divine promise to lead 
Abraham to the sacred place. 
Execution  
And Abraham rose early in the morning and saddled his donkey and took his two 
lads with him, and Isaac his son, and he split wood for the offering, and rose and went to 
                                                 
155 As in the initial call, God promises continuing communication regarding the final destination. 
When Abraham had arrived at the tree of Moreh in Shechem after his initial journey, God visually appeared 
to him there and promised the surrounding land to his offspring (Gen 12:7). That became the site of 
Abraham’s first altar in Canaan. 
156 Trible, “Genesis 22,” 173. 
157 “The burnt offering was the only sacrifice that required the burning of the totality of the 
animal: ‘The priest shall burn all on the altar as a burnt sacrifice’ (Lev 1:9).” Adam and Eve, Abel, and 
Noah offered burnt offerings. Doukhan, Genesis, 285. 
158 Doukhan, Genesis, 277.  
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the place that God had said to him. On the third day Abraham raised his eyes and saw 
the place from afar. And Abraham said to his lads, “Sit you here with the donkey and let 
me and the lad walk ahead and let us worship and return to you.” And Abraham took the 
wood for the offering and put it on Isaac his son and he took in his hand the fire and the 
cleaver, and the two of them went together. And Isaac said to Abraham his father, 
“Father!” and he said, “Here I am, my son.” And he said, “Here is the fire and the wood 
but where is the sheep for the offering?” And Abraham said, “God will see to the sheep 
for the offering, my son.” And the two of them went together. And they came to the place 
that God had said to him, and Abraham built there an altar and laid out the wood and 
bound Isaac his son and placed him on the altar on top of the wood. And Abraham 
reached out his hand and took the cleaver to slaughter his son.  
The first mention of chronological time in the Aqedah is Abraham’s early 
morning preparations for the journey.159 Previously, Abraham’s early rising was 
ensconced in safety as he observed the smoke of Sodom and Gomorrah from afar and 
witnessed the fading forms of Hagar and Ishmael disappearing into the wilderness from 
his campsite, but now it is he who must relinquish the safety of home to face death.160 
Abraham’s inner thoughts remain opaque but his actions are clear. Abraham’s six 
preparatory verbs encircle his human companions with Isaac his son in dead center.161  
Of Abraham’s tasks, chopping is the only task vigorously accomplished (piel 
verb). Delaying this step to just before leaving camp sets up the already saddled donkey, 
                                                 
159 This time frame suggests the test command came during the previous night. Doukhan, Genesis, 
278.  
160 Abraham’s early morning rising might be interpreted in various ways as a metaphor: for 
portending something ominous, demonstrating prompt obedience, perhaps troubled anxiety, deliberately 
maximizing secrecy, or as Abraham’s acquired habit (Gen 19:27, 21:14).  
161 Trible, “Genesis 22,” 173. It was noted in the grammatical section that Abraham is the sole 
subject (masculine singular) of all six verbs (rose, saddled, took; cut, arose, went). Possible reasons for his 
exclusive activity are: Abraham is the sacrificial priest for his family, he understood God command as a 
personal ordeal, the ordeal may end in Isaac’s funeral, his obedience attests to his singlemindedness toward 
God, he is communicating through body language to God. 
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two lads, Isaac, and God as the captive audience to the intense dismembering of the 
wood. If this sequence of saddling the donkey before chopping the wood seems odd, it is 
because the reader is drawing from the world of meaning in front of the text—the reader’s 
experiential knowledge of how wood is usually taken on a journey. Usually, the order is 
in reverse: first chopping the wood, then binding it, then packing it with other items onto 
the transporting entity. Karen Wacome therefore, interprets this unusual sequence of 
Abraham’s actions as a deliberate double-voiced silent protest, a speech-act162 
communication to induce God to relent. With each shattering stroke Abraham “presents 
the deity with a preview of the violence that will be done to Isaac if the sacrifice is 
completed.”163  
Other theological undercurrents may reside in the narrator’s handling of wood in 
the Aqedah test of worship. Of all the sacrificial implements, it is wood (5x), not knife 
                                                 
162 A “speech-act” is an utterance or action that conveys a meaning beyond a basic descriptive or 
propositional function. This is referred to as a performative, illocutionary act. John Langshaw Austin, How 
to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 52, 148. Bahktin recognized 
discourse could be nonverbal. “To live means to participate in dialogue; to ask questions, to heed, to 
respond, to agree and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: 
with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, and with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in 
discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium.” 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1984), 293. Abraham’s chopping of the wood may be interpreted by the servants and 
Isaac as routine preparation for a sacrifice, but because God and the reader are privy to what prompted it, 
subtle deviations from the expected norm (such as delaying the task until the end, unusual intensity of the 
chopping) can be understood to indicate confusion, reluctance, or even protest.  
163 Karen Ann Halvorsen Wacome, “Watching the Sacrifice of Isaac: Bahktin, Dialogism and 
Genesis 22:1-19” (PhD dissertation, Graduate Theological Union, 2005), 106. Others also recognize the 
drama of this foreboding action. “Each blow must be felt as compounding the murder.” Landy, “Narrative 
Techniques,” 13. “In a narrative famous for its rigorous economy in reporting physical details, this act of 
Abraham, wielding an axe and cutting things apart is ominously singled out for attention.” Alter, Genesis, 
104. 
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(2x), fire (2x) or altar (2x), that is mentioned most frequently. Wood is a recurring motif 
of the Aqedah. But why would such a mundane substance be given prominence? One 
narrative possibility reaches back to the world of meaning behind the text, the strange 
detail of a tamarisk tree Abraham planted after obtaining well-rights in Beersheba, just 
two verses before the Aqedah (Gen 21:33). Tamarisk trees have high water consumption 
and in ancient times were the sacred wood preferred for making divine images and 
known therefore as the “muscle and bone of the gods.”164 Was this tree mentioned 
because it was a source of wood for the offering? Even if the connotation of wood with 
idolatry existed only in the minds of the intended Israelite audience in the world in front 
of the text, a subtle polemic against wooden idols and grove worship can be plausibly 
educed by the narrative arc from Abraham’s first sacrifice165 at the sacred Tree of Moreh 
to his final sacrifice on Mt. Moriah where trees are reduced to transported fodder.166 If 
this hunch is correct, it might explain why this motif of wood is redundantly tagged in the 
                                                 
164 Thorkild Jacobsen, “The Graven Image,” in Ancient Isrealite Religion: Essays in Honor of 
Frank Moore Cross, eds. Paul D. Hanson, Patrick D. Miller Jr., and S. Dean McBride (Philadelphia, PA: 
Fortress, 1987), 25.  
165 Abraham’s life journey is marked by altars, Isaac’s by wells, and Jacob’s by stone memorials.  
166 Trees were prohibited within the confines of the tabernacle because of their association with 
idolatry. “You shall not plant any tree as an Asherah beside the altar of the Lord your God that you shall 
make” (Deut 16:21). Gideon was told to cut up an Asherah pole and use it as wood for a burnt offering to 
Jehovah (Judg 6:26). 
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Aqedah with the phrase “of the offering.” Wood is for offerings to God; trees are not 
gods to worship.  
Thus far, two of the test imperatives (take, go) have been completed, Abraham 
“took. . .  Isaac, his son” and “went to the place of which God had told him.” Only the last 
imperative of sacrifice remains.167 It is not clear whether the perfect tense (had told) of the 
verb amar (to say) in verse 3 implies directions were given to Abraham after verse 2 
(which I shall tell you) or whether if that phrase functions only as a rhetorical tag for the 
first mention of the place as told to Abraham.168 What is clear is the concept of the place 
(vv. 2, 3, 4, 9, 14) becomes increasingly important as the Aqedah progresses. It will 
remain as one of the lasting religious legacies of the Aqedah.  
These four narrative motifs hint at the realms of relationship (son), ritual (burnt 
offering), things (wood), and space (sacred place). Time, which had been the regular 
descriptive benchmark for the Abrahamic cycle is the one realm missing from the list.169 
                                                 
167 Gen 22:2. 
168 According to Wenham, “The last clause indicates that God had spoken again to Abraham, for 
the location of the mountain was not revealed at first.” Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 106; cf. Westermann, 
Genesis 12-36, 358. 
169 The Aqedah does not disclose the age of Abraham or Isaac. Instead, the framing temporal 
marker gathers everything that has happened prior to this event into one phrase “after these things,” the 
next temporal marker in the story “early the next morning” relays obedient preparations, the following 
temporal marker “on the third day” catapults the reader to the day of the sacrifice, and the last temporal 
marker is implied by “Abraham dwelt in Beersheba.” 
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In contrast to being so overt in previous events, in the Aqedah, time is used subliminally 
to affect the reader. 
For instance, the temporal marker “on the third day” alerts the reader to a missing 
two-day gap. Auerbach imaginatively fills this temporal vacuum with existential dread, 
“Thus the journey is like a silent progress through the indeterminate and contingent, a 
holding of the breath, a process which has no present, which is inserted, like a blank 
duration, between what has passed and what lies ahead, and yet which is precisely 
measured: three days! Three such days positively demand the symbolic interpretation 
which they later received.”170 The skip over two days is followed, per contra, by a wordy 
description of a single instant: “Abraham lifted up his eyes and saw the place from 
afar.”171 Though it is tempting and often necessary for narratologists to fill in time and 
verbal gaps,172 this should not rise to the level of disregarding the explicit temporal 
staging by the narrator. The curt reference of two days of narrated time indicates the 
content of those days as unimportant to the plot except, perhaps, as a symbolic duration, 
                                                 
170 Auerbach, Mimesis, 10. 
171 The narrator could have written, “On the third day, Abraham saw the place” to state the same 
fact. The phrase “Lifting up of the eyes and seeing” seems to be metaphor for meaningful recognition. 
Compare Gen 13: 10 “Lot lifted up his eyes and saw the Jordan Valley, that it was well watered like the 
garden of the Lord.” Lifting of the eyes does not always mean he looked up because Lot’s gaze is 
geographically downward, toward the Jordan valley. The metaphor relayed an apperception of verdant land 
reminiscent of the Garden of Eden. 
172 The pervasive silence that surrounds Abraham’s journey could be interpreted as dread, 
numbness, confusion, fear, or anxiety. God’s presumed silence during the three-day journey has also raised 
speculation about divine emotions. Filling in gaps is extremely dependent on context and because it invites 
projection and speculation, reveals more about the interpreter’s personality than anything else. Is there 
something more objective in the text to interpret the silences? 
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while the stretching of narration time highlights Abraham’s moment of sight as very 
significant to the plot of spiritual sight.173 The relation between narration time and 
narrated time, a technical relationship residing between the text and the reader in front of 
the text,  reveals the underlying priorities of the narrator, who anticipated the reading 
performance from the world behind the text. 174 
With the place in sight, Abraham also commands his servants through four verbs, 
just as God did: “[You] Stay for yourselves,” “[we] will go,” “[we] will worship”, “[we] 
will return.”175 The Hebrew ל dativus commode-reflexive here (as in the lek-lekha “walk 
for yourself” of the divine imperative to Abraham), comes across as “Sit for yourselves, 
sit for your own sakes.” Note how Abraham skillfully emphasizes their benefit in resting 
here and ends with a reassuring promise to return to them. Abraham’s rhetorical mastery 
continues in recognizing Isaac’s dual identity as a “lad” among other lads and as part of 
“we” with himself.176 Finally, a hint of self-effacing humor may be tucked away in the 
                                                 
173 Narrated time is literary time inside the story. Narration time is the objective, external “time 
required for telling or reading the narrative.” The longer the narration time relative to narrated time, the 
more important it is in the author’s eyes. Bar-Efrat, Narrative Art of the Bible, 143.   
174 “If we note variations in narrated time in relation to narration time, ranging from scenic 
representation to summary account, we will discover the narrative’s focal points and the relative 
importance of its various subjects.” Bar-Efrat, Narrative Art of the Bible, 151.  
175 God’s test command also had four verbs: “[you] Take,” “[you] Go for yourself,” “[you] Offer,” 
“I will tell you.” Verbal comparisons are: Opposites—“Take your son/Stay with the donkey,” Parallel—
“Go/Go,” Interpretive—“Offer him up/Worship,” Continuity—“ I will tell you/We will return to you.”   
176 “An identity of terms, an ironic divergence of meanings—the young men who are his 
servants—in fact, his slaves—and the boy to whom he fondly refers, whom he thinks he is going to kill.” 
Alter, Genesis, 104. Trible dissects the designations of Isaac, meticulously pointing out that “we” stands for 
bonding between father and son, but the distancing term “lad” unites Isaac with his companions. According 
to Trible, attachment-detachment is a “dangerous dialectic” that is about to be “transcended in the worship 
of God.” The ideal is “non-attachment.” Trible, “Genesis 22,” 179. Her explanation is: “Nonattachment is a 
transcendent way of knowing and thinking. It moves human beings beyond interpersonal entrapments to a 
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literary chiasmus177 of his nouns, “Wait you here with the ass and I and the boy will go to 
here.”178 Abraham juxtaposes himself with the donkey; a chiastic comparison can suggest 
either similarity or contrast.179  
When Abraham shares his intention to go with his son to worship and return 
together to the traveling party, the reader may wonder if this is a speech of hope, faith, 
confusion or deception.180 Though the dramatic irony at the beginning of the Aqedah 
                                                 
realization of the divine. Thus it offers a spiritual perspective that allows one to be in the world but not of 
it. In the language of Genesis 22, nonattachment is fear of God. In addition to scriptural foundations, this 
interpretation builds on Zen Buddhism and Metapsychiatry.” Ibid. fn. 20. Another possibility for 
understanding the concept of non-attachment is to consider the psychological concept of differentiation that 
avoids enmeshment and blurring of boundaries. Differentiation is the ability to be distinct, unique while 
remaining in healthy relation to a larger group or family. This is also referred to more broadly as “field-
independence” in psychology, a cognitive style where one can choose to be independent or distinct from 
their backgrounds or context without rejecting it. Oxford Dictionary of Psychology, 4th ed. (2015), s.v. 
“Field Dependence-Independence.” In any case, the journey holds the intimation of a rite of passage for 
Isaac, a coming of age from a dependent child to a semi-autonomous young adult and spiritual heir. 
177 A chiasmus is a rhetorical or literary figure in which words, grammatical constructions, or 
concepts are repeated in reverse order in the same or modified form. Oxford Dictionary of English, s.v. 
“chiasmus.”  
178 “Chiasmus can also be developed in precative discourse between verbs of different kinds. In Ge 
22:6 an ethical object stands in chiasmus with a subject, ‘wait you here with the ass and I and the boy will 
go to there.’” Andersen, The Sentence in Biblical Hebrew, 134.  
179 Abraham and the ass are the only two laden down with a burden, the lads and Isaac are free and 
oblivious.  
180 Early Church Fathers, like Origen recognized there were two ways to interpret Abraham’s 
speech here and reasoned “that in order to save Abraham from being an outright liar, we must assume 
Abraham thought both that he would fulfill God’s command and that they would both return; and the only 
way to resolve this patent contradiction would be for Abraham to have believed his son would be 
resurrected.” Stephen R. Palmquist and Philip McPherson Rudisill, “Three Perspectives on Abraham's 
Defense against Kant's Charge of Immoral Conduct,” The Journal of Religion 89, no. 4 (October 2009): 
467-497. The world of meaning behind the text, of previous chapters in Genesis, demonstrates Abraham’s 
habit under stress has been of half-truths to mislead hearers (Gen 20:11-13); the world of meaning in front 
of the text, as explicated by the book of Hebrews (Heb 11:19), says Abraham’s faith in the miracle of 
resurrection may be behind this utterance. These options for interpretation will be discussed in the next 
chapter on the level of meso-hermeneutics.  
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initially elevated the reader above the narrative characters by the privileged knowledge 
that this was a test, at this juncture the reader is more confused about Abraham’s thoughts 
than even his own servants who accept his words at face value. Ironically, privileged 
knowledge reads ambiguity into an otherwise straightforward proposition.181  
The last leg of the journey requires a second preparation and a second 
departure.182 “This time the objects, wood of the burnt offering and fire and knife, 
surround ‘Isaac his son.’ Ironies abound. Isaac carries the wood that will ignite him. Yet 
unkindled it is not dangerous material, unlike the fire and the knife that Abraham takes in 
his own hand. The father embraces his son with potential destruction even as he protects 
him from immediate danger. Syntactically and thematically this sentence echoes verse 
three to trap Isaac.”183 The depiction of a doomed son under wood evokes the image of 
Ishmael under a woody bush in the previous chapter.184 Whatever is keeping the wood 
                                                 
181 The irony of deeper knowledge causing confusion hinges on the documented moral character 
of  Abraham. Abraham is faithful, but in speech he has been misleading to others without outright lying. 
Thus, the reader is not sure how to understand him here. Is this remark a statement of faith, hope, a lie, or a 
half-truth (Isaac could return as burnt ashes for burial)? At this point in the test there are at least seven 
different levels of seeing/knowing the truth: God, the narrator, Abraham, Isaac, the servant lads, the donkey 
and the reader. The last entity is the most confused, even more confused than Abraham’s ass. 
182 Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 359. The first departure was from the physical home 
encampment. The second departure is from society altogether. The first separated Isaac from his protective 
mother, the second separates Isaac from his peers. The public personae of father and son have been left 
behind, only a private bond remains between these two. It will now be tested. 
183 Trible, “Genesis 22,” 175. 
184 From under the bush, Ishmael cried out to God though we don’t know what he said. God heard 
him then saved him through his mother and a well (Gen 21:17). From the same position relative to wood, 
Isaac speaks for the very first time as well. At this point in the story, Isaac has assumed the duties of the 
beast of burden, but unlike a dumb animal Isaac has a voice and a deductive mind and will call on his father 
to answer. 
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together is not mentioned185 and even Isaac’s back for carrying the wood is not 
mentioned. What is specifically highlighted is Abraham’s hand. Notably, it is Abraham’s 
hand, not the dangerous cleaver in it, that is the focus of the angelic prohibition later.186 
Thus laden with the implements of sacrifice, father and son “went, the two of them, 
together.”187 This tender inclusio188 of solidarity in solitude envelopes the central dialogue 
of the Aqedah.  
When Isaac finally speaks, the Hebrew is literally “and Isaac said to Abraham his 
father, and he said, “My father!”189 Doukhan writes, “It is the first and only time that 
Isaac speaks in this story. In the Hebrew text, the first ‘say’ of Isaac is not immediately 
followed by the words of Isaac. It is as if Isaac intended to say something but stopped and 
could not proceed. This detail, overlooked in most translations, suggests Isaac’s distress. 
He is full of contradictory thoughts and overwhelming emotions.”190 Alter’s rule that the 
                                                 
185 Only later do we hear about the binding of Isaac, looking back, we may assume that a binding 
material was probably holding the wood together for transport by Isaac. In the narrative called the Aqedah 
(the Binding), the verb bind is found but there is no mention of the material used. 
186 The angel of Elohim commands Hagar to hold Ishmael by the hand firmly in order to save him 
(Gen 21:18). The angel of YHWH commands Abraham to withdraw his hand from the lad, to save Isaac 
(Gen 22:12). The parental hand is the focus of the angel of YHWH for saving the child. 
187 Sarna depicts the poignant atmosphere in the phrase, “There is perfect rapport between the two, 
encompassed as they are in mutual solitariness and enveloped in silence. The tension between the 
unsuspecting innocence of the son and the unuttered agony of the father does not disturb the harmony.” 
Sarna, Genesis, 152. 
188 An inclusio is a refrain that occurs only twice, delineating a unit of text by enclosing it in the 
middle. Dictionary of the Old Testament, s.v. “Inclusio.” 
189 Doukhan, Genesis, 279-280.  
190 For a masterful exposition of the whole dialogue see Doukhan, Genesis, 280. Efrat also sees 
this as “irresolution, perhaps nervousness. Isaac wants to ask the question which is bothering him (‘Where 
is the lamb for the burnt offering?), but he is unsure, begins speaking, then hesitates.” Bar-Efrat, Narrative 
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manner of a character’s first speech is revelatory of character rings true, for Isaac is later 
portrayed as habitually delaying confrontation,191 as hesitant yet trusting,192 and as 
weighing sensory information carefully before forming a conclusion.193 Here Isaac breaks 
through his natural reticence and calls on Abraham as “his own unique and loving 
father.”194 
Abraham tenderly replies, “Here I am, my son.” This paternal response, human 
father to human son, marks the exact apex of the literary center of the Aqedah.195 Flanked 
by Abraham’s two other hinneni responses to God, it differs from them only by ending 
with “my son.”196 Landy hears in this phrase Abraham’s consistent readiness “to answer 
questions, at his disposal, kindly, attentive. This willingness is also protective: he will 
attempt to dispel doubt, satisfy curiosity and consequently anxiety, lend a tolerant and 
essentially comforting ear.”197 As the literary center of the Aqedah, this paternal response 
                                                 
Art in the Bible, 45. 
191 He’s waited three days to bring up the missing item to his father. He later avoids confrontation 
over wells yet keeps a sharp memory of past wrongs when Abimelech comes to make a treaty (Gen 26:15-
27). 
192 Isaac asks Jacob, “Who are you, my son? . . . How is it that you have found it so quickly, my 
son?” Gen 27:18-20. 
193 Isaac deliberates sensate evidence before choosing to believe, “The voice is Jacob’s but the 
hands are the hands of Esau.” Gen 27:21-27. 
194 Landy, “Narrative Techniques,” 16. Landy elaborates further, “Here, Abraham’s universal role 
as father of nations has receded into the background, Isaac relates to Abraham as ‘my father, my only 
father, whom I love, Abraham.’ Each is utterly irreplaceable to the other.” 
195 Doukhan, “Center of the Aqedah,” 19. 
196 This ending tenderly matches the possessive cry of Isaac, “My father!” 
197 Landy, “Narrative Techniques,” 16. Davidson reads it as indicative of intensity. J. Davidson, 
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either is, or points to the central meaning of the Aqedah. Crenshaw writes, “Indeed, one 
could even say that the heart of the story lies in just two (Hebrew) words within the 
dialogue: Dad/my son.”198 
Son and father share patterns of verbal sequence and rhyme. Landy compares 
them, “Abraham says to his lads, ‘Stay here (הפ) with the ass, and I and the lad will go 
thither (הכ דע)’ (v 5). Isaac says, ‘Here (הנה) are the fire and the wood, but where (היא) 
is the lamb for the burnt offering?’ (v 7).”199 For Abraham, the place beyond will divulge 
the final answer when Isaac, the unaware victim here finally reaches there. For Isaac, the 
unspoken reality of what awaits there may be starting to sink into the space here between 
his father and him: “This is another way of defining the terrible reality, without having to 
explicitly state: ‘Am I the lamb?’”200  
Instead of responding with spatial locator hinneh (behold/here) for the lamb’s 
whereabouts, or hinneni “Behold, I,” Abraham’s habitual answer to all questions (vv. 1, 
7, 11),201 Abraham focuses the answer on God, “God will see (for) Himself, the lamb for 
the burnt offering, my son.” The emphasis syntactically points to God202 as the solution; 
                                                 
“Abraham, Akedah, and Atonement,” 59. Westermann hears in it a “readiness to listen” that functions by 
making it “possible to introduce the dialog with the mutual exchange: ‘my father’ – ‘my son’ (v.7a).” 
Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 359.  
198 Crenshaw, Whirlpool of Torment, 29. 
199 Landy, “Narrative Techniques,” 26. 
200 Doukhan, Genesis, 280. 
201 Doukhan, “Center of Aqedah,” 23. 
202 God as the subject precedes the verb, a reversal of usual Hebrew order, thus syntax emphasizes 
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“He throws the ball back into God’s court, so to speak: ‘God will provide.’ At this 
moment there is still an opening left to God. One must note, however, that the statement 
has this meaning, and is possible, only in dialog.”203 
Is this dialog exclusively between the human participants? The speaking pattern 
evokes the first dialogue between God and Abraham: Isaac calls, “my father!” and God 
had called “Abraham! (Father of Nations),” Abraham answered to both “hinneni,” Isaac’s 
question has three objects and God’s command has three designations, the endings of 
both utterances overlap on one identity, Isaac is the lamb. If Abraham’s answer to Isaac is 
an indirect address to God, would it be too farfetched to surmise that God was using Isaac 
to provoke dialog with the taciturn Abraham?204 God is testing Abraham, is Abraham 
testing God?205 Abraham’s solicitous answer to Isaac “comes close to the solution, only 
                                                 
the subject, God. 
203 Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 359.  Hope, prophecy, prayer, evasion, kindness, irony, faith have 
all been proffered for Abraham’s motive behind this enigmatic answer. “The idiomatic force is ‘provide,’ 
but God’s seeing lines up with Abraham’s seeing the place from afar, his seeing the ram, and the seeing on 
the Mount of the Lord. Beyond the tunnel vision of a trajectory toward child slaughter is a promise of true 
vision.” Alter, Genesis, 105; J. Davidson, “Abraham, Akedah and Atonement,” 59; Doukhan, Genesis, 280; 
Landy, “Narrative Techniques,” 17; Von Rad, Genesis, 241; Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 109.  
204 Was God and Abraham in what can be framed as a custody battle, with the naïve Isaac as proxy 
for communicating indirectly? This possibility is brought up by Abraham’s history. Abimelech may have 
been used by God as proxy to publicly chastise Abraham’s lack of moral integrity over Sarah’s complete 
identity (Gen 20). 
205 There is a Jewish tradition of reading the Akedah as a test turned on its head with Abraham 
testing God’s own fidelity to the covenant and to His divinely provided son (Gen 21:1-2). Lippman Bodoff, 
“God Tests Abraham, Abraham Tests God,” Bible Review 9, no. 5 (October, 1993): 53-56, 62. 
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then to break off and leave both again to their thoughts.”206 Abraham and Isaac walk on, 
together.207  
When they arrived at the place “of which God had told him,” Abraham embarks 
on the final preparations208 as the sole actor of six verbs that target Isaac at the end of 
each triplet (built, arranged, bound Isaac his son, set, sent, took, to kill his son).209 After 
Isaac is bound and lying over the wood210 of the altar, the visual scope narrows to one 
aged hand, time slows down to one moment, one simple gesture is stretched out in 
                                                 
206 Von Rad, Genesis, 241.  
207 This inclusio “the two of them walked together” has not changed from verse 7, but the 
participants have—they are now gripped by new thoughts. Efrat calls this particular phrase a linguistic 
motif: “On occasions it is not a single word which is repeated but an entire phrase or a sentence within a 
narrative or a series of narratives, constituting a (linguistic) motif. Repetition of this kind may be verbatim 
or may evince slight changes, and both the actual repetition and modifications are important in reflecting 
the similarity of difference between situations, in describing characters, in emphasizing a topic or a 
concept, etc. So they went both of them together (Gen. 22.6, 8).” Bar-Efrat, Narrative Art in the Bible, 215.  
208 The sacrificial preparations through six verbs have been interpreted in opposite ways by 
narratologists. Coats reads it as a fast run up to the climax, “Following this transition, however, no further 
delays in the pace of narration appear. With rapid pounding verses 9-10 report construction of the altar, 
preparation of the wood, and the final order for slaughter that would end the son’s life in sacrifice.” Coats, 
“Abraham’s Sacrifice of Faith,” 394. Alter reads it as a slowing of time, “In contrast to the breathless pace 
of the narrative as a whole, this sequence inscribes a kind of slow motion: building the altar, laying out the 
wood, binding the child on top of the wood, reaching out the hand with the butcher knife—until the voice 
calls out from the heavens.” Altar, Genesis, 105. The difference may reside in whether one views the glut 
of verbs as action-packed haste or as one important task unbundled then conveyed in overly minute detail. 
Bar Efrat’s maxim of narrated time vs narration time would mark this activity as important to the plot. 
209 Trible, “Genesis 22,” 177. Davidson points out that we are never told when Abraham tells Isaac 
about the command, but by the time of binding “Isaac had to know.” J. Davidson, “Abraham, Akedah, and 
Atonement,” 60. The order for the Aqedah sacrifice (bind, lay on non-burning altar, slaughter) is not the 
same as for animal burnt offering (slaughter, splash blood, skin the animal, cut into pieces, lay pieces on 
burning altar, Lev 1:1-17). Perhaps Abraham is delaying the slaughter to the last moment, perhaps the 
customary order for human sacrifices is different. In either case, Abraham is very strong to pick up a bound 
young man to lay him on the altar. 
210 Ishmael was lying under the wood of the bush (Gen 21:15), Isaac had been under the wood 
initially (Gen 22:6-8) but is now lying over the wood on the altar (Gen 22:9).  
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narrative time into two predicative clauses and the knife that Isaac had carefully ignored 
until now, reappears; “Abraham stretched out his hand and took the cleaver.” Into this 
awful suspense, the narrator who divulged God’s intentions now grants the reader one, 
and only one peek into Abraham’s hidden intentions. Abraham took the cleaver with the 
resolute intent “to slaughter his son.”211 
Resolution  
And the Lord’s messenger called out to him from the heavens and said, 
“Abraham, Abraham!” and he said, “Here I am.” And he said, “Do not reach out your 
hand against the lad, and do nothing to him, for now I know that you fear God and you 
have not withheld back your son, your only one, from Me.” And Abraham raised his eyes 
and saw and look, a ram was caught in the thicket by its horns, and Abraham went and 
took the ram and offered him up as a burnt offering instead of his son. And Abraham 
called the name of that place YHWH-yireh, as is said to this day, “On the mount of the 
Lord, there is sight.” 
 
The sense of timing is absolutely sure in the Aqedah. A piercing cry from the 
heavens halts the near-death in the wilderness212 with “Abraham! Abraham!”213 Just as 
                                                 
211 Had the narrator not divulged his intent, Abraham’s actions could have been interpreted other 
ways, such as acting out required motions while hoping for a reprieve, or taking up the knife to fling it 
away in rejection of the command or taking up the knife to release Isaac’s bindings. Instead, the narrator 
reveals Abraham’s uncompromising homicidal intent. Ironically, Abraham who was always afraid that he 
might be killed violently (Gen 12:12; 20:11) is willing to enact the role of executioner over his trusting son.  
212 Near-death trial in the wilderness is a type scene identified by Robert Alter that marks the 
stories of Ishmael and Isaac in Gen 21-22. Along with the Leitwort, a type scene is a “distinctive biblical 
literary convention.” Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, 96. See also Robert Alter, “How Convention 
Helps Us Read: The Case of the Bible's Annunciation Type-Scene,” Prooftexts 3, no. 2 (1983):116-117. “A 
biblical type-scene is a narrative unit with numerous literary characteristics that are presented in a narrative 
pattern generally common to other similar passages but with key modifications. The characteristics of a 
well-developed type-scene include a combination of key terms and phrases, aspects of plot development 
and theme, and character actions and behaviors. While some of these elements may be common to many 
narratives throughout the biblical text, a good presentation of a type-scene highlights a collection of 
characteristics that distinguishes the narratives of the type-scene from all other passages.” Marina Hofman, 
“Dream Type-Scene in Old Testament Narratives: Structure and Significance” (PhD dissertation, 
University of St. Michael's College, 2014), 4. 
213 Name repetition can convey emotive passion or emphasis. Trible sees the added purpose of the 
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the messenger of Elohim rescued Ishmael,214 a messenger of YHWH rescues Isaac. 
Abraham answers in his usual manner, “Here I am.”215  
Abraham’s reaching his hand toward the lad is prohibited216 and his inner intent 
“to kill his son” is categorically condemned217 by “do nothing to him!” The tension of fear 
is broken, the bound victim is released, but instead of lingering on the happy scene the 
narrative focus immediately shifts upward into the eternal recesses of God’s knowledge. 
“For218 now I know that you fear God because you have not withheld your son, your only 
                                                 
repetition here as urgent “diversion, to compel a response.” Trible, “Genesis 22,” 178. Usually context 
determines how it should be interpreted, see Gen 46:2; Exod 3:4; 1 Sam 3:10; 2 Sam 19:4; Matt 7:22, 
23:37, 27:46; Luke 10:41, 22:31; Acts 9:4. 
214 Gen 21:11. 
215 This interruption may be unexpected to most readers, but Abraham’s answer of constancy 
suggests that a divine interruption may have been anticipated. 
216 The first reaching out of Abraham’s hand was to take the knife. Had Abraham reached out his 
hand again, but this time toward the lad with the knife in his hand? Doukhan believes the second movement 
is the one indicated by the angelic words. Doukhan, Genesis, 283. The ESV translates the angel’s words as 
“Do not lay your hand on the lad or do anything to him.” 
217 The second prohibition is a synthetic parallelism which enlarges to ban everything harmful to 
Isaac. William Brown, “Psalms and Hebrew Poetry,” in Cambridge Companion to the Hebrew/Old 
Testament (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 255-257; Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 110; 
Westermann thinks the second prohibition draws retrospectively from the span of the whole test, it “takes 
its meaning from the context. Nothing is to happen to the child, and this was God’s intention from the 
beginning. This half-verse makes clear and confirms that God never intended this cruel fate to befall the 
child.” Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 361. 
218 The deitic clause uses the particle “for, that” (ki) two times: for (ki) now I know that (ki). It is 
rare for narrators to pass overt moral judgment; they prefer to convey values through characters using the 
expression ki. Bar-Efrat, Narrative Art, 30. The function of ki is causal here, encased in a special 
motivational clause following a strong prohibition heightened by לא  and the subjunctive. Anneli 
Aejmelaeus, “Function and Interpretation of יכ in Biblical Hebrew,” Journal of Biblical Literature 105, no. 
2 (1986): 204, accessed March 9, 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3260389. 
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son, from Me.” This dramatic “climax, consequence, and conclusion”219 to the test 
touches on the psychology, assessment, and relationship between Abraham and God.  
Psychologically, God plumbs past the narrator’s disclosure of Abraham’s intent 
(“to kill his son”) which seems to fulfill the imperative (“offer him up there as a 
sacrifice”), all the way down to Abraham’s motivational identity (“you, fearing-one of 
God”).220 Evaluatively, Abraham’s inner state of reverence was exteriorized in objective 
visible obedience221 which was internalized as present divine knowledge (now, I know).222 
Hence God has not been a detached proctor in the test of the Aqedah but was profoundly 
affected by Abraham’s responses. Relationally, God’s effusive commendations suggest 
increased bonding between Abraham and God for relinquishing his son to God.223 But one 
                                                 
219 Trible, “Genesis 22,” 178. The narrative drama builds up to this point, then is suddenly 
released. “The narrative reaches its peak when Abraham puts out his hand and takes the knife to slay his 
son. The turning point comes at the very moment that the tension reaches its height: an angel of the Lord 
calls to Abraham from heaven, and at the very last moment the terrible deed is prevented.” Bar-Efrat, 
Narrative Art, 122. 
220 Distinction between Abraham’s intent and motive demonstrates a sophisticated understanding 
of what lies behind actions. This distinction is critical for criminal culpability in American law. For the 
difference between intent (plan to carry out an act) and motive (the reason behind the intention) in law, see 
Justices Alito and Thomas’ dissent discussion in Rosemond v. United States, 12-895 (SCOTUS 2014). God 
had also clarified this distinction in a dream to Abimelech: judging his motive as pure but his intent toward 
Sarah as sinful (Gen 20).  
221 “In the Tanakh, the fear of God denotes an active obedience to the divine will.” Fear of God 
was not understood to be limited to a private psychological state of mind. The Jewish Study Bible: Jewish 
Publication Society Tanakh Translation, eds. Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 46. 
222 In the world of the narrative plot, divine experiential knowledge is self-revealed as dynamic 
with temporal characteristics. 
223 Abraham had already not withheld a son from God, namely Ishmael in Gen 21. Isaac is more 
significant, but Abraham has a proven habit of giving up family members to authority (Gen 12, 16, 20). 
God does the opposite, He withholds (ךשח) Abimelech from sinning (Gen 20:6 “It was I who kept you from 
sinning against me.”) and He withholds Abraham from killing Isaac, while simultaneously commending 
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disquieting detail, easily overlooked, is God’s truncated reference to Isaac in this 
evaluation as “your son, your only son.” The last two emotive and covenantal 
designations (whom you love, Isaac) from the original test command have been dropped. 
Is this minor variation in repetition deliberate? In narrative analysis, it certainly is. In “an 
extremely sparse narrative, marked by formal symmetries, which exhibits a high degree 
of literal repetition, what you have to look for more frequently is the small but revealing 
differences in the seeming similarities, the nodes of emergent new meanings in the 
pattern of regular expectations created by explicit repetition,” writes Alter.224 In 
particular, when verbal repetition happens within the same pericope (three sets of divine 
serial designations for Isaac),225 from the same character source (God) of the initial 
presentation, about the same verbal object (Isaac), Sternberg’s Table of Repetition Types 
judges that variation as deliberate.226 Sternberg points out that the most valuable function 
of repetition resides “especially in the two areas about which the narrator is most reticent: 
the inner life of the agents and the ethical value of their acts. Repetition systematically 
                                                 
Abraham for “not withholding” (ךשח) Isaac from Him. 
224 Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, 97. The Aqedah is an extremely sparse narrative marked 
by formal symmetries with literal repetitions. 
225 Repetition that echoes an earlier appearance in a different text is called an allusive fixture and 
that which occurs earlier in the same text is called an internal fixture. The closer together the repetitions are 
(internal fixture), the higher the probability that they function with a purpose. Sternberg, Poetics of Biblical 
Narrative, 390. 
226 According to Sternberg’s Basic Guide to the Structure of Repetition Table, this pattern fits 
pattern no. 23 where the “motivation for retelling” with variation is to be considered purposeful or 
“deliberate.” Sternberg, Poetics of Biblical Narrative, 434-435. 
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illuminates those dark spots.”227 Thus in the Aqedah, deliberate variation in God’s own 
words must be taken as a serious ethical evaluation.228 Abraham’s test response seemingly 
fell short of God’s ideal. 
Freed by the angel’s words, Abraham now “lifts his eyes and sees” for the second 
time in his test.229 In verse four, he lifted up his eyes and saw “the place from afar” that 
“God had said to him.” This time, perhaps because no verbal indication was given, 
wonderful surprise ensues—he lifted up his eyes and saw and behold! He sees an animal 
in “the place”! A progressively clearer seeing is happening.230 Indeed, a photographic 
                                                 
227 Sternberg, Poetics of Biblical Narrative, 438. 
228 This change is also buttressed by the narrator who employs the first and last designations 
together (“his son, Isaac” in vv 3, 6, 9) up to the moment Abraham reaches for the knife. From that moment 
in the story, “Isaac” is dropped from the usual pair of designations and only “his son” remains (v 10, 13). 
By the time Abraham starts down the mountain, the narrator drops any mention of his son altogether. The 
immediately ensuing lineage of Nahor features the plural term “sons” (v. 20) which backlights this lacuna 
at the end of the Aqedah. 
229 Surprisingly, though the leitmotif of the Aqedah is “seeing,” Abraham is not depicted as 
visually comprehending God Himself. Abraham hears God. In the figure of speech for sight (he lifted up 
his eyes and saw), the concept of internal comprehension is primed by divine auditory instructions. Faith in 
God’s word is what endows vision with potent inner spiritual meaning. What Abraham sees is the place and 
the ram that God provided. 
230 “Abraham places his trust in God’s seeing (v. 8) and that trust finally enables him to see the 
lamb that God has seen to. Seeing saves the son.” Walter Brueggemann, “Genesis,” in The New 
Interpreter's Bible, ed. Michael E. Lawrence (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1994), 495. Except that it is 
a ram, not a lamb.  
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cluster of details is grasped immediately: the ram’s location,231 its maturity,232 and the 
antecedent nature of the provision.233  
In rapid succession the prescribed verbs of the test command (Take, go, offer) are 
fulfilled by Abraham on the animal: “Abraham went and took the ram and offered him up 
as a burnt offering instead of his son.” The ram is offered up as an equivalent substitute 
for Isaac in the sacrifice, not as an afterthought or consolation filler.234 Yet no divine 
words explicitly mention the ram, no divine words gave Abraham permission to 
substitute it. It was Abraham’s spiritual intuition that connected the angelic prohibition 
and the surprise ram together as two parts of a divinely provided solution for he 
                                                 
231 I have presented in the grammatical-syntactical section some discussion on a֨khar vs ֨ekhad for 
whether the meaning is to be positional—“behind/after,” chronological—“afterwards,” or  numerical—
“one” or “another.” In this section I would like to present some narrative arguments for translating it as 
“behind” (a֨khar). They are (1) Narrative Precedent: the previous identical phrase in v. 4 “he lifted up his 
eyes and saw” was followed by the object of sight with a spatial locator term immediately afterward, “the 
place from afar.” Thus the pairing of object-spatial locator in ram/behind matches the previous place/from 
afar, (2) Positional Blind Spot: If Abraham and Isaac were scanning their horizon expectantly for the 
provision of an animal while building an altar, the highest possibility for missing the ram is because it is 
outside their field of vision—behind them and even more, hidden in a thicket, (3) Stylistic consistency of 
surprise: “behold!” (hinneh) adds surprise to the phrase “he lifted up his eyes and saw,” “a ram!” adds 
surprise for not being a lamb but the prime candidate of sheep, “behind!” (a֨khar) adds surprise for 
overlooked location, “held by its horns in the thicket!” adds the chronologic element of surprise for God 
had already provided the solution before Isaac was bound in its [the ram’s] stead.  
232 Abraham and Isaac expected God to provide a sheep or lamb (seh) in verses 7-8 (see the 
grammatical syntactical analysis of verse 7 on seh, page 90, note 69). Instead God provided a mature ram 
trapped by the symbol of its masculine maturity—its horns. Metaphorically, the ram is the father of the 
lamb. 
233 This is implied by its silent but trapped position in the bush. Initially, a grown ram would 
struggle to free itself with thrashing noises. But since the text suggests Abraham did not notice this animal 
until this exact moment, the implication is the ram had fallen silent by the time Abraham came to the altar 
site for its presence in the bush was only discerned by sight. 
234 “God, the lamb, and the ram are involved in the same drama, as if they were identified with 
each other.” Doukhan, Genesis, 286.  
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proclaims235 the name of that place, “God will see/provide.” For Abraham, theocentric 
seeing/provision is the essence of “worship” (Gen 22:5), this is what makes a place 
sacred. 
Though Abraham’s conclusion could stand as the last word, the narrator deftly 
deploys a literary device that temporally transcends Abraham’s conclusion.236 The 
narrator breaks through the temporal limits of the plot to transport the reader into the 
world of meaning in front of the text—a point chronologically after the Aqedah event, but 
before the reader’s own time, into the narrator’s world—with the phrase “as it is said to 
this [the narrator’s] day.” Abraham’s hope-filled prophetic name for the place has been 
existentially interpreted by the narrator’s contemporaries into a proverb of certainty, “On 
the mount of the Lord, there is sight.” Vision in all directions (God is seen, man is seen, 
God’s present and future provision is seen) is allowed by the masculine singular niphal 
form of האר (to see). 
Conclusion  
And the Lord’s messenger called out to Abraham once again from the heavens, 
and he said, “By my own Self I swear, declares the Lord, that because you have done this 
                                                 
235 Abraham usually talked (“he said”) to God, servants, Isaac, and to the messenger of YHWH, 
but here for the first time in the narrative, Abraham called, as the messenger of YHWH had called to him. 
Did Abraham express proclamatory joy through verbal volume? Perhaps this is the moment referred to by 
Jesus in John 8:56, “Your father Abraham rejoiced that he was to see my day; he saw it and was glad.” 
236 In modern parlance, suspending the performance convention of configured reality is called 
“breaking the fourth wall.” In literature it is called “metalepsis” where the writer takes a hold of the 
“telling” of the story by changing levels. This happens when a character or narrator addresses the audience 
directly, refers to the plot or characters in the plot as such, thereby drawing attention to the dramatic or 
literary convention itself. Gerard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay on Method (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1972), 235. By sharing the proverb with the reader, the narrator validates communal 
hermeneutics that amended a faith-filled hope into certainty. 
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thing and have not held back your son, your only one, I will greatly bless you and will 
greatly multiply your seed as the stars in the heavens and as the sand on the shore of the 
sea, and your seed shall take hold of its enemies’ gate. 
Since most of the epiphanies in the Abrahamic cycle end with a blessing (12:2; 
13:16; 15:5; 17:2-6, 16, 20; 18:18; 21:13, 18), the long standing historical-critical 
categorization of verses 15-18 as secondary additions based on their expansive linguistic 
style has been challenged by several scholars.237 Narratively, this second angelic 
proclamation includes and exceeds the scope and emotional range of the first evaluation, 
which fulfills the criteria for the literary device of build-up and climax.238 Against the 
backdrop of the ascending smoke from the recent ram sacrifice, the soaring oration of the 
Lord’s blessings grants the final benediction. 
God swears on His own name and underscores it by the prophetic clause declares 
the Lord. Together, they express absolute certainty about what is to follow.239 The 
covenant blessings are unleashed “because240 you did this thing and did not withhold your 
                                                 
237 Coats, “Abraham’s sacrifice of faith”; Van Seters, Abraham in History and Tradition; T. 
Desmond Alexander, “Genesis 22 and the Covenant of Circumcism,” JSOT 8, no. 25 (1983): 17-22; 
Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 363; R. W. L. Moberly, “The Earliest Commentary on the Akedah,” Vetus 
Testamentum 38, no. 3 (July 1988): 302-323; Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 102; Sternberg, Poetics of Biblical 
Narrative, 55; Hamilton, Genesis 18-50, 115. 
238 See the Gen 22:15 footnote about build-up and climax (BUC) in Grammatical Syntactical 
Analysis section, page 96, note 102.   
239 This first divine oath in the Patriarchal cycles becomes a foundational touchstone of faith to 
refer back to (Gen 24:7; 26:3; 50:24; Exod 13:5). Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 111. In Exod 32:13 Moses 
explicitly recalls this oath that “you swore by your own self” to hold God back from destroying the 
descendants of Isaac. The second phrase “declares the Lord” (which appears 364 times in the Hebrew 
Bible) underscores divine dependability. 
240 Gen 18:19 speaks of divine promise with contingent actualization when God muses, “For I 
have chosen him [Abraham], that he may command his children and his household after him to keep the 
way of the Lord by doing righteousness and justice, so that the Lord may bring to Abraham what he has 
promised him.” The concept may be that even a promised gift requires obedient receptivity from the 
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son, your only son.” What constitutes this thing that Abraham accomplished? “This” 
suggests the preceding completed action of ram sacrifice as one linchpin, because 
Abraham’s previous intent and physical attempt to sacrifice Isaac had been emphatically 
thwarted and prohibited by God and therefore not accomplished. Yet God commends 
Abraham’s attitudinal willingness to not withold his precious progeny from God, this is 
the second linchpin. Together, the divine affirmations highlight what God endorses in 
Abraham’s response to the test. 
Suddenly divine exuberance is discharged241 through absolute infinitives followed 
by the finite form which magnify the verbs of blessings and multiplying. The three parts 
to the blessings are (1) emphatic certainty of blessing and multiplying of Abraham’s seed 
reinforced by the double imagery of stars in the heavens and the sands on the seashore, 
(2) Abraham’s seed will possess the gate of his enemies,242 and (3) all the nations will 
bless themselves through your seed. All three parts are rooted in past promises to 
Abraham, yet the focus of this renewal of the covenant has decidedly shifted downward 
                                                 
receiver in order to actualize its full effect. For instance, in Genesis 17 God had promised Abraham that 
Sarah would have a son in a year. However, it seems Sarah and Abraham weren’t sexually active in the 
interim, for when God later visits Abraham’s tent in Genesis chapter 18 and reiterates this same promise, 
Sarah laughs to herself, “After I am worn out and my lord is old, shall I have pleasure?” Postmenopausal 
vaginal dryness and age-related erectile dysfunction may have stymied their sexual life. Receptive 
obedience is required for full actualization of divine blessings. 
241 This juncture marks one of the differences between the approaches of narrative criticism and 
source criticism in the Aqedah. The synchronic approach of narrative analysis embraces the stylistic change 
in vocalization as rhetorically conveying exuberant joy while the diachronic approach had rejected and 
bracketed it out as an aberrant anachronistic anomaly precisely because of the poetic style. 
242 The Hebrew term for seed is a collective noun. Doukhan believes the singular masculine 
subject of the verbs in this section indicates the seed is referring to the promised Messiah, one singular 
individual who will possess the gates of his enemies and bless the nations. Doukhan, Genesis, 287. 
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to the seed of Abraham.243 The seed of Abraham is what has been spared and will be 
blessed with the fullness of the covenant because “you obeyed my voice.” 
The final divine conclusion of the Aqedah, “you obeyed my voice,” raises 
questions: (1) Abraham literally followed God’s verbal directions, except in the manner 
of the ram sacrifice which was not commanded verbally. Is the ram sacrifice excluded 
from this affirmation of obeying God’s voice or does God’s voice include nonverbal 
divine communication? (2) The name of the place refers to God’s actions, not Abraham’s 
obedience. What then, was the purpose of the test command?  (3) Though Abraham is 
roundly blessed for obeying God’s voice, why do most believers not wish to be tested by 
God as Abraham was? Perhaps this test effectively reveals all believers’ fear of God. 
Itinerary  
And Abraham returned to his lads, and they rose and went together to Beersheba, 
and Abraham dwelled in Beer-sheba. 
 
The physical return of the participants to the original location signals a tidy 
ending to this pericope. But buried under the neatness is a nagging ambiguity on the 
whereabouts of Isaac.244 The Hebrew verb for return is in the masculine singular form and 
Abraham is its subject. Why is this? (1) Is Isaac so identified with Abraham (the two had 
walked as one) that after the ordeal they are referred to as a unified entity?245 Both the 
                                                 
243 The last image of Isaac in the Aqedah is his bound body on top of the altar wood. Only the 
phrase instead of his son indicates that Isaac has been removed from that position. 
244 Sarah is not mentioned at the beginning of the Aqedah, Isaac is not mentioned at the end. This 
may be to emphasize that the test’s principal target was Abraham. 
245 Gen 12:6 also described the movement of Abraham’s encampment as a composite entity 
through the masculine singular form of the verb. “Abram passed through the land to the place at Shechem, 
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first and the last verbs in this verse (returned, dwelt) are in the masculine singular form, 
though Abraham’s act of dwelling certainly includes his encampment. (2) Does the term 
“his [Abraham’s] lads” refer only to the two servants left at the bottom of the mountain, 
or does it include Isaac? Abraham had previously referred to his son as a lad (v. 5) as did 
the messenger of YHWH (v. 12). (3) Is Isaac not with Abraham nor with the servants?246 
It would not be surprising to sense the ambiguity in the ending as intentionally designed 
to evoke a yearning for closure, one that can only be found in the future Promised Seed of 
Abraham. Hovering over the last scene of Abraham and his companions trudging into the 
desert to get back to Beersheba lingers a faint echo of Isaac’s wistful query, “But, where 
is the lamb?” 
Literary Structural Analysis 
Narratologists follow the arc of tension in the story, the buildup and relaxation of 
tension247 suggested by Aristotle’s plot scheme of beginning, middle and end.248 This 
                                                 
to the oak of Moreh.” 
246 As for Isaac’s whereabouts, one line of tradition believed he was burned, his ashes taken by 
God who then resurrected him: “Jewish weavers of tradition insisted that Isaac really gave his life on that 
sacred site, and the only son of Abraham was reduced to ashes. In infinite mercy God transported the ashes 
of Isaac to the Garden of Eden and revived him by heaven’s dew.” Crenshaw, Whirlpool of Torment, 27. 
Hamilton suggests the absence of Isaac from the end is to suggest that Abraham’s intent to sacrifice Isaac is 
equivalent to returning Isaac to God through sacrifice, hence the (literarily) missing son. Hamilton, Genesis 
18-50, 117. 
247 S. Bar-Efrat, “Some Observations on the Analysis of Structure in Biblical Narrative,” Vetus 
Testamentum 30, no. 2 (1980): 165, accessed 14 March 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1517521. 
248 “A whole is what has a beginning and middle and end. A beginning is that which is not a 
necessary consequent of anything else but after which something else exists or happens as a natural result. 
An end on the contrary is that which is inevitably or, as a rule, the natural result of something else but from 
which nothing else follows; a middle follows something else and something follows from it. Well 
constructed plots must not therefore begin and end at random, but must embody the formulae we have 
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suggests the main point of the story is the dramatic climax of vs. 11-12 where “at the very 
last moment the terrible deed is prevented. From here the line of the plot descends 
rapidly.”249 Coats, however, sees Abraham’s religious obedience as the element that 
unites the story, hence the test command of verses 1-2 necessitate the ringing re-
affirmation of Abraham’s obedience in the climactic verses 15-18: “because you did this 
thing. . . you obeyed my voice.”250 Philosophers Kant and Kierkegaard are arrested by the 
human predicament and existential struggle in the ethical paradox of the test, the initial 
command to sacrifice Isaac and the anguish of the journey grabs their attention as the key 
to the enduring significance of the Aqedah.251 Thus, three possibilities exist for the main 
focus of the test; the narrative approach focuses on the seeming reversal of the threat to 
Isaac, the traditional religious approach focuses on the salvific or etiological themes in 
                                                 
stated.” Aristotle, Poetics, (1450b27), accessed 9 December 2019, 
http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg034.perseus-eng1:1450b ction%3D1450b. 
249 Bar-Efrat, Narrative Art in the Bible, 122. In the case of the Aqedah, this climax seems to be 
marked by the device of reversal (as with Jacob and Esau and Esther). Alter notices how this climax centers 
on the parental hand as in the preceding story of Ishmael’s near death: “At the center of the story, 
Abraham’s hand holds the knife, Hagar is enjoined to ‘hold her hand’ (the literal meaning in Hebrew) on 
the lad.” Alter, Genesis, 106. 
250 Coats, “Abraham’s Sacrifice of Faith,” 392-396. For Coats, the main theme is not about the 
riveting plight of the victim, the near sacrifice of Isaac, but the leitmotif of obedience—Abraham’s faith 
filled obedience. 
251 Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. H. H. Hudson and T. M. 
Greene (New York, NY: Harper, 1960), 175. See also Soren Kierkegaard’s famous treatment of the Aqedah 
in his book, Fear and Trembling. 
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the story’s end, and the poetic, philosophical approach stresses the human condition or 
anguish at the beginning of the story.252  
How can one arbitrate between these competing possibilities? “If the meaning of 
the Aqedah ultimately depends on the place where the accent is put, it is important to 
analyze the literary structure of the text in order to determine the point of accentuation 
and the orientation that is thereby brought to light.”253 The inherent literary structure is an 
ordering of the story’s elements that exposes the priorities of the writer in setting down 
the tale. “It is the writer’s vision or agenda that determines what is relevant.”254 
Shimon Bar-Efrat’s article, “Some Observations on the Analysis of Structure in 
Biblical Narrative,” suggests that four different levels of elements must be considered in 
structural analysis. They are “(1) the verbal level; (2) the level of narrative technique; (3) 
the level of the narrative world; (4) the level of the conceptual content.”255 According to 
Bar-Efrat (1) the elements of the verbal world include metaphors, similes, unusual 
grammar or syntax, repetitions, (2) the elements of narrative technique refer to narrative 
explanations or comments, the difference between dialogues and narration, between 
                                                 
252 Doukhan refers to the Talmud, medieval Rabbis, Church Fathers, Protestant Reformers and 
modern critics for the religious approach, and Immanuel Kant, Soren Kierkegaard, Pierre Emmanuel, and 
E. L. Fackenheim for the poetic or philosophical approach. Doukhan, “Center of the Aqedah,” 17-18. 
253 Doukhan, “Center of the Aqedah,” 18. 
254 Fokkelman goes on to explain, “the plot is an organization of the action in such a way as to 
result in an ingenious combination of the ‘horizontal’ and the ‘vertical’ arrangement.” The linear axis of 
chronological succession of events make up the horizontal axis, the vertical axis is the vision of the writer 
that chooses only what is functional to his goal or plot. Fokkelman, Reading Biblical Narrative, 78. 
255 Bar-Efrat, Narrative Art in the Bible, 157.  
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summary and scenic presentation, between narration and description, (3) narrative world 
elements consist of characters (identity, nature and function), events (temporal, causal 
relations and secondary plots) and (4) conceptual content refers to themes, issues or ideas 
in narrative units. Some of Bar-Efrat’s elements have been addressed in the previous 
narrative analysis. For literary structural analysis, I will address additional elements of 
these four levels to discern the literary structure of the Aqedah that is text-based, coherent 
and comprehensive. 
Verbal and Narrative Technique Level 
By paying close attention to unique repeating phrases, verbal markers, silences 
and significant interactions between the main characters, Jacques Doukhan has 
convincingly filled out the dominant chiastic structure of the Aqedah narrative. The 
narrative chiastic structure is anchored by three dialogues, buttressed by the inclusio 
“wayyēleḵû šenêhem yahdāw” (and they walked, the two of them, together), and 
incorporates the pattern of 6-5-6 ‘mr (he said) to zero in on vv 7-8 as the center of the 
narrative. The following is an adaptation of Doukhan’s outline of the narrative chiastic 
structure of the Aqedah.  
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Gen 21:31 – 22:1, Prelude: Beersheba, theme of return, ‘Now it came after these things’ 
 
A, vv. 1-2. Dialogue:  God (Elōhîm) and Abraham 
a.  God’s call 
b.  Abraham’s response, hinnēnî 
c.  Order / Abraham 
d.  Order / the son, mountain to be designated 
 
B, vv. 3-6. Abraham’s walk 
 a.  Departure 
            b.  Wood on Isaac 
            c.  Takes fire in his hand, and knife 
            d.  ‘The two of them went together’ 
      wayyēleḵû šenêhem yaḥdāw 
C, vv. 7-8. Dialogue: Abraham and Isaac 
a.  Silence 
b.  Question 
c.  Response, hinnennî 
b1. Question 
a1.  Silence 
         wayyēleḵû šenêhem yaḥdāw 
B1, vv. 9-10. Abraham’s walk 
d. ‘The two of them went together’ 
a.  Arrival 
b.  Isaac on wood 
c.  Takes knife in his hand  
 
A1, vv. 11-19. Dialogue: God (Angel of YHWH) and Abraham 
          a.  God’s call 
          b.  Abraham’s response, hinnēnî   
          d.  Order / the son, mountain designated 
          c.  Blessing 
 
Gen 22:19-20, Postlude: Beersheba, theme of return. ‘Now it came after these things’ 
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The expansion of the central dialogue (C) of Abraham and Isaac shows the 
chiastic literary structure of a b c b1 a1  marking the exact center of the Aqedah. 
                      
a. Said Isaac to Abraham, his father— 
b. And he said: father? 
      c. And he said: here I am, my son. [emphasis added] 
b1. And he said: here is the fire and the wood, but where 
                         is the lamb for offering? 
a1. And said Abraham: God will see to himself the lamb for 
                              offering my son. 
  
The centralized meaning of the Aqedah narrative is not the faith-filled prophecy 
of Abraham, though that is a related theme, it is not the message of the angel of YHWH 
in verse 12, though that is the dramatic plot climax, it doesn’t seem to be the ram 
sacrifice, though that is the provided solution, and it is not a religious etiology, though 
that is the lingering legacy. Doukhan avers, “The structure of the text suggests that the 
accent here is primarily on the human questions and silences at the center. More 
important than the response or solution would in this case be the question without 
response and the open silence of the human being experiencing the event.”256 Questions 
and open silences do surround the pinpoint center of Abraham’s tender reply to Isaac, 
which happens to be a verbal reassurance of authentic paternal responsiveness—“Here I 
am, my son.” 
In striking literary contrast to this central communication of paternal assurance, 
Phyllis Trible demonstrates how Abraham’s four verb clusters convey underlying 
                                                 
256 Doukhan, “Center of the Aqedah,” 28. 
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tension. Irony lurks in the initial preparation for the journey (v. 3): “In the center, framed 
by six verbs that signal terrible obedience (rose, saddled, took; cut, arose, went), is the 
phrase ‘Isaac his son.’ The father’s activity surrounds his son not to protect him in life 
but to prepare him for death.”257 The fearful tension continues in the symmetrical transfer 
verbs of the accoutrements (v. 6): (took Abraham the wood…laid it upon Isaac…took in 
his hand the fire and the knife) “This time the objects, wood of the burnt offering and fire 
and knife surround ‘Isaac his son.’. . . The father embraces his son with potential 
destruction even as he protects him from immediate danger.”258 The penultimate cluster of 
verbs setting up the altar points with threatening parallelism (v. 9): “Abraham alone is 
subject of six verbs, with Isaac appearing as object after each group of three. He receives 
center-stress and end-stress.”259 Finally, the literary pattern of verbs regarding the ram 
support the meaning that Isaac is now safe (v. 13 and went Abraham, and took the ram, 
and sacrificed it for a burnt offering, instead of his son), “Strikingly, unlike the 
                                                 
257 Trible, “Genesis 22,” 174.  
258 Trible, “Genesis 22,” 175.   
259 Trible, “Genesis 22,” 177.   
 142 
 
syntactical patterns of previous sentences, the son stands here outside the action of the 
father.”260 In a literary sense then, as well as in actuality, Isaac is released by Abraham. 
Narrative World Level 
It is clear to any reader of the Aqedah that on the narrative world level of 
characters and events, Abraham the father, Isaac the son, and God are the three main 
acting characters of the Aqedah. But the ram cannot be ignored without dramatically 
affecting the plot and religious implications. Thus, four characters are essential to the 
meaning and the stress of their contributions to the plot in relation to the chiastic structure 
is outlined below.  
1.  Abraham performs almost all the action verbs in the story and has a total of five 
speaking parts: three are dialogues (to God, to Isaac, to God) that anchor the ends  
(A and A1) and center (C) of the chiastic structure, two are utterances to outsiders: 
directions to his two servants (v. 5) and naming a place for progeny (v.14). His 
verbal and active contributions are captured in the general outline of Doukhan’s 
chiastic structure. 
2.  Isaac is a passive character in this story except for one verbal exchange with his 
father Abraham (C).261 This human dialogue, which reveals their relationship, is 
                                                 
260 Trible, “Genesis 22,” 180.   
261 This also happens to be the only recorded dialogue between Abraham and Isaac in the whole 
Bible. 
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the center of the chiastic structure. His physical danger is reversed and resolved 
by the third dialogue (A1) in the chiasm.  
3.  God as a character performs three verbal utterances (dialogue, dialogue, 
monologue) which initiate, correct and conclude the test with evaluation. His 
speech of conclusion (c. Blessing vv 15-18) is the most emotive, complex and 
prolonged of the three. However, in the narrative chiastic structure this last 
utterance, sworn on his own name and referred to by subsequent generations,262 is 
subsumed as a subsection (c) of the last section (A1) and the divine providence of 
the ram is hidden in the chiastic structure.  
4. The ram is another a passive character, fulfilling a symbolic role as a proxy for 
God, then subsequently for Isaac as a substitutionary sacrifice. It fulfills 
Abraham’s prophecy of a sheep from the center of the chiastic structure, and 
Abraham discharges the three imperatives of the test command on it. It saves 
                                                 
262 Exod 32:13, Heb 6:13. 
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Isaac by taking his place. However, the ram solution to the test is not given any 
prominence in the chiastic structure. 
In summary, Abraham and Isaac’s contributions to the story are nicely captured 
by the literary chiastic structure, while the contributions of God and the ram are 
inadequately featured. 
Conceptual Content Level 
The Aqedah’s self-framing for the narrative is as a divine test (v. 1). Thus, to be 
faithful to the text, the conceptual content level of literary structure for the Aqedah would 
be expected to integrate paradigms of both narrative and test in some form. At a 
minimum, a literary structure for a test might demonstrate how the final solution relates 
(since we can only reason a posteriori–after the event) to the original test command.263 At  
maximum, the literary test structure may unpack the test design, provide some evaluative 
hint on Abraham’s performance, and indicate relevant preparation for this test. Arguably, 
the search for literary structure is a search for the inceptive vision of the writer. If the 
vision of the writer happens to exceed our expectations, the literary structure may too. 
The existing literary chiasm of the Aqedah can be visualized as having a central 
dialogue as the middle peak (vv 7-8), anchored on either side by two other dialogues as 
angles (vv 1-2; 11-12). The two sides of this triangle264 feature Abraham’s walk up the 
                                                 
263 In a sense there is a hermeneutical circle in the text that must go forward chronologically from 
the test command to the final divine evaluation to grasp what happened but then, must circle backward in 
retrospective reflection through the same recorded events to the original directive to understand what the 
test is about. 
264 The chiastic structure is an upside down “V” without a base. But for the purposes of integrating 
the chiastic structure with further refinement of it and to simplify communication to non-English readers, 
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mountain (vv 3-6) and the preparations at the altar site (vv 9-10). Trailing from the right 
corner dialogue (vv 11-12) is the rest of the narrative comprised of a long list of verses 
(vv. 13-19), looking much like a tail. See figure 3.5 below. 
 
  
 
Figure 3.5 Chiastic structure of Aqedah 
 
The “tail” or string of verses (vv. 13-19) shares phrases, key terms and concepts 
with the previous parts of the chiastic narrative structure. The first verse, verse 13, is the 
test solution of the ram and shares a figure of speech and three key verbs with B and A in 
that order.  
 v. 13a “And Abraham lifted up his eyes and looked—a ram, behind.”  
 B, v. 3 “. . . Abraham lifted up his eyes and saw the place, from afar.”   
 
 v. 13b “Abraham went . . . took . . . offered it [ram] up as a burnt offering ” 
  A, v. 2                  “Take . . . go . . . offer him [Isaac] there as a burnt offering” 
                                                 
the mathematical triangle has been chosen for my schema.  
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The second verse, verse 14, matches key terms and key phrases with B1 and C in 
that order. 
  v. 14a “So Abraham called the name of that place, ‘The Lord will provide’ 
                               B1, v. 9  “came to the place”    C, v. 8 “God will provide”   
  v. 14b  “. . . . . . . . On the Mount of YHWH-----------------It will be provided” 
 
The third verse, verse 15 is almost identical to A1. 
     v. 15 “And the angel of the Lord called to Abraham a second time from heaven” 
    A1, v. 12 “But the angel of the Lord called to him from heaven . . .” 
The 16th verse does not find a match within the verses of the Aqedah. Yet, it 
places the identity of God as the foundation for the oath of the covenant. If the 
connections of vv 13-15 to the chiastic structure presents a pattern to follow (side/angle 
[B-A]; side/angle [B1-C]; angle [A1]), v. 16ab would first match a side then an angle. It 
does! The first part (16a) can be envisioned as designating the bottom side of the triangle 
with the second part (16b) corresponding to angle A with “this thing.”   
     v. 16 ab “By Myself I have sworn, declares the Lord . . . you have done this thing  
                                 (base/bottom side of chiastic triangle)             A, v. 1 “after these things” 
 
Since vv.13-16ab connect to the corners and sides of the chiastic structure in a 
sequential clockwise fashion, this line of verses can now be seen as a smaller clockwise 
circle inside the chiasm, corresponding to it. 
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Figure 3.6 Aqedah Key. The phrases of verses 13-16b are verbally linked to the chiasmus 
and illuminate the religious legacy of the test. 
 
 
That is, the outer shape is the triangular chiasm of the narrative (vv 1-12). The 
inner circle represents vv. 13-16ab in relation to the chiastic structure. Conceptually, vv. 
13-16b offer the final meaning, the lasting religious legacy of the chiastic components: 
the substitute ram that represents God, the sacred mount of YHWH and the grounding of 
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the covenant on YHWH. This suggests that the circle of vv. 13-16ab, which constitutes 
the inner circle of this chiastic model functions as a test answer key.265  
What then is the function of the blessings in 16c-18? They do not show direct 
verbal links to the story of the Aqedah itself, but verbal and conceptual connections to 
Abraham’s previous revelations266 suggest a possible answer. Some of the previous 
covenant promises to Abraham are re-established here. 
What has not been recognized until now is how comprehensive and deliberate 
these seem to be. Verses 16c-18 correlate with the seven revelations of Abraham in 
words, phrases and concepts in an orderly manner. They line up with Abraham’s prior 
                                                 
265 A test key refers to a set of correct answers that explain or open the meaning of the test. 
266 Martin Buber outlines Abraham’s seven revelations. He writes, “The seven revelations are 
seven stations on the way of a man from the beginning of the mutual relations between this man and God 
until its completion.” Buber, On the Bible, 37. Buber does not include God’s speech on Ishmael’s 
banishment because it does not directly deal with the covenant to Isaac. In Buber’s list the Aqedah is the 
seventh revelation. I choose to include Ishmael’s banishment as the seventh revelation because it remains 
part of Abraham’s training before the Aqedah test, a dry run if you will, of entrusting a son, a uniquely 
loved son to God.   
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divine revelations in striking retrograde sequence. Each verse is followed by its 
corresponding numbered revelation. 
 v. 16c “you did not withhold your son, your only267 son”268 
7th Revelation: Gen 21 “And the thing was very displeasing to Abraham 
on account of his son . . . putting on her [Hagar]shoulder the child 
[Ishmael] and sent her away” 
  v. 17 “I will surely bless you and I will surely multiply your offspring”269 
5th Revelation: Gen 17 “multiply” x 3, “bless” x 3.  
  “as the stars of heaven”270 
4th Revelation: Gen 15:5 “Look toward the heavens and number the stars . 
. . so shall your offspring be.” 
  “as sands of the seashore”271 
                                                 
267 “It is interesting, however, that even yāḥîd was occasionally rendered into Greek with words 
indicating love. Thus, when God commands Abraham, “Take your son, your only son (yĕḥîdĕkā), whom 
you love” (Gen 22:2), the Septuagint, the ancient Jewish translation of the Torah into Greek, employs the 
awkward locution “your beloved son, whom you love” (ton huion sou ton agapēton hon ēgapēsas).” 
Levinson cites Judg 11:34, Amos 8:10, and Jer 6:26 as other examples of such translations. He reasons, “It 
is conceivable that some of these translations reflect a confusion of yāḥîd and yādîd in the underlying text, 
but, on the whole, it seems more likely that they testify to the tradition that understands yāḥîd as a term for 
the beloved one, and, in the case of Abraham and Jephthah, for the beloved offspring whom the devout 
father is obliged to sacrifice and immolate. When, in the synoptic gospels, a heavenly voice declares, just 
after Jesus’ baptism, “You are my beloved son, (huios mou ho agapētos); with you I am well pleased” 
(Mark 1:11 and parallels), a reference to that other beloved son, Isaac is surely to be understood.” 
Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 30.      
268 This twice repeated phrase “You did not withhold your son, your only son” refers to 
Abraham’s choice not to hold back either of his two sons from God. The banishment of Ishmael may have 
been a “dry run” or pre-test experience for the Aqedah, thus the phrase can refer to two different events 
because they demonstrate the same virtue of Abraham’s parenting style that raises children to look to God 
for everything. God as the consummate Tester had trained Abraham to succeed through a trust-building 
exercise with Ishmael before having him face the more difficult test with Isaac.   
269 The terms for multiply and bless are in the Hebrew absolute infinitive form for extreme 
emphasis, this corresponds to the maximum three times repetition of these terms in Gen 17. “That 
Abraham’s descendants would be extremely numerous (17:2; cf. 16:10)” Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 112. 
The promises of Genesis 17 include multiply three times (17:2, 6, 20) and bless three times (17:16 twice, 
20), including Ishmael as his descendant.  
270 “Indeed, as countless as the stars (15:5).” Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 112.  
271 The evoking of previous revelations does not exclude other overlapping relationships such as 
the stars and sand as a merism here and in Jeremiah 33:22, “As the host of heaven cannot be numbered and 
the sands of the sea cannot be measured, so I will multiply the offspring of David my servant, and the 
Levitical priests who minister to me.” That the dust of the earth and sands of the sea were employed as 
equivalent phrases is given support in the story of Jacob, who was promised by God that his descendants 
 150 
 
3rd Revelation:  Gen13:16 “I will make your offspring as the dust of the 
earth”  
  “your offspring shall possess the gates of his enemies”272 
2nd Revelation: Gen 12:7 “To your offspring I will give this land.” 
v. 18a “and in your offspring shall all the nations of the earth bless themselves”273 
1st Revelation: Gen 12:3 “In you all the families of the earth will be 
blessed.” 
       v. 18b “because you have obeyed my voice.” 
Summary Judgment: Divine epitaph of Abraham to Isaac in Gen 26:5 
“Because Abraham obeyed me and kept my charge, my commandments, 
my statutes and my laws.” 
 
These linguistic correlations and the sequential order of their allusions suggest the 
final cluster of divine covenant blessings is more than a random burst of divine 
exuberance. In fact, it looks very much like a systematic orderly assessment of 
Abraham’s test response in retrograde fashion that ends with a summary judgment. Six of 
the seven previous covenant revelations are indicated by this list. 
The demarcated absence of one revelation speaks volumes. One of the most 
puzzling aspects of Abraham’s behavior in the Aqedah for many scholars is the lack of 
moral protest from Abraham to God’s command to sacrifice his son. The moral courage 
that Abraham showed in the 6th Revelation (Genesis 18) when he negotiated with God 
based on divine justice and extended mercy is not displayed in the Aqedah. The list of 
                                                 
would be like the dust of the earth (Gen 28:14) but he later claims that God had promised that his 
descendants would be like the sands of the sea (Gen 32:12) without being rebuked. Finally, as one of my 
professors, Dr. John Reeves pointed out, the land of Israel geographically included sandy wilderness and 
desert regions where dust and sand were synonymous metaphors for ground material. 
272 Possessing the gates of your enemies is “a more realistic formulation of the promise of the land 
than earlier promises.” Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 112. 
273 Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 112.  
 151 
 
rewarded divine blessings likewise has no linguistic connections to Abraham’s 6th 
Revelation (Gen 18). This matching omission in Abraham’s test response and in God’s 
final covenant blessings in the test supports the hypothesis that the divine blessings of vv. 
15-18 indicate which covenant lessons Abraham actualized in the test, for they are 
prefaced by “because you have done this thing.” Thus, no one needs to “unbind” the 
Aqedah, it unbinds itself!274 The schematic diagram of these blessings linked to the 
covenant revelations (see Fig. 3.7 below) metaphorically corresponds to the shape of a 
key blade (the working long arm of a physical key that inserts into a lock).  
  
                                                 
274 The word “unbind” has been used rhetorically to refer to explaining or unraveling the puzzle of 
this divine test.  
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Figure 3.7 Aqedah Key List. The list of blessings compared to Abraham’s seven prior 
revelations. 
  
 153 
 
To summarize, the Aqedah key list is the divine interpretation (v. 16a “By my own 
self I swear”) of Abraham’s test response (v. 16b “because of what you have done”) that 
evokes the covenant revelations as a divine test norm, implying the Aqedah was a 
comprehensive test of all that Abraham had learned since the beginning of his journey 
from Haran. If this hypothesis for the literary structure of the Aqedah is correct, the 
Aqedah is more complex and comprehensive than previously assumed. It is now seen to 
be a test that contains a test command, execution, mid-test correction, substitutionary 
fulfillment, answer key and assessment through the re-establishment of covenant 
promises.  
The key list suggests that the Aqedah may not be a test requiring Abraham to be 
willing to abdicate his covenant experience by killing Isaac, but one that requires 
Abraham to fulfill and enact his role as a divinely educated and trained covenant father. 
The micro-hermeneutical analysis has revealed the Aqedah contains the literary structure 
of a brilliantly designed narrative test, complete with its own hidden answer key. Finally, 
Gen 22:19-20 ends with a Postlude that matches the Prelude of Gen 21:34-22:1. Abraham 
started in Beersheba and ends in Beersheba; the test of Abraham started “after these 
things” and ends with “after these things.”275  
Conclusion 
This chapter started with a proposal to adapt the model of the hermeneutical spiral 
for theology by incorporating several key concepts: (1) the role of Scripture as the central 
                                                 
275 Doukhan, “The Center of the Aqedah,” 26.  
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long axis of the hermeneutical spiral, (2) delineation of loops into micro-meso-macro 
hermeneutical levels, and (3) worlds of meaning (in, behind, in front of, above and below 
the text) of the spiral ramp. The model additionally incorporated the theological 
principles of Sola, Tota, and Prima Scriptura in the hermeneutical model.  
Testing of this model by application to the Aqedah at the micro-hermeneutical 
level (biblical/textual principles of interpretation) was done through grammatical-
syntactical, narrative, and literary structural analysis. This micro-hermeneutical round of 
analysis supported many of the major findings of commentaries, it also revealed some 
areas that had been given less attention. In particular, the last divine speech in the Aqedah 
seems to hold potential for evaluating Abraham’s performance in the test, even 
suggesting the revelations of the covenant were to be embodied in Abraham’s response to 
the test, not abdicated. The meso-hermeneutical analysis of the next chapter will delve 
into the underlying logic, significance and theological meaning of these micro-
hermeneutical findings. 
The drawback of the Axial Model on the micro-hermeneutical level is that a 
casual reader will not wish to follow multiple analytic rounds of the whole pericope at 
one hermeneutical level. For them, one round is enough. This model doesn’t dictate how 
thorough the analysis must be on any level, only of the need to respect the whole 
pericope as the norming axis for analyzing the biblical narratives, to systematically 
process the text by the literary structure and indications given by the text itself, to persist 
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in studying the text through all three levels and to recognize the worlds of meaning as 
necessary for deeper understanding. 
The main difference between the Axial Model of hermeneutics and what is 
usually done in interpretation is that the horizontal discipline of analyzing the complete 
pericope (Gen 22:1-19) multiple times through textual tools allows the whole text to 
norm the process and offset the interpreter’s biases to some extent. The text is given a 
chance to speak through its own grammatical-rhetorical voice, to allocate significance to 
its own parts, and to allow its own literary structure to surface. If a vertical approach 
(sequential analysis of single verses utilizing multiple hermeneutical levels) is used, some 
of these textual insights might be overlooked by the interpreter’s filtering dogma or 
rashly tethered to favorite theological ideologies. Once the micro-hermeneutical 
structure, drama and details of the text have been unearthed as sensitively and as fairly as 
possible, the meso-hermeneutical level organizes this data into a meaningful theology 
using the canonical context for guided framing and testing.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
A MESO-HERMENEUTIC FOR THE AQEDAH 
 
Introduction 
Søren Kierkegaard’s analysis of the Aqedah, Fear and Trembling, begins with 
four psychological scenarios1 that sets up the reader to appreciate Kierkegaard’s inner 
depiction of Abraham as the paradoxical Knight of Faith. Though I am interested in the 
opposite direction, a theocentric viewpoint, it may be useful to introduce the meso-
hermeneutic level of the Axial Model with four common rationales given in the Aqedah 
literature for why God tested Abraham. The analogy in italics are of a king testing his 
friend.  
1. God tested Abraham with the command to sacrifice Isaac to see if Abraham loves 
Him more than he loves his son.2 A king tests whether his friend’s affection is 
                                                 
1 My summary of Kierkegaard’s four “Attunement” options with weaning analogy are: 
1. Abraham pretends he is an idolatrous murderer to shift Isaac’s naïve trust from his 
father to God. A mother blackens breast to wean the child, yet “the mother—she is still 
the same.” 
2. Abraham obeys but he cannot forget God did this to him. Isaac lives, but “Abraham’s 
eyes were darkened, and he saw joy no more.” A mother conceals her breast to wean the 
child, but “then the child no longer has a mother.”  
3. Abraham chose duty to God over his paternal duty, then repents of this sin (of 
forgetting his duty to his son) without finding peace. A mother grieves with the child at 
weaning, for “she and the child are more and more to be separated.” 
4. Abraham obeys while trying to hide his clenched despair and shuddering, but Isaac 
sees it and loses faith. A mother should have stronger sustenance at hand when weaning 
“so that the child does not perish.” Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 44-48.  
2 Augustine says, “In a word, not to value above God what God gives us.” Origen sees Abraham 
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authentic by requiring him to return the king’s most valuable gift. 
 
2. God tested Abraham with the command to sacrifice Isaac to see if Abraham was 
God-fearing and would comply unconditionally and absolutely.3 A king tests his 
subject’s submission through literal obedience by demanding the most difficult 
sacrifice possible. 
 
3. God tested Abraham with the command to sacrifice Isaac to see Abraham’s 
morality.4 A king tests his choice of a morally worthy friend by seeing how he 
handles an unmistakably unethical order. 
 
4. God tested Abraham with the command to sacrifice Isaac to see Abraham’s faith 
in His power of resurrection.5 A king tests the limits of his friend’s faith in him, by 
                                                 
struggling between “affection and faith, love of God and love of the flesh.” Carey Ellen Walsh, “Christian 
Theological Interpretations of God’s Grace in the Binding of Isaac,” Perichoresis 10 no. 1 (2012): 52-53. 
The “narrative will strain Abraham’s faith and obedience to the uttermost in order to reveal his deepest 
emotional attachment.” Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 113.  
3 “He [Abraham] must therefore unequivocally prove his worthiness to be God’s elect. The totally 
disinterested nature of his devotion to God must be established beyond all doubt. It is this that dictates the 
abnormality of the test, and it is this very abnormality that explains why God, not His angel, must present 
it, in contrast to the order to desist. It would not be adequate for Abraham to be asked to sacrifice himself, 
because he would surely do this in order to preserve his son, and he would still know that the divine 
promises would be honored. The sacrifice of his son is thus the decisive ultimate test that can be devised.” 
Sarna, Genesis, 393. 
4 Bodoff reads Abraham as using strategic compliance, “He did not rush—he stalled! He broke up 
the task that he was given into numerous tasks, or steps, and at each one he stopped, waiting to see whether 
‘the Boss’ had reconsidered. . . . Given Abraham’s moral purity, we may reasonably conclude that if, at the 
very end, God had not rescinded His command for Isaac’s death, Abraham would have rejected the 
command, chosen the moral course of not committing murder, and saved his son—and then been forced to 
re-examine the prospects of his new religion, and the belief and faith on which it rested.” Bodoff, The 
Unbinding of Isaac, 39. Omri Boehm sees God testing Abraham’s morality, but in the original narrative 
(Gen 22:1-10, 13, 19) Abraham ethically sacrificed the ram instead of Isaac on his own initiative, thereby 
passing the test. Boehm notes that medieval interpreters such as Maimonides and his followers perceived 
two layers of meaning in the Aqedah, the external one of obedience “to maintain politico-religious 
stability” and the esoteric, concealed layer of disobedience—as Abraham’s “true affirmation of faith.” 
Boehm, The Binding of Isaac, 2, 13, 23. 
5 The writer of Hebrews 11:17-19 explains, “By faith Abraham, when he was tested, offered up 
Isaac, and he who had received the promises was in the act of offering up his only son, of whom it was 
said, ‘Through Isaac shall your offspring be named.’ He considered that God was able even to raise him 
from the dead, from which, figuratively speaking, he did receive him back.” Many Christian theologians 
read this rationale into the Genesis narrative. Kierkegaard depicts Abraham’s courage as paradoxical, “To 
renounce the whole of temporality . . . then to grasp the whole of temporality on the strength of the absurd . 
. . that courage is the courage of faith. Through faith Abraham did not renounce his claim on Isaac, through 
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setting him up to behave in a manner that necessitates hope in the impossible. 
 
The interpretations based on these four themes of love, compliance, morality and 
resurrection will be the group referenced by the term “traditional interpretations” for this 
study. This chapter on the meso-hermeneutical level of the Axial Model focuses on 
theology and dogmatics. Because multiple subspecialties of theology6 exist, a choice 
must be made to choose one of them for analysis. This is not to ignore the richness of the 
Aqedah for historical research, theological development, typology, systematic truths, 
morality, ethics and praxis. Since the Axial Model is a continuous spiral model, other 
options can be pursued on future journeys. But to be very clear, for this present study 
through Genesis 22:1-19 my chosen theological task on the meso-hermeneutical level is 
text interpretation. 
Charles Taylor defined interpretation as that which “aims to bring to light an 
underlying coherence or sense.”7 But for an interpretation to be successful, it must 
articulate from the text an underlying logic and also demonstrate an intuitive fidelity to 
reality.8 This requires, as Schleiermacher saw, attending to the “origin of the text 
                                                 
his faith he received Isaac.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 77.    
6 Bernard Lonergan outlined eight functional specialties in the enterprise of theology, each 
requiring different methods: Research, Interpretation, History, Dialectics, Foundations, Doctrines, 
Systematics, Communications. Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto, CDN: University of 
Toronto Press, 1971), 169. 
7 Charles Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,” The Review of Metaphysics 25, no. 1 
(September 1971): 3. Already, macro-hermeneutical assumptions are being made—that an underlying 
coherence exists in a text and can be recognized by humans. 
8 In terms of persuasive power, these two aspects of internal coherence and external coherence are 
powerful and often trump raw research data. Daryl J. Bem, Andrea Allen, “On Predicting Some of the 
People Some of the Time: The Search for Cross-Sectional Consistencies in Behavior,” Psychological 
 159 
 
(reaching ‘behind’ a text), the content (‘within’ the text), and its effects (‘in front of’ the 
text).”9 Previously in micro-hermeneutics, the world in the text was the focus, now, meso-
hermeneutics takes the world in the text and relates it to the worlds of meaning behind the 
text and in front of the text on the X-axis of the Axial Model. In concrete terms, the canon 
that precedes and follows the text provides a literary framing and norm that orients and 
tests the meaning of the text through the principle of Tota Scriptura. Extended further, the 
existential worlds of meaning of the biblical writer behind the text and the traditional 
history of text reception in front of the text also confront the reader-interpreter who brings 
their own personal worlds of meaning into the interpretive task. Integration of these 
objective, subjective, and cultural components is acknowledged in Charles Taylor’s 
definition of meaning in which meaning is always (1) about something, (2) for someone, 
and conveys (3) a sense related to fields of other meanings.10  
Since subjective and cultural elements are an inherent part of interpretive 
meaning, E. D. Hirsch is right to worry, “Is interpretation really a discipline, or is it just a 
playground for the jousting of opinions, fancies and private preferences, where the stake 
is not knowledge but the so-called higher humane values?”11 I believe correct 
interpretation is both a playground and discipline, first one then the other.12 Some have 
                                                 
Review 81, no. 6 (1974): 510. 
9 Schleiermacher cited by Thiselton in Hermeneutics, 160.  
10 Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,” 12.  
11 E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), 163.  
12 Hirsch supports this sequence, “But the fact that these two activities require and accompany one 
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argued that hermeneutics is not a philosophy with methods but a movement similar to 
existentialism because its goal is meaning,13 however, I believe that meaningfulness can 
be assessed and compared. Sound interpretation may start with a creative appropriating 
process called the hermeneutical circle or hermeneutical method,14 but that can be 
distilled into a testable interpretive hypothesis which can be critiqued then for relevance. 
This chapter will proceed through three sections. First, I will elucidate the role of 
the interpreter (for someone) in the Axial Model. Second, a concise overview of four 
phases for text interpretation15 will be given. Third, the Aqedah text (about something) 
will guide the application of interpretive methods to itself and the resulting interpretive 
hypothesis will be tested by the norm of the canon (a sense related to fields of other 
                                                 
another in the process of understanding should not lead us to confuse the whimsical lawlessness of 
guessing with the ultimately methodical character of testing. Both processes are necessary in interpretation, 
but only one of them is governed by logical principles. . . . He [Schleiermacher] thus recognized implicitly 
the comparative nature of probability judgments, and though he rightly insisted that the divinatory and 
comparative functions go together, he failed to notice that one function is always prior to the other, that 
female intuition brings forth the ideas which the comparative male judgment then tests and either accepts or 
rejects.” Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 204-205.   
13 Gary Shapiro and Alan Sica, Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects (Amherst, MA: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 3-4. 
14 The hermeneutical circle or method is the acknowledgement that understanding requires a 
dialogical movement of inductive and deductive reasoning, from anticipation of the whole meaning 
(preunderstanding) to examining the detailed data, then back again to adjust the first impression and so on. 
David Klemm, “General Introduction,” in Hermeneutical Inquiry: The Interpretation of Texts, Vol. 1 
(Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1986), 23-32. 
15 Because it is a continuous spiral model, future rounds of meso-hermeneutics may employ other 
methodologies. 
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meaning) then critiqued for relevance. All of this requires an engaged self-aware 
interpreter, whose role in the Axial Model deserves explanation. 
Interpreter in the Model 
In some hermeneutical models, the human subject is either missing, rendered as 
dot traveling along a line, or exists as an inert label in an otherwise dynamic diagram.16 
This is the opposite of reality. The living human interpreter is the most dynamic, creative, 
and historically conditioned element who activates the process of interpretation, taking on 
the task of making meaning clear.17 If, as some models suggest, the interpreter adds little 
to the process except to apply the method, how can identical methodology applied to the 
same text by different competent interpreters generate a variety of interpretive meanings? 
And yet, this is a common occurrence. To be sure, conflicting interpretations may 
                                                 
16 Such models convey the impression of an objective process, unaffected by human subjectivity. 
This ignores what is human about humans—that they are undeniably historical organisms, laden with 
prejudice, bias, presuppositions both conscious and unconscious. Even bracketing, Husserl’s method of 
consciously suspending presuppositions (e.g., time-space context) to minimize human bias—may 
paradoxically render it even more insidious and powerful precisely because it is unacknowledged and thus 
uncontrollable. Many hermeneutical models can be found in Grant Osborne’s excellent work, The 
Hermeneutical Spiral, see pages 167, 203, 348, 351, 354, 386, 417-419. 
17 In some ways text interpretation is analogous to problem solving in the sciences. Michael 
Polanyi saw creativity for problem solving in mathematics resided in “the student’s technical facility for 
transforming the given data in different ways and by the range of germane theorems with which he is 
acquainted.” An intuition of logical relations is deemed necessary for “success will depend ultimately on 
his capacity for sensing the presence of yet unrevealed logical relations between the conditions of the 
problem, the theorems known to him and the unknown solution he is looking for.” Michael Polanyi, 
“Problem Solving,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 8, no. 30 (August 1957), 99. 
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eventually require normative solutions,18 but it seems prematurely brutish to efface the 
vibrant humanity of the interpreter with static, atemporal hermeneutical models.  
The Axial Model has already recognized the text as a historical entity bearing 
multiple worlds of meaning so it makes sense to recognize that the human reader is also a 
historical entity who comes to the text imbued with his or her personal worlds of meaning 
(see Fig. 4.1a below).19 It cannot be denied from our comparative study of Aqedah 
interpretations that Levenson and Fretheim bring different life experiences, canons 
(Jewish and Christian) and methods (historical-social and existential) to the text. These 
interpretive tools from their personal worlds of meaning influence and enrich their 
interpretations which must then be normed by the text for validity.  
In the Axial Model the interpreter’s personal worlds of meaning are depicted as 
anchored to a central core of identity. If the interpreter happens to be a believer, that 
                                                 
18 Evaluation is necessary because “not all plausible interpretations are compatible . . . the fact that 
all interpretations are different warrants neither the sanguine belief that all plausible interpretations are 
helpful and compatible nor the hopeless proposition that all interpretations are personal, temporal, and 
incommensurable.” Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 128-129. 
19 We find ourselves already existing in a world, within a certain situation, profoundly shaped by 
this involuntary condition. Heidegger referred to Dasein being the thrown of the throw that becomes aware 
of its being-in-the-world. Heidegger, Being and Time, 181-183fn. Gadamer also rejected the assumption of 
the radically autonomous self as a false delusion, “History does not belong to us, we belong to it.” The 
traditions of history that form our perspectival vision create worlds of meaning “into which we move and 
that moves with us.” Gadamer, Truth and Method, 288-289, 302, 315. Dissertationists like myself, find 
ourselves in a technological era marked by the “imperiled digital human condition” where the dissertating 
Dasein must grapple with the “tensions between memory loss (technological obsolescence) and the 
hauntings of everlasting data.” Incredible technological advances are offset by the volume intimidation of 
overwhelming impersonal data. Amanda Lagerkvist, “Existential Media: Toward a Theorization of Digital 
Thrownness,” New Media and Society 19, no. 1 (2017), 107. Today’s Dasein discloses not one world but 
multiple “open, coherent, distinct contexts or worlds in which we perceive, feel, act, think.” Hubert Dreyfus 
and Charles Spinosa, “Further Reflections on Heidegger, Technology and the Everyday,” in Philosophical 
Romanticism, ed. Nikolas Kompridis (New York: Routledge, 2006), 265. 
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anchoring core20 is held together by Scripture as provisionally understood (see Fig. 4.1b 
below). Scripture informs and stabilizes the ground, guardrails and feedback system for 
self-understanding, worldview, and philosophical presuppositions. Thus, appropriated 
Scripture affects core identity and pervades the attached personal worlds of meaning. 
 
                   a. 
      
        b. 
 
                  c. 
  
Fig. 4.1 Interpreter’s Sphere. a. Personal Worlds of Meaning. b. Anchored to a biblically 
grounded core. c. Interpreter’s Axes. 
 
 
For pictoral simplicity, the personal worlds of meaning can be coalesced into two 
axes (Fig. 4.1c). The horizontal X-axis of the sphere refers to the worlds of meaning 
behind and the worlds of meaning in front of this moment of existence. They include 
                                                 
20 If the interpreter is not a believer in God and the Bible as God’s Word, then Scripture as 
provisionally understood becomes just one area of interest, a personal world of meaning among many other 
worlds of meaning. This means change in the meaning of Scripture will have localized effect on adjacent 
worlds of meaning, but not necessarily transform the core of the interpreter’s sphere. Secular core identity 
can be wrapped by a cultural or family role, a career identity, or a loose patchwork of eclectic hopes and 
past experiences. 
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personal narratives and future hopes. The vertical Y-axis represents the worlds of 
meaning above and below, personal presuppositions of ultimate reality about God and the 
cosmos. The temporal Z-axis of the sphere is a punctate core because the human lifespan 
is very brief relative to the long Z-axis of objective Scripture that has lasted thousands of 
years. The interpreter’s core which represents the core self in the present moment, is 
where Scripture is provisionally understood or heard21 for understanding happens in the 
present. From the converted core, the Principle of Prima Scriptura is actualized by a 
dynamic wave of change that radiates from the core and transforms the tethered worlds of 
personal meaning.22 
Understanding is a complex process that is produced by three kinds of spirals. In 
the first, the interpreter’s sphere travels on the hermeneutical ramp in a spiral pattern with 
the interpreter repeatedly encountering the objective scriptural text (central long axis) 
then traversing the accessible biblical worlds of meaning (the ramp) in a looping spiral.23 
                                                 
21 The original objective text and the human working copy of the text comprise the two anchoring 
poles of this model. The relative chronological duration of each is reflected as a line and a point, 
respectively. Correction of the dynamic internalized text of the interpreter is sparked by an unexpected or 
surprising discrepancy in making sense that necessitates a return and re-reading of the external objective 
text in order to “hear” it better and incorporate it more fully into one’s life. Aspects or meanings of the 
Bible that are not appropriated would naturally have no bearing on the personal worlds of meaning. 
22 Prima Scriptura is actualized as a dynamic life-changing principle when the interpreter accepts 
the teaching of Scripture as the prime revelation by which all other theological sources must be judged. 
Thus, a newly grasped understanding of Scripture readjusts an interpretation of a past experience, reshapes 
the future vision and goals of the reader, opens a new vista on the character of God or elicits heartfelt 
repentance on an overlooked sin. This leads to new perceptions and action. 
23 A Bible commentary demonstrates this cognitive spiraling path in literary form. A verse (or an 
aspect of the verse) is presented, then followed by a discussion drawn from the worlds of meaning 
(archeology, anthropology, language, history, theology, etc.) relevant to the verse, this pattern is then 
repeated for each subsequent verse. Thus, “most commentaries that we call interpretations are concerned 
with significance as well as meaning.” Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 136.  
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This flat spiral circuit (see Fig. 4.2a below) on the ramp represents the chosen path of the 
hermeneutical method that relates the text (the whole) to its biblical worlds of meaning 
(the parts) through the words and syntactical formulations. The specific path is influenced 
by the theological task or goal of the interpreter.24  
 
                            a.                           b. 
 
Fig. 4.2 Spiral circuit of interpreter (a) and Viva Scriptura (b).  
 
The second kind of spiral that functions simultaneously with the first (see Fig. 
4.2b) internally integrates the finished text puzzle as a personal conviction, melding the 
cognitive, emotive, and physical effects of personal understanding. This happens when 
the interpreter brings to the text their personal worlds of meaning as their horizon of 
                                                 
24 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, 169. For example, if the goal is textual research, the 
circuit would traverse from the objective text in its final form to ancient biblical worlds of meaning as 
indicated by its terms and syntax, which are comprised of materials (ancient documents, artifacts, and 
artworks) relevant for testing reliability, veracity, and historic value. 
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understanding and asks questions of the text. The answers found in the text and by the 
study of the text with its worlds of meaning, norm, inform, and redirect the questions 
posed to it. The insights from this question and answer process are then incorporated, or 
fused with the interpreter’s spherical horizon, enlarging the interpreter’s personal horizon 
of understanding. 
The third spiral of understanding is the broader projection and integration of the 
hermeneutical levels by the interpreter moving up or down the spiral ramps from level to 
level. This process is demonstrated in this study by the projection and integration of 
findings from chapter 3 (micro-hermeneutics) to chapter 4 (meso-hermeneutics), then 
absorbed into chapter 5 (macro-hermeneutics) of this study. The three-tiered 
hermeneutical process integrates the exegetical, theological and philosophical analysis of 
the Aqedah into a coherent whole as normed by the text.  
All three spirals require contact between the sphere’s surface and the spiral ramp 
of the Axial Model. Here is where the Principle of Viva Scriptura (Fig. 4.2b) acts. 
Though this may be a new term, the Principle of Viva Scriptura refers to the dynamic 
fusion of human and biblical horizons by the Holy Spirit who enables the understanding 
of God’s Word to become a transformative power, a genuine conviction.25 When biblical 
understanding is internalized through Spirit-empowered appropriation into the 
interpreter’s core, the personalized Principle of Prima Scriptura then permeates from the 
                                                 
25 This marks the difference in the scope of understanding between the reader of the biblical text 
who gains only cognitive information and another reader who is profoundly converted by reading the same 
text. Life changing understanding that is facilitated and effected by God the Holy Spirit is the 
hermeneutical Principle of Viva Scriptura. 
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interpreter’s core outward to their tethered personal worlds of meaning. The result is a 
new perspective, a “new birth” conversion from biblical insight. The internalizing 
principle of Viva Scriptura with the suffusing power of Prima Scriptura is salvific and 
transformational. It all starts with the desire to authentically hear and incorporate God’s 
Word.  
Phases of Interpretation   
It has been said to hear ancient texts as living works, “every age must reinterpret 
for itself the texts of the past.”26 E. D. Hirsch27 differentiated meaning from interpretation 
when he said this proverb “doesn’t mean the meaning changes, only that interpretation 
does.”28 He later clarifies, “It is more descriptive to say that each age must re-criticize the 
works of the past in order to keep them alive and ourselves alive to them. As critics we 
                                                 
26 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 42.  
27 I have chosen Hirsch’s methodology for this round of meso-hermeneutics because he retains a 
high respect for authorial intent and his phases of “understanding, interpretation, judgment, criticism,” 
incorporate a self-critical method for testing any hypothesis. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 133-144. 
Critique of Hirsch’s methods and philosophy with further developments in hermeneutics can be found in 
American Literary Criticism since the 1930’s by Vincent B. Leitch (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 
162-169. I resonate with the literary camp of hypothetical intentionalists as opposed to actual 
intentionalists such as Hirsch. I acknowledge that interpretation is an earnest attempt to arrive at the “best 
possible hypothesis” about the author’s intentions that “a suitably equipped reader” “can reasonably take 
him or her to mean” by examining the intentional direction of the text. See Types of Interpretation in the 
Aesthetic Disciplines, eds. Staffan Carlshamre, Anders Petterson (Ithaca, NY: Mc Gill University Press, 
2003), 11. 
28 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 42.  
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should remind ourselves that we are not perceiving a new work or a new meaning, but a 
new significance of the work.”29 
Hirsch famously differentiated meaning as stable but significance as always open 
to change.30 “Meaning is that which is represented by the text; it is what the author meant 
by his use of a particular sign sequence; it is what the signs represent. Significance, on 
the other hand, names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a conception, 
or a situation, or indeed anything imaginable.”31 Meaning requires both understanding 
and interpretation, significance consists of judgment and criticism. The order does not 
imply that the latter phases are less important than the first ones, in fact, the potential 
                                                 
29 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 137 fn 5.   
30 Hirsch’s method of philological hermeneutics partially incorporated “Gadamer’s divinatory and 
historicist notion of ‘application’ into his interpretative theory of reconstruction” but he kept the original 
historical meaning of a text separate from the current relevance of a text. Hirsch’s New Hermeneutic critics 
believed that “meanings must change over time, since history does, and, as it does so, human understanding 
changes.” Vincent B. Leitch, American Literary Criticism, 168.  
31 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 8. 
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understanding in the first phase has no impact on reality if there is no relevance to it as 
examined in the last phase. 
Hirsch’s four sequential hermeneutical phases are:  
1. Understanding—construction of meaning,32  
2. Interpretation—explanation of meaning (adapted to Interpretive Hypothesis),33  
3. Judgment—validating a relation of meaning to something else,34 
4. Criticism—valuation of that validated meaning.35  
 
For the rest of this chapter these four phases will guide the interpretation of the 
Aqedah on the meso-hermeneutical level of the spiral model. Each one of the four phases 
                                                 
32 “Understanding is construction of meaning.” Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 136. 
33 “So interpretation is an explanation of meaning.” Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 136. 
Because the term interpretation has been used loosely to cover many aspects of hermeneutics, I will adapt 
Hirsch’s term interpretation to interpretive hypothesis. Especially for a narrative, a succinct interpretive 
hypothesis of it is the only way to render a story accessible for testing by a norm. 
34 “The act of judging is the construing of this relationship, whether it be that between a meaning 
and criteria of value or between a meaning and anything else imaginable.” Hirsch, Validity in 
Interpretation, 143. 
35 “Criticism is not identical with significance, but rather refers to it, talks about it, describes it . . . 
perhaps the most important function of criticism as distinguished from interpretation is to show that a work 
is valuable or valueless in some respect.” Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 144. 
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will initially explain its particular theory and method then demonstrate its application. 
Wherever possible, the biblical text will direct the application of the method to itself. 
Understanding 
Theory and Method of Understanding 
Hirsch believed there was no methodology for constructing a meaning of the 
text.36 Yet he described the first phase of understanding as an active construction of 
meaning.37 Construction implies a method, not random chaos. Even if meaning seems 
immediately given by the text,38 the actual process always starts with a human guess39 
                                                 
36 “The discipline of interpretation is founded, then, not on a methodology of construction but on a 
logic of validation.” Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 207.  
37 “The definitive proof that understanding requires an active construction of meaning and is not 
simply given by the text is the obvious fact that no one can understand an utterance who does not know the 
language in which it is composed.” Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 134. 
38 “In all cases, what we understand is a construction, and if the construction happens to be 
unthinking and automatic, it is not necessarily more vital and authentic for that.” Hirsch, Validity in 
Interpretation, 43. The text both supports and constrains what the reader can construct. Though textual 
meaning is pluripotent, Ricoeur also recognized, “The text is a limited field of constructions.” Paul 
Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 213. Likewise, the physical world both supports and 
constrains new scientific theories. “Development of the theory is also shaped by the way the world is. So 
the way the world is constrains the way theory develops, which creates pressure for reshaping habits in 
ways that fit comfortably with what theory has become.” Margolis, Paradigms, 24.   
39 “The notion that a reliable methodology of interpretation can be built upon a set of canons is 
thus a mirage. . . . No possible set of rules or rites of preparation can generate or compel an insight into 
what an author means. The act of understanding is first a genial (or a mistaken) guess, and there are no 
methods for making guesses, no rules for generating insights. The methodical activity of interpretation 
commences when we begin to test and criticize our guesses.” Hirsch, Validity of Interpretation, 203. 
Ricoeur agrees, “Why do we need an art of guessing? Why do we have to ‘construe’ the meaning? Not only 
–as I tried to say a few years ago—because language is metaphorical and because the double meaning of 
metaphorical language requires an art of deciphering which tends to unfold the several layers of meaning. 
The case of the metaphor is only a particular case for a general theory of hermeneutics. In more general 
terms, a text has to be construed because it is not a mere sequence of sentences, all on an equal footing and 
separately understandable. A text is a whole totality.” Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 
211-213. 
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about the whole idea or direction of the text. Without a guessing reader, the text remains 
a mute sequence of language symbols.40 Hirsch wrote, “Every interpretation begins and 
ends as a guess, and no one has ever devised a method for making intelligent guesses.”41 
Howard Margolis shares that the process of guessing is just as critical for scientific 
thinking: “Characteristically, the first (framing) stage does not involve an explicit 
process. Rather, the person is treated as somehow recognizing or imputing a particular 
way of seeing the problem, in a way that is not itself ordinarily subjected to analysis. 
Instead it is only at the second (judgment) stage that we get an analysis, and that comes in 
terms of a comparison with some normative standard of rational judgment.”42 
 From where do these guesses come? From the repertoire of patterns and types in 
the personal worlds of meaning that the interpreter brings to the text. “If all cognition is 
reducible to sequences of pattern-recognition (and Patterns [Margolis’ first book of the 
series] amounts to a long argument for that), then what a person can do at any particular 
moment is constrained by the repertoire of recognizable patterns currently available.”43 
                                                 
40 “In fact, what is out there? There is just a series of signs. Anything over and above a re-issue of 
the same signs in the same order will be mediated by the experience, intelligence, and judgment of the 
interpreter.” Lonergan, Method in Theology, 157.  
41 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 170. Karl Popper agrees, “My view of the matter, for what it 
is worth, is that there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas or a logical construction of 
this process. My view may be expressed by saying that every discovery contains ‘an irrational element,’ or 
‘a creative intuition.’” Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 
8.  
42 Howard Margolis, Patterns, Thinking and Cognition: A Theory of Judgment (Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), 5.  
43 Margolis, Paradigms and Barriers, 36. 
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This explains why different interpreters see different meanings from the same text and 
why the same interpreter will see at a later time new meanings in a familiar text; “change 
in the cognitive repertoire is the heart of the matter.”44 Since these guesses come from the 
interpreter’s worlds of meaning, self-disclosure of relevant repertoire45 may further 
empathetic understanding of opposing points of view.46 
Is guessing completely random? No, textual “cues appear critical to prompting 
that pattern”47 and help to tailor the guesses. Micro-hermeneutics exposes a myriad of 
objective cues from the text and their possible implications for meso-hermeneutical 
construction. For instance, authorial emphasis emerges if a literary structure is validated48 
and variations in narrative repetition may convey a nuanced appraisal of two comparable 
situations. This is the literary hermeneutical circle that relates textual parts to the whole 
biblical passage through the flat spiraling circuit of the interpreter ranging across the 
                                                 
44 Margolis, Paradigms and Barriers, 207. 
45 David Rennie, “Qualitative Research as Methodical Hermeneutics,” Psychological Methods 17, 
no. 3 (2012): 392. 
46 Hermeneutics is not limited to interpreting texts but also analyzes the interpretive process itself. 
Thus, it also seeks to promote a “more sympathetic understanding of views and arguments that at first seem 
alien or unacceptable. Hermeneutics seeks to establish bridges between opposing viewpoints. This does not 
necessitate giving ground to the other view, but sympathetically to understand the diverse motivations and 
journeys that have led in the first place to each respective view or argument.” Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 6.  
47 Margolis, Paradigms and Barriers, 204.  
48 I beg to differ from Ricoeur when he says, “There is no necessity and no evidence concerning 
what is important and what is unimportant, what is essential and what is unessential. The judgement of 
importance is a guess.” Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 211. It may be a guess initially, 
but it can be tested. If a literary structure is discerned in the text and coheres with further analysis of the 
whole pericope, what is important or unimportant in the text according to the original vision of the narrator 
can be validated.  
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ramp of biblical worlds of meaning. The second hermeneutical circle fuses the horizons 
of the text and the interpreter by weaving from the personal worlds of meaning to the 
textual worlds of meaning and back again. Exactly how textual cues and the interpreter’s 
pattern recognition mesh remains an unsolved problem49 but the two iterative movements 
from textual cues to the whole text and from a pattern of meaning from the interpreter’s 
worlds of meaning to the text then back again is jointly assumed in the hermeneutical 
method for understanding.  
Because these two methods of circularity are how humans apprehend meaning 
from texts, an accusation of eisegesis reveals a simplistic and modernist presupposition of 
a clear, acknowledged boundary separating exegesis and eisegesis. There is no normative 
universal criteria for where that imaginary line is, though many have intuitive hunches for 
where they believe it ought to be. Hermeneutics necessitates the overlapping spectrum of 
text and interpreter which only excludes the polar extremes of text or interpreter in 
isolation (see Fig. 4.3 below). Of course, different schools of thought stake the limits of 
acceptable proposals along this spectrum with good reasons for doing so. But a random 
                                                 
49 Margolis, Patterns, Thinking and Cognition, 2.  
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accusation of eisegesis only reveals in reverse, a personal discomfort with the accused 
overstepping the accuser’s comfort zone for interpretation.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.3 Hermeneutical scope for meaning 
 
On a larger scale, faith communities assume their own interpretive boundaries are 
self-evident, often without self-awareness. The Christocentric insistence of Christian 
interpreters on the Hebrew Bible or Old Testament texts is certainly considered eisegesis 
by Jews. The Koran based filter of Muslim theologians on the New Testament is called 
eisegesis by Christians. Feminist, Liberation and Ethnic perspectives are called eisegesis 
by conservative denominations, who may use inerrant or infallible filters in their textual 
exegesis. Instead of labels, explaining the principles and arguments behind discomfort 
with a proposed interpretation is more helpful and builds cognitive bridges across faiths 
 175 
 
and denominations, leading to correct understanding of alternative positions from their 
framework of orthodoxy and reasonableness without compromising one’s own. 
Within such parameters, what forms a group’s understanding of a text? Gadamer 
called the process—harmonizing: “The movement of understanding always runs from the 
whole to the parts and back to the whole. The task is to expand in concentric circles the 
unity of the understood meaning. Harmonizing all the particulars with the whole is at 
each stage the criterion of correct understanding. Its absence means the failure to 
understand.”50 Ricoeur recognized the bi-directional orchestration to this process: “The 
reconstruction of the text as a whole necessarily has a circular character, in the sense that 
the presupposition of a certain kind of a whole is implied in the recognition of the parts. 
And reciprocally, it is in construing the details that we construe the whole.”51 This means 
the harmonizing hermeneutic method is vulnerable to confirmation bias52 which can turn 
the hermeneutic circle into a mental trap for “an interpretive hypothesis . . . tends to be a 
self-confirming hypothesis. Thus, the distressing unwillingness of many interpreters to 
relinquish their sense of certainty is the result not of native close-mindedness but of 
imprisonment in the hermeneutic circle.”53 Accordingly, the result of harmonizing, 
                                                 
50 Hans Georg Gadamer, “On the Circle of Understanding” in Hermeneutics Versus Science? 
Three German Views, eds. J. M. Connolly and T. Keutner (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988), 68. 
51 Paul Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as A Text,” New Literary 
History 5, no. 1 (1973): 106. 
52 “The tendency to test one’s beliefs or conjectures by seeking evidence that might confirm or 
verify them and to ignore evidence that might disconfirm or refute them.” Oxford Dictionary of 
Psychology, 4th ed. (2015) s.v. “confirmation bias,”  
53 Hirsch recognizes the implications of this phenomenon: “Literary and biblical interpreters are 
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internal coherence alone cannot discriminate between a correct understanding and a 
cohesive circle of illusion.54 A second criteria of internal correspondence may help to 
arbitrate between competing coherent interpretations, based on how well one “makes 
functional the elements of the mute text than a rival hypothesis.”55 These two internal 
criteria of coherence and correspondence constitute the internal validity of an 
interpretation. However, to gain widespread interpretive plausibility—which requires an 
intuitive correspondence to external reality—three additional hermeneutical heuristics are 
helpful.  
The three heuristics are (1) the Principle of Charity, (2) the Principle of Humanity 
and (3) Occam’s Razor. The first, the hermeneutical Principle of Charity, recommends 
maximizing coherence and self-consistency in interpreting the words and actions of 
others. Willard Van Orman Quine articulated the Principle of Charity for critical 
translation: “The maxim of translation underlying all this is that assertions startingly false 
                                                 
not by nature more willful and un-self-critical than other men. On the contrary, they very often listen 
patiently to contrary opinions, and after careful consideration, they often decide that the contrary 
hypothesis ‘do not correspond to the text.’ And of course, they are right. The meanings they reject could 
not possibly arise except on the basis of a quite alien conception of the text. After all, since the text is 
largely constituted by the hypothesis, how could the hypothesis fail to seem inevitable and certain?” Hirsch, 
Validity in Interpretation, 166. Heidegger referred to this bias confirmation phenomenon of the 
hermeneutic circle as the famously coined “vicious circle.” Heidegger, Being and Time, 152. 
54 Taylor believed all interpreters should be self-critical, “How can I be sure? Maybe my intuitions 
are wrong or distorted, maybe I am locked into a circle of illusion.” Taylor, “Interpretation and the 
Sciences of Man,” 5-6. This subjective circle of self-confirming coherence within a pericope points to the 
need for an external norm for validity. 
55 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 190. 
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on the face of them are likely to turn on hidden differences of languages.”56 Donald 
Davidson’s hermeneutical version of the above maxim is “Charity in interpreting the 
words and thoughts of others is unavoidable in another direction as well; just as we must 
maximize agreement, or risk not making sense of what the alien is talking about, so we 
must maximize the self-consistency we attribute to him, on pain of not understanding 
him.”57 The second heuristic, the hermeneutical Principle of Humanity, recommends an 
approach where “one should attribute to a creature the propositional attitude one 
supposed one would have oneself in those circumstances.”58 The third heuristic, Occam’s 
Razor, was originally articulated as an ontological maxim: “Entities are not to be 
multiplied without necessity.”59 Applied to hermeneutics this means if two options for 
interpretation are comparable in explanatory power, the simpler option is to be preferred. 
Using these two internal literary criteria and three intuitive heuristics, the 
following section on understanding the Aqedah will proceed in this manner. First, I will 
attempt to construct a theocentric viewpoint of the Aqedah as the primary thesis from the 
text. Next, the anthropocentric viewpoint from the text will be presented as the alternate 
thesis. Then, the final form of the Aqedah text will be analyzed as the biblical synthesis 
                                                 
56 W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960), 54. 
57 Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 1984), 27. 
58 Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 343. Together, the 
Principle of Charity and the Principal of Humanity resonate with Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical principle 
of divination, a psychological or empathic understanding of the text as the words of a human author who 
lived in the same shared world of the reader. 
59 Quoted in Boehm, Binding of Isaac, 8.  
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of these two viewpoints.60 For this work, the Bible translation for this chapter and all the 
remaining chapters of this dissertation will utilize the Revised Standard Version for its 
accuracy in capturing the meaning of the original Hebrew. 
Application: Understanding 
Thesis: Theocentric viewpoint 
The construction of a theocentric viewpoint of the Aqedah will be through the 
hermeneutic method described above. Usually this construction is done privately and 
informally then publicly argued in a logically linear fashion that leaves the discovery 
process inscrutable and black-boxed to readers. To be transparent, I will demonstrate the 
                                                 
60 Even though Hegel never used the terms of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, Hegel’s triadic 
pattern has been labeled with these terms by tradition. If this triadic is adapted for hermeneutics, it would 
envision a process where a particular interpretation or thesis is asserted, the anti-thesis refers to the 
negation or competing interpretation to the first, then synthesis is the reconciliation of the two that forms a 
“newer, fuller, and more informed interpretation or understanding—the Hegelian synthesis or Gadamerian 
‘fusion of horizons.’” David Schwartz, Encyclopedia of Knowledge Management (Hershey, PA: Idea 
Group Reference, 2006), 8. The terms I will use in this dissertation is thesis for the theocentric viewpoint, 
alternative thesis for the anthropocentric viewpoint and synthesis for the complementary conjoining of the 
two. The term alternative thesis is more accurate for Abraham’s perspective because he is not a negation 
for God and his motive is not in contradiction to the divine will (v. 11 Now I know you fear God). Instead, 
his actions align with the test command literally, while his understanding of the divine will behind the test 
command differs only on one point. So, as a learning, disciple-servant of God, Abraham’s viewpoint 
matches God’s viewpoint all the way until his grasping of the knife to kill his son—one significant 
departure, though done in faith. The interaction in Genesis 17 also shows a similar pattern of divergence 
between the two on only one point (Abraham’s wrong assumption that Ishmael was the promised son) that 
was readily corrected by Abraham when God made it clear. 
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informal, creative and intuitive hermeneutical method as directed by the text and my 
constructive approach will remain literary, theological and historical.61  
By means of the first verse, the narrator explicitly posits the proper paradigm for 
understanding62 the Aqedah: “After these things God tested Abraham and said to him, 
‘Abraham!’ And he said, ‘Here I am’” (Gen 22:1). This verse indicates that Aqedah 
should be understood (a) in the context of the preceding Abrahamic stories (after these 
things), as involving (b) two viewpoints63 (God tested Abraham)—Tester and testee—in 
(c) one test, (d) with emphasis on God the Tester (grammar with definite article, emphatic 
syntax reversal order) over Abraham the testee for the nature of this test (e) with dialogue 
                                                 
61 Source-historical aspects of the text were addressed in chapter 3 on the micro-hermeneutical 
level. The historical aspect of this present meso-hermeneutical journey will focus on the previous stories of 
the literary Abrahamic cycle in the canon as background.  
62 One way to make certain that this introduction by the narrator is taken seriously is to ask 
oneself, what concept would be missing from consideration if this phrase, term, or syntax wasn’t present? 
The same exercise from the opposite direction is to reduce the sentence to its minimum proposition (God 
tested Abraham), then note what is added to the core meaning by each un-essential elaboration. 
63 Though one united viewpoint would be ideal, Boehm admits, “the present literature on Gen 22 . 
. . lacks one simple interpretation that elegantly resolves the various difficulties found in the text.” Omri 
Boehm, The Binding of Isaac, 8. Albert Einstein recognized minimum limits to simplification when he 
wrote, “It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible basic 
elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation of a 
single datum of experience.” Albert Einstein, “On the Method of Theoretical Physics,” Philosophy of 
Science 1, no. 2 (April, 1934): 165. This was later summed up by Alice Calaprice as “Everything should be 
made as simple as possible but not simpler.” Alice Calaprice The New Quotable Einstein (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 290. Since God is the Tester and Abraham is the testee and there is 
admittedly a vast difference between the intelligence and nature of the two beings, at a minimum two 
viewpoints appear necessary to adequately understand the epistemology of this event of Divinity testing 
His creature. 
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as the divine mode of engagement that required Abraham to appropriate (Here I am) his 
covenant identity (Abraham!).64 
The (a) contextual phrase, “after these things [it happened]”65 can indicate 
conjunctive or disjunctive framing. However, conjunction of the Aqedah with the 
previous covenant journey is the only way to see the test as a problem. In disjunctive 
isolation from its context, the Aqedah is neither a theological problem nor a discovery. It 
is only a problem if it “puzzles and worries somebody” and a discovery only if it 
“relieves somebody from the burden of a problem.”66 Since the problematic nature of the 
test is a core assumption in the Aqedah literature, I will plumb the conjunctive approach 
to appreciate the difficulty of the test and to try to resolve the tensions in the narrative.67 
                                                 
64 Gadamer believed praxis-oriented legal, normative or biblical texts require appropriation from 
the very beginning of the process for correct understanding: “We too determined that application is neither 
a subsequent nor merely an occasional part of the phenomenon of understanding, but codetermines it as a 
whole from the beginning.” Gadamer, Truth and Method, 333; See also Jean Grondin, “Gadamer’s Basic 
Understanding of Understanding” in The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, ed. R. Dostal (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 36-51. Appropriation begins when we accept that “the most 
important thing is the question that the text puts to us, our being perplexed by the traditionary word so that 
understanding it must already include the task of the historical self-mediation between the present and 
tradition. . . . In order to answer the question put to us, we the interrogated must ourselves begin to ask 
questions.” Gadamer, Truth and Method, 382. 
65 Where the RSV version of the narrative leaves out Hebrew terms and it is helpful to the point 
being made, I will supply the missing translation in brackets. 
66 Michael Polanyi’s germane example of this point is “a chess problem means nothing to a 
chimpanzee or to an imbecile and hence does not puzzle them; a great chess master on the other hand may 
fail to be puzzled by it because he finds its solution without effort; only a player whose ability is about 
equal to the problem will find intense preoccupation in it. Only such a player will appreciate its solution as 
a discovery. It appears possible to appraise the comparative hardness of a problem and to test the 
intelligence of subjects by their capacity for solving problems of a certain degree of hardness.” Michael 
Polanyi, “Problem Solving,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 8, no. 30 (August 1957): 92. 
The Aqedah testing speaks well of Abraham for God thought it equal to Abraham’s capacity to understand 
and succeed. 
67 Illogically, most theological treatments initially assume a conjunctive stance to elaborate the 
vexing moral conundrum of the Aqedah, then proceed to ignore the preceding narratives and try to resolve 
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The conjunctive stance assumes God as the divine Tester to be consistent with His 
revealed benevolent character and accepts the biblical record as truthful about the divine 
source issuing the demand for human sacrifice.68 Then human reason must keep 
listening69 to the story until the natural end of the telling, without rejecting any part of 
Scripture. 
How should understanding be pursued, what method is appropriate for the 
Aqedah? The divine Tester employed the (e) dialogical70 method with Abraham to start 
the test and this interactive approach is similar to the bi-directional hermeneutical 
                                                 
the problem of the Aqedah in disjunctive isolation from the covenant context. This move routinely leads to 
ahistorical abstract philosophical concepts to make sense of the test. Context is critical for appropriate 
interpretation. Howard Margolis’ demonstration of this maxim is superb: “To interpret the meaning of ‘or’ 
one must know the context: i. Soup or salad (waiter—neither, or either but not both), ii. $100 or 10 days 
(judge—either, not neither, not both), iii. Cream or sugar (hostess—either, neither, or both), iv. Wash or 
sweep (parent to child—either or both, not neither).” Margolis, Patterns, Thinking and Cognition, 94. 
68 In contrast to this stance, Immanuel Kant argued: “If God should really speak to man, man 
could still never know that it was God speaking. It is quite impossible for man to apprehend the infinite by 
his senses, distinguish it from sensible beings, and recognize it as such. But in some cases man can be sure 
that the voice he hears is not God’s; for if the voice commands him to do something contrary to the moral 
law, then no matter how majestic the apparition may be, and no matter how it may seem to surpass the 
whole of nature, he must consider it an illusion.” In a footnote Kant specifically added: “We can use, as an 
example, the myth of the sacrifice that Abraham was going to make by butchering and burning his only son 
at God’s command (the poor child, without knowing it, even brought the wood for the fire). Abraham 
should have replied to this supposedly divine voice: ‘That I ought not kill my good son is quite certain. But 
that you, this apparition, are God—of that I am not certain, and never can be, not even is [read: if] this 
voice rings down to me from (visible) heaven.’” Immanuel Kant quoted by Stephen R. Palmquist and 
Philip McPherson in “Three Perspectives on Abraham's Defense against Kant's Charge of Immoral 
Conduct,” The Journal of Religion 89, no. 4 (October 2009): 471-472.  
69 Abraham exemplified active listening with obedience to the end and was divinely commended 
at the end of the test with the approbation, “You obeyed my voice.” 
70 The method of provocative questions and answers is sometimes referred to as the Socratic 
dialectic, but I have no interest in importing Socrates’ “apparent intention of convicting his interlocuters of 
their inability to answer the question rather than with the intention of supplying the answer.” Alasdair 
MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1966), 20. Instead, I am 
following the question and answer methods of Jesus (Matt 6:26-30; 12:10-11; 21:23-27; 22:41-45) who 
used questions to prepare a receptive space in the hearers’ heart and mind to comprehend the answer better. 
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method. A call or question works by creating a receptive opening in the listener for 
understanding. Heidegger likened understanding to an opening, a clearing that allows for 
authentic sight.71 Likewise, Abraham’s answer to God “Hinneni” (lit. behold me) 
conveys a receptive invitation for God to see him, with Abraham simultaneously open to 
whatever God wants to disclose of Himself.72 This simple yet profound exchange of 
mutual openness is characteristic of an “I-Thou”73 relation and anchors the three angles of 
the Aqedah literary structural triangle. It thus seems appropriate to accept the congruence 
between the hermeneutical method of questions and answers and the divine dialogical 
method of the test to understand the Aqedah. This hermeneutical understanding will be 
                                                 
71 “In the analysis of understanding and the disclosedness of the there in general, we referred to the 
lumen naturale and called the disclosedness of being in the clearing of Da-sein in which something like 
sight first becomes possible. Sight was conceived with regard to the basic kind of disclosing characteristic 
of Da-sein, understanding in the sense of the genuine appropriation of beings to which Da-sein can be 
related in accordance with its essential possibilities of being.” Heidegger, Being and Time, 159. Da-sein 
was Heidegger’s invented term for the experience of Being that is peculiar to human beings, a form of 
understanding. 
72 “Gadamer argues that the ‘logical structure of openness’ is to be found in the model of the 
Platonic dialogue, or to be more accurate, in the Socratic dialectic of question and answer. In order to effect 
a ‘fusion of horizons’ between the horizon of the interpreter and the object of his interpretation, a dialogue 
takes place between the individual and the phenomenon of interest. However, the interpreter must be aware 
of his prejudices and recognize that his knowledge is not absolute but incomplete—he must be ‘open’ to the 
phenomenon.” Tom Butler, from Table 1: A Taxonomy of Dialectic Techniques for Hermeneutic Research 
in “Towards a Hermeneutic Model for Interpretive Research in Information Systems” in Journal of 
Information Technology, (1998): 290. 
73 There is a difference between encountering the other through the senses only (“I-It”) and 
relating to the other in an authentic, living, profoundly positive way (“I-Thou”). The second encounter is 
what makes me—really me. “I become through my relation to the Thou: as I become I, I say Thou.” Martin 
Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York, NY: Continuum, 2004), 17. 
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constructed through dialog by asking questions, then listening to (or more accurately, 
searchingly reading then contemplating deeply) the answers provided by the text. 
What is the Aqedah? Verse one announces the self-organizing narrative to be a (c) 
divine test74 between (b) two participants. Though this is an ancient, puzzling, 
unrepeatable test and I have no direct access to the mind of the narrator, because the 
narrator chose to frame the Aqedah as a test, to understand this text it is absolutely 
necessary to guess75 at what characteristics of a test the narrator and I might hold in 
common. Then the hermeneutical method requires me to return to the text to validate or 
invalidate those guesses.76 
The term test is a textual cue that cannot help but evoke my practical experience 
of tests as a possible intuitive backdrop to the reading of the Aqedah. For instance, the 
                                                 
74 Test qualifies as a language game in the Wittgensteinian sense of the term for it is a semiotic 
social convention of language and actions woven together that is recognizable, but not rigid. Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 
1986), 2 [3]. A recognizable social convention assumes initiator and responder share a history, vocabulary, 
purpose and pattern of interactions. Thus, for the reader to be able to hear God’s test command as Abraham 
heard it, requires the reader to be seeped in Abraham’s past covenant journey and keep it in mind as a 
hermeneutic grid to understand the test. 
75 All previous biblical studies on test (nissah) from the micro-hermeneutical level are now 
incorporated as part of my personal worlds of meaning and provide the exegetical backdrop for meso-
hermeneutical guesses. To avoid redundancy in this project, connections from personal testing experience 
are highlighted in this meso-hermeneutical chapter to add to the already growing exegetical understanding 
of the Aqedah. The findings from the last chapter will be assumed to be already in place and active as 
background textual information. 
76 The biblical pericope will be used as the most universally available standard to support and 
narrow the scope of test meanings brought into this study. Of course, the term test carries multiple 
implications and “the generation of implications depends on the interpreter’s previous experience of the 
shared type.” Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 66. This is shown by the disagreement between Jon 
Levenson and Nahum Sarna on whether the term test implies or doesn’t imply that the threat to Isaac’s life 
was genuine, this difference in test implications does not stem from the Hebrew term itself but from their 
previous experiences related to the concept of a test. See Sarna, Genesis, 393; Levenson, Death and 
Resurrection, 126.  
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Aqedah is shrouded in Abraham’s silence as evinced by Isaac’s question.77 This is not 
surprising to me, for almost every test in my life was taken in silence. Silence is the 
normal mode for tests. Typically, the tester’s silence stems from confidence that adequate 
preparation has been given before the test and that further help is not necessary for 
successful completion.78 The testee’s silence may indicate confusion, numbness, and 
despair but it may conversely signal active interest, reflection, pondering, reasoning, and 
alert attentiveness79 to any new directions from the tester to correct or clarify the test 
further. 
Though Abraham had not been afraid in the past to morally protest a judgment 
from God (Gen18), the unusually intuitive Abraham who had become God’s friend may 
have sensed from the rhetorical aspects of the divine communication and unusual demand 
                                                 
77 Many reasons have been offered for Abraham’s silence: shock, horror, disgust, numbness, grim 
obedience. But according to Kierkegaard, Abraham’s silence is the solitary suffering of carrying out a 
mission that nobody could or would understand because it was unrelatable and done in absolute relation to 
the Absolute. Abraham cannot speak because even speaking would not have made his actions 
understandable, in fact, being understood would have been a temptation to make God’s order subservient to 
universal human maxims. Kierkegaard even regards Abraham’s speech to Isaac about God offering 
Himself a lamb as ironic because it is a non-answer, according to him. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 
142. What Kierkegaard and most theologians are assuming correctly in noting the unusual silence of 
Abraham is that Abraham has not been shy about voicing moral protests to God in the past. But could it be 
that they underestimate Abraham’s ability to sense this divine communication is different in nature from all 
the rest because it targets his deepest fear? 
78 The idea of God’s silence and hiddenness in such tests is implied in II Chron 32:31: “God left 
him [Hezekiah] to himself, in order to test him and to know all that was in his heart.” Even when Hezekiah 
took the wrong choice and failed the test, no divine mid-test correction was given, only a judgment at the 
end. See 2 Kgs 20:12-19; 2 Chron 32:27-31. In the case of Abraham’s test, God intervened because Isaac’s 
life, and therefore the covenant was at stake. 
79 During a verbally directed performance test of surgical knot-tying in an ob-gyn clinical rotation, 
a slight shift in seating position by an examiner caught my hyperattentive hearing and I looked up 
immediately to see if he was giving me nonverbal indications that I was doing it wrong. He smiled at me 
reassuringly, so I went back to my task. Abraham likewise happened to be in a verbally guided 
performance test.  
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that this was a trial or examination completely different from past revelations and he may 
be responding accordingly with soul-searching silence. In addition, Abraham’s silence 
may signal a hyperattentive listening mode since God had specifically promised further 
communication80 (which I shall tell you, v. 2). If he was also hoping for a possible 
reprieve, that would be another reason to keep the matter to himself instead of sharing it 
prematurely with others. Though we cannot and should not rule out emotional reasons for 
Abraham’s silence, I find the text-provided paradigm of an auditory-guided test with 
pending instructions has strangely never been proposed as a plausible reason when it is 
the most obvious. God calling Abraham by his covenant name, a first, conveyed to the 
highly intuitive81 Abraham that something unusual and very serious was happening even 
if he wasn’t told explicitly that this was a test. Silent, hyper-attentive listening is later 
proven by Abraham’s instantaneous mid-action reversal reaction to the angelic 
interruption (v. 11). 
A second characteristic from my testing experience also resonates with textual 
cues from the Aqedah. As every student knows, a tester usually knows the purpose of 
                                                 
80 The Bible records God can speak very softly, perhaps even articulating a thought through 
silence: “And after the earthquake a fire, but the Lord was not in the fire. And after the fire the sound of a 
low whisper” (1 Kgs 19:12). In Abraham’s covenant journey, the nighttime conversation about counting 
the stars fit that gentle mode: “And he [God] brought him outside and said, ‘Look toward heaven, and 
number the stars, if you are able to number them.’ Then he said to him, ‘So shall your offspring be’” (Gen 
15:5). Since the Aqedah command was probably a nighttime revelation beginning with na (please or now), 
a quiet communication is a possibility and if so, it would engender Abraham’s hushed listening mode, 
straining to catch the next whisper from God as promised (Gen 22:2). 
81 In Gen 18:21, 23, God only mentioned investigating the truth about the outcry from Sodom and 
Gomorrah and didn’t outline any planned actions, but Abraham intuited that God would find them evil, 
judge them, and destroy the city. Their ensuing dialogue demonstrates that Abraham’s highly sensitized 
spiritual intuition about YHWH was correct and the events of Gen 19 underline it. 
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their test better than the testee (d). In fact, a consistently successful testee will not only 
try to understand the actual test directions but also intuit what the tester is trying to 
measure by means of the test. Test requirements must be handled capably to pass,82 but 
this gap between the tester’s knowing and testee’s guessing regarding the test purpose 
suggests that logical alignment of the divine Tester’s actions83 in the Aqedah may reveal 
the original purpose84 of the test better than following the wake of Abraham’s reactions.85 
                                                 
82 A test must be satisfied in some manner. If there is ambiguity or confusion in the design of the 
test and the testee correctly senses what the tester is trying to assess, a clever testee will overwhelm the 
inadequate test options by choosing the best available and adding a side notation to demonstrate their 
knowledge or skill, thereby providing what they think the tester is trying to assess. The learner’s knowledge 
of the tester is demonstrated by their response to ambiguous/unusual aspects of the tests from the tester. 
What does this say about Abraham? 
83 Most of my personal test experiences are not germane to the text and were eventually ruled out 
by the text norm, but two experiences matched the Tester’s actions in the Aqedah text and opened tentative 
possibilities for understanding. I took tests from a chemistry professor who was renowned for posing test 
questions that were completely unlike the homework assignment problems but required the comprehensive 
understanding and integration of several cognitive processes taught in the homework in order to solve the 
unique test problems. Another physics professor was unusual in that he would make himself available for 
mid-test redirection if a student was stumped during a test. Silently, he would correct or re-direct the 
student’s work with a red pen thereby allowing the student to successfully complete the problem and those 
red marks were incorporated into the grading of the test.  
84 “The unifying and controlling idea in any type of utterance, any genre is the idea of purpose.” 
Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 110. The assumption here is that the Tester’s unstated purpose for the test 
can be discerned as the consistent direction or trajectory of His words and actions in the Aqedah. 
85 Traditional Aqedah theology tends to be anthropocentric, focused and elaborating on Abraham’s 
actions and words over God’s words and actions. This may be because Abraham was commended by God 
as having passed the test and the interpreter automatically identifies with Abraham’s anguish when 
confronted by the harsh test command. But both test logic and principles of biblical exegesis point to God 
as the most reliable reference in this story for what the test is about.  
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Using Occam’s Razor,86 I will attempt to reconstruct a logically linear87 theocentric 
understanding of the Aqedah if possible.  
For tracing God’s actions in the Aqedah test where should one begin? Perplexity 
regarding a test is usually addressed by the tester at the end of the test experience. The 
literary structure of the Aqedah had suggested God’s last speech (vv. 16-18) was a divine 
interpretation or commentary on Abraham’s actions (v. 16 “because you did this 
thing”).88 Since the last divine speech is an interpretation of the test, it differs in style 
from the terse test narrative.89 This final divine word in the Aqedah re-establishes the 
covenant on God Himself then lists themes and blessings corresponding to six of the 
seven previous covenant revelations to Abraham as we have seen on the micro-
hermeneutical level of analysis. As a divine interpretive assessment of Abrahams’ test 
                                                 
86 A simpler or logical non-contradictory, non-retracting test hypothesis would be preferred, if 
found, over a contradictory or self-retracting explanation for God’s actions. 
87 If a logical linear progression of theocentric actions in the Aqedah can be constructed that is 
equal in explanatory power to the traditional interpretations that assume God retracted or pulled back His 
test command, it would be aesthetically simpler and preferable.  
88 R. W. L. Moberly, “The Earliest Commentary on the Akedah,” in Vetus Testamentum 38, no. 3 
(July 1988), 312, 318. A test interpretation functions as a test assessment, an explanation. 
89 At the end of Hezekiah’s test, II Kings 20:12-18, Isaiah delivers an assessment in a very 
different style from the curt staccato questions used in the debriefing just prior to it. After Job’s trial, God’s 
assessment of their conversation (Job 42:7-8) is delivered to Eliphaz in narrative style also very different 
from His oratorical browbeating of Job in the whirlwind. 
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response, this is the closest objective indication in the text of the Tester’s purpose90 for 
the Aqedah. 
What was the divine purpose of the Aqedah?91 According to the final divine 
interpretation in vv. 15-18 that references Abraham’s test actions and evaluates it against 
the norm of previous covenant revelations, one logical interpretative hypothesis for the 
purpose of the test is that it was testing the integration of Abraham’s covenant identity by 
eliciting a comprehensive covenant-based response from the divinely trained Abraham. 
That is, the divine test command which threatened to end the covenant through the 
required sacrifice of Isaac may have been designed to be solved by a paternal covenant 
response from Isaac’s father, the first prophetic intercessor and covenant father of God’s 
                                                 
90 Hirsch claims that “the author’s intention is the single meaning of the text.” Hirsch, Validity in 
Interpretation, 133-144. Because the author’s intention is rarely accessible as a norm outside the text or 
directly explicated in the text, I appreciate Anthony Thiselton’s observation that the “directedness” or 
“intentional directedness” of the text has been accepted as its nearest representation. Thiselton, 
Hermeneutics, 27. Kevin Vanhoozer agrees with Thiselton, “the text stands between author and reader as 
an embodied intention, that, through various textual strategies, extends the matter and mode of the author’s 
attention to the world into the world of the reader, enabling the reader to respond to the same matter in an 
appropriate fashion.” Kevin Vanhoozer, Is there Meaning in this Text? The Bible, the Reader, and the 
Morality of Literary Knowledge (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1998), 282. See also David E. Klemm, 
“Introduction,” 35 and Teruhiko Nagao, “On Authorial Intention: E. D. Hirsch’s Validity in Interpretation 
Revisited,” The Annual Reports on Cultural Science 40, no. 1 (November 1991): 161-180. 
91 The divine purpose for the Aqedah has historically generated many conjectures: (1) Satan 
accuses Abraham of ingratitude after Isaac’s birth—God counters by saying Abraham would obediently 
offer the child and tests him. Rabbi Yossi ben Zimra in Sanhedrin 89b, Babylonian Talmud, (2) Prince 
Mastema asks God to test Abraham’s faithfulness and love since he now has a son he loves and “is more 
pleased with him than everything.” O. S. Wintermute, “Jubilees: A New Translation and Introduction,” in J. 
H. Charlesworth, The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, vol. 2 (New York City, NY: Doubleday, 1985), 35-
142, esp. 90, (3) All the angels and heavenly host were jealous of Abraham because of God’s miracle gift 
to him, so God tells him to give up “the fruit of your body.” Biblical Antiquities of Pseudo-Philo, 32:1-2 as 
quoted by I. Kalimi, “Go, I Beg You, Take Your Beloved Son and Slay Him!: Binding of Isaac in Rabbinic 
Literature and Thought,” Review of Rabbinic Judaism 13 (2010), 1-29, (4) Ishmael and Isaac are 
contending over who is more righteously deserving to inherit the birthright, Isaac asserts at 37 years old if 
God were to “demand all my members I would not hesitate.” So, the Lord does. Targum Pseudo-Jonathan 
on Gen 22:1. My contribution remains text-based and text-normed in searching for the divine purpose. 
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chosen nation, using an integration of all of the seven covenant revelations that preceded 
the test.92  
Now, if the Aqedah was testing Abraham’s covenant identity through his 
response, how does that relate to the leitmotif of divine seeing/providing that runs 
throughout the narrative? All that Abraham is and could be, stemmed from his divinely-
guided covenant journey. Even from the beginning, God had provided Himself as a 
paternal mentor to Abram after separating him from his biological father, his kinsmen 
and his country, seeing in him the beginning of a great chosen nation.93 Through a 
covenant journey (lek-lekha: go for/to/into/with yourself, Gen 12:1, 22:2), God had 
transformed an obedient barren Abram into the covenant father Abraham, educating and 
training him through seven covenant revelations.94 The Aqedah divine interpretation 
                                                 
92 Based on the first verse and norm for the grading of the test, the main purpose of the Aqedah is 
the testing of Abraham’s covenant identity. Related implications may include: (1) contrasting pagan and 
Yahweh fathers in regard to child sacrifice as worship, (2) confronting and curing Abraham’s persistent 
fear of death, (3) initiating Isaac into the covenant, (4) fulfilling God’s promise of substitutionary self-
imprecation to preserve the covenant with the provided ram—Gen 15, (5) revealing Abraham’s fear of God 
and obedience to God’s voice, (6) demonstrating divine graciousness by praising Abraham while not 
covering up Abraham’s imperfections, (7) establishing the covenant on Himself while blessing Abraham 
relative to his covenant obedience, and (8) setting up a paradigm of meaning for the sacrificial services 
culminating in the Day of Atonement. 
93 A test functionally uncovers present capacity, identity in terms of motives, and hints at 
teleology. Why is someone the way they are? How did they come to be this way? What drives them to 
continue in such a way? “The goal of testing is an understanding of what a person can do, what one really 
has in oneself, and who one is.” Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament Vol. IX, s.v. הסנ, eds. G. 
Johannes Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren, Heinz-Josef Fabry (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 444. The 
test will exhibit to what extent Abraham has fulfilled the spiritual potential that God called him to 
personify. 
94 Gen 12:1-3; 12:7; 13:14-17; 15; 17; 18; 21:12-13.  
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(22:15-18) indicates that Abraham had internalized and integrated into his covenant 
identity six of the seven revelatory lessons as actualized in his test response. 
 At this point, it must be remembered that most tests do not end with perfect 
scores. In fact, a consistently perfect score can indicate that the tester is not adequately 
assessing the maximum potential of the testee. Thus, the prospect of Abraham achieving 
an imperfect performance is not to be taken as something negative. It can be rightly 
understood as underscoring the skill and knowledge of the Tester in disclosing the upper 
limits of Abraham’s covenant maturity. Once hidden limitations are made explicit 
through testing, the testee can see his or her true condition and has the opportunity to 
master the missing component more deeply than before. Thus testing can be pedagogical 
in a profoundly effective and remedial way. What else in the text backs the possibility 
that the Aqedah was about testing the covenant identity of Abraham? The test begins with 
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God and Abraham affirming his covenant identity: “After these things God tested 
Abraham and said to him, ‘Abraham!’ And he said, ‘Here I am’” (Gen 22:1).95 
If this abductive hypothesis96 of the Aqedah testing Abraham’s covenant identity 
is correct, it should predict the test command details.97  Charles S. Pierce offered this 
formulation for abductive reasoning: 
  The surprising fact, C, is observed; 
  But if A were true, C would be a matter of course 
  Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.98 
 
For our purposes, C is the Aqedah test command. If A, the abductive hypothesis 
that the Aqedah was a test of Abraham’s covenant identity is correct, then “it would be a 
matter of course” for C, the test command99 to require or evoke concrete, observable 
                                                 
95 God calling his servant/friend by name and the human responding with hinneni is not unusual. 
What is unusual is that with Moses (Exod 3:4), Jacob (Gen 31:11), Samuel (1 Sam 3:4), and Isaiah (Isa 
6:8), God called them by their birth names (even after he had given Jacob a covenant name—Gen 46:2). In 
the Aqedah, God called the testee by his covenant name Abraham, not his birth name Abram.  
96 “Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation 
that introduces any new idea; for induction does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely 
evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis.” C. S. Pierce, Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Pierce, eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1974), 106. Hermeneutically, when abductive reasoning excavates a possible purpose for a text which is 
confirmed by its explanatory power for the underlying logic and minute details of the text, fuller 
understanding has been gained. “We can understand a text only when we have understood the question to 
which it is an answer. But this question can be derived solely from the text and accordingly the 
appropriateness of the reply is the methodological presupposition for the reconstruction of the question, any 
criticism of this reply from some other quarter is pure shadow boxing. . . . This is, in fact, an axiom of all 
hermeneutics; we described it above as ‘fore-conception of completeness. . . . For we have seen that to 
question is to lay open, to place in the open.” Gadamer, Truth and Method, 363, 375-376. 
97 “Thus the principle rule of abduction is that ‘its conclusion should be such that definite 
consequences can be plentifully deduced from it of a kind which can be checked by observation.’” Arthur 
W. Burks, “Pierce’s Theory of Abduction,” Philosophy of Science 13, no. 4 (October 1946): 306. 
98 Pierce, Collected Papers, 117.  
99 The design of the test command is directly controlled by the tester and the test purpose. The 
testee may or may not align with the test purpose for they retain the freedom to respond to the test any way 
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actions from what Abraham had internalized and integrated from the seven covenant 
lessons. Since the Aqedah was a performance100 test, the integrated maturity of 
Abraham’s covenant character will be revealed by his response. 
But first let us back up, what concrete observable actions could be expected from 
internalization of the previous seven epiphanies? The covenant epiphanies taught/trained 
Abraham through (1) Gen 12:1-3: to follow divine directions to an unknown destination 
by trusting God’s vision of him as the father of a chosen nation, to believe he was 
protected by God to bless the world, (2) Gen 12:7: to offer sacrifice to the God that 
appeared and promised his offspring the land of Canaan, (3) Gen 13:14-17: to lift up his 
eyes and walk the land in possessive faith believing his offspring would be like the dust 
of the earth,101 (4) Gen 15: to see stars as indicative of progeny numbers and expect God 
to preserve the covenant at the cost of His own life, (5) Gen 17: to accept circumcism and 
his covenant name Abraham, believing that Isaac would bear the covenant line, (6) Gen 
18: to believe Isaac would be born to Sarah and intercede with God for the innocent on 
                                                 
they wish. In fact, if the testee doesn’t realize it is a test, their test response may be more authentic and 
uncontrived, therefore more revelatory of their true condition. 
100 Dr. Vadim Dementyev brought to my attention that the etymology of the English term 
performance comes from the French parfournir: par “through to completion” and fournir “furnish, 
provide.” Oxford Dictionary of English, s.v. “performance,” ed. Angus Stevenson, 3rd ed. This concept of 
bringing something to completion suggests an intrinsically formative component to a performance test such 
as Abraham’s test. Vadim Dementyev’s own work highlights the performance aspect of homiletics in 
relation to the Trinity. Vadim Dementyev, “For the Sake of Beauty: Proposing a Homiletic of Trinitarian 
Performance” (PhD dissertation, Fuller Theological Seminary, 2019). 
101 “One can also point to the command to Abraham to lift his eyes in 22:3 and 22:13 who [sic] 
might be reminiscent of the same wording in Genesis 13:14.” K. Schmid, “Abraham’s Sacrifice: Gerhard 
von Rad’s Interpretation of Gen 22,” Interpretation 62, no. 3 (2008): 268-276.  
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the basis of divine mercy and justice, and (7) Gen 21:12-13: to not withhold his son from 
trusting God fully for his future.  
As it happened, the Aqedah test design (Gen 22:1-2) started by calling his name, 
Abraham, which he confirmed (Lesson 5. Acknowledged his Covenant name) then God 
posed a covenant crisis through a sacrificial threat to Isaac’s life. Physically, this required 
him to head out in faith to an ambiguous location (Lesson 1. Follow the divine call to an 
unknown destination), prepare and offer a burnt offering to God at the end of the trip 
(Lesson 2. Sacrifice to YHWH), to lift up his eyes and look (Lesson 3. Lift up eyes and 
look)102 while walking a three-day journey to Moriah (Lesson 3. Walk the land in faith of 
future possession), required overnight camping (Lesson 4. View the stars in faith that his 
descendants would be many)103 and wonder how God would risk his life to guarantee the 
covenant (Lesson 4. Told Isaac to trust that God would provide Himself, a lamb), and it 
necessitated Abraham transferring Isaac’s complete trust to God (Lesson 7. Entrusted son 
to God’s care) which Isaac did, for he was willing to be bound and set on the altar. What 
                                                 
102 “The patriarch, looking northward, saw the promised sign, a cloud of glory hovering over 
Mount Moriah, and he knew that the voice which had spoken to him was from heaven.” Ellen G. White, 
Patriarchs and Prophets, (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press Publishing Association, 1979), 151. 
103 “Abraham looked up to the calm brightness of the unclouded heavens, and recalled the promise 
made nearly fifty years before, that his seed should be innumerable as the stars. If this promise was to be 
fulfilled through Isaac, how could he be put to death?” White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 148. 
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Abraham was trained to do through most of the covenant lessons (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7) was 
required logistically by the test command.   
Only one covenant lesson, the lesson of prophetic mediation (6. Prophetic 
intercession for the innocent based on divine justice and mercy) required a different 
approach. What method would be effective in eliciting authentic and heartfelt mediation 
(voluntary, not ordered)? As revealed by micro-hermeneutical analysis, the 
perlocutionary effect of the four appellations (your son, your only son, whom you love, 
Isaac) of the divine test command was in opposition to the locutionary content of the 
command to sacrifice Isaac. This was not the case with the previous divine order to 
banish Ishmael. The Principle of Humanity suggests that a father confronted with the loss 
of a second son to the same deity by verbal command would likely compare104 the two 
life-threatening commands. God’s command to relinquish Ishmael offered two rational 
incentives to induce Abraham’s compliance: to safeguard the covenant through Isaac as 
protected by Sarah and assurance that God himself would guarrantee Ishmael’s survival 
and success as a great nation. No divine incentives or punitive measures for 
noncompliance are in the command for sacrificing Isaac. 
In addition, three physical-emotive factors affect Abraham during his test. The 
divine source consistently remains out of sight (and at some distance in the heavens), the 
                                                 
104 The hermeneutical Principle of Humanity would pose that any parent faced with notes from the 
same teacher about two different sons will naturally compare the differences in the teacher’s perspective for 
each unique child. In this case, the life of each son is at stake, so the wording of God’s commands was 
probably mulled on over and over during the three-day journey.  
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repetitive appellations105 stoke paternal compassion, and the requirement necessitates 
proximity to the victim with execution by Abraham’s hand.106 These specific factors do 
not allow Abraham to evade direct personal accountability for Isaac’s impending 
demise.107  
Could it be that the divine command to sacrifice Isaac by his own hand, nullifying 
all of God’s previous covenant promises, rhetorically delivered in a manner that 
intensifies paternal compassion without any moral rationale to justify compliance, was a 
test method to elicit from Abraham a response of covenant mediation? An authentic 
intercession (voluntary and heartfelt) requires an authentic threat. The logistical design 
of the test required enactment of six of the seven covenant lessons and the combination of 
                                                 
105 These four appellations are the one consistent literary component that ties all three divine 
speeches in the Aqedah together, though they are in modified form in the second and third repetition.  
106 Sociologist Stanley Milgram’s experiments in the 1960’s demonstrated that increased spatial 
distance from the authority source and increased proximity with direct visual contact with the recipient of 
the “electric shocks” were the only modifications that decreased the percentage of humans who consistently 
obeyed authority figures to the point of being willing to inflict “fatal damage” to another human being in a 
simulated learning test. Without such modifications, the percentage of those willing to inflict fatal damage 
chillingly remained at 61-65% regardless of socio-economic strata, education, or culture. Stanley Milgram, 
Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2009). 
107 The failed Nuremberg Defense plea was used by Nazi collaborators during the Nuremberg 
Trials of November 1945 to October 1946 to avoid culpability for killing others. It tried to absolve a 
subordinate from responsibility if they were merely carrying out what was commanded of them by their 
superior authority. The presiding judge, Justice Robert H. Jackson firmly believed that “individuals should 
be held accountable for what they had done. Mitigation of punishment might be considered, however, in 
cases where the moral choice was impossible.” H. T. King Jr., “The Legacy of Nuremburg,” Case Western 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 34. 335 (Fall 2002), 338. In Abraham’s test from the highest authority 
in his life, no dire consequences for disobedience were specified and none had been imposed by God in 
their shared past. The Hebrew term na (please or now) in Abraham’s test command is interpreted by Sarna 
to indicate “Abraham has absolute freedom of choice. Should he refuse he would not incur any guilt.” 
Sarna, Genesis, 151.  
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test rhetoric with the unjustified horrific sacrificial command begs for the covenant skill 
of prophetic intercession. 
It appears the abductive hypothesis (A) that the test was a covenant-crisis 
challenge to elicit a comprehensive paternal covenantal response from Abraham 
demonstrates a robust predictive correspondence for the specific details of the test 
command (C) “as a matter of course.” This logically linear alignment between the third 
speech (test answer key) and first speech (test design) of God in the Aqedah establishes 
internal validity for the covenant hypothesis. The four traditional108 hypotheses presented 
in this chapter’s introduction (love, fear of God, morality, and faith in resurrection) are 
not as robust in requiring the specific details in the test command because all of them can 
be fully satisfied by commanding an offering of Isaac on an sacrificial altar right by 
Abraham’s tent.109  
In addition to the detailed design of the covenant test above, the customized scope 
of this particular test is ontologically comprehensive and customized to Abraham. It 
                                                 
108 Three of the four traditional hypotheses for the Aqedah purpose are derived from the text either 
implicitly or explicitly, though on narrower grounds than the Covenant Hypothesis. One is imported from 
the New Testament but is congruent with the text. They are love (v. 2), fear of God (v. 12), morality (v. 2, 
12), faith in resurrection (v. 5 and Heb 11:19).   
109 None of them require a walking journey, stars, looking up, intercession. If God’s central 
purpose for the Aqedah test was not to test Abraham but mainly intended for the future—to reveal the 
future temple site and the operations of substitutionary sacrifice concretely, then the additional test 
command details could be seen to fulfill this purpose. The weakness with that ritual hypothesis for the sole 
purpose of the test is that a literalistically obedient pagan father could satisfy the test perfectly, for pagan 
fathers routinely traveled to high mountain places to worship (2 Kgs 17:10-11; Hos 4:13) and willingly 
sacrificed their firstborn children as burnt offerings. That Abraham’s test actions appear identical to theirs 
poses a theological danger that can only be unpacked by understanding God’s final speech and 
interpretation of Abraham’s actions in the Aqedah correctly.  
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encompasses the existential poles of Abraham’s life. By posing a divine threat to Isaac’s 
life, Abraham’s faith was tested to its core belief in a promise-keeping God. At the 
opposite pole, by requiring Abraham’s own hand to sacrifice his son, the test ironically 
put Abraham—who had a persistent fear of death—into the violent executioner’s role. As 
the pragmatist Pierce once said, “what we think is to be interpreted in terms of what we 
are prepared to do.”110 The test design thus spans the complete vertical axis of Abraham’s 
existential belief system, connecting his poles of metaphysical faith and concrete bodily 
fear. The superlative skill of the Tester is demonstrated in tailoring this test to Abraham 
like a customized glove for a hand.111 
Now that the test command and the test assessment are aligned, how is the middle 
speech of the angel of YHWH (vv. 11-12) to be understood?112 Can the self-consistency 
implied by the Principle of Charity overcome the traditional assumption that God is 
rescinding or contradicting Himself? The Covenant Hypothesis anticipates the timing and 
content of this angelic interruption without imputing incongruity to God. The following 
                                                 
110 Pierce as quoted by Arthur W. Burks, “Pierce’s Theory of Abduction,” 303.  
111 At the same time, this abductive hypothesis is an inference to the best explanation which, like 
all inductive inferential hypotheses, remains underdetermined. Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best 
Explanation (New York, NY: Routledge, 1991), 56. Thus, I remain open to better hypotheses in the future. 
112 The hermeneutical Principle of Charity is used here in the attempt to interpret a seemingly 
contradictory verse in a coherent manner if logically possible. This is therefore a respectful endeavor to 
assume and uncover self-consistency in divine purpose.  
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analysis will demonstrate how the covenant hypothesis interprets this speech in regard to 
(A) timing and (B) content.  
A. Timing: Abraham’s compliance to the test command had demonstrated all the 
lessons of the covenant except for one, the intercessory role of a prophet from 
covenant lesson six (Gen 18). With Isaac bound on the altar, when Abraham 
reached for the knife with the intent “to slaughter his son”—this was the exact 
moment where Abraham’s test actions deviated from his previous covenant 
training.113 God had waited until the last possible moment, giving Abraham 
the maximum chance to remember or consider interceding for Isaac. But when 
Abraham, with full confidence that God was fully capable of resurrecting 
Isaac,114 reached toward Isaac with the butcher knife, the angel of YHWH 
suddenly broke through his faith-filled concentration to thwart him, 
                                                 
113 Abraham’s choice of obedient violence demonstrated by taking up the knife instead of 
mediatorial intercession may be a harbinger, as are so many other parts of his life, of his descendants’ 
proclivities for violence. God had promised Abraham, “To your offspring I will give this land” (Gen 12:7), 
“for all the land that you see I will give to you” (Gen 13:15), “to give you this land to possess” (Gen 15:7), 
“and I will give to you and your offspring after you the land of your sojournings” (Gen 17:8), but only after 
Abraham takes up the knife in the test does this divine gifting of land shift toward a method that promises 
victory in conflict. God substitutes the customary send-off blessing “your offspring shall possess the gates 
of his enemies” (Gen 22:18; 24:60) to correspond to the second covenant revelation (Gen 12:7). At the 
same time, this conflict blessing evokes and intimates’ victory in the conflict between good and evil that 
was glimpsed in the promises of Gen 3:15.  
114 Heb 11:19. Resurrection hope necessitated killing Isaac because to raise a body to life, it must 
first be dead. Through this test, Abraham’s faith was made complete: “You see that faith was active along 
with his works, and faith was completed by works” James 2:22. At what point in the test was his faith 
completed?  
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“Abraham! Abraham! . . . Do not lay your hand on the boy or do anything to 
him!” (v. 12).  
B. Content: Boehm correctly points out that the first angelic speech “tends to 
over-explicate Abraham’s obedience, which does not seem to require 
explanation at this point.”115 There is no question that Abraham’s absolutely 
singular obedience and faith-filled resurrection hope are extraordinary and 
worthy of praise. Kierkegaard calls his fidelity to the letter of God’s command 
the “guiding star that saves the anguished.”116 Few can believe in the 
resurrection as firmly as Abraham must have believed to be willing to kill his 
own son. Yet, reasoning a posteriori from the Aqedah text as it unfolds, it is 
clear that God didn’t want Isaac killed even if the miracle of Isaac’s death and 
resurrection would have exceeded the miracle of supplying an animal in a 
bush and provided a more exact typology for the death and resurrection of the 
Messiah. We must keep in mind that there is no specific praise in the text for 
                                                 
115 Boehm, The Binding of Isaac, 29.  
116 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 20. 
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Abraham’s willingness to kill,117 even though his willingness to do so is often 
taken by less careful readers as the point of the story.118   
Then why is the angelic interruption so repetitive and prolonged? Because it must 
accomplish a sensitive and sophisticated agenda, to forbid the intent while praising the 
motive behind it.119 The three parts120 of the speech are: 1) prohibition—Abraham’s 
literalistic compliance and intention to harm Isaac by offering him up as a sacrifice is 
forbidden—Do not lay your hand on the boy or do anything to him, 2) affirmation—
Abraham’s Fear of God is divinely acknowledged in the present—for now I know that 
you are God fearing, and 3) nuanced commendation—Abraham’s paternal release of 
Isaac to God fulfils half of God’s appellations for his relationship to Isaac—Seeing you 
                                                 
117 On a tragic note, wrong Aqedah theology may cause psychic scars. The Aqedah may have been 
deeply imbedded in the suspicious subconscious of the Israelites slaves for they kept regressing to a worry 
about Moses’ hidden motives to kill them (Exod 14:11-12, 16:3, Num 20:4) because Moses had framed his 
request to Pharaoh as a three-day journey into the wilderness to offer sacrifices (Exod 3:18; 5:3; 8:27). The 
motif of Moses’ formal request may have summoned their collective memory of the Aqedah.  
118 The New Testament exegesis of the Aqedah by Jesus counters this focus on willingness to kill 
being the moral point of the Aqedah. “If you were Abraham’s children you would be doing the works 
Abraham did, but now you seek to kill Me, a Man who has told you the truth which I heard from God. This 
is not what Abraham did” (John 8:39-40). Jesus clearly de-emphasizes Abraham’s willingness to kill 
(though it is obvious in Gen 22:10 and is highlighted in traditional interpretations of the Aqedah) and 
spotlights the critical moral point that Abraham abstained from carrying out his intention because he 
listened to God’s correction. Jesus condemns his opponents’ intention to kill because they will not 
relinquish it and recognize the voice of truth from God through Jesus. Jesus’ words, “Truly, truly, I say to 
you, before Abraham was, I am” (John 8:58), identifies himself as the divine Tester that gave the test 
command and was present at that event.   
119 This is exactly what God did previously for Abimelech in a dream (Gen 20). He affirmed the 
innocent motives of the agent while adamantly prohibiting his intended action.  
120 When the angelic message of vv. 11-12 is read as the ending and final assessment of the test, 
one of its three parts is usually interpreted as the purpose of the Aqedah: (1) Prohibition of human sacrifice, 
(2) God needed to know if Abraham was God-fearing, and (3) God requires obedient relinquishment of 
anything (or everything) at His command.  
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have not withheld your son, your only son [missing: whom you love, Isaac] from Me. 
Each of the three parts will now be unpacked further.  
1) Prohibition: Do the prohibitions reverse God’s injunction to sacrifice Isaac 
because Abraham’s obedience had already been proven by reaching toward Isaac 
with the knife? If analyzed carefully, the angelic prohibitions are not a direct 
reversal or retraction of the test command, as the potential phrase “do not offer 
him up as a burnt offering” would certainly be. Only the direct method for 
fulfilling the sacrifice of Isaac has been blocked by prohibiting Abraham’s hand 
movement and intent to kill the lad. To be precise, the test command for Isaac’s 
sacrifice still stands. 
     But if this true, how can Isaac be offered up as a burnt offering without being 
touched or without Abraham doing anything to him? It certainly seems 
impossible. But if the abductive covenant hypothesis is correct that Abraham is 
being set up to demonstrate the covenant lessons in his test response, covenant 
details not yet actualized by Abraham may offer an option. The yet unactualized 
covenant remnants are: Abraham intercedes with God (6. Gen 18:23-33), God 
appears at the altar site (2. Gen 12:7) and God in symbolic form takes on death to 
guarantee the covenant (4. Gen 15:17).  
     The perfect fit of these three unrealized aspects of the covenant experiences to 
the eventual test solution of the Aqedah demonstrates the generative power121 of 
                                                 
121 The generative power of a research program of theories refers to its direct implications which 
can be validated. Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programes” in 
 202 
 
the Covenant Hypothesis in unlocking the test. Had Abraham prophetically 
interceded based on God’s righteousness instead of taking up the knife, then 
looked around afterward for any sign that his prayer had been heard, the ram was 
just behind him and could have been discovered easily (as it certainly was) to 
fulfill God’s test command for the sacrifice of Isaac indirectly, as Isaac’s 
divinely-provided substitute and representative.  
2) Affirmation: The central divine affirmation is “Now I know that you fear God.” 
God reveals there is a temporal component to divine omniscience. Unlike 
ourselves who are passive knowers—either we know something or we don’t, we 
cannot ‘not know’ once we are informed because we cannot control our 
knowledge precisely—God may be able to exercise exact control over the 
degrees, modes and methods122 of His omniscience in parallel fashion to His 
precise self-control over His own omnipotence. In the Aqedah, as invited by 
Abraham’s hinneni, God’s words reveal He is presently experiencing afresh the 
                                                 
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 91-196. 
122 This is too large a concept to adequately address here and will be discussed in the macro-
hermeneutic chapter 5 that follows, in the section on Divine Hermeneutics. For now, consider that if human 
knowledge in human life-experience can be factual, relational, intuitive, inferential, emotional, practical, 
evaluative, forensic, contextual, imaginative, and creative, then by inference, since man is made in the 
image of God (Gen 1:17), God’s scope of knowledge cannot be more reductive than man’s, i.e. limited to 
cognitive propositions. God’s omniscience must, by inference, include unlimited access to unlimited kinds 
and methods of knowledge while controlled by God’s omnipotence over his own omni-abilities. In the 
Aqedah, “now I know” may indicate an existing, partial, self-restraint of one type of divine omniscience 
(perhaps relational-emotive) that has just been lifted by God in response to Abraham’s actions, allowing a 
deeper saturation of divine experiential knowledge about Abraham in relational response to Abraham’s free 
choice of responding to the test as he did. 
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divine knowledge (yada—complete, intellectual, relational, intimate knowledge) 
of Abraham as one that fears God. 
     What drives Abraham’s covenant identity? God-fearing faith. As Moses 
explained to the Israelites at another mountain, the fear of God embedded by 
God—through testing—keeps one from sinning: “Moses said to the people, ‘Do 
not fear, for God has come to test you, that the fear of him may be before you, 
that you may not sin.’”123 Abraham proved his fear of God was intact by 
remaining highly responsive to God up to the last second by not killing Isaac, 
allowing God to hold him back. At one time, Abraham had said in Gen 20:11, “I 
thought, ‘There is no fear of God at all in this place.’” Yet, in that event it was the 
pure-hearted God-fearing Abimelech with clean hands who also allowed God 
hold him back124 from sin and showed even more concern than Abraham to avoid 
sin, “What have you done to us? And how have I sinned against you, that you 
have brought on me and my kingdom a great sin?”125 If the current Aqedah 
commendation is heard against the background of Abraham’s covenant journey, 
                                                 
123  Exod 20:20. But the terrified Israelites begged Moses to be a conduit between them and God to 
avoid direct address by God’s voice. Their subsequent idolatry at the foot of the mountain proved the fear 
of God had not become part of them deeply enough. Meanwhile as their intercessor, Moses loyally opposed 
God’s expressed intent to destroy them, pleading for God to remember the oath he made long ago on a 
mountain in Moriah (Aqedah), “Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, your servants, to whom you swore 
by your own self, and said to them, ‘I will multiply your offspring as the stars of heaven, and all this land 
that I have promised I will give to your offspring, and they shall inherit it forever.’” Exod 32:13. God 
relented.  
124 Gen 20:5-6. 
125 Gen 20:9. 
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God is praising Abraham for catching up to Abimelech’s level of God-fearing 
moral sensitivity and responsiveness. But was the fear of God the sole purpose of 
the Aqedah? Richard Middleton astutely points out, “This statement describes 
what was discovered through the testing, but it is a logical fallacy to infer that this 
was the purpose of the test—especially if we have reason to believe otherwise.”126  
     So, if the angel’s interruption of vv. 11-12 does not rescind or end the test but 
is an affirmative correction, wouldn’t an ideal Tester hint toward the preferred 
response?127 Yes, and the hint is right in the center of the angelic speech. The 
angelic speech is couched in two familiar motifs: present divine knowledge128 
(Now I know) and Fear of God129 (you fear God). These motifs thematically and 
                                                 
126 Richard Middleton continues with an example: “A professor may say to a student after the test, 
‘Now I know that you are a “C” student.’ But that doesn’t mean that this was the purpose of the test. The 
professor was hoping the student would put out some effort and get an A.” Richard Middleton, “Unbinding 
the Aqedah from the Straightjacket of Tradition: An Inner-Biblical Interpretation of Abraham’s Test in 
Genesis 22,” in upcoming book Reframing Lament, eds Matthew Anstey, Jeanette Mathews, and Peter 
Lockwood. First presented (under the title "How Abraham Lost his Son") as the Zenas Gerig Memorial 
Lecture at Jamaica Theological Seminary at Kingston, Jamaica, September 2012. Middleton believes 
Abraham’s test was whether he could differentiate the character of his particular God from other gods. I 
wholeheartedly agree, it was their seven encounters that delineate the character of YHWH and what kind of 
obedience is desired by Him. The Fear of God is one of the goals of the Aqedah test, for faith, love, loyalty, 
obedience, hope and morality are all part of the covenant. 
127 The Principle of Humanity intuits what a benevolent tester who wants the testee to succeed, 
would do. The tester would correct a testee’s mistake and pedagogically hint toward the right answer 
without giving it overtly. 
128 “Now I know” is sometimes explained as directed to the reader and Abraham instead of God. 
Origen “says that the adverb is added in verse 12 for our sake to highlight that Abraham has clearly passed 
the test. He adds too that ‘now’ there is also certainty in Abraham’s inner heart; he knows for sure that he is 
fully obedient to his God, regardless of the command.” Carey Ellen Walsh, “Christian Theological 
Interpretation,” 60. Yet, the words are self-referential to the speaker—the angel of YHWH. 
129 Since Jacob refers to YHWH as the Fear of Isaac (Gen 31:42) and the Aqedah is the only 
biblical narrative where Isaac and the term occurs, the implication is that Isaac could overhear the angelic 
messages. This may be why God is characteristically very gracious and indirect in correcting Abraham, 
especially in front of his bound son. God’s glowing epitaphs to Isaac (Gen 26:5) and Solomon (1 Kgs 3:14) 
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linguistically link the Aqedah angelic re-direction to God’s self-revelation of his 
knowledge-based judgment in Genesis 18130 and Abraham’s mention of the fear of 
God in Genesis 20.131 Interestingly, what ties these chapters together is that in 
                                                 
regarding their fathers are likewise sterling and covers for their well-known lapses.  
130 Divine knowledge and seeing is pivotal in Genesis 18. God reasons, based on his initial choice 
to engage in preferential knowledge of Abraham, “For I have known him, that he may command his 
children and his household after him to keep the way of the Lord by doing righteousness and justice, so that 
the Lord may bring to Abraham what he has promised him” (Gen 18:19). Then God decides to advance 
another step and include Abraham into his confidence. He shares His reason for the earthly visit, to confirm 
divine knowledge by seeing for Himself the condition of Sodom and Gomorrah: “Because the outcry 
against Sodom and Gomorrah is great and their sin is very grave, I will go down to see (ה ֶא ְר ֶא ְו ) whether 
they have done altogether according to the outcry that has come to me. And if not, I will know” (Genesis 
18:20-21). This sharing of divine intent with Abraham places Abraham in the category of prophets who are 
given unique access to God’s plans (“For the Lord God does nothing without revealing his secret to his 
servants the prophets” Amos 3:7). Abraham then rises to his prophetic privilege by interceding for Sodom 
and Gomorrah (Gen 18:22-33). 
131 In the Abimelech debacle, knowing, withholding, seeing, and Fear of God are the 
corresponding terms used. Abraham is called a prophet by God and divinely set up to be an intercessor 
again (Gen 20:7). God knew Abimelech was morally innocent, “Yes I know you have done this in the 
integrity of your heart and it was I who kept you from sinning against me” (Gen 20:3-6). Abimelech berates 
Abraham the next day, asking him, “What did you see that you did this thing?” Abraham defended himself, 
“I did it because I thought, ‘There is no Fear of God at all in this place, and they will kill me because of my 
wife.’” Clearly, Abraham was wrong, Abimelech did have a Fear of God as demonstrated by his clean 
hands and a pure heart, his strong sense of righteousness, his courage in confronting God and Abraham 
over the moral injustice of placing an innocent pawn like himself in peril of death, and his scrupulousness 
in avoiding sin. Yet God sets up Abraham to intercede, and he does so successfully for Abimelech (Gen 
20:17). 
Why is this story of Abimelech included in the Abrahamic cycle? Among other reasons, it may 
have been to give Abraham another chance at prophetic intercession. Though Abraham had interceded for 
Sodom and Gomorrah, he saw the next morning that they were destroyed (Gen 19:27-30). The reader 
knows that God had honored Abraham’s intercession by saving Lot (Gen 19:29) but Abraham may not 
have known it since Lot retires to a cave and his daughters assume that they will never have a chance to 
marry (Gen 19:30-31). This suggests Lot chose not to rejoin society or return to Abraham’s encampment. 
Thus, Abraham could have assumed he had failed as a mediator and this would make him less likely to risk 
doing it again. This may be one reason why God specifically set him up in Gen 20 as a prophetic 
intercessor even when Abraham was morally unworthy as the facilitator of the sin, to encourage Abraham 
to intercede by granting him public success.  
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both, the primary role of Abraham was identical: Abraham was set up by God to 
be a prophetic intercessor.132 
3) Nuanced Commendation: The next phrase is sometimes understood to commend 
Abraham’s willingness to relinquish or lose Isaac. However, I am convinced the 
phrase “you did not withhold . . . from Me” commends Abraham for prioritizing 
full relational access between Isaac and God, allowing God to manage Isaac, but 
this phrase does not necessarily require the loss of Isaac’s relation to Abraham.133 
      Joseph uses the exact same Hebrew term in Genesis 39:9 to Potipher’s wife in 
explaining that Potiphar has not withheld anything from him except for his wife. 
Clearly, Potiphar didn’t relinquish or renounce ownership of everything, for he 
demonstrates retention of ownership when he banishes Joseph as manager after 
hearing his wife’s story. The term “not withold” means that Potiphar entrusted 
Joseph with access to managing all his things except for his wife. The precision of 
the divine phrase, “You have not witheld your son, your only son from Me,” 
doesn’t mean God is affirming Abraham’s willingness to lose, relinquish, or kill 
Isaac through death but, accepting the contextually clarified use of the phrase, it is 
                                                 
132 Interestingly, Sarah was present at both events as eyewitness (Gen 18 & 20). Had Sarah been 
included in the Aqedah trip, it is possible that her input may have been invaluable as she knows Abraham 
was called a prophet and set up to intercede with God and in the case of Abimelech, that Abraham was 
successful in saving the doomed innocent.  
133 Three times in Genesis the meaning of “withhold” consistently targets the accessibility of the 
terminal relation between three entities: God withholds Abimelech from sinning against Himself (Gen 
20:6); regarding Isaac, God commends Abraham for not withholding “your son, your only son” from Me 
(Gen 22:12), and Joseph says Potiphar has not withheld “anything from me.” (Gen 39:9). Interestingly, 
Genesis 22:16 uses the phrase “you did not withhold your son, your only son” and drops the specification 
“from Me.” 
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God commending Abraham for his willingness to entrust Isaac to God, in other 
words allowing complete accessibility by letting God take control of Isaac’s 
future. The terminal bond between Isaac and God is the locus of action, without 
necessarily annihilating the original link between father and son (see Fig. 4.4).  
 
 
 
Fig 4.4 Locus of Relation targeted by the phrase: “not withhold.” 
 
     Finally, Abraham’s treatment of his son in the test is evaluated through the 
repetition of the test command appellations for Isaac: the first two are mentioned 
(your son, your only son) the last two are missing (whom you love, Isaac). Since 
Steinberg claims that the most valuable function of Hebrew repetition resides in 
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illuminating “the inner life of the agents” and the “ethical value of their acts,”134 
the shortened nomenclature reveals the divine ethical evaluation of Abraham’s 
actions. Abraham’s religiously motivated compliance in reaching toward Isaac 
with the knife to kill him treated Isaac as his son to give (biological and societal 
ownership), as his only son (entrusting his future to God as embodied in his 
precious son), but his test response did not embody the fullness of paternal love 
(whom you love) and a covenant-based regard for the unique covenant individual 
(Isaac). God’s nuanced commendation suggests an alternative option existed and 
was missed.135  
After his focus is freed by the angelic correction, the intially overlooked ram is 
visually discovered. An overlooked test solution deserves keen attention when discovered 
after a mistake136 to ponder the reason why it was initially missed. The ram’s discovery 
                                                 
134 Sternberg, Poetics of Biblical Narrative, 438.  
135 This may be why one thematic parallel with the preceding chapter remains unrealized in 
comparing the trials of the two sons of Abraham. The actualization of Ishmael’s name, God hears, marked 
the turning point of his desert ordeal: “And God heard the voice of the boy, and the angel of God called to 
Hagar from heaven and said to her, “What troubles you, Hagar? Fear not, for God has heard the voice of 
the boy where he is” (Gen 21:17). Had Abraham mediated for Isaac as he had been trained to do on two 
different occasions (Gen 18 and 20), lifted his eyes and discovered the ram in the thicket, that might have 
converted their anguished tension into the joy-filled laughter of grateful relief at God’s antecedent 
provision for their emergency. Isaac’s pinnacle redemption could have been marked by the actualization of 
his name, eruptive father and son laughter. 
136 I do not believe Abraham’s hope of resurrection is a wrong or sinful mistake, I believe it is an 
interesting mistake. It is an ethical mistake because it directly necessitated a willingness to kill Isaac, which 
was thwarted by the angel of YHWH. But it remains an interesting mistake because it forged a new channel 
of faith-derived hope from his past experience, fulfilling God’s assertion that nothing is too hard for the 
Lord (Gen 18:13) and his grasp of the certainty of resurrection may have been the antidote God knew 
Abraham needed to heal his dysfunctional phobia of being killed. However, the cautionary aspect of this 
antidote is that once Abraham fixated on the resurrection as the test solution, he felt no need to look for 
another or better answer to his dilemma, so he stopped looking for the substitute animal. 
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holds several surprising details. Directionally, it was positioned behind him. Temporally, 
it was provided prior this arrival, proof of antecedent divine grace and foreknowledge. 
But the biggest surprise is that the test solution was not a young lamb but a mature ram.  
Does this detail matter? The ram is the father relative to a lamb. Even if seh (v. 7-
8) is translated more literally as sheep or goat, the provided answer of the ram with horns 
indicates this was certainly a mature male sheep.137 Significantly, in this event, Isaac’s 
two fathers are interacting through a test. This is a test between fathers. Abraham is the 
biological father of Isaac who has contributed one cell but God is clearly the co-paternal 
birth agent (Gen 21:1-2) of Isaac, the defender of Isaac’s covenant inheritance (Gen 
17:19-21; 21:12), the protector of Isaac’s future (Gen 21:22-24), and now the redeemer of 
Isaac’s life by providing Himself through the representative animal to take the place of 
Isaac. In a sense, God is the superlative father of Isaac who backs up Abraham if 
Abraham falters in fulfilling his God-given paternal role. When the prophet Isaiah voices 
a lament of the oppressed that evokes Isaac’s plight, Isaiah posits YHWH in this role of 
substitute superlative Father: “Look down from heaven and see, from Your holy and 
beautiful habitation. Where are your zeal and your might? The stirring of your inner parts 
                                                 
137 Within two chapters the narrator has been unusually specific on sheep identity: ewes for the 
ownership of the well (Gen 21:28-30), a lamb or sheep in the conversation between Abraham and Isaac 
(Gen 22:7-8), a mature ram held by its horns in the thicket (Gen 22:13). Had a lamb been found in the 
thicket, the intertextual resonances between the Lamb of God taking the place of the designated lamb, 
Isaac, would have been aesthetically satisfying to a Christian reader. But it was specifically a ram that was 
waiting. Even more, it was held in place by his horns (about 3 years old). This ram image suggests 
theological links to: the three year old ram in the covenant ritual (Gen 15:9) that God passed through, the 
sole ram burnt offering on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16:3), the ram of burnt offering and the ram of 
ordination in the installation of Aaron and his son as priests (Lev 8:18, 22), and the messianic prophecy that 
envisions the coming savior as our “everlasting Father” (Isa 9:6) for the ram is the father-figure among 
sheep. 
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and your compassion are held back from me. For You are our Father, though Abraham 
does not know us and Israel does not acknowledge us. You, O LORD, are our Father; our 
Redeemer from of old is Your name” (Isa 63:15-16). In the Aqedah sacrifice, the 
substitution of the father ram138 taking the place of the lamb points typologically to the 
role of Christ139 who, as our “Everlasting Father”140 takes upon Himself our sacrifice as 
the provided “lamb of God.”141  
How does the test solution of the ram relate to the center of the chiastic structure? 
“Hinneni, beni” (here I am, my son) is the central point from which the Aqedah is 
composed centrifugally. It is the response of a responsive compassionate father who 
offers himself to his son. Flanked on both sides by Abraham’s hinneni to God, this center 
embodies the essence of Abraham’s covenant relationship. “The relationship of father 
and son that existed between Abraham and Isaac was exactly the same relationship that 
existed between God and Abraham.”142 The substitutionary ram represented Abraham’s 
                                                 
138 “We can even say that the ram was a symbol of Christ, for to be held fast by the horns is like a 
crucifixion. So all this obscurely prefigures Christ.” Augustine quoted by Walsh, “Christian Theological 
Interpretation,” 59.  
139 “Luther draws a parallel with Christ’s two natures here. Isaac stands as Christ’s divine nature, 
which does not die, while in the ram ‘here Christ, the Son of God, is prefigured, who like a mortal man died 
on the cross. Yet the divine nature did not die, the human nature being sacrificed in its place.’” Walsh, 
“Christian Theological Interpretation,” 60. 
140 “For to us a child is born, to us a son is given; and the government shall be upon his shoulder, 
and his name shall be called Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace.” 
Isaiah 9:6. [italics added]  
141 John 1:29. Jesus is both Son (lamb) of God and Everlasting Father (ram) to us.  
142 Hard Sayings of the Bible, Walter C. Kaiser Jr., Peter H. Davids, F. F. Bruce, Manfred T. 
Brauch (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996), 125. God called Abraham to depart from his 
father’s household and filled that void with Himself in an ideal paternal relationship to Abraham by 
providing a new vision that exceeded his wildest dreams (Gen 12:1-3, 7; 13:14-17), met with him multiple 
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redemptive God, the ideal father figure. The eternally compassionate, open and intimate 
presence of Abraham’s God was conveyed through Abraham’s response to Isaac “Here I 
am, my son,” and is relayed to Abraham’s descendants through the Messianic name 
Emmanuel, “God with us”143 who, as our everlasting Father, became our substitute 
sacrifice. The center of the Aqedah does not hold a paradoxical vacuum, or a question 
without an answer, or a metaphysical mystery, but the reassuring response of a human 
father embodying to his son the compassionate concern of his heavenly Father, later 
fulfilled by the ram that gave up its life for the endangered son. Abraham protectively 
deferred144 full honesty by giving Isaac a God-centered, hope-filled but seemingly evasive 
answer to his question (God will provide Himself the lamb for a burnt offering, my son), 
                                                 
times to mature him into a visionary father of faith. When there was an option to share bad news, God 
chose to, twice (Gen 15:13-16; 18:18). When Abraham doubted whether he would have heirs, God brought 
him out to count the stars and reassured him (Gen 15:5). When Abraham pleaded for something more 
tangible, God self-imprecated Himself by passing through cut animals to covenant with Abraham (Gen 15: 
18-21) and directly addressed Abraham’s deepest fears about dying (Gen 15:15). God modeled covenant 
fatherhood to Abraham in training.  
143 Isa 7:14; Matt 1:22-23. 
144 Abraham has a habit of keeping crucial details to himself. After he was told by God that he 
would have a son in about a year (Gen 17), God visited him in person (Gen 18). Sarah’s words imply she 
didn’t know about God’s promise and hadn’t been intimate with Abraham yet, for Sarah laughed to herself 
after God promised a son in a year, saying, “After I am worn out and my lord is old, shall I have pleasure?” 
(Gen 18:12). Later, Isaac repeats Abraham’s ruse in passing off his wife as his sister in the same town of 
Gerar (Gen 26:6-14). Not only does this violate Abraham’s and Abimelech’s treaty to not to deal falsely 
with each other or with each other’s descendants (Gen 21:23), it suggests that Isaac may not have known 
about the history of his father’s very public embarrassment in that same city. Most scholars believe that 
Abraham didn’t tell Sarah about the test command when he took Isaac to Moriah. Like father, like son, 
Isaac also tried to hide from his wife his plans to bless Esau (Gen 27). 
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which is not the center of the Aqedah as indicated by its offset position145 in the chiastic 
structure, but God also redeemed it as fulfilled prophecy.  
But if the ram is the test solution of the Aqedah, why does God not verbally 
command or indicate the ram sacrifice? Perhaps because the divine voice exceeds explicit 
words; miraculous circumstances are included as God’s communications. Abraham’s 
lifting up of his eyes that sees the ram reveals he has regained his previous146 capacity to 
recognize God’s providence with faith-attuned senses. His claim that the ram was 
divinely provided proves his prophetic insight is intact, despite his lapse of prophetic 
intercession. Abraham’s substitution of the ram “instead of his son”(v.13) indicates the 
angel did not abrogate the original test command for Isaac’s sacrifice, for the ram fulfills 
the command in Isaac’s place. The emic147 meaning for the Aqedah test is expressed in 
Abraham’s naming of the site “the Lord will provide.” Worship, for Abraham, focuses on 
                                                 
145 “Here I am, my son” is the exact center of the Aqedah literary chiastic structure, not Abraham’s 
answer, “God will provide Himself a lamb, my son.” Had Abraham answered Isaac’s question with his only 
authentic answer in the Aqedah by repeating “Here I am, my son,” Abraham’s willingness to reflect the 
self-sacrificial role of God (Genesis 15) in guaranteeing the covenant with his life might have become part 
of an intercessory plea at the altar site. But the ram representing God Himself would still remain the 
ultimate and final solution. In one hypothetically ideal scenario—both Abraham and God could have 
demonstrated paternal compassion at the cost of their lives, with Abraham’s perennial fear of death 
overridden by his love of Isaac, God, and the covenant. This possibility would have set up Abraham to be a 
fuller type for Christ, superseded by God’s provided ram. 
146 Previously, (v. 4) he lifted his eyes and saw the designated place from far away. His visually 
directed recognition is either confirmation of a nondocumented verbal communication or taken by 
Abraham to be synonymous to the voice of God.  
147 The term emic has come to stand for the internal language and meanings of a defined culture as 
expressed by a member of that culture and therefore is considered a more authentic expression than an etic 
description with conjectures from an outside observer who cannot hope to capture comprehensively all the 
nuances of meaning. See James Lett, “Emics and Etics: Notes on the Epistemology of Anthropology” in  
Emics and Etics: The Insider/Outsider Debate, eds. Thomas N. Headland, Kenneth L. Pike and Marvin 
Harris (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 127-142.  
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divine eschatological grace, not in his own obedient performance. Lastly, because 
Abraham’s undirected but completed ram sacrifice is included in “because you have done 
this,” God’s final divine commendation “you have obeyed My voice” includes 
Abraham’s obedience to both God’s auditory and non-auditory voice.148 
In retrospect, throughout the covenant journey God has transformed Abram into 
Abraham (Gen 12:1-3, 15, 17, 22:1-2), corrected Abraham when he needed it (Gen 15:4; 
17:19- 20, Gen 22:12), rescued his family members when they needed it (Gen 12:17; 
16:7; 19:29; 20:6-7; 21:17, 22:13), protected his reputation (Gen 12:16-17; 15:19; 20:7) 
and blessed him (Gen 12:2-3, 7; 13:14-17; 15:5, 7, 18-19; 17). God’s actions in the 
Aqedah (calling [v. 1], correcting and protecting [vv. 11-12], rescuing [v. 13], and 
blessing [vv. 15-18]) is a condensed recap of what He has been providing until now for 
Abraham. The Aqedah is a cumulative reprise of Abraham’s learning and God’s 
seeing/providing for Abraham. With a Tester like Abraham’s God, we need not fear His 
testing. 
The hermeneutical sin in interpreting the Aqedah lies in privileging Abraham’s 
words and actions over God’s words and actions in the narrative. The text-given 
paradigm of a test and its own literary structure must direct and help the interpreter weigh 
                                                 
148 As a Christian I believe that Holy Spirit works through every aspect of this narrative, but the 
ram sacrifice is where I recognize retrospectively the Holy Spirit working in and through Abraham in the 
Aqedah. It is the Holy Spirit who imbues the believer with spiritual insight to interpret circumstances in 
harmony with the Word of God, guides them in faithful deeds of love that go beyond explicit divine 
commands and helps the believer perceive events as foretokens of the final fulfillment of God’s promises. 
Jesus’ exegesis of the Aqedah event discloses the ensuing exuberance in Abraham’s joyful understanding 
of the future fulfillment of his own test, “Your father Abraham rejoiced that he would see my day. He saw 
it and was glad” (John 8:56).   
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the parts correctly.149 It is only by hearing all of God’s words in the Aqedah even more 
sensitively and seriously that the beauty of a cogent (covenant identity) yet 
comprehensive (integrated covenant) test of Abraham becomes clear. The theo-centric 
viewpoint of the Aqedah is that God imposed a covenant-crisis challenge to elicit an 
integrated covenant response from father Abraham. 
Alternative thesis: Anthropocentric viewpoint 
Turning from the omniscient Tester, we now examine the Aqedah from the 
complimentary anthropocentric viewpoint of the puzzled yet trusting testee. Von Rad is 
right that the “twofold viewpoint for the story, which is about to unfold (one sees it 
through Abraham’s eyes and at the same time from a high level), unmasks the 
extraordinary narrator.”150 In contrast to the theocentric thesis of the Aqedah as a divine 
test of covenant crisis to be solved by the covenant, most interpretations of Aqedah 
literature interpret it as a divine test or trial to be endured by literal compliance based on 
Abraham’s actual actions which earn him God’s praise. Traditional interpretations 
usually understand the Aqedah as a radically disjunctive event requiring the abdication of 
                                                 
149 Without the text functioning as a norm for understanding, unchecked presuppositions slip into 
Aqedah interpretations unnoticed, for instance, we can now see that: test passing does not require a perfect 
test score, the testee is not a reliable norm for the original purpose of the test, not all tests of faith are 
compliance or endurance tests, human suffering is an unreliable value currency for sacrifice, dramatic 
moral paradox is not holier than solvable moral challenge, the ultimate worship of God is not the same as 
the ultimate worship of Baal or Moloch, teleological suspension of the ethical is not inevitable in the 
Aqedah, resurrection hope never justifies ritual human slaughter, preferred typology doesn’t refute accurate 
interpretation, nihilism is not the highest pinnacle of morality, pedagogy does not warrant abuse of others, 
and this test might turn out to be a measurement assay not a pass/fail audition based on human response. 
150 Von Rad, Genesis, 239. 
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the covenant at God’s command. Even as he believed God would give Isaac back after 
his dies, this test required Abraham to relinquish his future through the ancient ritual of 
human sacrifice. 
The divine demand for human sacrifice in the Aqedah confronts the reader’s 
modern sensibilities in front of the text as unbearably horrific. As Levenson has expertly 
outlined, the world of biblical meaning behind the text included sporadic familiarity with 
human sacrifice and the sacrifice of a firstborn innocent fits the perfect firstfruit offering 
motif.151 Westermann writes, “the history of religions attests human sacrifice in a number 
of places, as well as among Israel’s neighbors, the Phoenicians, the Ammonites, the 
Moabites (2 Kings 3:21), in Egypt and Canaan.”152 When God addressed Abraham with 
the command to sacrifice Isaac (Gen 22:1-2), Abraham may have been familiar with this 
form of worship153 though it must not be forgotten that  he heard this difficult command 
coming from his trusted God, to whom he belonged and who had sustained him through 
                                                 
151 Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, 3-17. Plaut suggests Abraham 
might have considered the command legitimate in the historical context of his times, this is why he didn’t 
protest as over Sodom and Gomorrah. The Torah: A Modern Commentary, G. Plaut, ed. (New York, NY: 
UAHC Press, 1981) 149.  
152 Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 357; Moberly, “The Earliest Commentary on the Akedah,” 305.    
153 “Indeed, to modern eyes this may seem obvious: a father’s readiness to sacrifice his beloved 
son presents an exceptional act of submission. To earlier readers, however, this was not quite as obvious. 
On the contrary, as I already said, stories of child sacrifice were frequently encountered in the Near East; 
there was nothing out of the ordinary in Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice Isaac. . . . In the Near Eastern 
stories, the father is not only willing to slay his son but, unlike Abraham, eventually does so.” Boehm, The 
Binding of Isaac, 15.  
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the years.154 Though he was not told he was being tested,155 he immediately sets out to 
comply with the test command (Gen 22:3-10).  
In the Aqedah there are four verbal clusters of Abraham’s actions. Three of the 
verbal clusters demonstrate Abraham’s radical compliance to the test command details 
                                                 
154 “This familiarity of shared history must be granted to Abraham in order to understand his 
willingness to accept the command.” Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 356.  
155 Divine tests are found in the Bible and Abraham is depicted as experiencing such ordeals 
multiple times. “The idea of temptation, i.e., of a pedagogical test which God permits men to endure in 
order to probe their faith and faithfulness, is not really new in the patriarchal stores. The report about God’s 
promise and conduct of Abraham from Mesopotamia (chs. 12.1 ff.; 15.1 ff.) contained a temptation motif. 
The outbreak of famine must also be understood as a test which Abraham did not pass (ch. 12.10 ff.). And 
finally, the visit of the three heavenly beings was a test for Abraham (see at ch. 18.1 ff.). What is here new, 
however, is the programmatic appearance of the idea of testing in the very first verse of the story as well as 
its destructive harshness.” Von Rad, Genesis, 239. 
Testing was a common theme in Israel’s wilderness experience and either referred to obeying an 
expressed law of God and resisting the temptation to break that law (Exod 16:4) or being tested through a 
fearsome experience so that the fear of God would remain before them, to help keep them from sinning 
(Exod 20:20). Instilling the fear of God, compliance to His commands, faithfully trusting in His redemption 
are the expressed goals of corporate wilderness testing and has been applied to the Aqedah as relevant 
themes. However, two important differences distinguish the tests of Israel from the Aqedah: (1) the Aqedah 
is a final test of an individual entity at the end of a long covenant journey compared to a corporate entity 
initiating their covenant experience and (2) the Abraham’s test command contradicts God’s previous 
words, Israel’s tests usually demanded alignment with God’s previous words. 
A closer analogy to the Aqedah as an individual test after a long collaborative history with God is 
God’s test of Hezekiah with the envoys from Babylon. Hezekiah’s one failing was pride and greed, 
evidenced by his accumulating riches “for himself.” The test targeted that weakness. “And so in the matter 
of the envoys of the princes of Babylon, who had been sent to him to inquire about the sign that had been 
done in the land, God left him to himself, in order to test him and to know all that was in his heart.” (2 
Chron 32:31). Hezekiah fails his test (2 Kgs 20:12-19). Correspondingly, Abraham’s one persistent failing 
was his fear of violent death at the hands of others, it is aptly ironic then, to put the knife into his hand and 
make him confront violent death through the imperiling of his beloved son.  
The second aspect of testing an individual through contradictory divine commands have resulted 
in varied human responses as recorded in the Bible. Yet they are not routinely charged with disobedient 
sinning even if they respectfully decline to comply: (a) When God commands Ezekiel to cook over human 
dung, Ezekiel begs to not defile himself and God acquiesces and allows cow dung (Ezek 4:12-15 vs Deut 
23:12-14 human dung is to be covered up, not seen by God who walks among you). However, the divine 
accommodation mitigated the intended lesson of exiles in extremis eating food that is defiled. (b) God 
commands Hosea to marry Gomer and remarry her after she has been with another man (Hos 1:2-3; 3:1-3 
vs Lev 21:7 priests prohibited from marrying prostitutes or previous married women, Deut 24:1-4 a 
divorced woman, who remarries and divorces again cannot be taken back by former husband, it is called an 
abomination). Hosea complies, and God uses his marriage as an object lesson of God’s faithfulness to 
unfaithful Israel. (c) A prophet commands another prophet to strike and harm him (1 Kgs 20:35-37 vs Exod 
21:18-27 striking has consequences in a conflict context). The first one refuses. “Then he said to him, 
“Because you have not obeyed the voice of the Lord, behold, as soon as you have gone from me, a lion 
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without deviation: preparation for journey (v. 3: rose, saddled, took, cut, arose, went), 
transfer (v. 6: took, laid, took), preparation for sacrifice (vv. 9-10: came, built, laid, 
bound, laid, took). They warrant God’s affirmation, “Now I know that you fear God” (v. 
12)156 and “you have obeyed my voice” (v. 18) because Abraham personally157 undertakes 
all the actions necessary leading up to the sacrifice of Isaac with unmistakable focus and 
unswerving resolve.158 However, the last and fourth verb cluster regarding the transfer of 
sacrifice to the ram (v. 13 went, took, offered) falls outside the scope of divine verbal 
commands. Nahum Sarna recognized this, “Substitution of the ram for Isaac is a 
spontaneous gesture on the part of Abraham, performed at his own initiative and not 
                                                 
shall strike you down.” He is killed by a lion. The next candidate complies, and the wounded prophet 
carries out a mission to be an object lesson to Ahab from the Lord. (d) Jesus ignores a Syrophoenician 
woman and seemingly rejects her, referring to her as a dog (Matt 15:21-28; Mark 7:24-30 vs Matt 5:22 not 
to insult anyone or call them a fool or they will be subject to the fires of hell), she accepts the metaphor by 
persisting in claiming leftover crumbs from the Master of dogs. Jesus rewards her faith by granting her 
wish and praises her. (e) Peter is commanded to eat unclean animals three times in a vision (Acts 10-11 vs 
Lev 11; Deut 14). Peter consistently declines the command in vision, then is guided by the Holy Spirit 
through intuition to interpret the vision as a metaphor for accepting gentiles who had been previously been 
considered “unclean” by the Jews. 
156 The Fear of God “must not be considered as a special emotional reaction to the reality of God 
which is experienced as mysterium tremendum. That the Old Testament is familiar with such a thing cannot 
be disputed, but where the phrases ‘fear of God’ and ‘fearing God’ occur in the Old Testament, they refer 
not to a particular form of strong emotions but rather to their consequence, i.e., to obedience (Gen 20.11; 
42.18; II Kings 4.1; Isa 11.2; Prov 1.7; Job 1.1, 8). It would be more correct to interpret the phrase ‘fear of 
God simply as a term for obedience to the divine commands. But the Old Testament rarely uses this word 
predicatively. This passage, to be sure, and Job give exemplary proof of such obedient fear of God (Job 1.1, 
8).” Von Rad, Genesis, 242.    
157 As noted by the micro-hermeneutical level of exegesis, all the verbs in these verb clusters are in 
the masculine singular with Abraham as their antecedent agent.  
158 “He was on the way three days, and one already sees from that that his obedience was firm and 
not simply a brief effervescence.” Von Rad, Genesis. 240. 
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divinely ordained.”159 Yet, this last verb cluster is the most important of the group in the 
Aqedah because it matches and fulfills the test command verbs with went, took, offered 
(v. 2 take, go, offer). Linguistically, it signals exact obedience; objectively, it 
incorporates God’s provided solution; narratively, it concludes Abraham’s test 
performance. 
In contrast to the transparency of Abraham’s compliant actions, his speeches are 
ambiguous. Isaac hears all of them except for the initial test command. The only 
unambiguous answer in the Aqedah that Abraham gives is Hinneni (Here I am), his ready 
and open response to God and to his son that anchors the chiastic structure. But the rest 
are open to diverse interpretation. Abraham’s first speech to his servants is bordered by 
two verbal clusters (prep and transfer) and preceded by Abraham’s apperception of the 
mountain place. Abraham describes his mission as worship with assurances that they 
would both return. This conveys faith in God’s promise that Isaac will return, but 
knowing Abraham’s history of half-truths, one cannot exclude other motives for his 
words.160 Abraham’s answer to Isaac’s question conveys hope that God will intervene by 
providing Himself as the sheep for the burnt offering.161 But Abraham’s answer allows for 
                                                 
159 Sarna, Genesis, 392.  
160 “White lie, prophecy, hope, even disobedience, can surely coexist in the believer, especially in 
times of acute crisis. The enigmatic ambiguity of ‘we shall return’ perhaps gives an insight into the quite 
contrary ideas agitating Abraham’s mind at this time (‘I believe; help my unbelief,’ Mark 9:24; cf. Matt 
14:27-31).” Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 108. 
161 Trusting in God’s providence is how Calvin interprets the meaning of Abraham’s speech: “This 
example is proposed for our imitation. Whenever the Lord gives a command, many things are perpetually 
occurring to enfeeble our purpose: means fail, we are destitute of counsel, all avenues seem closed. In such 
straits, the only remedy against despondency is to leave the event to God, in order that he may open a way 
for us when there is none. For as we act unjustly towards God, when we hope for nothing from him but 
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at least two meanings, either that God will provide the animal for a burnt offering or less 
likely, that Isaac is the animal God has provided for the burnt offering.162 From his words 
it appears Abraham is struggling to work out how God’s command to immolate Isaac as a 
burnt offering might be fulfilled without disobedience on his part and losing Isaac. This 
one and only conversation recorded between father and son is flanked on both sides by 
the inclusio—“So they went, both of them together.” 
The verb cluster of preparation for the burnt offering has most scholars assuming 
Isaac was told about his role and was compliant because he is bound first, then placed on 
top of the wood of the altar by Abraham. But no communication is divulged by the text.163 
By the time Abraham’s reaches for the knife “to slaughter his son” (v. 10) it is clear 
Abraham is no longer looking for (if he ever was) a substitute animal. The writer of 
Hebrews relays that Abraham reasoned God could resurrect Isaac (Heb 11:19). This 
faith-filled conviction propelled him to reach toward Isaac for the sacrificial slaughter, 
                                                 
what our senses can perceive, so we pay Him the highest honor, when, in affairs of perplexity, we 
nevertheless entirely acquiesce in his providence.” John Calvin, Commentaries on The First Book of Moses, 
1:568. 
162 “The answer is ambiguous, but it contains a truth of which Abraham himself is not yet aware.” 
Von Rad, Genesis, 241.   
163 Luther imagined a dialogue here: “The son was undoubtedly struck with amazement and in turn 
reminded his father of the promise: ‘Consider, father, that I am the offspring to whom descendants, kings, 
peoples, etc., have been promised. God gave me to my mother Sarah through a great miracle. How, then, 
will it be possible for the promise to be fulfilled if I have been killed? Nevertheless, let us first confer about 
this matter and talk it over.’ All of this should have been recorded here. I do not know why Moses omitted 
it.” LW 4, 112-113. Calvin, along with most theologians imagines Isaac “voluntarily surrendered himself.” 
Calvin’s answer to skeptics was, “Should any one object, that there was no necessity to bind one who 
willingly offered himself to death; I answer, that the holy man anticipated, in this way, a possible danger; 
lest anything might happen in the midst of the act to interrupt it.” John Calvin, Commentary on Genesis, 
1:568.  
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for the son must die in order to be resurrected. Only then did the angel of YHWH 
suddenly counter his course of action.  
In traditional interpretations the angelic prohibition officially ends the test at this 
point with his commendation of Abraham’s motive. Westermann interprets the angel’s 
message as “Now I know that Abraham is God-fearing; this has been shown by the fact 
that he has not withheld his only son from God. And so he has passed the test.”164 
Abraham’s intent “to kill his son” counts for the deed, so he is regarded as obeying 
fully.165 Yet God’s righteous morality is not to be impugned because Isaac was not 
physically sacrificed.166 Though by outward action there appears to be no difference 
between Abraham and religious fathers who were willing to sacrifice their children to 
worship Baal and Molech, on the inside, faith in God’s resurrection for this lifetime is 
said to be the critical difference between the two kinds of fathers. But this focus on 
Abraham’s faith in the resurrection as the clear religious difference between his faith and 
the faith of other pious but idolatrous fathers is not indisputable. Shalom Spiegel notes 
                                                 
164 Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 361.  
165 The concept that intent is morally equivalent to the deed is supported by Matt 5:27-28, “You 
have heard that it was said, ‘You shall not commit adultery.’ But I say to you that everyone who looks at a 
woman with lustful intent has already committed adultery with her in his heart.” However, this idea is not 
exclusive to Christians. Nahum Sarna writes, “It is not important that the act was unfulfilled, for the value 
of the act may lie as much in the inward intention of the doer as in the final execution.” Sarna, Genesis, 
153. “The intent and willingness to offer Isaac is seen as equivalent to doing it. Abraham’s inner act of 
responsiveness to God’s command is the equivalent of an outward act in which Isaac was returned to God 
as a sacrifice.” Hamilton, Genesis 18-50, 117.  
166 This logic is not consistent. If Abraham’s intent is accepted as morally equivalent to the deed to 
kill Isaac, then God’s intent in the test command to require Abraham’s intent to kill Isaac must also be 
taken as morally equivalent to the deed of killing Isaac.   
 221 
 
that resurrection was not a foreign concept to ancient religions and was indeed even 
routinely celebrated in ritualistic fashion in Canaan.167 
Now, I want to be clear that Abraham’s response in the Aqedah is to be 
commended for accurate literal obedience to the divine test command. His willingness to 
give up everything through the offering of Isaac opens new vistas for theological 
contemplation on the extreme limits of morality, ethics, faith and meaning. It is only after 
Abraham has gone to the limits of his endurance that the angelic encounter relieves him 
and Abraham discovers the divinely provided ram as the test solution and offers it instead 
of his son.  
There is also more than one way to understand who the ram represents. It may 
represent God, Isaac or Abraham. Doukhan suggests God, the lamb and Isaac are 
represented: “First, God Himself had been ‘provided’ as (‘instead of’) the lamb for the 
sacrifice (22:8), and thus implicitly ‘instead’ of the son. It is the ram, which is now 
substituted by God as the sacrifice ‘instead of’ the son.”168 Wenham equates the ram to 
Isaac, “In sacrifice the animal symbolically represented the offeror whose place it took. 
Here the ram replaces Isaac, so a full-grown ram, as opposed to a younger lamb, fittingly 
                                                 
167 Spiegel, The Last Trial, 113. Baal himself was an ancient Near Eastern resurrection god and 
according to the Canaanite version, “Baal dies, a victim of deified Death (Mot), in the hot, dry summer; 
nature dies with him. But Death is, in turn, killed, Baal lives anew, and nature flourishes and luxuriates in 
response.” Jon Levenson, Resurrection and the Restoration of Israel: The Ultimate Victory of the God of 
Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 215. 
168 Doukhan, Genesis, 286.  
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takes his place.”169 But since the test commanded Abraham to offer up Isaac’s sacrifice, 
the ram could represent the offerer Abraham and at the same time substitute for Isaac as 
the victim. In the end, for Abraham the meaning of the Aqedah and worship does not rest 
on the symbolism of his human task, but on the divine source for the sacrifice. God will 
see/provide is what Abraham clearly re-affirms as the final meaning of the test. 
God then re-establishes the covenant and promises blessings to Abraham and his 
seed ending with the affirmation, “You have obeyed my voice.” Moberly explains how 
divine grace and obedience work together in the covenant. 
A promise which was previously grounded solely in the will and purposes of 
Yahweh is transformed so that it is now grounded both in the will of Yahweh and 
in the obedience of Abraham (VT 38 [1988] 320). This is analogous to the 
assumptions underlying intercessory prayer. Here, too, faithful human response to 
God is taken up and incorporated within the purposes and activity of God. 170 
  
Abraham then returns home with his servants. The test is over, the covenant has 
been re-established because Abraham was willing to lose his son171 but Isaac was spared 
                                                 
169 Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 110.  
170 Moberly, “The Earliest Commentary on the Akedah,” 320.  
171 “Abraham has demonstrated his willingness to forfeit his posterity in obedience to God’s will.” 
Sarna, Genesis, 154.  
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by the angel and Abraham’s obedience and faith has been tested and proven to God’s 
satisfaction. Thus ends a summary of the anthropocentric viewpoint on the Aqedah. 
Synthesis: The final form of the Aqedah 
The final form of the Aqedah blends the theocentric and anthropocentric 
viewpoints together so masterfully that few catch the discrepancy between God’s will and 
Abraham’s actions in the test. It is routinely presumed that Abraham’s test response must 
be perfect due to God’s commendations and the lack of censure. Yet theological 
tensions172 and awkward linguistic transitions173 persist in the final form of the text just 
below surface readings and continue to elicit new explanatory endeavors from discerning 
interpreters. 
The application of the hermeneutical method to the Aqedah has unearthed a 
theocentric thesis of the Aqedah which sees the divine test as a covenant crisis designed 
to elicit a paternal covenant response from Abraham. The anthropocentric alternative 
thesis of Christian interpretations lauds Abraham’s faith-filled literalistic compliance as 
buoyed by his resurrection hope based on Hebrews 11:19.174 Recognition of the interplay 
between the two viewpoints, divine and human, in the Aqedah provides the most 
                                                 
172 The main moral-ethical tension remains “Given the divine command to sacrifice Isaac . . . 
disobedience cannot be regarded a ‘better’ alternative to obedience. There is no ‘better alternative’ for 
Abraham in this narrative, neither rationally nor ethically: killing one’s son and disobeying a direct divine 
command are both unthinkable.” Boehm, The Binding of Isaac, 3.   
173 See Moberly, “The Earliest Commentary on the Akedah,” 309-310. 
174 Overlapping the Christian emphasis on faith, Jewish anthropocentric interpretations follow the 
compass of overt compliance as voiced by God’s final assessment of Abraham, “You obeyed my voice.” 
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coherent explanation for explaining the narrative and satisfying the two criteria of 
internal coherence and correspondence175 and the three heuristics of the Principle of 
Charity, of Humanity and Occam’s Razor. The two viewpoints are depicted in Figure 4.5 
below and together, they constitute the Covenant Hypothesis.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5 The Covenant Hypothesis: Human and Divine viewpoints in the Aqedah. 
 
 If Aqedah narrative details are operationally rendered by shapes on the literary 
structure, it reveals an asymmetrical pattern with only one missing piece. For easier 
                                                 
175 Boehm resolves the Aqedah diachronically by splitting the narrative historical-critically into 
two chronologically different strands. Regarding “questions as what Abraham should have done or whether 
he in fact did the right thing,” Boehm says, “I do not know how to answer them and, in fact, would be 
suspicious of any account that claims to do so.” Boehm, The Binding of Isaac, 3. I fully accept Boehm’s 
suspicion and rest my case on a synchronic resolution of the tension by recognizing the synthesis of the 
divine and human viewpoints in the final form. 
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comprehension of the structural elements on the literary triangle, I will depict Abraham’s 
four verb clusters as circles, the two matching pairs of phrases (“Abraham lifted up his 
eyes and saw” and “so they went, both of them together”) as simple text, and Abraham’s 
monologue as boxed speech in Figure 4.6 below.  
The pattern of operations on the right side of the chiastic triangle initially matches 
the left side176 but just after Abraham’s taking up the knife to kill his son (v. 10), the rest 
of the components are missing. Instead of Abraham continuing as the sole antecedent 
agent (subject of the masculine singular verbs) for the test actions and speech along both 
sides of the literary structure, Abraham’s reaching for the knife forces the angel of 
YHWH (vv. 11-12) to interrupt and become the (masculine singular) subject just once, 
disrupting the overall pattern. This interruption is followed by the displacement of the 
next two operational elements: the lifting of the eyes and the fourth verb cluster (v. 13b 
went, took, offered the ram) into the center circle of the literary triangle. The following 
awkwardness of the anticlimatic, accidental (“behold!”) discovery of the ram solution, 
after the plot tension has been already broken by the saving angel, provides a hint that 
                                                 
176 The left side of the chiastic triangle from the bottom to the apex consists of: the test command 
(bottom left angle, vv. 1-2) followed by the preparation verb cluster for the journey (v. 3), the lifting of 
Abraham’s eyes and seeing the site (v. 4), verbal exchange with the servants to remain (v. 5), transfer verb 
cluster of sacrificial accoutrements onto Abraham and Isaac (v. 6a).  Then the paired inclusio “So they went 
both of them together” (v. 6b and 8b) envelopes the apical central dialogue between Abraham and Isaac 
(vv. 7-8a).  Then a verb cluster of preparations for the sacrifice follows (v.9) with the startling move “then 
Abraham reached out his hand and took the knife to slaughter his son” (v. 10).  
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something has gone awry. Sketched out below, the displacement of the operational and 
oral rythmn of the story is obvious. 
 
   
 
Fig. 4.6 Present literary structure reveals asymmetry. 
  
Due to the underlying principle of symmetry in chiastic literary structures with the 
left-sided elements already in place, a matching sequence for the right side can be 
reconstructed177 from the existing elements in the Aqedah pericope (Fig. 4.7). This 
                                                 
177 In attempting a reconstruction of a hypothetically ideal response to the test, it may appear that 
this study is indulging in a methodology akin to higher criticism and not remaining true to a posteriori 
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historical-grammatical literary analysis that is the foundational method of this study. A rationale will be 
presented here based on the final form of the text. Historical-Critical scholars have a keen sense for 
recognizing features of literary continuity and discontinuity in the text and that school of thought believes 
later editors and redactors have left traces of their work in the final text. Fundamentalist scholars may have 
been too quick in dismissing these literary details because of assumed agendas of humanistic skepticism 
behind the search for these discontinuities.  
Employing the Principle of Charity to the final form, namely, assuming that there is a rational 
purpose for leaving grammatical and syntactical irregularities in the text, could it be that these “speed 
bumps” in reading are subtle triggers designed to pedagogically elicit ponderings on theological nuances 
from sensitive readers? Christo Lombaard believes these were “purposely intended to indicate to their 
readers these internal editorial, and therefore, debating activities. These are indeed deliberately ‘writerly’ 
texts that both exhort and inform later, including modern, dialogue. The educational value of such insights 
can hardly be overestimated.” Christo Lombaard, The Old Testament and Christian Spirituality: 
Theoretical and Practical Essays from a South African Perspective (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 2012), 128. According to Thiselton, a writerly text is “one which is capable of generating a 
plurality of meanings in the production of which readers can share.” Thiselton, New Horizons in 
Hermeneutics, 98. Eckart Otto believed the purpose for these “apparent inconsistencies in the text, which 
call for texts behind the given text” were to indicate “narration time within the plot of narrated time.” 
Eckart Otto, “A Hidden Truth Behind the Text or the Truth of the Text” in South African Perspectives on 
the Pentateuch between Synchrony and Diachrony, eds. Jurie H. le Roux and Eckart Otto (New York, NY: 
Clark, 2007), 19-28. However, this last rationale seems less likely since the Aqedah has no hesitation 
announcing narration time overtly as in the metalepsis of Gen 22:14 “As it is said to this day.” So if, 
according to a conservative faith community’s belief, the final form of the Bible was preserved by the Holy 
Spirit for instruction, this suggests that a theological rationale for any unusual style, syntax, grammar might 
be worth surmising about.  
What are some literary details in the Aqedah that catch the attention of historical-critical scholars 
and what possible theological nuances might be indicated by their continuing existence in the final form of 
the text (regardless of theories about their origin)? 
1. Style: On the micro-hermeneutical level we have already noted the dramatic stylistic 
differences between the poetic, repetitive, speeches of the angel of YHWH and the sparse 
narrative style of vv. 3-10, 13, 19, as well as the congruence between the first (vv. 11-12) and 
second angelic speeches (vv. 16-18) that lead historical-critical scholars to assume a later date 
for them. I would point out that the test command (vv. 1-2) is also repetitive, poetic and 
lyrical in contrast to the lean narrative and shares the name of Elohim with the first angelic 
speech (vv. 12). All three divine speeches also reference the same repetitive appellations for 
the victim Isaac. But no one assigns the initial test command to a later date on stylistic 
grounds for it would collapse the logical premise of the test. However, the concordance of 
divine verbal patterns in the Aqedah link the identity of Elohim to the angel of YHWH and 
the wide dissimilarity between the three divine speeches and the rest of the narrative argues 
for these three belonging together based on linguistic similarity. 
2. Redundancy: “Why does the text say ‘and he offered it [ram] up as a burnt offering instead of 
his son’? Obviously it was instead of his son, so why does the text have to explain?” Boehm, 
The Binding of Isaac, 11. Boehm reasons that this redundancy is a relic from the earlier 
version of the story without the angelic prohibition of vv. 11-12 that protects Isaac. In the 
original version, he surmises, this redundancy was necessary in order to assure the reader that 
in the story, Isaac is finally out of danger. In the final form of the text as it stands, the 
redundancy makes no sense if the angelic prohibition is understood to have already withdrawn 
the requirement for the sacrifice of Isaac. If, however, as the covenant hypothesis indicates, 
the angelic prohibition only cancels the direct method of fulfilling Isaac’s sacrifice with 
Isaac’s own body, then the remaining indirect method of ram substitution for Isaac may 
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reconstruction hints that after the third cluster of verbs for altar preparation, a monologue 
from Abraham to God would be expected—to correspond to Abraham’s monologue to 
the servants on the other side. If there is no verbal response from God to Abraham after 
his mediation, we can expect from Abraham’s previous habit (v. 4) that he would lift up 
                                                 
require the tagging “instead of his son” to theologically convey completion of the original test 
task.  
3. Placement: Boehm thinks that v.10 and v.13 should flow together naturally—Abraham 
reaches for the knife to kill his son he lifts up his eyes and behold, a ram, behind! In Boehm’s 
reconstruction the uninterrupted flow would emphasize the provided ram. But I would 
question why would a father intent on slicing his son’s neck with a knife look up? The final 
form of the text puts the climactic accent on the angelic prohibition, with the ram as an 
afterthought. The Covenant Hypothesis uncovers a proposal that places the ram as the 
climactic divine answer to Abraham’s prophetic intercession. Unfortunately, this possibility 
was never actualized.  
4. Sense of Completion: Moberly believes vv. 15-18 are a later addition to the original story 
because “the structure and content of vv. 1-14 which are such that the story is complete by v. 
14.” He reasons: Abraham’s obedience is demonstrated and affirmed by v. 12, God’s rights to 
demand the firstborn and his mercy in providing the ram is concluded by v. 13, and the theme 
of the place and divine see/providing is legitimized by v. 14. Moberly, The Earliest 
Commentary on the Akedah, 304. A thematic sense of completion is determined by what an 
interpreter assumes as the divine purpose of the test. Moberly sees these three points as God’s 
purpose for testing Abraham, other theologians may not agree. Moberly takes vv.15-18 
seriously for “the fact remains that vv. 15-18 are the commentary that the OT itself contains.” 
Moberly believes “the commentary is put in the mouth of the angel of Yahweh” for “the 
theological commentary in Gen. xxii 15-18 is to draw out the significance of Abraham’s 
obedience in such a way that Abraham can be seen to have a role within the salvation-history 
of Israel akin to that of Moses.” Thus, it “should be given a position of climactic significance 
within the Abraham cycle as a whole.” I accept these verses as a divine interpretation of the 
Aqedah and not a human commentary that is later “put into the mouth of the angel of 
YHWH.” Because the ending of a test or trial unpacks the whole event, where one accepts 
that explication to be, changes everything. If the divine interpretation of vv. 15-18 is taken as 
the test answer key, it unbinds the Aqedah very cogently. 
5. Awkward syntax: The Hebrew term taken as ʼakhar (behind, after) or ʼekhad (one) follows 
the sighting of the ram. Stylistically, ʼakhar is usually accompanied by an orienting noun 
object, i.e., behind him (Gen 19:6) or after these things (Gen 22:1). In verse 13, ʼakhar is left 
dangling by itself. A possible theological reason for not definitively demarcating the meaning 
to one or the other option for translation is that by leaving the term floating and unattached, it 
remains open to both translation possibilities: the spatial location of the ram for structural 
symmetry as well as retaining suggestive linguistic resonances with the single ram burnt 
offering on the Day of Atonement. Syntactical ambiguity allows for a more generous scope of 
possible and alluded meanings. 
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his eyes and look around for any sign that God had heard him. Behind him in the bush is 
God’s waiting ram. After the ram is substituted for Isaac and Abraham names the site, the 
angel of the YHWH would follow with one congratulatory speech (instead of two) that 
re-establishes the covenant on God with a complete list of seven (not six) covenant 
themes/blessings as specific commendations. 
 
  
 
Fig. 4.7 Reconstruction of a symmetrical literary structure. 
  
 230 
 
In summary, the Covenant Hypothesis recognizes that in the final form of the 
Aqedah, the divine and human viewpoints are melded together imperfectly. As a new 
interpretation for the Aqedah it exhibits ten advantages over the traditional 
interpretations. (1) The Covenant Hypothesis is comprehensive because this theocentric 
interpretation does not displace but incorporates the traditional anthropocentric 
interpretations as valid regarding Abraham’s intentions, which then required interruption 
and gracious redirection by God (vv. 11-12) to save Isaac and discover the theocentric 
solution of the ram. (2) It privileges and proposes a logically linear theocentric 
interpretation over the anthropocentric justification for the Abraham’s choices which may 
or may not assume inconsistency in God’s Aqedah behavior. (3) The Covenant 
Hypothesis retains consistency in the uniquely revealed character of Abraham’s God 
while taking divine speech very seriously as precise and accurate without downplaying 
their exuberant poetical rhetoric. (4) The literary context of the preceding Abrahamic 
cycle becomes necessary to the new recognition of the Aqedah as a cumulative final test 
assessing Abraham’s integration of all the previous revelations into his covenant 
character. (5) The Covenant Hypothesis is powerfully pastoral and pragmatic178 for it 
recommends understanding and responding to new revelations through an integrative 
                                                 
178 This covenant hypothesis does not have to say with Martin Luther, “You are not Lot; you are 
not Abraham. Therefore you should not imitate what Lot and Abraham did . . . Those who are not called by 
a specific command outside the rule, to be ‘wonder men’ (if I may use this expression), should keep within 
the rule. Then they will not transgress or err. But Lot, Abraham, and their like are ‘wonder men’; their spirit 
is carried away beyond the law, beyond example and consequence. For they have an extraordinary call and 
impulse. You do not.” Luther as cited by Elizabeth Palmer, Faith in the Hidden God: Luther, Kierkegaard, 
and the Binding of Isaac (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2017), 108. 
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hermeneutic grounded on the synthesis of past divine revelations, for Abraham’s 
experiental journey with YHWH is his only “Bible” for understanding the challenging 
test command. (6) It recognizes the test design conveys divine respect for human 
intelligence because morally solving a crisis requires higher sophistication than mute 
compliance.179 (7) The Covenant Hypothesis demonstrates a greater degree of internal 
coherence, contextual consistency, correspondence, and realistic intuitive plausibility. (8) 
A fuller typology of Christ is implied by the Covenant Hypothesis: Isaac and the ram are 
already recognized types for Christ but this interpretation suggests Abraham was set up to 
be the clearest and fullest type for Christ (obedient servant, prophetic intercessor, 
covenant head, risk-taking self-sacrifice to preserve God’s covenant).180 (9) This 
                                                 
179 It has been recognized that the Aqedah test “structure matches exactly what a test is made up 
of: a task is presented, its completion is described and the passing of the test is determined.” Seigfried 
Kreuzer, “Das Opfer des Vaters—die Gefährdung des Sohnes: Genesis 22,” 62. However, the covenant 
hypothesis additionally recognizes: a mid-performance affirmative correction (vv. 11-12), the very specific 
test solution of the ram (v. 13) in relation to the anticipated solution of the lamb (v. 8), what the testee 
learned and the enduring legacy of the test (v. 14), a divine interpretation of the test that measures the 
degree of covenant integration in Abraham’s character (vv. 15-18). 
180 Palmer sees Moberly’s typology trying to connect Abraham with the Messiah metaphorically, 
tying fear to faith. “Abraham is a type of Jesus. . .. Moberly defines Jesus’ divine sonship as trust and 
obedience . . . connects Jesus’ divine sonship with Abraham’s fear of God . . . equates Abraham’s fear of 
God with the New Testament conception of faith . . . faith is constituted by constant trust and obedience 
(both of which were manifest by Abraham in Genesis 22 and Jesus in Matthew’s Gospel).” Elizabeth 
Palmer, Faith in the Hidden God: Luther, Kierkegaard, and the Binding (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
2017), 42 fn 113. See R. W. L. Moberly, The Bible, Theology, and Faith: A Study of Abraham and Jesus 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 223, 226, 227. Hamilton sees the suffering servant in 
both father and son. He “makes an offering and sees his offspring (Isa 53:10). But like Isaac, who silently 
consented to being sacrificed, he was ‘like a lamb that is led to the slaughter . . . [yet] he opened not his 
mouth’ (Isa 53:7). And like Isaac, he offered himself, rather an anyone else. But unlike Abraham, Isaac, or 
Job, the servant actually died (Isa 53:8).” Hamilton, Genesis 16-50, 117. Abraham was given a chance to 
experience a suffering akin to God’s. “The agony which he endured during the dark days of that fearful trial 
was permitted that he might understand from his own experience something of the greatness of the sacrifice 
made by the infinite God for man’s redemption. No other test could have caused Abraham such torture of 
soul as did the offering of his son. . .. ‘He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, 
how shall He not with Him also freely give us all things?’ Romans 8:32.” Ellen G. White, Patriarchs and 
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Covenant Hypothesis connects the fatherhood metaphor embodied by the ram to the exact 
literary center of the Aqedah, where Abraham responds as a loving father, “Here I am, 
my son.” (10) God’s own words hold the interpretive key to His superlatively designed 
test—the Aqedah unbinds itself.  
To wrap up this section, the voice of the future faith community is inserted into 
the telling of the Aqedah by the etiological metalepsis181 of verse 14: “As it is said to this 
day, ‘On the mount of the Lord, it/he shall be seen.’” Doukhan believes this text implies 
Abraham had an inkling of the Day of Atonement.182 Westermann sees this as an etiology 
referring to the physical mountain, the sanctuary on the mountain, or an allusion to 
Jerusalem where Yahweh appears or is seen.183 Wenham takes the passive form of seeing 
as connecting to Abraham’s history for it is “regularly used of the Lord appearing to men 
(cf. 12:7; 17:1; 18:1), thus making a link backward with Abraham’s past experience and 
                                                 
Prophets, 154. 
181 This metalepsis underlines Abraham’s prophetic role of mediatorial communicator for 
subsequent generations who are expected to ponder this story for themselves and interpret it, which they 
do. The Torah binds subsequent generations to this narrative by the metaleptic promise. For further 
discussion on how metalepsis works in ancient text see Ilse Mueller, “Celebration and Narration. 
Metaleptic Features in Ex 12:1-13, 16” in Narratology, Hermeneutics and Midrash: Jewish, Christian and 
Muslim Narratives from Late Antiquity through Modern Times, eds. Constanza Cordoni and Gerhard 
Langer (Göttingen, AU: Vienna University Press, 2014), 25-37.  
182 Grammatically, Doukhan points out, “This is the same passive form that is used in Leviticus 16 
to describe the appearance of the Lord on the Day of Atonement; ʾeraʾeh ‘I will appear’ (lit. trans.: ‘I will 
be seen’) ‘in the cloud above the mercy seat’ (Lev 16:2). The grammatical correspondence suggests that 
Abraham has in view, through the offering of the ram he just performed, the service of the Day of 
Atonement, when the Lord (already identified as the lamb) will appear on the mercy seat. Jewish tradition 
has not only related the ʻaqedah (22:7) to Passover, it also associated the ʻaqedah and the Day of 
Atonement. In addition, the ʻaqedah is a prominent motif in the liturgies of Rosh Hashanah and the Day of 
Atonement.” Doukhan, Genesis, 286.  
183 Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 363.  
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forward to Israel’s future experiences on the mountain of God (Exod 3:1-2, 16; Lev 9:4, 
6, etc.).”184 This metalepsis therefore connects the Aqedah to the God who is seen and 
provides, the God who is present through history via the cult, temple and canonical 
events in the scriptures behind and in front of the text. Establishing historical credibility, 
the narrator’s authority, and the continuing relevance of the meaning of the Aqedah for 
Abraham’s descendants, this metalepsis conveys communal confidence that just as 
Abraham experienced on the mountain, true vision awaits those who go to the Mount of 
YHWH.  
Interpretive Hypothesis 
Theory and Method for Interpretive Hypothesis 
The previously constructed understanding of the Aqedah will now be distilled 
into a summative interpretive hypothesis. The process of understanding was an informal, 
creative application of the hermeneutical method that first traced two trajectories in the 
narrative then analyzed the final form as their synthesis within one test. Next, matching 
the pattern of symmetry in the left side of the chiastic structure as uncovered at the level 
of micro-hermeneutics, meso-hermeneutical theology reconstructed a viable ideal test 
response to the test command by matching the chiastic sides (left and right sides of the 
triangle) to each other using the existing verses of the text. Now the free-ranging 
construction of understanding needs to be distilled into a succinct linear interpretive 
                                                 
184 Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 111.  
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hypothesis so it can submit to the next phase of testing by canonical validation or 
invalidation. 
The method of transforming a discovery-constructive process of understanding 
into a publicly arguable interpretive hypothesis requires recognizing the crux of the 
argument. The crux is a test. The Bible explicitly tells the reader that the Aqedah is to be 
understood as a test between God and Abraham (v. 1). The conventional structure of 
tests, which is consistent with other narrative tests in the Bible, is: challenge, response, 
evaluation. But the logical sequence of unpacking a test is evaluation, challenge, then 
response. This last order uncovers the process of creating and administering a test 
because the tester must start with a concept of what they want to assess and the criteria 
they will use to assess it, create a construct to elicit it, apply that construct to a testee, 
then evaluate the test results against the predetermined criteria. Since the goal of an 
interpretative hypothesis is to explain the meaning of the Aqedah text,185 this 
interpretation will follow the Sola Scriptura paradigm of the text as a divine test. 
Application: The Covenant Hypothesis  
The Aqedah frames itself as a test, “God tested Abraham” (v. 1). As a test, the 
tester’s final evaluation of the testee’s test response indicates the original purpose of the 
test. God’s final evaluation (vv. 15-18) of Abraham’s complete test response (v. 16 
“because you have done this”) contains covenant themes and blessings (“not witheld your 
son,” intensive blessings and multiplying, “stars of heaven,” “sands of the seashore,” 
                                                 
185 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 136.  
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“possess the gates of his enemies,” “nations of the earth bless themselves”) that 
correspond to six of Abraham’s previous seven covenant revelations in retrograde order186 
(Gen 21:12-14; Gen 17, Gen 15:5, Gen 13:16, Gen 12:7, Gen 12:1-3). The sixth, or next 
to last revelation (Gen 18) is notably missing from the list. Since Abraham’s covenant 
revelations are referenced as the norm for divine evaluation, a logical interpretative 
hypothesis for the purpose of the Aqedah is testing the integration of the covenant 
revelations in Abraham’s covenant identity.  
This abductive hypothesis is supported by the design of the test command that 
requires actions corresponding to the covenant revelations. The logistical design of the 
test command requires Abraham to acknowledge his covenant name (Gen 17), to go (lek-
lekha) to an unknown destination (Gen 12:1-3), to sacrifice at destination (Gen 12:7), to 
walk the land in faith, lifting his eyes for mountain (Gen 13:14-17), to gaze at stars in 
faith during overnight journey (Gen 15), and to have a son that trust God fully—Isaac 
consents to be placed on altar (Gen 21:13). The endangerment to the covenant bearer 
Isaac, couched in emotive rhetoric that incites paternal compassion, calls for covenant-
based training from the sixth revelation of Gen 18: prophetic intercession for the innocent 
based on God’s righteous justice. An authentic intercession that is voluntary and heartfelt 
requires an authentic threat. The test command poses an authentic threat to the covenant 
and the promised son by Abraham’s own hand. By requiring a three-day journey in close 
                                                 
186 Connections of some of these covenant blessings to previous covenant promises have been 
noted by many theologians. This study expands to include all of them and clarifies the specific nature of 
these acknowledged links.  
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proximity with the victim, the test provided time to remember and ponder on all that God 
had taught him. Thus, the test was designed to elicit all the lessons of the Abrahamic 
covenant.   
However, Abraham’s actions in the Aqedah discloses his assumption that the 
divine command required exact literalistic compliance irrespective of the content of the 
command (as do most traditional interpretations of the Aqedah). God did not intervene 
until the exact moment Abraham’s actions stepped outside the boundaries of his covenant 
training, when “Abraham reached out his hand and took the knife to slaughter his son” (v. 
10). Immediately, the angel of YHWH strongly prohibited the consummation of his faith-
filled literalistic obedience while graciously commending his motive (v. 12) and ended 
with nuanced praise (you did not withold your son, your only son [missing: whom you 
love, Isaac]). Abraham then discovered the divinely provided ram that had been waiting 
and substituted it as a burnt offering “instead of Isaac” (v.13), calling the place “YHWH 
Yireh” (v. 14). At the end of the Aqedah, God re-established the covenant with Abraham 
on Himself and graciously but specifically listed themes and blessings corresponding to 
six of the seven covenant lessons as the final divine interpretation of Abraham’s test 
response (v. 15-18). The summary conclusion is that Abraham has shown integrative and 
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correctable obedience to the voice of God. Abraham then returns home with his servants 
(v. 19). 
Judgment 
Theory and Method for Judgment 
The Covenant Hypothesis has demonstrated internal validity by internal 
coherence (all three divine speeches can be aligned morally) and internal correspondence 
(almost all the narrative details are now captured as theologically functional). For 
external validation187 either a comparison can be made with every other competing 
hypothesis of the Aqedah using probability measures to assess whether the covenant 
hypothesis is the most cogent and comprehensive explanation for the Aqedah text,188 or, 
due to space limitations, the canon can be used to test this hypothesis by applying two 
                                                 
187 External validation is necessary to escape the trap of (1) accepting a historically-socially 
constructed interpretation on the sole basis of the theologian’s expertise, (2) asserting that the interpreter’s 
direct connection to God makes their interpretation by inference, true, (3) that validity is a disguised term 
for “use”—a valid interpretation is defined by its goal (i.e. a feminist interpretation is valid if it furthers 
feminist aims), or (4) that there is no legitimate way to validate anything. External validation assumes an 
underlying coherence to the nature of reality. The Christian community of faith believes a valid 
interpretation of one part of the Bible will be coherent with sound understanding of other parts of the Bible.  
188 Ricoeur saw interpretive conflict as fulfilling the role of falsification: “To the procedures of 
validation also belong procedures of invalidation similar to the criteria of falsifiability emphasized by Karl 
Popper in his Logic of Scientific Discovery. The role of falsification is played here by the conflict between 
competing interpretations.” Paul Ricoeur, The Model of the Text, 211-213. But as Hirsch points out, two 
disparate interpretations may have commensurate explanatory plausibility for the same text, without 
enough evidence to invalidate either one decisively. “Some of the ‘internal evidence’ can be generated only 
by a particular interpretation” and externally, “the interpreter is faced with the dilemma that some 
independent evident evidence favors one hypothesis, while other independent evidence favors its rival. This 
is the normal state of affairs in interpretation.” Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 181.  
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scientific methods with relevant sets of texts.189 To accomplish the latter, the Covenant 
Hypothesis must be distilled down to one specific variable for clarity in testing results.190  
One way to narrow a narrative hypothesis into a one-variable testable hypothesis 
is to articulate a hypothetical abductive question (A = abductive question) that is 
answered by the telling of the Aqedah narrative. Gadamer’s method for finding this 
abductive question is by envisioning the Aqedah as an historically appropriate answer to 
it.191 This means the abductive question must be answerable by a divine test of a human 
being, it must relate to God’s provision of Himself, it must relate to fear of God, it must 
require a concrete obedient human response to God in physical space and time, it must 
require an ethical worship and eschatological divine solution. Abraham Heschel’s 
abductive question (A) “What does God ask of us?”192 fits the above criteria. Heschel 
                                                 
189 The level of generality for an interpretive hypothesis of the Aqedah is stipulated by the 
anticipated scope of testing data. If the scope is limited to the pericope itself or by unambiguous references 
to the Aqedah, the hypothesis to be tested may remain specific and mainly descriptive. If the scope of 
testing data includes a class of other similar events based on the agent’s moral response to a divinely 
threatened demise in the canon, then the interpretive hypothesis must be postulated in a form that suggests 
proscriptive actions for the agent corresponding to Abraham’s role. Proscriptive recommendations are 
required for theological-ethical relevance to modern readers. 
190 The problem in using direct comparison of other narratives to prove the validity of one 
narrative interpretation is that one set of readers will focus on the similarities between them and another set 
of readers will counter by focusing on the discrepancies between them. In addition, within each set of 
readers, subsets will weigh the narrative particulars differently regarding their significance. Thus, 
narrowing down the interpretation to one unique conceptual contribution at a time is an attempt to make the 
process of validation more precise and straightforward. This dissertation will test two particulars of the 
Covenant Hypothesis by the canon.  
191 This process of articulating the presumed abductive question also allows the whole narrative to 
be understood in a relevant and deeper manner. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 363, 375-375. 
192 Abraham Heschel, Man is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion (New York, NY: The Noonday 
Press, 1979), 241. 
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believes what God desires from humans is ultimate commitment and ultimate 
reciprocity.193 This corresponds to the anchors of the Aqedah in the literary structure. In 
the Aqedah, Abraham demonstrated ultimate commitment and ultimate reciprocity to 
God in the three dialogues, to God twice (Abraham-Here I am) and to his son once (My 
father-Here I am, my son). 
That abductive question can be tapered further to pinpoint the one variable that 
distinguishes between the traditional anthropocentric hypotheses and the theocentric 
Covenant Hypothesis. The question becomes, “Faced with the specific test command to 
sacrifice Isaac in the Aqedah—what did God want Abraham to do?” The two options for 
the single variable are comply or solve. Now, the traditional hypotheses can be grouped 
and articulated as the default null hypothesis194 (H0) and the Covenant Hypothesis as the 
alternative hypothesis (H1) respectively:195 
“What does God want from Abraham?” 
H0: In the test, God commanded the sacrifice of Isaac and wanted Abraham to comply 
by being willing to sacrifice Isaac thereby ceding the covenant.  
                                                 
193 “It is now our task to define the Jewish conception of religion. As noted above, religion—its 
human side—begins with a sense of obligation, ‘with the awareness that something is being asked of us,’ 
with the consciousness of an ultimate commitment. It is furthermore an awareness of ‘God who sues for 
our devotion, constantly, persistently, who goes out to meet us as soon as we long to know Him.’ 
Accordingly, religious consciousness is to be characterized by two features—it must be a consciousness of 
an ultimate commitment and it must be a consciousness of ultimate reciprocity.” Abraham Heschel, Man is 
Not Alone, 241. 
194 The null hypothesis is not a derogatory term, it designates the default or original position. The 
alternative hypothesis usually refers to the new or proposed hypothesis. 
195 I acknowledge freely that whether the Aqedah test is approached from a literalistic compliance 
mindset or a covenant solution mindset, it was designed in such a way that almost all the covenant lessons 
(6 of 7) could be fulfilled by either approach of obedience except for the point of whether to destroy or try 
to save Isaac and the covenant. Thus, the two hypotheses will be articulated around this one point of stark 
difference.  
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H1: In the test, God commanded the sacrifice of Isaac and wanted Abraham to solve it 
by interceding for Isaac thereby embodying the covenant.  
Two of the most rigorous testing methods available196 are the positivist 
hypothetical-deductive method197 and post-positivist falsification method.198 An 
adaptation of these methods will be used to test the interpretive hypotheses by narratives 
and propositions of the canon, respectively. 
Tailoring the Hypotheses for Deductive and Falsification methods 
Hypothetico-deductive method: Predictives 
Since God never again directly commands a child sacrifice, the scope of selection 
for the set of canonical testing narratives cannot remain limited to identical premises. I 
                                                 
196 These two methods assume ontological objective reality exists. This metaphysical stance 
reflects the philosophical stance of the mainstream in my faith community of Seventh-day Adventists. 
197 The deductive method for testing rests on a positivist paradigm. It assumes a hypothesis is a 
true or untrue statement of a universally immutable reality and that logical deductive reasoning of its 
effects can be tested by empirical data which will prove it true or false, a binary conclusion. Egon G. Guba 
and Yvonna S. Lincoln, “Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research” in Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, eds. N. K. Denzin, Y. S. Lincoln (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994), 109-110; See also C. 
Mantzavinos, Naturalistic Hermeneutics, trans. Darrell Arnold (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) and Dagfinn Føllesdal, “Hermeneutics and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method,” Dialectica 
33, no. 3-4 (1979): 319-336. Where my application of the hypothetico-deductive method differs from 
Mantzavinos and Føllesdal is that they describe this method to be what interpreters usually do in 
ascertaining the best “fit” between several hypotheses to the original text under scrutiny, and I am using 
this method in a more stringent and objective manner by extracting deduced predictives from two 
competing hypotheses and testing them quantitatively against comparative narratives in the rest of the 
canon. In other words, if an interpretive hypothesis is a true understanding of this divinely set up situation, 
it should bear explanatory or predictive utility for other similar situations.    
198 Falsification is an example of post-positivist methodology. It assumes reality is independent of 
humans, but human grasp of that reality remains partial and incomplete. Thus, methods for knowledge can 
only approximate truth probabilistically. Falsification is an efficient way to apply the method of trial-and-
error to fallible hypotheses by destroying imperfect models upon the discovery of one basic fact that 
contradicts it. Guba, “Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research,” 110.  
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will need to expand the set to biblical situations where a covenant prophet/leader is 
informed of God’s impending threat toward His elect. As in the Aqedah, the focus will 
remain on the response of the covenant prophet/leader. These narratives can then be 
compared using the question “What did the prophet/leader do in those situations?” These 
considerations result in the deduced predictive hypotheses (HPr)199:  
H0Pr: Faced with a divine threat to the elect, 
a covenant prophet/leader complies with God’s command. 
 
H1Pr: Faced with a divine threat to the elect, 
a covenant prophet/leader intercedes with God’s command. 
Falsification method200: Sub-hypotheses and falsifiers 
For testing the interpretive hypotheses by propositions (prophetic utterances, 
laws, concepts from narratives) in the canon, our two hypotheses must be de-constructed 
                                                 
199 Deduced predictions are then compared to other biblical narratives of the same narrowed class 
using the quasi-inductive method. 
200 Karl Popper’s method of falsification seeks empirically basic statements contradictory to a 
proposed hypothesis to correct or negate it. Hypotheses that withstand the severest of tests are accepted, not 
as verified truth, but as statements closer to the truth than the ones which did not survive the testing ordeal. 
Thus, the search for truth is the willingness to be vulnerable to the hard facts of reality, to formulate 
superior conceptualizations of what is real and survive pruning by oppositional facts. Popper is very clear 
that empirical falsifiability only distinguishes what is scientific from what is not a scientific hypothesis. 
According to Popper, meaningful statements (religious, metaphysical, beliefs) may be true without having 
to be scientific or empirical (falsifiable). Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2002), 66-73. However, the question could still be asked, can Popper’s methods be 
appropriately applied in the human sciences? “While doubt can be raised as to whether the social sciences 
are empirical or non-empirical, Popper classed the social sciences as empirical.” Sylvain K. Cibangu, “Karl 
Popper and the Social Sciences” in Social Sciences and Cultural Studies, Asuncion Lopez-Varela, 
IntechOpen, DOI: 10.5772/38818, 24, accessed 19 October 2018, 
https://www.intechopen.com/books/social-sciences-and-cultural-studies-issues-of-language-public-opinion-
education-and-welfare/karl-popper-and-the-social-sciences. Because of the biblical principle of Tota 
Scriptura, Popper’s method of falsification can be used on a document that is interpreted as self-consistent 
by a faith community.  
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into succinct and clear sub-hypotheses.201 Then basic statements of falsification (called 
falsifiers) against each sub-hypotheses are formulated ahead of testing in order to remain 
as objective as possible. Finally, the application of the method of falsification is to search 
for texts that match specific falsifiers. The goal of this method is to eliminate faulty 
hypotheses.  
This test method of falsification is rarely used for biblical interpretation so it 
requires explanation. The usual method of justifying a biblical hypothesis is to gather 
supportive texts and argue inductively from them. Like the hermeneutical method, this 
form of justification is very vulnerable to confirmation bias. The number of supportive 
texts is in direct proportion to the usually unstated selection criteria. Also unstated is the 
yardstick for stretching textual implications in order to classify them as supportive. Since 
criteria are not made explicit, this supportive-inductive method requires another equally 
competent scholar or opponent of the hypothesis to filter the amassed texts and evaluate 
the legitimacy of the conclusions. The casual reader can only choose between opposing 
experts and evaluate their arguments as far as they can. This reflects the current methods 
used in the Aqedah literature to support conflicting interpretations.   
The testing method of falsification is far more efficient yet devastatingly harsh 
because it actively searches for one clear contradictory text to destroy the interpretive 
                                                 
201 The Aristotelian method of reductionistic dividing or deconstructing the ‘whole’ into its ‘parts’ 
so they can be understood in structural terms is employed here to the hypotheses to make them amendable 
to the falsification method of contradiction. The reconstruction of the testing results may provide a deeper 
understanding and explanation for the original ‘whole.’ See Tom Butler, “Towards a Hermeneutic Model,” 
290. 
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hypothesis as invalid.202 Even if the current application of the Popperian method in this 
dissertation fails to deliver the vaunted “death blow” to a hypothesis,203 this method is 
useful for clarifying the underlying assumptive beliefs for preferring a certain hypothesis. 
                                                 
202 The use of a falsifier from outside the pericope to threaten an interpretive hypothesis of the 
chosen pericope is not logical unless there is a crucial common denominator shared by both. In this case the 
common denominator is the source of the assertion and the body of work. God is presumed to be self-
consistent in character, holy and benevolent, the same entity throughout the canon. Therefore, a theo-
centric interpretive hypothesis can be tested by the canon. In addition, the canon is assumed to be self-
coherent.  
203 Hirsch is doubtful that direct falsification will work with most texts. “In the historical sciences 
such a result can seldom be achieved because decisive, falsifying data cannot be generated at will, and if 
such data had already been known, the two hypotheses would not have been in serious competition. 
Sometimes, of course, decisive data does by good fortune turn up, but usually neither competing hypothesis 
can be falsified, and both continue after their separate fashions to account for the evidence.” Hirsch, 
Validity in Interpretation, 181.  
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Both Aqedah hypotheses204 will be analyzed into their sub-hypotheses and potential 
falsifiers below. 
H0: In the test, God commanded the sacrifice of Isaac and wanted Abraham to comply 
with it by being willing to sacrifice Isaac thereby ceding the covenant. 
  Sub-hypotheses: 
1. Divine commands are identical to the divine will.  
2. Obedience requires exact compliance.  
  H0 Canonical Falsifiers: 
1. God never commanded child sacrifice.  
2. God doesn’t will child sacrifice. 
3. Covenantal intercession is obedience. 
 
H1: In the test, God commanded the sacrifice of Isaac and wanted Abraham to solve it by 
mediating for Isaac thereby embodying the covenant. 
  Sub-hypotheses: 
1. Divine commands are not always identical to the divine will.  
2. Obedience requires covenantal compliance.  
  H1 Canonical Falsifiers: 
1. God commands child sacrifice. 
2. God wills child sacrifice. 
3. Exact compliance is obedience.  
 
                                                 
204 “After having produced some criticism of a rival theory, we should always make a serious 
attempt to apply this or a similar criticism to our own theory.” Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery, 65 fn1. 
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The next phase of Judgment submits these forms to the norm of the canon (Tota 
Scriptura) for testing. However, before testing starts, a brief exposition of the rationale 
for using the canon as a unit for testing a singular narrative in one of the books is needed.  
Rationale for canonical testing  
Interpretive hypotheses of literary texts, statistics, history or Scripture face a 
unique hurdle for judgment. Deductive predictions and empirically reliable (in the sense 
of reproducible) results are extractable from subsequent experiments in natural science 
but they are not accessible from unique events or texts. Instead, textual or evidential data 
must be used quasi-inductively205 to validate or invalidate206 them. The testing of texts 
requires other texts which are similar enough to be relevant and considered part of the 
same set, but different enough to be useful for comparative evaluation. Thus, not any text 
is appropriate for testing another.  
When the source of the testing data comes from outside the initial text, the 
interpreter must justify that source as a legitimate norm for the original text under 
                                                 
205 “In his early study in confirmation, Hempel advanced the thesis that as a rule, theories using 
theoretical terms do not yield observational predictions from finite observational reports without ‘quasi-
inductive’ steps of reasoning.” Ilkka Niiniluoto and Raimo Toumela, Theoretical Concepts and 
Hypothetico-Inductive Inference (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1973), 211. Hempel reserved the term 
inductive to refer to the development of a new hypothesis from observation data and used the term quasi-
inductive to refer to the testing stage or confirmation/disconfirmation of certain hypothesis—where an 
observation (part) is related to an already stated hypothesis (whole), even if that observation was initially 
deductively predicted by the hypothesis. Carl G. Hempel, “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation (II.),” 
Mind 54, no. 214 (April 1945): 101.  
206 Howard Sankey, “Scientific Method” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, 
eds. Martin Curd and Stathis Psillos (London, UK: Routledge, 2014), 284-286. “To verify is to show that a 
conclusion is true; to validate is to show that a conclusion is probably true on the basis of what is known.” 
E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 171. 
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scrutiny. “Validity requires a norm—a meaning that is stable and determinate no matter 
how broad its range of implication and application.”207 Since an interpretation of a 
biblical narrative is aimed at serving the community of faith, the norm of that faith 
community provides a natural standard for legitimacy. Faith communities refer to a canon 
for orthodoxy and the Christian community’s canon includes the Hebrew Bible and the 
New Testament, a demarcated class of normative texts. From that canon we can extract a 
class of texts to test the hypotheses.208 Using the criteria mentioned in the previous 
subsections, the Christian canon will be used to test the Covenant Hypothesis of the 
Aqedah.  
Application of Hypothetical-Deductive Method 
The criteria for testing texts will require these three elements: God (or divine-like 
representative), an individual covenant prophet/leader, and a serious threat (mortality or 
divine abandonment) of the elect. Each narrative will be summarized with intertextual 
Aqedah resonances in italics to provide justifying context for their inclusion and insight 
into human behavior. Each human response will be classified as H0Pr (compliance) 
                                                 
207 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 126. 
208 What is the basis for narrowing down texts? Hirsch explains his criteria: “The more we know 
about the object, the narrower and more reliable we can make the class. Then, on the basis of what we 
know about other individuals belonging to the same class, we make a guess that the unknown traits of any 
object will be the same as the corresponding traits of most individuals in the class—more often than not. . . 
. the task of narrowing the class entails the ferreting out of as much detailed information as possible. 
Evidence from other works by the same author; evidence from all his works is less weighty than evidence 
from his works similar to the one at hand; evidence from all similar works by the author is less weighty 
than evidence taken from this similar work composed at the same period as the text under scrutiny, and so 
on, mutatis mutandis, for other class-defining traits.” Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 188.  Thus, the 
relative weight of the testing data is in direct proportion to its narrowness of class (internal linguistic and 
thematic similarities and external factors such as author, timing, genre, proximity). 
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and/or H1Pr (intercession). As a reminder, the two predictive hypotheses with the 
narrowed class of relevant narratives for testing are 
H0Pr: Faced with a divine threat to the elect,  
       a covenant prophet/leader complies with God’s command.  
 
H1Pr: Faced with a divine threat to the elect, 
       a covenant prophet/leader intercedes with God’s command. 
The selected list of testing narratives from the Christian Canon are: 
 (1) Jacob wrestling with divine angel—Gen 32:22-31. 
 (2) Judah before Joseph as Prime Minister—Gen 44:14-34.  
 (3) Moses on Mt. Sinai—Exo 20:18-21; 32:7-14. 
 (4) Jephthah and his only daughter—Judg 11:30-39. 
 (5) David and Bathsheba’s firstborn—2 Sam 12:14-23. 
 (6) David on Mt. Moriah—2 Sam 24.    
 (7) Jesus in Gethsemane—Matt 26:36-46. 
 
(1) Jacob wrestling with divine angel, Gen 32:22-31. God had covenantally 
promised Jacob at Bethel, “Behold, I am with you and will keep you wherever you go 
and will bring you back to this land. For I will not leave you until I have done what I 
have promised you” (Gen 28:15). But after wrestling with Jacob at the River Jabbok and 
proving he was divine by incapacitating Jacob’s hip, his divine antagonist said, “Let me 
go, for the day has broken.” God commanded relinquishment of Himself which 
contradicts His previous covenant promise to not leave Jacob. Jacob replied, “I will not 
let you go unless you bless me.” Jacob did not comply but pleadingly held on,209 exerting 
                                                 
209 A disabled hip socket incapacitates any ability to walk or kneel, thus Jacob was probably 
prostrate on the ground, clinging to the lowest part of his antagonist’s body to keep him from leaving, most 
likely an ankle. The poetic irony is that Jacob the heel-grabber of Esau at birth, who had always wanted to 
be Esau instead of Jacob—thereby idolizing his brother and grasping for Esau’s firstborn privileges, is now 
finally (through divinely inflicted injury) relegated to grasping the actual heel of God, the One he was 
always meant to grab onto.  
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a personal intercession for himself to get God’s blessing and he obtained it. Then he 
seemingly complied and let the angel go, afterward. This validates both H0Pr and H1Pr in 
reverse sequence, intercession then compliance. 
(2) Judah before Joseph as Prime Minister, Gen 44:14-34.210 Joseph is a source of 
food and authority in god-like fashion relative to his brothers. Because Judah has pledged 
himself as Benjamin’s safety, when Joseph commands Benjamin to remain as his servant, 
Judah pleads with a Aqedah-like tale of an aged father losing his only son (ignoring the 
many half-brothers) and offers himself in Benjamin’s stead. Joseph relents and reconciles 
with the family. Because Judah loved his father, he chose mediation and self-sacrifice 
instead of compliance and was successful. This validates H1Pr for intercession and adds 
the component of self-substitution for the victim. 
(3) Moses on Mt. Sinai, Exo 20:18-21; 32:7-14. Mt. Sinai is where Israel is tested 
corporately at its base and Moses is tested individually at its summit. But the people were 
afraid and begged Moses to be their mediator. Moses said to the people, ‘Do not fear, for 
God has come to test you, that the fear of him may be before you, that you may not sin.’” 
Leaving them, and going up alone, “Moses drew near to the thick darkness where God 
was.” While Moses was gone the Israelites worshipped idols. God threatened, “Now 
therefore let me alone, that my wrath may burn hot against them and I may consume 
them, in order that I may make a great nation of you.” But Moses implored, “Remember 
                                                 
210 The many shared linguistic and thematic links between this story of Judah’s pleading and the 
Aqedah are: “father, an old man,” “the child of his old age,” “two sons,” “he alone is left . . . and his father 
loves him,” “I may set my eyes on him,” “if he should leave his father, his father would die,” “one left me 
and I said, ‘surely he has been torn to pieces,’” “his life is bound up in the boy’s life.” 
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Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, your servants, to whom you swore by your own self, and said 
to them, “I will multiply your offspring as the stars of heaven, and all this land that I 
have promised I will give to your offspring, and they shall inherit it forever.’ And the 
Lord relented. Recalling the Aqedah where God had sworn by Himself, Moses had 
interceded successfully. Then Moses went down and punished them, complying with 
God’s will to eradicate idolatry. So Moses’ response encompassed both H0Pr and H1Pr in 
reverse sequence, intercession with God followed by compliance.211 
(4) Jephthah and his only daughter, Judg 11:30-39. Jephthah promised God on his 
own initiative to sacrifice the first thing that came out of his home if God would grant 
him victory. His daughter was the first and with her consent (neither realizing this rash 
vow could be repented of with a sin offering: Lev 5:4-6) he “did with her according to his 
vow that he had made.” Jephthah complied, though it was his own rash vow that set up 
the trap. This story is quite unusual in that H0Pr compliance is demonstrated without 
intercession. There is general consensus among Jewish rabbis that this choice of 
compliance by Jephthah was unfortunate and considered non-exemplary in contrast to 
Abraham’s compliance in the Aqedah.212 
(5) David and Bathsheba’s firstborn, 2 Sam 12:14-23. As punishment for adultery, 
God caused the baby of David and Bathsheba’s from their affair to have a terminal 
                                                 
211 It seems the Israelites didn’t allow themselves to be tested by God. Since they did not submit to 
the testing, they did not allow God to put the Fear of God before them for they sinned against Him within 
forty days by idolatry.   
212 “The Rabbis concluded also that Jephthah was an ignorant man, else he would have known that 
a vow of that kind is not valid; according to R. Johanan, Jephthah had merely to pay a certain sum to the 
sacred treasury of the Temple in order to be freed from the vow; according to R. Simeon ben Laḳish, he 
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illness. “David therefore sought God on behalf of the child. And David fasted and went in 
and lay all night on the ground” (v. 16). But after the baby died, David washed, 
worshipped, then ate, explaining, “While the child was still alive, I fasted and wept, for I 
said, ‘Who knows whether the Lord will be gracious to me, that the child may live?’ But 
now he is dead. Why should I fast? Can I bring him back again? I shall go to him, but he 
will not return to me” (vv. 22-23). David mediated but when not successful, he was fully 
compliant (instead of resentful, despairing or angry, as his servants expected). He 
worshipped and accepted the consequences of his failure at mediation. This supports both 
H0Pr  and H1Pr in reverse order, intercession then compliance.  
(6) David on Mt. Moriah, 2 Sam 24 and 1 Chron 21. David took a census then 
recognized he had sinned. Of three options for punishment, David chose three days of 
pestilence. But when Jerusalem was to be struck by the destroying angel, “the Lord 
relented from the calamity and commanded the angel, ‘It is enough; now stay your 
hand.’” David saw the angel and said, “Behold, I have sinned, and I have done wickedly. 
But these sheep, what have they done? Please let your hand be against me and against my 
father's house.” God directed David to sacrifice on the threshing floor of Araunah where 
David “built there an altar to the Lord and offered burnt offerings and peace offerings. So 
the Lord responded to the plea for the land, and the plague was averted from Israel.” The 
angel then placed the sword of destruction back into its sheath, responding to David’s 
                                                 
was free even without such a payment (Gen. R. l.c.; comp. Lev. R. xxxvii. 3).” Emil Hirsch, Jewish 
Encyclopedia, s.v. “Jephthah (חתפי),” accessed 17 April 2019, 
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/8584-jephthah. 
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plea. David was called a “man after my [God’s] own heart” (1 Sam 13:14, Acts 13:22). 
Solomon later chose “to build the temple of the LORD in Jerusalem on Mount Moriah, 
where the LORD had appeared to his father David. It was on the threshing floor of 
Araunah the Jebusite, the place provided by David” (2 Chron 3:1). Intercessory offer of 
self-sacrifice followed by compliant burnt and peace offerings where the Lord had 
appeared marks the place for YHWH’s temple. This validates both H0Pr and H1Pr in 
reverse order, self-sacrificial intercession followed by compliance with burnt offerings.213 
(7) Jesus in Gethsemane, Matt 26:36-46. Jesus left most of his disciples at a spot, 
saying “Sit here, while I go over there and pray” (v. 36). Taking three disciples, he 
shared, “My soul is very sorrowful, even to death; remain here, and watch with me” (v. 
38). Going a little further he prayed, “My Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from 
me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as you will” (v. 39). The second prayer was, “My 
Father, if this cannot pass unless I drink it, your will be done” (v. 42). The third prayer 
was “the same words again” (v. 44). Then he resolutely set himself upon the unavoidable 
path to his death on the cross, “See, the hour is at hand, and the Son of Man is betrayed 
into the hands of sinners. Rise let us be going; see, my betrayer is at hand” (v. 45-46). 
Jesus demonstrates a unique fusion of mediation and compliance together in his prayer, 
undergirded by his willing self-sacrifice as the Lamb of God. This validates both H0Pr 
and H1Pr but instead of the sequence of intercession followed by compliance as in the 
                                                 
213 The last verse acts like a postscript on the event by telling the reader that the tabernacle was in 
Gibeon at this time “But David was not able to go there to inquire of God, because he was terrified by the 
drawn sword of the angel of the Lord” (I Chron 21:30). It seems the Fear of God was instilled by the 
angel’s appearance to David at Mount Moriah. 
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previous examples, Jesus blends both of them in one seamless supplication, his 
intercession is mingled with compliance all the way through and ends with offering 
himself as the sacrificial victim who pays the ultimate price with his life. 
Results of Deductive Method 
Out of the seven selected narratives, six of them (1, 2 , 3, 5, 6, 7) validate 
intercession as part of the obedient response of a covenant prophet/leader. Five cases (1, 
3, 5, 6, 7) demonstrate both responses, first intercession then compliance. In addition to 
intercession, three (2, 6, 7) offer themselves in substitution for the victims, and two (6, 7) 
offer sacrificial offerings. Jesus (7) seamlessly combines all the components: intercession 
and compliance, substitution and self-sacrificial offering in His response. The results 
indicate that intercession is a biblically allowable response to an Aqedah-like situation 
with Jesus embodying and integrating all the possibilities in His exemplary redemptive 
response.   
Application of Falsification Method 
Falsification requires only one214 basic text per falsifier to undermine either 
interpretive hypotheses, H0 and H1.  
H0: In the test, God commanded the sacrifice of Isaac and wanted Abraham to 
comply by being willing to sacrifice Isaac thereby ceding the covenant. 
                                                 
214 “We shall take it as falsified only if we discover a reproducible effect which refutes the 
theory.” When asked how often an effect has to be reproduced in order to quality as a reproducible effect, 
Popper answered, “The answer is: in some cases not even once.” Popper offered the example that the 
assertion “that there is a family of white ravens in the New York Zoo” can be tested in principle, even if 
that bird family is deceased, by appealing to “witnesses, documents, etc.; that is to say, by appealing to 
other intersubjectively testable and reproducible facts.” Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 66, 
67 fn1.  
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Sub-hypotheses: 
a. Divine commands are identical to the divine will. 
b. Obedience is exact compliance. 
H0 Falsifiers with corresponding text. 
1.God never commanded child sacrifice.  
Jer 7:31 And they have built the high places of Topheth, which is in the 
Valley of the Son of Hinnom, to burn their sons and their 
daughters in the fire, which I did not command, nor did it come 
into my mind. 
2.God never wills obedient child sacrifice. 
Deut 12:31 You shall not worship the Lord your God in that way, for 
every abominable thing that the Lord hates they have done for 
their gods, for they even burn their sons and their daughters in 
the fire to their gods. 
3.  Covenantal intercession is obedience. 
Exod 32:9-14 Now therefore, let Me alone, that My wrath may burn hot 
against them and I may consume them. And I will make of you a 
great nation.”11 Then Moses pleaded with the Lord his God, and 
said: “Lord, why does Your wrath burn hot against Your people 
whom You have brought out of the land of Egypt with great 
power and with a mighty hand? . . . 14 So the Lord relented from 
the harm which He said He would do to His people. 
H1: In the test, God commanded the sacrifice of Isaac and wanted Abraham to 
solve it by mediating for Isaac thereby embodying the covenant. 
 
Sub-hypotheses: 
a. Divine commands are not identical to the divine will. 
b. Obedience is covenantal compliance.  
H1 Falsifiers with corresponding text. 
1. God commands child sacrifice. 
Ezek 20:25-26 Moreover, I gave them statutes that were not good and 
rules by which they could not have life, And I defiled them 
through their very gifts in their offering up all their firstborn, that 
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I might devastate them. I did it that they might know that I am 
the Lord.  
2. God wills child sacrifice. 
Ezek 20:26 And I defiled them through their very gifts in their offering 
up all their firstborn, that I might devastate them. I did it that 
they might know that I am the Lord. 
3. Obedience is exact compliance. 
Jer 7:16 As for you, do not pray for this people, or lift up a cry or prayer 
for them, and do not intercede with me, for I will not hear you. 
 
Results of Falsification Method  
The search for falsifying texts has been too successful, the texts seemingly 
contradict each other. How can the texts regarding God’s relation to child sacrifice be 
reconciled? One way to approach the problem carefully is to consider the nature of the 
apparent contradiction. Logical contradictions are not the same as operational 
contradictions. Logical contradictions are absolute abstracted statements of a mutually 
exclusive or self-cancelling nature (e.g., A is not non-A) and Karl Popper is correct to say 
that for formal logical contradictions, elimination of one or the other is necessary in the 
pursuit of an adequate hypothesis.215 Operational contradictions function in the real world 
                                                 
215 “Theories are put forth tentatively and tried out. If the outcome of a test shows the theory is 
erroneous, then it is eliminated: the method of trial and error is essentially a method of elimination: the 
method of trial and error is essentially a method of elimination. Its success depends mainly on three 
conditions, namely, that sufficient numerous (and ingenious) theories should be offered, that the theories 
offered should be sufficiently varied, and that sufficiently severe tests should be made. In this way we may, 
if we are lucky, secure the survival of the fittest theory by the elimination of those which are less fit.” Karl 
Popper, “What is Dialectic?” in Conjectures and Refutations (London, UK: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1963), 313. The remaining hypotheses left standing may not be true or accurate, but they are probably 
closer to the accurate truth if they have withstood the pruning method of falsification. 
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of space, time, living entities and include intersubjective perceptions, commands, wants, 
and reactions. Operational contradictions may be contrastive sides or aspects of one 
thing, they may turn out to be complementary, situation specific, inquiry conditioned, or 
perspective/value laden (e.g., light is a particle/wave).216 Canonical texts refer to a divine 
dynamic agency operating intersubjectively with humans in a real world through the 
medium of human language. This means apparent contradictions may turn out to be 
paradoxes in which seeming opposites are theoretically related and/or resolvable. 
Since elimination of any part of the canonical norm (Total Scriptura) is 
unacceptable for constructing whole biblical truth and the divine self-revelatory texts 
regarding child sacrifice indicate contrastive meanings, dialectic reasoning217 may help us 
grasp all that the Bible reveals. Each set of falsifying texts happens to support the 
opposite hypothesis, so the headings can be switched without changing the meaning or 
supporting logic and the textual meanings can be grouped accordingly. This gives the sets 
below. 
Theocentric Covenant Hypothesis: Jer 7:31; Deut 12:31; Exod 32:9-14 
1. God never commanded child sacrifice, 
2. The thought of child sacrifice never came into His mind,  
                                                 
216 Berry Groisman, “What is Dialectic? Some Remarks on Popper’s Criticism,” PhilSci Archive, 
[preprint] (2007), accessed 4 April 2019, http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3980.    
217 Here, I use the term dialectic reasoning for the logical endeavor to reconcile two seemingly 
contrastive points into a coherent whole in order to remain faithful to the whole of revealed divine 
revelation. This term is not meant to ascribe to the presuppositions of dialectic theology or dialectic 
philosophy (Hegel) with the connotations of evolutionary progress, irreconcilable or compromising 
metaphysical negations of truth. See Paul Tillich, “What is wrong with the ‘Dialectic’ Theology?” The 
Journal of Religion XV, no. 2 (April 1935): 127-145; David W. Congdon, The Mission of 
Demythologizing: Rudolf Bultmann’s Dialectical Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2015); 
Christophe Chalamet, Dialectical Theologians: Wilhelm Herrmann, Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann 
(Zürich, CH: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 2005).   
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3. God hates child sacrifice,  
4. God accepts mediation and relents from destroying His elect. 
 
Anthropocentric Null Hypothesis: Ezek 20:25-26, Jer 7:16 
1. God gave them bad laws of child sacrifice, 
2. God defiled them through child sacrifice, 
3. God devastated them, so they might know He is the Lord, 
4. God forbade intercession, saying He will not listen 
Focus on the type of verbs utilized suggests a direction for dialectic synthesis. 
A. Theocentric Covenant Hypothesis-aligned texts use expressive verbs: the first three 
texts use verbs that refer to God’s inner being (emotion, will, thought, responsive 
forgiveness). God Himself hates, never required, never harbored child sacrifice in 
his mind and responds to intercession by relenting from human destruction.  
B. Anthropocentric Null Hypothesis-aligned texts use instrumental verbs: The last 
texts use verbs of divine interaction with recalcitrant wicked humans (gave, defiled, 
forbade, devastated) with the motive to turn them back to Him. God gave them bad 
laws, defiled them through child sacrifice, forbade intercession, devastated them—
so that “they might know that I am the Lord.”  
A possible conclusion to the dialectic analysis of these falsifier texts is that child 
sacrifice is against God’s nature and is not expressive of who He is, yet God reserves the 
freedom and right to employ alien rituals if necessary for desperate salvific ends. Divine 
freedom is a challenge for human minds to understand. Now that the Covenant 
Hypothesis has demonstrated validity in respect to canonical testing, we now turn to the 
valuation or relevance of the validated Covenant Hypothesis for the Aqedah.  
Criticism 
Through the centuries, it has been the paradoxical nature of the Aqedah test that 
has continued to fascinate and repel great thinkers. Chrysostom saw the central issue in 
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the Aqedah to be “God contradicts God, faith the faith, the command the promise.”218 
Martin Luther219 and John Calvin220 highlighted the divine paradox in God’s words versus 
His previous words. For them, the human duty was to have faith that God would resolve 
His own mystery while complying with the divine test command.221 Immanuel Kant 
moved the paradox to the human reception of the divine command and solved it by 
rejection since he doubted the veracity of the divine source due to the immorality of the 
test command.222 Soren Kierkegaard moved the paradox within humans as the paradox of 
authentic faith, a subjective double movement223 of full resignation to God yet fully 
expecting God to grant it back in this lifetime.224 According to Kierkegaard, Abraham’s 
                                                 
218 Kreuzer, “Das Opfer des Vaters—die Gefährdung des Sohnes: Genesis 22,” 64.  
219 “Abraham was actually tempted by God Himself, not concerning a woman, gold, silver, death, 
or life but concerning a contradiction of Holy Scripture. Here God is clearly contradicting Himself; for how 
do these statements agree: ‘Through Isaac shall your descendants be named’ (Gen 21:12) and ‘Take your 
son, and sacrifice Him’?” Luther’s Works: American Edition, 55 vols. General Editors: Jaroslav Pelikan, 
vols. 1-30; Helmut T. Lehmann, vols. 31-55 (Philadelphia, PA: Concordia and Fortress Press, 1955-1976) 
4:92.  
220 “His mind, however, must of necessity have been severely crushed, and violently agitated, 
when the command and the promise of God were conflicting within him. But when he had come to the 
conclusion, that the God with whom he knew he had to do, could not be his adversary; although he did not 
immediately discover how the contradiction might be removed, he nevertheless, by hope, reconciled the 
command with the promise; because, being indubitably persuaded that God was faithful, he left the 
unknown issue to Divine Providence.” John Calvin, Commentaries on the First Book of Moses, Genesis 
22:1-24. 
221 Jon Balserak, “Luther, Calvin, and Musculus on Abraham’s Trial,” 362.  
222 Kreuzer, “Das Opfer des Vaters—die Gefährdung des Sohnes: Genesis 22,” 65. 
223 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 85.  
224 “Abraham did not renounce his claim on Isaac, through faith he received Isaac.” Kierkegaard, 
Fear and Trembling, 77. 
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faith goes beyond universal ethical rationality, exemplifying a “teleological suspension of 
the ethical.”225 Martin Buber, who lived through the atrocities of the Hitler regime, 
strongly disagreed with any ‘suspension of the ethical’ because he believed it objectified 
humans: “In the realm of Moloch honest men lie and compassionate men torture.”226 
Emmanuel Levinas joined Martin Buber in moving beyond Kierkegaard’s “excessive, 
isolated, and violent self-encapsulation” of Abraham as the particularized soul traveling 
in existential anguish up Moriah. Levinas sees Abraham recapturing meaning at the 
mountaintop by listening to the angel and dropping the knife in the sacred space of 
ethical intersubjective relation: “Abraham’s attentiveness to the voice that led him back 
to the ethical order, in forbidding him to perform a human sacrifice, is the highest point 
of the drama.”227  
Many of these Aqedah interpretations would be classed by Hirsch in the category 
of theological or philosophical critiques, not interpretations, for they discuss the 
significance of the Aqedah to contemporary concerns. Their contribution lies in drawing 
out aspects of the Aqedah228 that illuminate the limits, challenges, and struggles in the life 
                                                 
225 The teleological suspension of the ethical does not mean to discard the ethical for “what is said 
to be suspended in this sense is not forfeited but preserved in something higher, the latter being precisely its 
telos.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 83.  
226 Kreuzer, “Das Opfer des Vaters—die Gefährdung des Sohnes: Genesis 22,” 66. 
227 Laurence Bove, “Unbinding the Other: Levinas, the Akedah, and going beyond the Subject” in 
Interpreting Abraham: Journeys to Moriah, eds. Bradley Beach, Matthew T. Powell (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2014), 179. “Levinas says Kierkegaard did not go far enough in the story. . . ‘That he [Abraham] 
obeyed the first voice is astonishing: that he had sufficient distance with respect to that obedience to hear 
the second voice—that is the essential.” Ibid., 171.  
228 Different interpretive trends arise from different communities. “Jewish and Christian 
interpretation, which is completely or overwhelmingly positive in its judgment, is confronted by a 
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of faith. Most of them assume the paradox of the test command is a hidden divine 
mystery, accordingly, they focus mainly on the human response to the puzzling trial. 
Because the focus remains mainly on Abraham’s response to God229 these can be 
considered anthropocentric approaches. At first glance, this may not seem fair for they 
demonstrate the importance of Abraham’s compliance to a clear divine command to 
sacrifice Isaac, only differing from each other in the human virtue it demonstrates (love, 
fear of God, obedience, resurrection hope, morality, faith, absurd fidelity, etc.). But 
extreme compliance is not instrinsically a moral virtue. Absolute compliance is a wax 
nose that can serve any chosen god. Where interpreters may have veered wrong in their 
understanding of the Aqedah is in interpreting God’s praise of Abraham’s obedience 
through the filter of anthropocentric interpretations of Abraham’s test actions that 
assumes everything he did was correct. 
A theocentric interpretation of the Aqedah does the opposite. It interprets the 
nature of Abraham’s obedience that is praised by God through God’s own interpretation 
                                                 
passionate condemnation by enlightened humanism. . . . There is also an important difference of opinion, 
though nowhere near so great, within the exegesis which takes a positive view of the narrative, that is 
between Jewish and Christian interpretation. Christian exegesis sees the crucial point of the narrative in 
what happens between God and Abraham; so Luther, Kierkegaard, and von Rad following them; Jewish 
exegesis on the contrary sees it in what happens between God, Abraham, and Isaac. This is particularly 
obvious when the Jewish exegesis speaks of the Akedah . . . what is essential is the concrete event, whereas 
the Christian interpretation looks to a spiritual happening between God and man.” Westermann, Genesis 
12-36, 354. 
229 It is not only traditional interpretations that ignore Isaac, Kafka and Derrida offer modern 
reflections on the Aqedah that do the same. See Interpreting Abraham, eds. Bradley Beach and Matthew 
Powell (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014), 149-212.   
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of Abraham’s test actions. This is how a proper test works. The Tester’s evaluation is 
what counts, not the testee’s or the spectators’ guesses.  
The theocentric approach embraced the divinely provided interpretation of vv. 15-
18 as the Aqedah answer key that disclosed the divine purpose of the Aqedah by evoking 
the covenant revelations. Then the alignment of the test design and the test interpretation 
revealed the Aqedah to be a challenge test of Abraham’s covenant identity. The Aqedah 
was a covenant crisis divinely designed to elicit230 an integrated covenantal response from 
Abraham that would lead to the grace-filled solution of a divinely provided ram. Though 
Abraham initially believed the test solution was the resurrection, “because the ram 
appears and the angel cancels the sacrifice, the resurrection of Isaac becomes 
unnecessary. As Genesis 22 proceeds, the solution to the contradiction between command 
and promise shifts from resurrection to ram.”231 It is significant that the ram remains the 
capstone of the Covenant Hypothesis. 
With all this in mind, does the Covenant Hypothesis resolve the paradoxes posed 
in the Justification section of chapter one?232 They were: (1) God’s test command to 
immolate Isaac appears to nullify all previous commands and covenant promises. 
Because the divine test was designed to elicit from Abraham a comprehensive paternal 
                                                 
230 According to Austin’s speech-act theory, “Saying something will often, or even normally, 
produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the 
speaker, or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them.” 
John Austin, How to do Things with Words, 101. 
231 Elizabeth Palmer, Faith in the Hidden God, 106.  
232 These are found on pages 10-12. 
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covenant response including an authentic, heartfelt, prophetic intercession, this required 
the test method of posing an authentic threat to the covenant and Isaac. (2) The two divine 
commands (to offer him up and to not do anything to him) concerning Isaac appear to 
contradict each other. As analyzed in this chapter, the two divine commands do not 
contradict each other for the angel of YHWH merely proscribes the direct method of 
sacrificing Isaac through harming him. The sacrifice of Isaac was always intended to be 
accomplished indirectly through the divinely provided ram representing Isaac. (3) The 
apex of the chiasm echoes Abraham’s response toward his human son, not God. The 
essence of the covenant relationship between God and Abraham was to be reflected in 
Abraham’s relationship to Isaac. Ethics is to reflect theology. God’s ram as His 
representative to substitute for Isaac in sacrifice embodies the paternal responsiveness at 
the apex of the chiasm, “Here I am, my son,” which verbally captures the epitome of 
parental love as ultimate responsiveness to meet the needs of the vulnerable. (4) God 
clearly praises Abraham for listening and obeying the voice of the Lord yet the actual 
solution to the test and the final obedient act of accepting and sacrificing the ram in the 
place of Isaac does not match a verbal substitutionary command in the text. Because the 
divinely provided ram sacrifice in the Aqedah is not linked to a divine verbal command 
yet the divine commendation refers to Abraham obeying God’s voice, this suggests an 
expanded scope for God’s “voice” beyond verbal and auditory communication. 
Nevertheless, the Covenant Hypothesis may have a historical-critical Achille’s 
heel. A historical consensus has existed among source-critical scholars that the divine 
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speech of vv. 15-18 is a late editorial addition.233 Moberly recognizes this textual 
problem234 while retaining his final focus for meaning on the given form of the Aqedah. 
Moberly and I both agree that the last monologue fulfills a finalizing function in the 
Aqedah and has underutilized explanatory potential. He believes it is a later addition to 
the original narrative that has been reframed as God’s voice, but I, with an ever growing 
                                                 
233 “There is no agreement, however, whether this represents the consistent work of just one or two 
editors, or whether this was a process extended over several centuries of editorial moulding of the 
patriarchal traditions. . . . there is simply insufficient evidence available to allow any definitive resolution 
of date and context, surmises about which must necessarily remain hypothetical, any interpretation which 
substantively depends on relating the text to a historical context must itself be for ever [sic] tentative and 
hypothetical.” Moberly, “The Earliest Commentary on the Akedah,” 304, 312. Westermann classifies vv. 
15-18 to be an addition because “there are generally several promises together which do not correspond to 
the situation narrated.” Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 112. The Covenant Hypothesis provides powerful 
evidence to the contrary. Von Rad accepts that elements of the Aqedah “went through many stages of 
internal revision, whose material was, so to speak, in motion up to the end.” Von Rad, Genesis, 243. 
234 Moberly presents his reasons for seeing the divine last speech (vv. 15-18) as a later addition. 
They are: three concerns of the test are resolved prior to the last speech (obedience, child sacrifice, seeing-
providing), the last speech seems displaced as it comes after Abraham’s name for the site instead of before 
it, its style and vocabulary are different from the rest of the story. Moberly, “The Earliest Commentary on 
the Akedah,” 304-308. The Covenant Hypothesis posits one overriding purpose for the test (covenant 
identity/character) with multiple subsegments (love, faith, obedience, morality, 7 covenant lessons), so 
prior resolution of several subsegments is not unexpected before the test finally ends with a comprehensive 
interpretation given afterward. Moberly’s preferred order—ram sacrifice (v.13), last speech (vv.15-18), 
naming of site (v. 14)—reflects a preference for a modern conventional order of resolution which is 
anachronistic to impose on an ancient text. The Covenant Hypothesis recognizes the linguistic style of the 
first and second angelic speeches to be alike, as does the historical critical scholar Omri Boehm, but doesn’t 
excise one (as Moberly and historical critical scholars do) or both (as Boehm does) out of the narrative as 
later additions. Instead, their dramatic differences in style support their unique functions in the narrative as 
the mid-test corrective with titrated praise and the comprehensive evaluation of the test through covenant 
credits/blessings. 
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number of scholars,235 believe this may be part of the original story and is what it claims 
to be, a divine interpretation.  
There may be many more interpretive layers to uncover in the Aqedah.236 The 
Covenant Hypothesis is only one step in the long neglected direction of a theocentric 
intepretation of the Aqedah. As an interpretive option for understanding the Aqedah, the 
three conceptual strengths of the Covenant Hypothesis are: it adopts the given test 
paradigm more fully in explicating the narrative, it is theocentric in orientation, and it is 
resolutely faithful to the Abrahamic covenant context for understanding the Aqedah. 
Conclusion 
This chapter of meso-hermeneutics focused on a theological text interpretation of 
the Aqedah. To do this, meso-hermeneutics related the findings of the world in the text 
(illuminated by micro-hermeneutics) to the worlds of meaning behind (Abraham’s 
covenant journey) and in front of it (canonical testing by later narratives and 
propositions). In addition, the role of the interpreter, who is present on every level of the 
spiral model, was carefully explicated and operational locations were clarified for the 
                                                 
235 G. W. Coats, “Abraham’s Sacrifice of Faith,” 395; J. Van Seters, Abraham in History and 
Tradition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975), 230; T. D. Alexander, “Genesis 22 and the 
Covenant of Circumcism,” 17-22; Crenshaw, A Whirlpool of Torment, 13.  
236“One must from the first renounce any attempt to discover one basic idea as the meaning of the 
whole. There are many levels of meaning, and whoever thinks he has discovered virgin soil must discover 
at one that there are many more layers below that. . . . there is only one limitation for the expositor, but it is 
absolutely valid: the narrative must not be interpreted as the representation of a general unhistorical 
religious truth. . . .For it describes an event that took place in the sacred history which began with 
Abraham’s call and whose enigmatic character is qualified only by this realm.” Von Rad, Genesis, 243-
244.  
 264 
 
theological principles of Sola Scriptura, Tota Scriptura, Viva Scriptura, and Prima 
Scriptura. Then Hirsch’s four phases for interpretation were undertaken: (1) 
understanding, (2) interpretive hypothesis, (3) judgment, and (4) criticism.  
As directed by the Aqedah text, an understanding of the Aqedah was constructed 
through the hermeneutical method by incorporating the micro-hermeneutical findings that 
included the pivotal Aqedah answer key in the final divine speech (vv. 15-18). The 
resulting theocentric hypothesis saw the Aqedah test as a covenant crisis designed to 
elicit a covenant response from Abraham. However, anthropocentrically, Abraham’s 
action-verb clusters in the Aqedah revealed that he responded with radical compliance 
even as he faithfully struggled to reconcile God’s command with God’s previous 
promises. The angel of YHWH thwarted the consummation of Abraham’s literal 
compliance and Abraham obeyed him, then fulfilled the test command by sacrificing the 
divinely provided ram as Isaac’s substitute. A divine interpretive monologue ends the test 
by re-establishing the covenant on Himself while bestowing incomplete covenantal 
blessings in a systematic retrograde manner. This interpretive hypothesis that explains the 
final form as the synthesis of two viewpoints (divine and human) is the Covenant 
Hypothesis. 
For testing, the Covenant Hypothesis was re-articulated into two distinct 
interpretive hypotheses (H0 and H1) and tested by the canon through the hypothetical-
deductive and falsification method. Integrative and dialectic reasoning melded the results 
into nuanced theological constructs which await future expansion by systematic theology. 
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Finally, a criticism on the paradoxical nature of the Aqedah illustrated how the Covenant 
Hypothesis resolves them. 
The weakness of the hermeneutical spiral model on the meso-hermeneutical level 
is that it does not provide one universal logical method for theology. Theology has 
multiple concentrations requiring different methods and tools, so the theological goal 
must utilize the appropriate method. The true strength of the spiral model for meso-
hermeneutics is that it reveals the actual interactive dynamics between the text with its 
biblical worlds of meaning and the theologian/interpreter with their personal worlds of 
meaning. It demonstrates how the horizons of meaning fuse, where the principles of Sola, 
Tota, Viva and Prima Scriptura operate, and it offers a way to norm interpretive 
hypotheses by canonical testing with critical evaluation. In short, the hermeneutical spiral 
model at the level of meso-hermeneutics reveals the necessary conditions that make 
credible theological meaning possible. The next chapter on the level of macro-
hermeneutics will delve into the basic presuppositions that underlie interpretive 
hypotheses and demonstrate how the text is able to direct metaphysical exploration as 
well.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
A MACRO-HERMENEUTIC FOR THE AQEDAH 
 
Introduction 
From the micro and meso-hermeneutical levels of analysis through the Axial 
Model1 a new interpretation for the Aqedah has emerged, the Covenant Hypothesis.2 This 
chapter addresses the third level of the Axial Model, the macro-hermeneutical level, 
where the presuppositions of the interpreter encounter metaphysical insights from the 
world of biblical philosophical meaning emanating from the text. The paired worlds of 
philosophical meaning about God and the cosmos are envisioned in the Axial Model as 
situated above and below the text respectively, and constitute the vertical Y-axis,3 the 
broadest conceptual lens4 of the model.  
This study has been progressing inductively through the Axial Model (micro-
meso-macro). However, if one begins at the macro-hermeneutical level, the sequence 
                                                 
1 In the Axial Model the interpreter traverses in looping fashion a three-tiered (micro, meso, 
macro) hermeneutical spiral ramp anchored and normed by the axial axis of the biblical text.  
2 The Covenant Hypothesis interprets the Aqedah as a divine test of a covenant crisis challenge 
where God commands Isaac’s sacrifice to elicit from the divinely trained Abraham a paternal and 
compassionate response of integrated covenant revelations.   
3 The Y-axis refers to the worlds of meaning above and below the text which comprise the macro-
hermeneutical level of analysis, the philosophical presuppositions of the text. The other two axes were the 
Z-axis which was aligned with the text and time corresponding to the exegetical world within the text 
(micro-hermeneutics) and the X-axis which represented the worlds of meaning behind and in front of the 
text corresponding to theology (meso-hermeneutics).   
4 Many thanks to Dr. Martin Pröbstle who suggested labeling the Y-axis in order to clarify its 
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follows the deductive methodology of systematic theologians, for systematic theology 
starts with commitments to foundational presuppositions (macro), then the exegesis of all 
relevant canonical texts are performed (micro), resulting in new findings, relations, 
clarification or insights as theological fruits (meso). On the other hand, Apologetic 
theology starts on the meso-hermeneutical level and defends church dogmatics (meso) by 
appealing to the rational intuitions of the audience (macro) then cinches the correlation of 
the two with biblical evidence (micro). These unforeseen but affirming recognitions 
indicate that the sequence of the spiraling levels of the Axial Model accurately discloses 
how biblical hermeneutics operates. 
The present chapter on macro-hermeneutics will be divided into four parts. A 
discussion of Kierkegaard’s and Derrida’s philosophical readings of the Aqedah will 
launch this chapter by illustrating the intellectual richness of the Aqedah test and the 
value of continuing philosophical engagement. Next, the metaphysical aspects of the 
Axial Model and the methodology of hermeneutical philosophy will be clarified. This 
will be followed by a macro-hermeneutical analysis of the Aqedah exploring aspects of 
                                                 
function and importance.  
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ontology, epistemology, axiology. Finally, a summary of the macro-hermeneutical 
findings will close this chapter.  
Kierkegaard and Derrida on the Aqedah 
The philosophical tradition of the Aqedah has been heavily influenced by Søren 
Kierkegaard’s work, Fear and Trembling,5 with its paradoxical reflections on the nature 
of Abraham’s great and anguished faith. Jacques Derrida’s article “Literature in Secret: 
An Impossible Filiation”6 is less known but follows Kierkegaard’s lead by delving deeper 
into the silent secret center of Abraham’s decision. Together, these incisive and 
provocative philosophical works demonstrate a deep respect for the Aqedah story7 and 
reveal the profundity of the Aqedah for interpreting human existence.  
Kierkegaard’s Four Paradoxes 
Kierkegaard believed that the singular uniqueness of Abraham resided not in his 
act of sacrifice but in the great faith that preceded and enabled this act. Since Kierkegaard 
understood the Moriah journey as demanded by God to obtain proof of Abraham faith,8 
                                                 
5 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric by Johannes de silentio, trans. 
Alastair Hannay (London, UK: Penguin Books, 2003).  
6 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death and Literature in Secret, trans. David Wills, 2nd ed (Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008). “Literature in Secret” was chosen as the focus of this discussion 
because it more closely follows the text of the Aqedah than Derrida’s better-known work The Gift of Death, 
which was also on the Aqedah.  
7 Kierkegaard demonstrates deep respect for God and the biblical text. Derrida is not a traditional 
believer but deeply engages and respects the texts that he deconstructs, sometimes reading them even more 
closely than his detractors do.  
8 “Then why does Abraham do it? For God’s sake, and what is exactly the same, for his own. He 
does it for the sake of God because God demands this proof of his faith, he does it for his own sake in order 
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when this proof was produced at the journey’s end by Abraham’s holding the knife over 
Isaac, Kierkegaard believed God’s demand was met and the divine command was 
appropriately rescinded. All the other elements of the biblical story, God’s three 
speeches, Abraham’s dialogue with Isaac, the Angel of the Lord, the ram, and even the 
specific doctrine of resurrection, were downplayed by Kierkegaard who honed his 
philosophical focus to the last day of Abraham’s anguished three-day journey9 to the altar 
site in Moriah.  
Kierkegaard famously characterized Abraham’s great faith, not as a confident 
contented state of certainty in God, but as a distressed, silent, conflicted anguish.10 Why is 
Kierkegaard’s Abraham filled with anguish, distress and fear?11 According to 
Kierkegaard, genuine faith is characterized by paradox.12 Paradox strains and stretches 
                                                 
to be able to produce the proof.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 88.  
9 “What he yearned for was to accompany them on the three-day journey when Abraham rode with 
grief before him and Isaac by his side. He wanted to be there at that moment when Abraham raised his eyes 
and saw in the distance the mountain in Moriah, the moment he left the asses behind and went on up the 
mountain alone with Isaac. For what occupied him was not the finely wrought fabric of imagination, but the 
shudder of thought.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 44. 
10 Kierkegaard sarcastically mocked attempts to mitigate the anguish of Abraham by using 
metaphors to assuage the listener’s discomfort. “What is left out of the Abraham story is the anguish . . . to 
a son the father has the highest and most sacred of obligations. Yet anguish is a dangerous affair for the 
squeamish, so people forget it, notwithstanding they want to talk about Abraham. So they talk and in the 
course of conversation they interchange the words ‘Isaac’ and ‘best’. Everything goes excellently.” 
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 58.  
11 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 103.  
12 “What I intend now is to extract from the story of Abraham its dialectical element, in the form 
of problemata, in order to see how monstrous a paradox faith is, a paradox capable of making a murder into 
a holy act well pleasing to God, a paradox which gives Isaac back to Abraham, which no thought can grasp 
because faith begins precisely where thinking leaves off.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 82.  
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spiritually, socially, emotionally and relationally. Four paradoxes provide a conceptual 
map to Kierkegaard’s philosophical introspections on Abraham and deserve further 
investigation. 
First, “the paradox that gives Isaac back to Abraham is the one highlighted in the 
contrast between the knights of infinite resignation and of faith.”13 Unlike the figure of a 
tragic hero who relinquishes a lower ethical good to achieve a higher ethical good within 
the universal mode of behavior, such as sacrificing one’s own child to save the village or 
nation,14 Kierkegaard’s two figurative knights escape the universal realm of ethics to obey 
the call of religion.15 The knight of resignation renounces and is willing to infinitely lose 
whatever God demands of him/her in a single movement of relinquishment,16 while the 
knight of faith never renounces what he/she loves17 but is just as willing to lose what is 
                                                 
13 Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014), 41.    
14 Kierkegaard uses the examples of Agamemnon, Jephthah and Brutus as examples of those who 
murdered to obtain a higher ethical prize, the good of the nation or state. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 
86-87.  
15 “In his action he overstepped the ethical altogether, and had a higher telos outside it, in relation 
to which he suspended it.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 88.  
16 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 77. 
17 “Through faith I don’t renounce anything, on the contrary in faith I receive everything, exactly 
in the way it is said that one whose faith is like a mustard seed can move mountains. It takes a purely 
human courage to renounce the whole of temporality in order to win eternity, but I do indeed win it and 
cannot in all eternity renounce that, for that would be a self-contradiction; but it takes a paradoxical and 
humble courage then to grasp the whole of temporality on the strength of the absurd, and that courage is the 
courage of faith. Through faith Abraham did not renounce his claim on Isaac, through faith he received 
Isaac.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 77.  
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demanded while simultaneously retaining faith that God will give it back in this finite 
lifetime, a double dialectic movement that appears absurd18 to human reason. 
Second, Abraham’s faith included the paradox of moral contradiction because 
“the ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he was willing to murder Isaac; the 
religious expression is that he was willing to sacrifice Isaac; but in this contradiction lies 
the very anguish that can indeed make one sleepless; and yet without that anguish 
Abraham is not the one he is.”19 Kierkegaard saw the ethical or the universal (community 
modes for behavior)20 as derivatively subordinate21 to the individual believer’s absolute 
relation to God. Thus, if unmediated direct relation to God defines the telos of the 
Christian, the communal ethical must be suspended by the particular believer as a norm 
when it conflicts with God’s command. This leads to the paradox that the particular 
believer may appear unethical to his community, when he/she is actually being super-
ethical.22 This then leads to another paradox. The set of human universal or ethical norms 
                                                 
18 “The absurd is not one distinction among others embraced by understanding. It is not the same 
as the improbable, the unexpected, the unforeseen. . . . On this the knight of faith is just as clear: all that can 
save him is the absurd; and this he grasps by faith. Accordingly, he admits the impossibility and at the same 
time believes the absurd; for were he to suppose that he had faith without recognizing the impossibility 
with all the passion of his soul and with all his heart, he would be deceiving himself, and his testimony 
would carry weight nowhere, since he would not have come as far as infinite resignation.” Kierkegaard, 
Fear and Trembling, 76.  
19 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 60.  
20 “In other words, the ethical as the universal is not something like a Platonic form of a Kantian 
principle, it is rather a concrete universal, some historically particular community to which individuals 
belong and whose laws and customs are the norms for their lives.” Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of 
Faith, 43.   
21 “This ethical relationship is reduced to the relative as against the absolute relation to God.” 
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 98. 
22 Here, the meaning of super is the notion of extra, exceeding, outside the scope of the norm. “But 
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now becomes a temptation to the knight of faith once they have chosen to step outside it, 
for the universal always remains capable of tempting (or more precisely, of socially 
shaming) the resolute believer away from enacting their absolute religous duty to God 
alone.23 
The third paradox is that Abraham’s love for God meant death for Isaac. Yet, the 
sacrificial test paradoxically demanded intensification of Abraham’s compassion for 
Isaac because “when God asks for Isaac, Abraham must if possible love him even more, 
and only then can he sacrifice him: for it is indeed this love of Isaac that in its paradoxical 
opposition to this love of God that makes his act a sacrifice. But the distress and anguish 
in the paradox is that, humanly speaking, he is quite incapable of making himself 
understood.”24  
Fourth, there is a paradox hidden in Abraham’s silence. Kierkegaard admits that 
though “it cannot be denied that secrecy and silence, as determinants of inner feeling, 
                                                 
now when the ethical is thus teleologically suspended how does the single individual in whom it is 
suspended exist? He exists as the particular in opposition to the universal. Does this mean he sins? . . . If 
this norm cannot be said to repeat itself in a way other than that of sin, then judgement has been delivered 
upon Abraham. Then how did Abraham exist? He had faith. That is the paradox that keeps him at the 
extremity and which he cannot make clear to anyone else, for the paradox is that he puts himself as the 
single individual in absolute relation to the absolute. Is he justified? His justification is, once again, the 
paradox: for if he is the paradox it is not by virtue of being anything universal, but of being the particular.” 
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 90. 
23 “What we usually call a temptation is something that keeps a person from carrying out a duty, 
but here the temptation is the ethical itself which would keep him from doing God’s will. But then what is 
the duty? For the duty is precisely the expression of God’s will.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 88. 
And even more specifically, “The love of God can cause the knight of faith to give his love of neighbor the 
opposite expression to that which is his duty ethically speaking.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 98. 
Absolutist thinking respects no humane limits. 
24 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 101. 
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really make for greatness in a man. . . . I always run up against the paradox, the divine 
and the demonic: for silence is both of these. It is the demon’s lure, and the more silent 
one keeps the more terrible the demon becomes; but silence is also divinity’s communion 
with the individual.”25 If silence can signal the absolute relationship to either the demonic 
or divine,26 how does Kierkegaard justify Abraham’s silence? Kierkegaard believes 
Abraham’s silence is not demonic- even as it facilitates Isaac’s death27—because it stems 
from his absolute determination to do the will of the God he loves.28 Abraham is silent for 
he cannot make himself understood to others,29 thus, even his reply to Isaac’s question 
continues to be a form of silence, an ironic non-answer: “First and foremost he doesn’t 
                                                 
25 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 115.  
26 “The demonic has that same property as the divine, that the individual can enter into an absolute 
relationship to it. This is the analogue, the counterpart to the paradox we are discussing. It therefore bears a 
certain resemblance to it that can prove misleading.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 123.   
27 “His silence is not at all to save Isaac.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 137.  
28 He cannot say “It is you who are to be sacrificed” because “with talk of this kind he would fall 
out of the paradox, and if he really wanted to talk to Isaac he would have to transform his own situation 
into that of a temptation.” In other words, by being honest, he opens himself to the possibility of being 
dissuaded from obeying God’s command. Abraham cannot say he doesn’t know, because he does know: 
“He knows that God demands the sacrifice of Isaac, and he knows that precisely at this moment he himself 
is ready to sacrifice him.” By saying God will provide a lamb, “he utters no untruth, for on the strength of 
the absurd it is after all possible that God might do something quite different.” But ultimately, “he cannot 
say anything since what he knows he cannot say.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 142-143.  
29 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 107. 
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say anything, and that is his way of saving what he has to say. His answer to Isaac has the 
form of irony, for it is always irony to say something and yet not say it.”30  
All of these paradoxes are contingent on Kierkegaard’s acceptance of the 
traditional interpretation of the Aqedah as an unconditional compliance test of Abraham’s 
faith. What Kierkegaard exposes is the hidden paradoxical absurdity of Abraham’s faith 
that brings reason up to its own limits and requires the leap of faith. What would happen 
to Kierkegaard’s paradoxes if the Covenant Hypothesis was substituted as the 
interpretation of the Aqedah? Kierkegaard’s four paradoxes shift in surprising ways.  
The first Kierkegaardian paradox that brings Isaac back to Abraham highlighted 
the difference between the knight of resignation and the knight of faith as relinquishment 
(single movement) versus relinquishment with expectation of Isaac’s return (double 
movement). Under the Covenant Hypothesis the premise for the two knights is clarified 
and a new “third knight” appears. Kierkegaard’s knight of resignation renounces and 
infinitely relinquishes what is loved to his/her ultimate authority (single 
movement/complies with overt divine power);31 the knight of faith does not renounce but 
infinitely relinquishes with expectation of Isaac’s miraculous return in this finite life as 
promised (double movement/paradoxical faith in latent divine power).32 However, the 
                                                 
30 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 142. 
31 “Through resignation I renounce everything, this movement is one I do by myself . . . this 
movement is one I make by myself, so what I win is myself in my eternal consciousness, in a blessed 
compliance with my love for the eternal being.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 77.  
32 “Through faith Abraham did not renounce his claim on Isaac, through his faith he received 
Isaac. That rich young man, by virtue of his resignation, should have given everything away, but once he 
had done so the knight of faith would have to say to him: ‘On the strength of the absurd you shall get every 
penny back, believe that!’ And these words should by no means be a matter of indifference to the once rich 
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knight of covenant faith intercedes based on God’s character and claims God’s justice 
with expectation of divine substitution as promised by God in the previous cut-animal 
covenant ritual of Genesis 15 (single sublimated movement of faith in revealed divine 
character).  
The second Kierkegaardian paradox of moral contradiction judged Abraham’s 
action by two opposing standards: as murder by ethical standards, yet God-pleasing 
sacrifice by religious standards. The Covenant Hypothesis reconciles the religious and 
ethical standards in covenant-based intercession. Covenant-based intercession must be 
grounded on God’s justice and righteousness (not selfish interests or human ethics) and 
recognizes the absolute freedom and authority of God to accede or decline the 
intercession, this God-fearing attitude embodies the absolute religious standard. The 
intercessor is, at the same time, concretely pleading on behalf of another human being at 
risk which embodies the human ethical standard. Since Abraham did not actualize this 
covenant test option, divine intervention was necessary to save Isaac and redirect 
Abraham’s focus away from harming Isaac, so that his focused gaze would be freed to 
look elsewhere for the divine solution that awaited him.  
Kierkegaard’s third paradox pits Abraham’s love of God against Abraham’s love 
for Isaac in an either/or rivalry while simultaneously increasing Abraham’s love for Isaac 
because a sacrifice requires losing what one loves. This uncovers the underlying 
assumption that the true value currency of sacrifice is directly in proportion to the 
                                                 
young man; for it he gave his possessions away because he was bored with them, then his resignation was 
in a sorry state. Temporality, finitude is what it all turns on.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 77-78. 
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intensity of pain and suffering of the offerer. While the Covenant Hypothesis aligns with 
Kierkegaard’s insistence that Abraham’s love of God should remain supreme, it does not 
pit Abraham’s love for God in opposition to his love for Isaac. Instead, Abraham’s love 
for his son Isaac is to be assimilated into Abraham’s love for God because the future of 
God’s covenant that will bless the world is tied to Abraham’s Seed. Both loves must be 
preserved together. While the Covenant Hypothesis agrees with Kierkegaard that 
Abraham ought to love Isaac even more fervently for God’s four appellations for Isaac 
purposely intensify paternal compassion—it does not agree with Kierkegaard’s 
implication that this is in order to increase the value of Abraham’s sacrifice by increasing 
his suffering in killing Isaac. Rather, the Covenant Hypothesis sees it as working in the 
opposite direction as God’s rhetoric to intensify paternal compassion so that it may lead 
to covenant intercession and/or substitutionary redemption. 
One unexpected insight on the Kierkegaardian paradox between love and death is 
that the Covenant Hypothesis unearths a hidden, unacknowledged love at the altar site. 
Abraham’s self-preserving love had always been his most precious love, arguably even 
more than his love for Isaac, for Abraham’s self-love had relinquished Sarah to 
Abimelech (Gen 20) after God had promised Sarah would give birth to Isaac in a year 
(Gen 17, 18). This means she was given away sometime within her gestational year. 
Thus, Abraham’s self-preserving love had threatened Isaac’s existence and the covenant 
before the Aqedah event. Relinquishing Isaac (in a sense, again!) in sacrifice only repeats 
Abraham’s habitual relinquishment of family members to figures of authority, it doesn’t 
alleviate the historic competition between Abraham’s self-preserving love and his love 
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for everything else. It must be remembered that by the time of the Aqedah, Abraham has 
relinquished every family member at least once (Terah, Nahor, Lot, Sarah, Hagar, 
Ishmael). Relinquishment of loved ones is not a new test for Abraham; it is his norm. 
Covenant intercession deals with this tension33 for a prophetic mediator knowingly bears 
the personal risk of their intercession.34 
The fourth paradox is that silence can be either divine or demonic. Kierkegaard 
sees Abraham’s silence as guarding divine communication, because talking to others is 
seen by Kierkegaard as succumbing to the temptation for human justification. 
Kierkegaard’s argument that others are not capable of understanding the nature of 
Abraham’s test, tacitly assumes Kierkegaard’s seventeenth century modern ethics as 
Aqedah background. If child sacrifice was a part of Abraham’s historical-cultural milieu, 
as it may have been in ancient times,35 this argument fails. According to Kierkegaard, 
since Abraham’s silence guards his singular obedience to God, his silence is linked to 
divine communication. The Covenant Hypothesis shifts from the anthropocentric focus of 
                                                 
33 Had Abraham gone one step further and anticipated God’s ram gesture by offering himself to 
take Isaac’s place, that would definitively demonstrate that his fear of death was overcome by his love for 
Isaac and the covenant. 
34 The decision-maker appealed to may punish, reward, substitute or respond in any manner to the 
intercessor for the target victim. A mediator carries the personal risk for their oppositional stance, 
regardless of whether it stems from loyal (fear of God) or disloyal (rejection of God) motives. 
35 The fact that Abraham was willing to kill Isaac for sacrifice could imply that this form of 
worship wasn’t unknown to him. Contrary to Kierkegaard, I have entertained the notion that Abraham’s 
silence could be understood another way, that his contemporaries would too easily understand the divine 
demand for child sacrifice because it was common to the gods of his surrounding cultures. Thus, if 
Abraham was unwilling to have others think his singular God was the same as other bloodthirsty deities, 
this can also explain why Abraham kept this unexpected, yet ubiquitous divine demand for a child sacrifice 
a secret. 
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Kierkegaard to the theocentric role of God in the Aqedah. It uncovers even more radical 
paradoxes in God’s initial speech and ensuing divine silence. The divine test command is 
paradoxically both divine and demonic for God is certainly the divine speaker but as the 
Divine Tester, God speaks out-of-character by echoing the pagan demonic demand for 
human sacrifice. God’s ensuing silence is understandable as a test method, but retains 
perilous moral paradoxes. If God directly communicates the test solution to Abraham and 
rescues His moral reputation, the premise of the test is destroyed as a test of Abraham’s 
integration of the covenant into his character. If God remains silent, allowing Abraham to 
wonder if God harbors a demonic aspect in His character, both Abraham’s faith and 
Isaac’s life hang in peril.36 Thus, God’s disciplined three day silence in the test also 
reveals the greatness of God’s faith in humankind; the Divine Tester’s silence 
demonstrates His confidence in the capabilities of the human testee to figure it out. 
The Covenant Hypothesis contributes one last point to Kierkegaard’s reading of 
the Aqedah. In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard’s Abraham is depicted as an acting, 
feeling, living being gripped in the throes of a crisis, an appropriate existential treatment 
                                                 
36 In the Aqedah, morality is acutely contingent on the exact timing of divine silence. If God 
breaks His silence too early, Abraham will not struggle with a personal response and the test is no longer a 
test of Abraham’s maturation of character. If God speaks one second too late, Isaac dies and must be 
resurrected to keep the covenant promises valid. Yet Christians realize that the possibility of Isaac’s death 
through sacrifice with ensuing resurrection would more accurately foreshadow the future role of the 
Messiah. But within the historical context of the Hebrew Bible, allowing Isaac to be killed by his father in 
worship followed by resurrection effectively erases the moral difference between the worship of YHWH 
and the worship of Baal or Molech. The sole remaining difference between the two kinds of worship would 
then be the quantitative gradation of power (the resurrection capacity of Baal and Molech versus YHWH). 
Because this was unacceptable to the Angel of the Lord, He intervened before the knife plunged into Isaac: 
morality was not to be sacrificed to power on Abraham’s altar (regardless of the content of Abraham’s 
faith). 
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of the human subject. But Kierkegaard’s picture of God is reduced to an ahistorical, 
abstract non-personal source of absolute power and command. The Covenant Hypothesis 
fleshes out a richer picture of God by revealing His test communications were 
deliberately customized to God and Abraham’s unique historical relationship. In God’s 
carefully crafted test command, God juxtaposed Abraham’s worst fear with Abraham’s 
greatest hope in a test framework that rhetorically evoked their first communication to 
move to Canaan (Gen 12) while deliberately eliciting his natural paternal instincts to hint 
toward prophetic intercession (Gen 18). God’s subsequent test correction (vv. 11-12) 
invoked the past themes of  divine knowledge (Gen 18) and the fear of God (Gen 20) and 
God’s final speech (vv. 15-18) acknowledges six of their previous seven encounters (Gen 
12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 21). The God of the Covenant Hypothesis demonstrates large-scale, 
purpose-filled, historically-informed agency. 
In the Covenant Hypothesis, Abraham also comes across as very humanly 
relatable with real hopes, finite fears, verbal sophistication and intuitive intelligence. If 
his Aqedah utterances are taken as sincere, they demonstrate a variable plot line. He 
conscientiously assumes literal compliance is demanded at first, yet remains fastidiously 
correctable in God-fearing faith and finally, with trained prophetic intuition he links the 
surprise of the ram to God’s provision. Thus, the Covenant Hypothesis respects the 
existential aspects of both Tester and testee by appreciating the deep nature and timing of 
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their interactions, feelings expressed through verbal rhetoric, individuality of differing 
approaches to the test, with historical consistency in character.  
As with every great piece of literature, appreciation of what is overtly presented 
by the text must be balanced with what is pointedly absent from the text. Since the 
Aqedah has been acknowledged as a narrative that ingeniously enfolds deep meaning into 
the silences and crevices between the details, we turn now to the philosopher Jacques 
Derrida to appreciate the aspect of unusual secrecy in the Aqedah. 
Derrida’s Double Secret 
The secretive silence of Abraham is what connects Jacques Derrida’s 
deconstructive reading to Soren Kierkegaard’s existential treatise on the Aqedah. But 
where Kierkegaard’s locus for silence is in the hidden great faith of Abraham after his 
acceptance of God’s test command, Derrida’s locus for Abraham’s silence hovers in the 
unknown abyss before the issuance of the test command—in God. For Derrida notes the 
fact that Abraham is silent, not only due to the nature of the test command but even more 
terrifyingly, because at the center of this secret—Abraham doesn’t know why God 
imposed this command on him and by implication, neither do we. Thus, both 
philosophers are intrigued by the silence of the Aqedah and together, they explore the 
silence on both sides of the test command—secrets in the human and divine. For Derrida, 
the Aqedah is clearly a double secret.37 In his article “Literature in Secret,” Derrida 
                                                 
37 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 129.  
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explores the secret center of their shared secret using his philosophical method of 
deconstruction on the Aqedah.38  
Deconstruction refers to Derrida’s work on exposing the scaffold for meaning39 in 
the text.40 Some of deconstruction’s goals were to crack open dogmatic closed systems of 
thought,41 to explicate the underpinnings of an overt meaning,42 and to subvert preference 
                                                 
38 Deconstruction is not the same as destruction. The goal is of deconstruction is not the 
annihilation or evacuation of meaning but the recognition of the unlimited plurality of meaning. It is 
disciplined thinking about the variable production of meaning. Deconstruction requires reading a text 
carefully with a heightened sense of possible irony using direct and indirect approaches to see what related 
meanings have to be assumed in order to bring out the present presence, the preferred concept. Derrida 
never definitively defined deconstruction but was clear on what it was not. It was not a disregard for any 
reference or dissolution of overt meaning, it was recognizing the undecidable complexity of the process in 
the text that creates the illusion of a “natural” and defined meaning or truth. Derrida’s disruptive search was 
to uncover the hidden, marginalized, oppressed concepts that were overlooked and then to point out the 
productive yet elusive gap between them and the written word. John Caputo quotes Derrida saying, “It is 
totally false to suggest that deconstruction is a suspension of reference. Deconstruction is always deeply 
concerned with the ‘other’ of language,” for “deconstruction is not an enclosure in nothingness, but an 
openness towards the other.” John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without 
Religion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), 16-17. 
39 Deconstruction recognizes at least two processes that create the meaning of any term, that of its 
“spacing of difference” from the opposite term (whether present or absent from the text) and the infinite 
deference of related terms connected in “chains of signification that radiate in all directions” both 
synchronically and diachronically, an limitless deferral of full meaning. Deconstruction, as coined by the 
term différance is the marking “of the trace of difference.” “Deconstruction” subsection in Gary 
Aylesworth, “Postmodernism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward 
N. Zalta, ed., accessed 5 June 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/postmodernism/. 
40 The term text is not to be limited here to written work, but includes speech, art, rituals, events, 
anything worthy of careful scrutiny.  
41 “Whenever deconstruction finds a nutshell—a secure axiom or a pithy maxim—the very idea is 
to crack it open and disturb this tranquility. Indeed, that is a good rule of thumb in deconstruction. That is 
what deconstruction is all about, its very meaning and mission, if it has any. One might even say that 
cracking nutshells is what deconstruction is. In a nutshell . . . the paralysis and impossibility of an aporia is 
just what impels deconstruction, what rouses it out of bed in the morning.” John D. Caputo, Deconstruction 
in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 
1997), 32. 
42 “It's possible, within text, to frame a question or undo assertions made in the text, by means of 
elements which are in the text, which frequently would be precisely structures that play off the rhetorical 
against grammatical elements.” Paul de Man’s understanding of deconstruction as quoted by Moynihan, 
Robert, A Recent Imagining: Interviews with Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartman, J. Hillis Miller, Paul De 
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in binary systems so that repressed ambiguity and hidden ambivalence are also 
acknowledged and the meaning of the text is opened to more than was previously 
assumed.43 To these ends, Derrida destabilized accepted meanings by carefully analyzing 
overlooked traces—marginal aspects, metaphors or fault fissures—within the text that 
carried along a trace of what was hidden by it, the indicated absences in and by the text.44  
Thus, the semiotic results of philosophical deconstruction were analogous to 
suddenly recognizing the vast ocean of repressed concepts that had been buoying up a 
constructed raft of meaning and that no part of this watery sea was intrinsically superior 
to another part. This means that for most readers, deconstruction left meaning adrift and 
readers, metaphorically, felt lost at sea. The limitless language network of infinitely 
deferred meaning, like the vast ocean water, presented no paths to follow. To address this 
human need for some order or direction amidst the newly recognized infinite network of 
possible linguistic meanings, there has been a philosophical movement toward 
constructive deconstruction45 that aspires to incorporate the critical insights of 
                                                 
Man (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1986), 156.  
43 “To represent is to select, to select is to omit, to omit is to misrepresent.” Martin Schiralli, 
Constructive Postmodernism: Toward Renewal in Cultural and Literary Studies (Westport, CT: Bergin and 
Garvey, 1999), 1. The retrieval of the repressed options that are required for the process of narrowing and 
clarifying meaning is characteristic of deconstruction.  
44 The possibility of meaning ensconced in the silence of the Aqedah experience intrigued 
Kierkegaard, Derrida and Auerbach who famously recognized that the most intriguing aspects of the test 
reside in the non-explicit nature of this narrative: as Auerbach noted, the Aqedah is “fraught with 
background.” In this context it is fascinating that the demarcated (missing from an ordered list) and 
indicated (missing from paired chiastic symmetry) absences in God’s evaluation and the Aqedah’s literary 
structure that have led to the Covenant Hypothesis that something was missed by Abraham in his test 
response.  
45 Constructive postmodernism or constructive deconstruction is the attempt to “work productively 
and meaningfully within the limitations” of uncertainty that result from postmodern analyses and 
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deconstruction into a fresh meaningful and productive framework. The Covenant 
Hypothesis is amendable to that mode of thinking for it hears God’s final words as 
providing the context-faithful covenant framework for reconstituting the deconstruction 
of the Aqedah.46 The ensuing discussion will initially present Derrida’s deconstructive 
insights on the Aqedah from his article “Literature in Secret,”47 then the Covenant 
Hypothesis will engage with his findings.   
In “Literature in Secret,” Derrida initially avers from proffering an interpretation 
by merely offering a reading of the Aqdah, but then circles back and claims that his 
presupposition underlies all interpretations of the story: 
  I would like to propose a reading of it, one that I will distinguish, in this case, from an 
interpretation. At the same time active and passive, this reading would be presumed 
                                                 
deconstruction. Resources used in the place of foundationalism to reconstruct deconstruction include 
“pragmatism, or common sense, or naturalism, or experimental method.” Lawrence Cahoone, From 
Modernism to Postmodernism, Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd, 2003), 223. See also Martin Schiralli’s Constructive Postmodernism and also Sacred Interconnections: 
Postmodern Spirituality, Political Economy, and Art, ed. David Ray Griffin (Albany, NY: State University 
of New York Press, 1990).   
46 The difference between Derrida’s deconstruction to undecidability and my reconstruction of 
specific and comprehensive meaning lies in the ontological distinction that Derrida rejects any center, norm 
or anchor for meaning in language and my study recognizes an outside originator, co-user of language, and 
norm for human meaning—God as the reliable explicator of meaning. Thus, God’s words are to be taken as 
the most reliable set of utterances in the Aqedah. This may help explain why Derrida’s treatment of the 
Aqedah leads to an aporic vacuum of non-meaning and this dissertation uses the theocentric debriefing at 
the end of the puzzling test (micro-hermeneutic) to make sense of all the preceding parts (meso-
hermeneutic) because God is accepted by the faith community as the most reliable speaker and 
communicator of truth in the Bible (macro-hermeneutic). 
47 Jacques Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 117-158. Derrida’s handling of the Aqedah is consistent 
in both “Literature in Secret” and The Gift of Death for they expound related concepts. Derrida’s Gift of 
Death deconstructs the morality of responsibility as requiring irresponsibility to everything else, the gift of 
death as inevitable for life, and silence as necessary for preserving alterity. His more text-oriented article on 
the Aqedah, “Literature in Secret,” focuses on the meaning (which is, at the center, non-meaning) in 
Abraham’s secret test, the purpose of Abraham’s test as the singular compliance of keeping a secret, the 
silence and absolute nature of unconditional love, and finally, forgiveness for the unforgivable limitations 
of finite choices that puts everything else at risk. 
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by every interpretation, by the exegesis, commentaries, glosses, decipherings that 
have been accumulating in infinite numbers of thousands of years. As a result, it 
would not be simple one interpretation among others. . . . It would also have the 
clarity and distinction of being a secret experience concerning a secret. What secret? 
Well, the following one: unilaterally assigned by God, the test imposed on Mount 
Moriah would consist precisely in proving [éprouver] whether Abraham was capable 
of keeping a secret: in short, “of not meaning to say.48 
According to Derrida, the test tested Abraham’s capacity to keep a secret49 at a 
huge cost:  
Now—and this is something that cannot be a simple interpretive hypothesis of 
mine—this request, this test, is consequently at least that of seeing just how far 
Abraham can go in keeping a secret, up to the point of the worst sacrifice, to the 
extreme testing point of the secret that is asked of him: that of death given, by his 
own hand, to what he loves most in the world, the putting to death of promise itself, 
of his love for the future and the future to come of his love.50 
Usually, secrets protect a shared truth but Derrida reminds the reader that 
Abraham didn’t know the secret in the center of the secret, the why behind the order.51 
Thus Abraham’s secret happens to be a double secret for “Abraham is held to secrecy 
quite simply because the secret remains a secret to him. He is therefore held to secrecy 
                                                 
48 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 122.  
49 Derrida’s article is careful in differentiating between (1) the external secret of the test—this test 
proved Abraham’s capacity to keep the test a secret from everyone else, and (2) the central secret reason 
why the test was imposed by God on Abraham, a secret Abraham didn’t know. Since Abraham is presumed 
by Derrida to not know the divine reason or purpose for the test, Derrida concludes that the consequent 
meaning of the test can only pivot on the singularity of their bond, the unconditional nature of the 
commitment between God and Abraham.   
50 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 129. Derrida does not believe the test was mainly about the 
threat to Isaac. He explains why: “Moreover, what interest could God have in the death of this child, even if 
it were offered as a sacrifice? That is something he will never have said or meant to say. The putting to 
death of Isaac therefore becomes secondary, which is an even more, monstrous eventuality.” Ibid., 155. 
51 “The sense of that order remained secret, even to him.” Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 121.  
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not because he shares God’s secret but because he doesn’t share it.”52 But unlike Job, who 
complains to God that he doesn’t know the why behind his suffering, Abraham kept his 
secret perfectly, suffering in passive silence and actively refraining from putting the 
question to God.53  
Because Abraham has no clue why God has imposed this secret test on him, the 
secret center is actually a vacuum, this center “has no sense”, and yet “everything will 
hang on this suspension of sense.”54 This absence of meaning (relative to Abraham) at the 
center of God’s test means Abraham’s test response is not tied to a specific meaning. 
Thus, Abraham can only respond to the singular unconditional nature55 of what lies 
between them. The Aqedah is then, “the test of unconditionality in love, namely the oath 
sworn between two absolute singularities.”56 As Derrida describes it, Abraham’s silence 
is apt because it 
at bottom, at the bottomless depth of this bottom—must mean (to say) nothing. . . . In 
short, the secret to be kept would have, at bottom, to be without an object, without 
                                                 
52 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 129.  
53 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 129.  
54 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 155.  
55 “For the secret of secrecy about which we shall speak does not consist in hiding something, in 
not revealing the truth, but in respecting the absolute singularity, the infinite separation of what binds me or 
exposes me to the unique, to one as to the other, to the One as to the Other [sic].” Derrida, “Literature in 
Secret,” 122-123.  
56 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 155.  
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any object other than the unconditionally singular covenant, the mad love between 
God, Abraham, and what descends from him. His son and his name.57  
Hence, Abraham’s unconditional, absolute love for God has the potential to 
threaten all of his other loves including Abraham’s love for Isaac. This is why after the 
test, Derrida imagines Abraham repenting for his decision, asking paradoxically for 
forgiveness from God (for who else can grant it?) for holding such overwhelmingly 
devastating love for God:  
I ask you to forgive me for listening to you, too faithfully, for too much fidelity to my 
sworn faith, for loving you, for preferring you, for choosing you and letting myself be 
chosen by you, for responding to you, for having said “here I am,” and as a result, for 
having sacrifice the other to you, my other other, my other other in the person of my 
other absolute preference, my own, singular and plural, the best of what is mine, the 
best of my own ones, here Isaac.58 
One must not forget, Derrida reminds us, that Isaac is not only Abraham’s son but 
the promise, the future, the covenant, the symbol for every other, the symbol of love for 
any other. For rejecting, for betraying everything and everyone else that exists,59 Derrida 
explains, Abraham must repent.60  
At the end of his article, Derrida ties the theme of betrayal to literature that 
betrays Abraham’s secret by making it public. Since Abraham had been so careful to 
                                                 
57 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 156.  
58 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 126.  
59 “From that moment on there is nothing more sacred in the world for Abraham, for he is ready to 
sacrifice everything. This test would thus be a sort of absolute desacralization of the world.” Derrida, 
“Literature in Secret,” 154. 
60 “It was that promise itself that he almost sacrificed, and that is again why he asks God for 
forgiveness, forgiveness for the worst: for consenting to put an end to the future to come, and hence to 
everything that gives breath to faith, to a faith or oath that is sworn, to the fidelity of every covenant. As 
though Abraham, speaking in his heart of hearts, were saying to God: forgive me for preferring the secret 
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keep this secret to himself,61 the biblical text goes against Abraham’s ardent desire.62 But 
the betrayal doesn’t stop there, literature betrays Abraham’s secret another way. 
Literature can betray the holy secret by transmitting that sacred singular secret63 into a 
common public work (a routine retelling for others). In a way, all literature performs 
desacralization by converting sacred traditions into a secular form without 
acknowledging the holiness of its origins.64 According to Derrida, this is not appropriate 
appropriation.65 Thus, “literature can but ask forgiveness for this double betrayal.”66 
Derrida concludes, “there is no literature that does not, from its very first word, ask for 
                                                 
that binds me to you rather than the secret that binds me to the other, to each and every other, for a secret 
love binds me to the one as to the other, and to mine.” Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 126.   
61 “Concerning God’s precise, singular call and command, Abraham says nothing and to no one.” 
Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 128.  
62 “In the case of what descends from him, however, the singularity is sealed but necessarily 
betrayed by the inheritance that confirms, reads, and translates the covenant. By the testament itself.” 
Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 156.  
63 “If literature, the modern thing that legitimately bears that name, ‘desacralizes’ or ‘secularizes’ 
the Scriptures, holy or sacred Scripture, it thereby repeats the sacrifice of Isaac, stripping it bare, delivering 
it and exposing it to the world.” Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 154.  
64 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 157.  
65 “There there [sic] is secrecy [il y a là du secret], and we sense that literature is taking over these 
words, without, for all that, appropriating them in order to fashion them to its own purpose.” Derrida, 
“Literature in Secret,” 120.  
66 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 157. 
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forgiveness. In the beginning was forgiveness. For nothing. For meaning (to say) 
nothing.”67  
Now that, according to Derrida, Abraham’s singular double secret (a secret test 
with and even more secret purpose) has been doubly betrayed (publicized and 
secularized) by becoming a part of literature, the question left begging and not addressed 
by Derrida is, can and should we try to discover the secret purpose in the center of God 
and Abraham’s secret test? Since Abraham presumably didn’t know that secret, is it 
hubris to think that we can find it?  
And yet everyone keeps trying, even Derrida.68 Kierkegaard thought the divine 
purpose of the test was to prove Abraham’s great faith, an anguished silent faith of 
hidden paradoxes in tensive aporetic juxtaposition. Derrida thought the purpose of the 
test was to see if Abraham could keep a costly secret even to the point of losing Isaac. 
                                                 
67 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 157. I understand Derrida to be saying that literature does not 
inherently carry meaning within itself, for in the case of the Aqedah even the main character that was being 
tested didn’t know the meaning of his own test. Derrida uses the Aqedah to point out that Abraham’s test 
case uncovers the inherent emptiness of literature in regard to meaning, yet literature is widely assumed to 
be a carrier of meaning that hands down the secrets of sacred tradition to the masses in a public form for 
secular consumption. This is ironic masking and a betrayal of holy origins. Thus, Derrida cannot help but 
see the reader—as the locus for creating meaning when confronted with a text that inherently cannot carry 
it.  
68 This is the operational genius of the Aqedah as literature, it is not handed down through 
literature as having a clear univocal meaning but as an unsolved problem, a biblical Gordian Knot that has 
challenged religious and secular readers alike to ponder the significance of what Abraham was faced with 
and come up with multiple interpretations. The Gordian Knot is an idiom for a seemingly insoluble 
problem based on a legendary tale of Alexander the Great who came upon a knot in Gordium with a 
prophesy that it was only capable of being loosed by the future conqueror of Asia. Alexander didn’t attempt 
to untie it but sliced through it with his sword and this was hailed by his men as a good omen for his Asian 
campaign. Nigel Cawthorne, Alexander the Great (London, UK: Haus Publishing Limited, 2004), 24-25. In 
this study, the Covenant Hypothesis perceives God’s final monologue in the Aqedah as the double-edged 
sword that cuts and releases the Binding of Isaac.  
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Kierkegaard’s premise located the test meaning in what makes Abraham who he is; 
Derrida’s premise located the test meaning in what makes God who He is—beyond 
human comprehension.  
According to the Covenant Hypothesis, God’s own words in the Aqedah out-
derrida Derrida, deconstruct his deconstruction, in other words, subtly reveal what was 
assumed by Derrida to be hidden beyond human reach. The Covenant Hypothesis does 
not ascribe to the reader the creation of meaning but the discovery of it, it assumes God 
as the Lord of language utilizes language in ways that ironically stretch and grow our 
hermeneutical (hearing) abilities. Thus, meaning is contingent on how well we are trained 
or willing to be trained by God to understand what God is saying.  
Ironically, Derrida didn’t, but could have recognized that the Aqedah secret of 
why God tested Abraham happens to be outed by God in the test supplement of Gen 
22:15-18.69 Not only is this section of the Aqedah routinely regarded by historical-critical 
scholars as later literary addition, functionally, a test evaluation does not have to be 
divulged70 for a test to be a test. That decision to share is the prerogative of the Tester. 
Thus, God’s interpretative unpacking of Abraham’s test actions is properly a supplement 
                                                 
69 For Derrida the concept of a supplement (supplementarity) was something added later to a 
supposedly complete entity which supplies a sense that is lacking, thus it is actually inherent or “inscribed 
within that to which it is added.” Robert Bernasconi, “Supplement” in Jacques Derrida: Key Concepts, ed. 
Claire Colebrook (London, UK: Routledge, 2015), 19. Testing demonstrates this well. The grading of a test 
comes at the end as an added process, separate from test taking. However, grading assumes a test norm or 
standard is being used to evaluate the test response. This norm pre-existed before the test was given to the 
testee and in a real sense even determined the design and construct of the test. Thus, it chronologically 
follows the test but holds within itself the originary hidden premise of the test.       
70 This was made clear to me when I was told that I had passed my doctoral comps and no details 
about the assessment were made accessible.  
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and a decentered-center71 that functionally provides, from its teleological position at the 
end of the story, the seven epiphany covenant as the test norm. The divine revelation of 
the covenant as the test norm uncovers the original conceptual framework for the purpose 
and design of the test and therefore allows a reconstruction of the deconstruction of the 
Aqedah.  
How exactly does God’s last speech retrieve the hidden divine norm/purpose? It is 
through recognizing the triggering traces72 in the list of covenant blessings. Some are 
overt and unmistakably echoes of the covenant (such as the stars in the sky = Gen 15) and 
some are recognized as synonyms of that era (such as Jacob’s use in Gen 28 and 32 of the 
sands of the sea = dust of the earth, here in the Aqedah it evokes Gen 13); others are 
linguistic hooks (multiply and blessings in absolute infinitive form = the verbs multiply 
and blessings repeated three times = Gen 17) and explanatory methods (Seed will posess 
the gates of his enemies = I give you this land of Gen 12).  
But something unexpectedly remarkable happens when these traces (indicated 
absences necessary for meaning) are traced to their corresponding covenant encounters 
and back again to the present Aqedah articulations. The background Abrahamic covenant 
                                                 
71 It is decentered in at least two ways. It is not at the center of the literary chiastic structure of the 
Aqedah but at the end of it, and it is not anchored on any logocentric center within the linguistic network of 
language but on the identity/character of a divine dynamic speaker (By myself I have sworn, says the 
Lord).  
72 A trace is, according to Derrida, a contingent condition that the present term or concept must 
evoke its absent or hidden opposite and related meanings in order to make any sense. Arthur Bradley, 
Derrida's Of Grammatology: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2008), 77, accessed 30 September 2019, ProQuest Ebook Central. God’s last speech in Genesis 
22:15-18 requires evocation of their past fuller meanings of covenant interactions in temporal-situational 
settings in order to make sense.  
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gleams73 through a previously unrecognized gap in this Aqedah list of covenant blessings. 
The trace corresponding to the sixth covenant meeting (Gen 18) is absent from the test 
answer key of Gen 22:15-18. In this manner, God out-derridas Derrida by an absence of 
an absence.74 This subtle commnication appropriately reveals to Abraham and the 
competent reader what is missing from Abraham’s test response while gently veiling 
Abraham’s lapses from his son Isaac and the casual reader. Within the hermeneutics 
between intimates, silence speaks.75 Outsiders with limited historical context and a 
logocentric focus bound to overt utterances that are present, would miss this subtle form 
of communication completely.76  
As a reconstructive paradigm, the Covenant Hypothesis fulfills the goals of 
deconstruction in four areas of traditional Aqedah interpretations. It accomplishes this by 
                                                 
73 Deconstructionists “designate the crevice through which the yet unnameable glimmer beyond 
the closure can be glimpsed.” Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1976), 14. 
74 In God’s last speech, what is present (list of covenant blessings) activates what is absent 
(covenant history of seven encounters), but what is absent and made present by the trace (through covenant 
memory) now reveals the presence of a new absence (the trace for the sixth encounter is absent from the list 
of covenant blessings). 
75 When a wife asks her husband if a new dress makes her look fat and the husband hesitates 
before answering, regardless of what he tries to say afterwards, she recognizes by the initial silence—that 
he has answered her original question in the affirmative. More apt to the list of six out of seven covenant 
meetings, I have six children. If my husband were to praise five of them, a stranger would not think 
anything was amiss while I would wonder immediately why he skipped over one of our children. The 
recognition of silence for effectively conveying meaning is noted in close friendships, sophisticated 
business negotiations, and is critical for certain kinds of humor. Abraham and God were close friends. 
76 Derrida’s work tried to undermine the logocentric “history of metaphysics as the epoch of 
presence.” Derrida, Of Grammatology, 143. The usual theological preoccupation with anthropocentric 
logocentrism and presence may explain why this divine assessment utilizing circumspect silence was 
unrecognized until now. 
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initially destabilizing (deconstructing) then recovering (or reconstructing) the same 
concepts on the firmer foundations of Abraham’s covenant.  
First, the Covenant Hypothesis upsets rigid binary test expectations. Many readers 
expect binary test results from Abraham’s test: either a pass or fail based on exact 
literalistic compliance. The Covenant Hypothesis understands God’s speech as a 
carefully nuanced assessment that Abraham certainly passed his test even with an 
imperfect score, actualizing six of the seven covenant lessons. That this outcome was 
praised by God through divine superlatives is unexpected and speaks well of God’s 
graciousness without reifying every one of Abraham’s test actions as ideal. The Covenant 
Hypothesis further suggests that Abraham’s literalistic compliance initially misdirected, 
then self-corrected when confronted by divine prohibition (v. 11-12). This means 
literalistic compliance is not evil or wrong, but certainly risky. In the place of literalistic 
obedience, the Covenant Hypothesis deduces from God’s final conclusion (which 
exhibits traces to previous revelations) that integrative covenantal obedience was the 
kind of obedience God desired and praised Abraham for, which Abraham shows he was 
fully capable of. 
Second, the Covenant Hypothesis destabilizes hierarchical ordering of binary 
religious values and indicates a way to re-conceptualize them. What are these hierarchical 
values? Value binaries construe the Aqedah as an inescapable bind that required 
Abraham to preferentially choose his love of God over his love for Isaac, obedience to 
divine commands over obedience to human compassion, and morality for God’s sake 
over morality for humanity’s sake. The Christian interpretation of resurrection hope may 
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not require a choice between two options, but in the traditional interpretations of the 
Aqedah it often aligns them in paradoxical justification: Abraham’s hope of Isaac’s future 
resurrection provides moral justification for killing that same life in the present as 
ordered by God’s command. Derrida’s insight that every concept carries a trace of its 
opposite or related meanings renders absolute love as requiring death to all other loves,77 
religious meaning as based on “no-meaning” (divine secrets beyond human 
comprehension),78 and every responsible selective decision requiring an irresponsible 
sacrifice of every other alternate option.79 In contrast, the Covenant Hypothesis melds 
love for God with love for Isaac in mediation where God’s character of love and justice 
becomes the very basis for saving Isaac’s life. It sees prophetic intercession as a 
covenant-derived response to divine threats to the covenant, and covenant morality 
appropriates God’s moral objective to bless every human being. Regarding the Christian 
juxtaposition of resurrection hope as justification for killing, the Covenant Hypothesis 
recognizes Abraham’s resurrection hope stemmed from God-fearing motives, but even 
this God-fearing rationalization was countermanded by God through the angel (do not do 
anything to him!). 
Third, Derrida’s treatment of the Aqedah infers three aporias that expose the 
inherent limits of human finitude. Human finitude explains Derrida’s observations that 
                                                 
77 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 154.  
78 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 129.  
79 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 126.  
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(1) the human capacity to love is not infinite—different loves must compete for primacy 
which implies extinction of some is always a possibility, (2) human meaning is 
contingent on the network of human language that harbors no meaning in itself for it is 
not directly anchored to a referrent outside itself, (3) finite human resources require 
selective decisions that by necessity reject other options. However, the Covenant 
Hypothesis shows that God can modify each of them: (1) God can increase the finite 
human capacity to love and enlarge finite perspectives and options for expressing 
authentic love that is inclusive in nature, (2) God offers meaningful revelation in human 
language, anchored in the certainty of Himself as a trustworthy communicator, and (3) 
God can exceed foreseeable options by divine providence such as the hidden ram in a 
bush. 
Fourth, most traditional interpretations assume God’s will and Abraham’s will are 
perfectly aligned in literal obedience in the Aqedah. Both Kierkegaard and Derrida 
assume one uniform unbroken trajectory of the two participants. The Covenant 
Hypothesis cracks opens this dogmatic, monolithic assumption by recognizing two 
trajectories intertwine until the altar site, where they diverge over one missed covenant 
option, reaching for the knife to kill his son versus interceding for his son’s life based on 
God’s character—Gen 18. Abraham demonstrated literalistic obedience but God desired 
covenantal obedience culminating in paternal prophetic intercession at the altar. The 
Covenant Hypothesis thus clarifies an original ethical divine purpose for the Aqedah test, 
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though Abraham’s literalistic obedience did accept divine correction to not kill Isaac and 
discovered God’s ram.  
In conclusion, the Covenant Hypothesis re-constructs Derrida’s deconstruction of 
the Aqedah on the basis of God’s own interpretation and covenant test norm without 
burying the insights of deconstruction or regressing back into a dogmatically closed and 
rigid system of thought. The Covenant Hypothesis satisfyingly explains why the secret 
purpose of the test had to remain secret even from Abraham. It was because the Aqedah 
was a test of Abraham’s integrative incorporation of his faith into his character, as 
revealed through phronesis. Thus, the Covenant Hypothesis remains an open, permeable 
and porous interpretation because it inaugurates new connections between the Aqedah 
text and its context, reveals the assimilative integrative obedience desired by God, 
recognizes experiential variability in human hermeneutics, demonstrates the synthetic 
mediatory nature of memory (the phenomenon that makes present what is absent) for 
meaning, and the grace of God that delivers God-fearing believers in spite of themselves.  
This section has demonstrated the interdependent relationship between the meso-
hermeneutical level of theological interpretation and macro-hermeneutical level of 
philosophy. The Covenant Hypothesis from the meso-hermeneutical analysis shows 
integrative, evaluative and generative capacity for the macro-hermeneutical level of 
Aqedah philosophy in conversation with Kierkegaard and Derrida’s work. As a theory it 
appears capable of solving and explaining both problems and aporias from the text that 
have stumped other interpretations. Thomas Kuhn believed such problem-revealing and 
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solving capacity of any theoretical model to be its strongest argument as an accurate 
representation of reality compared to other models with lesser abilities in this sense.80  
Now it is time to turn to an exploration of the macro-hermeneutical implications 
of the Aqedah by direct examination of the text. The next section will depict the theory 
and methodology of the macro-hermeneutical level of the Axial Model for the Aqedah. 
Then the text will be plumbed for macro-hermeneutical insights. 
Model Cores and Macro-hermeneutical Methodology 
Sound “interpretation follows the path of thought opened up by the text.”81 How 
does the text open up the metaphysical conceptual lens of the interpreter? This section 
will first elucidate the metaphysical nature and relationship between the Axial Model’s 
two cores on the macro-hermeneutical level and clarify the methodology of 
hermeneutical philosophy. Then the metaphysical aspects of the text will be extracted 
systematically. 
Model Cores 
The simplest description of the Axial Model is that it consists of two cores 
interacting on a continuous spiral ramp. One core is the biblical text, the long axial 
                                                 
80 Thomas Kuhn believed paradigms or models were to be considered as advancement in truth 
based on their ability to resolve or better explain multiple anomalies arising from the object of study that 
had frustrated or were ignored by previous models. “A scientific theory is usually felt to be better than its 
predecessors not only in the sense that it is a better instrument for discovering and solving puzzles but also 
because it is somehow a better representation of what nature is really like.” Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions, 206. 
81 Ricoeur, “What is a Text?” 162. 
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anchor and norm which emanates biblical worlds of meaning that form the spiral ramp. 
The other core is the punctate center of the interpreter’s sphere, the self-identity of the 
human interpreter attached to its personal worlds of meaning. This section will probe the 
metaphysical nature of these two cores and their relationship to each other.  
In previous chapters, the two cores have been depicted as a solid rod and a solid 
ball.82 Yet the axial core, the text of Scripture, is to be received by faithful believers as a 
dynamic divine communication with transforming power. How can a work of inert 
writing change a human being? Ricoeur’s answer to this problem elucidated three levels 
of relations between the text and the interpreter in hermeneutics. First, an interpreter can 
perceive the text as a unique work83 with its own internal structure and relations—this 
was the main focus of the micro-hermeneutical analysis. Second, a text can be related to 
the community of other literary works84—this was the main focus of meso-hermeneutical 
analysis. Third, a text can be restored to a form of speech, as a “living communication” 
which “opens out onto other things” if it is appropriated by the self in self-
                                                 
82 This agrees with Ricoeur’s definition of an objective text as “any discourse fixed by writing” 
and the obvious fact that the interpreter is a physical human being. Ricoeur, “What is a Text?” 145. 
83 Ricoeur takes this first depiction to an extreme, saying “We can, as readers, remain in suspense 
of the text, treating it as a worldless and authorless object.” Ricoeur, “What is a Text?” 152. In narrative 
biblical micro-hermeneutics this is not the case as exegetes carefully attempt to reconstruct the historical, 
personal and linguistic world of the narrator of the text in order to understand the text’s internal logic and 
relations more accurately. 
84 “This relation of text to text, within the effacement of the world about which we speak, 
engenders the quasi-world of texts or literature.” Ricoeur, “What is a Text?” 149. In biblical meso-
hermeneutics, the community of texts that constitute the canon were primary resources and life experiences 
provided intuitive patterns for personal immersion into the text.   
 298 
 
understanding85—this is the focus of this current chapter on macro-hermeneutics. Ricoeur 
tags this level as the place where “hermeneutics and reflective philosophy are correlative 
and reciprocal.”86 In the appropriation of a text, the reader-interpreter voluntarily 
overcomes a natural “estrangement from the system of values upon which the text is 
based” and allows the fusion of “textual interpretation with self-interpretation.”87 This is 
how semiotics becomes semantics for the hearer and symbol becomes speech again.88 
This means the appropriating interpreter may feel confronted by the biblical text 
and at times, even surgically splayed. The writer of Hebrews proclaims, “The word of 
God is living and active, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing to the division of 
soul and of spirit, of joints and of marrow, and discerning the thoughts and intentions of 
the heart.”89 Yet, Scripture’s ability to provide deeper self-understanding through 
disclosure is one of the prized rewards the hermeneuticist seeks in coming to the text.  
If the interpreter is on one side of the text as a receiver, what is on the other side 
of the text? A word implies a speaker, and life must exist on both sides of language for it 
                                                 
85 Ricoeur, “What is a Text?” 152, 158, 159.  
86 Ricoeur, “What is a Text?” 158. Gadamer, as we have previously noted, believes appropriation 
does and must mark every level of the interpretive process especially when studying legal or religious texts 
that have proscriptive intent. Ricoeur’s residual symbolic meaning is the final product of his interpretive 
arc, he tags appropriation to the last step because symbolic meaning is eminently transferable.  
87 Ricoeur, “What is a Text?” 159. This does not mean that the interpreter will necessarily meld 
and become aligned to the text, but that true understanding requires authentic engagement, evaluation, 
insight, and response.  
88 Ricoeur, “What is a Text?” 159. In Ricoeur’s discussion this dynamic can be true of any text. 
89 Heb 4:12. Luther saw the Word of God “not merely a written word belonging to the past, but a 
viva vox evangelii, a word of God which encounters us here and now.” Anthony Thiselton, The Two 
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to mean anything. God is taken as the originating source of the message and “no creature 
is hidden from his sight, but all are naked and exposed to the eyes of him to whom we 
must give account.”90 When self-appropriation of the text calls the interpreter to be 
responsible to the ultimate source of the text, the arc of responsive transformation in the 
creature is complete. 
Since God is on the other side of the biblical text, the axial core of the 
hermeneutical spiral ramp is more accurately a filled straw (see figure 5.1 below), a straw 
of the delicate web of human language (in another figure of speech) wrapped lightly 
around non-corporeal Divinity. Human language becomes God’s chamber.91 Scripture 
attests that God deputized humans92 to write under divine inspiration (even what they did 
not fully understand93) and God inspired the believing community through the Holy Spirit 
                                                 
Horizons, 100. 
90 Heb 4:13. What the Bible attests to is that God sees us even when we do not see him, but what 
we can perceive is His word, we can hear him through the biblical text and other channels. “God sees me, 
he looks into me in secret, but I don’t see him, I don’t see him see me, even though he sees me facing me 
and not like an analyst on whom I will have turned my back. Since I don’t see him see me, I can, or must, 
only hear him. But most often I have to be led to hear him, by insinuation [on doit me le donner á 
entendre], I hear tell or hear my self say what he says through the voice of another, another other, a 
messenger, an angel, a prophet, a messiah, or a postman, a bearer of tidings, an evangelist, an intermediary 
who speaks between God and myself. . . . God looks at me and I don’t see him, and it is on the basis of this 
gaze that singles me out [ce regard qui me regarde] that my responsibility comes into being.” Jacques 
Derrida, The Gift of Death, 91.  
91 “Language is the house of Being.” Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” Basic Writings, 
ed. D. F. Krell (London, UK: Routledge, 1978), 217. 
92 “Knowing this first of all, that no prophecy of Scripture comes from someone's own 
interpretation. For no prophecy was ever produced by the will of man, but men spoke from God as they 
were carried along by the Holy Spirit.” 2 Pet 1:20-21. 
93 1 Pet 1:10-12. 
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to ascribe Scripture’s meaning to God, thereby receiving it as speech from Him addressed 
directly to them. All believers are thus appropriating interpreters. 
The second core of the Axial model is the core of the interpreter. Genesis 
describes human beings as compositions of dust and divine breath, relapsing back to dust 
upon death.94 The biblical connotation of a fragile constellation of material (dust) held 
together by divine immaterial life-force (breath) corresponds to Kintsch’s Constructive-
Integration Model,95 (see figure 5.1 below). In Kintsch’s Constructive-Integration Model 
a dynamic network of interconnected nodes of knowledge in the human mind works by 
being either activated or dampened by the semantics of a text. Then, a construct model is 
built from the activated nodes utilizing inferences from the interpreter’s personal 
experience. Finally, the construct model is then integrated into a mental situation model 
or symbols which can be recalled as memory. The core of the interpreter can be depicted 
as a three-dimensional web of responsive knowledge nodes, held together by God’s 
                                                 
94 Gen 3:19. 
95 Walter Kintsch and Teun A. van Dijk, “Toward a Model of Text Comprehension and 
Production” Psychological Review 55, no. 5 (Sept 1978): 363-394; Walter Kintsch, “The Role of 
Knowledge in Discourse Comprehension: A Construction-Integration Model” Psychological Review 95, 
no. 2 (1988): 163-182; Allan M. Collins, “A Spreading-Activation Theory of Semantic Processing” 
Psychological Review 82, no. 6 (1975): 407-428.   
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breath of life, that forges internal models of reality from the fusion of horizons at its 
periphery. 
 
                     Biblical text core 
 
 
                  Interpreter’s core 
 
Fig. 5.1 Two Cores of Axial Model. Biblical text core is human language wrapped 
around God like a straw and the interpreter’s core is a network of knowledge nodes. 
 
Now that the cores have been depicted, how do the cores relate to each other? In 
order to be internally consistent, the relations on the macro-hermeneutical level of the 
Axial Model must remain just as faithful to the revelations of the biblical text as the 
previous two levels of micro and meso-hermeneutics have been.  
Ontologically, the axial core of the spiral is divine, eternal, and self-sustaining 
even though it is figuratively wrapped in human language that has a temporal telos.96 
                                                 
96 “For truly, I say to you, until heaven and earth pass away, not an iota, not a dot, will pass from 
the Law until all is accomplished.” Matt 5:18. The text has a fulfillment, a telos, but the center of the 
biblical text is eternal. 
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Ontologically, the interpreter’s core is a dynamic and unstable mixture of material held 
together by divine breath—“because he maintains me in existence, God confers on the 
certainty of myself the permanence that it does not hold in itself.”97 Thus, if the Genesis 
account of human creation and the transformation of Abraham through his covenant 
journey can be taken as analogous processes, the ontological relation between the cores 
remains a unidirectional flow of created and re-creating life force from the eternal self-
sustaining source, God, to the contingent creature, the human being, who beomes fully 
actualized through openess to God. 
Epistemologically, Paul describes human knowledge as a mirror that is not yet 
fully transparent but will someday be so. In 1 Cor 13:12 he writes, “For now we see in a 
mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I 
have been fully known.” This biblical metaphor about knowledge is analogous to a one 
way mirror.98 Since to recognize something as intelligible, the interpreter must use 
interpretive patterns to try to decode the meaning of the text,99 the biblical text 
predominantly interprets the reader to themselves, while offering only as much of God as 
                                                 
97 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 9. Ricoeur attributes this line of thinking to Descartes. 
98 A one-way mirror (confusingly also called a two-way mirror) is a piece of glass that is reflective 
on one side and transparent on the other. Usually, the reflective side is better illuminated so the reflective 
effect is strong, and the mirror’s transparent properties are minimized. The ratio of lighting between the 
two sides of the glass affects whether the reflective or transparent properties predominate. “Mirror” in How 
It Works: Science and Technology, 3rd ed., vol. 11 (Tarrytown, NY: Marshall Cavendish, 2003), 1463-1464. 
99 The crucial role of interpretive patterns for human understanding was discussed in the Theory 
and Method subsection of Understanding in Chapter 4: Meso-hermeneutics. This does not mean that 
meaning is necessarily determined by interpretive patterns for such patterns can be modified and changed 
by their encounter with the text.   
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the human comprehension can handle without being overwhelmed. But someday, as Paul 
anticipates, direct knowledge will be accessible.  
Axiologically, the Bible works as a magnifying lens100 that magnifies details of 
God’s character-based actions and engraves101 the holiness and glory of God’s character 
into the emotive-core of the interpreter. The Holy Spirit can tenderize and render the 
interpreter inscribable: “And I will give them one heart, and a new spirit I will put within 
them. I will remove the heart of stone from their flesh and give them a heart of flesh.”102 
By appropriating as commanded, “You shall therefore lay up these words of mine in your 
heart and in your soul,”103 believers will start to reflect God’s character. To this end Paul 
urges believers “to put off your old self, which belongs to your former manner of life and 
is corrupt through deceitful desires, and to be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and to 
put on the new self, created after the likeness of God in true righteousness and 
                                                 
100 A magnifying glass is a convex lens (converging) that makes things look larger if viewed 
through them and concentrates parallel light toward a focal pinpoint with increased heat. If this focal 
concentration is held to the surface of an object, the heat produced may burn or inscribe into it. David 
Krashkevich and Susan R. Loehr, “Ophthalmic Glasses” in The Properties of Optical Glass (New York, 
NY: Springer, 1998), 263-270. This concept of inscription is being used here metaphorically, where the 
Holy Spirit channels the power of God’s word to change the heart of the reader.  
101 The engraving of moral divine law on the heart is a well-known biblical metaphor. “For this is 
the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, declares the Lord: I will put my law 
within them, and I will write it on their hearts. And I will be their God, and they shall be my people.” Jer 
31:33. 
102 Ezek 11:19; 36:26. 
103 It continues, “and you shall bind them as a sign on your hand, and they shall be as frontlets 
between your eyes.” Deut 11:18. 
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holiness.”104 These ontological, epistemological and axiological hermeneutics necessitate 
a hermeneutical methodology of philosophy. 
Macro-Hermeneutical Methodology 
Ontology, epistemology, and axiology, comprise the Y-axis105 of both cores and 
refers to the world of meaning above and below the origin, the metaphysical assumptions 
about ultimate reality and the fundamental nature of the cosmos. Because the Y-axis is 
the conceptual lens106 of the biblical text and of the interpreter, a hermeneutical 
                                                 
104 Eph 4:22-24. 
105 The Y-axis was first described relative to the Z and X axes in the subsection “A Model 
Hermeneutic” near the beginning of Chapter 3: Micro-Hermeneutics, see pages 70-74.    
106 Conceptual lens refers to the mental framework or paradigm at the most basic level of 
understanding. Historically, the term philosophy referred to rational, critical thought with claims to 
universal validity while worldview had a more personal and historically relative connotation in reference to 
a point of view. There are several ways that these two concepts can be related to each other; I am partial to 
the one that treats philosophy as the rational distillation or yield from the ground of a personal worldview 
that accepts Scripture as foundational. See Albert M. Wolters, “On the Idea of Worldview and its Relation 
to Philosophy” in Stained Glass: Worldviews and Social Science, eds. Paul A Marshall, Sander Griffioen, 
Richard J. Mouw (Lanham, MD: University Press of American, 1989), 14-25.  
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methodology is needed that that expedites re-calibration of the interpreter’s conceptual 
lens (Y-axis) by the text’s conceptual lens (Y-axis).107   
The methodology for hermeneutical philosophy is not synonymous with the 
methodology for traditional philosophy. My understanding of Anthony Thiselton’s three 
methodological shifts of hermeneutical philosophy108 follows. 
1. The epistemological flow is not exclusively understood as from the reader to 
the text but also from the text to the human inquirer, who, in understanding the subject 
matter, sees their previous pre-understanding of the subject matter challenged, and by 
extension—themselves as interpreted by the text.109 This kind of engagement can only 
result from intentional appropriation.110  
2. Traditional philosophy focuses on abstract problems which have been extracted 
from their origin in human situations, but hermeneutical philosophy explores those 
“‘questions that arise’ within a chain of question-and-answer that reflects concrete 
                                                 
107  “The categories in which the Biblical man conceived of God, man, and the world are so 
different from the presuppositions of metaphysics upon which most of Western philosophy is based that 
certain insights that are meaningful within the Biblical mind seem to be meaningless to the Greek mind. It 
would be an achievement of the first magnitude to reconstruct the peculiar nature of Biblical thinking and 
to spell out its divergence from all other types of thinking. It would open new perspectives for the 
understanding of moral, social and religious issues and enrich the whole of our thinking. Biblical thinking 
may have a part to play in shaping our philosophical views about the world.” Heschel, God in Search of 
Man (New York, NY: Farrar, Status and Giroux, 1083), 23 note 8.  
108 Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 7-12. 
109 “The truth has us ourselves as its object.” Ernst Fuchs, “The Hermeneutical Problem” in The 
Future of our Religious Past. Essays in Honour of Rudolf Bultmann, ed. J. M. Robinson, (London, UK: 
SCM Press, 1971), 267-278. T. F. Torrance believed “the key to the interpretation of a text, whether of 
Plato or of St. Paul, is self-understanding.” Torrance quoted by Thiselton in The Two Horizons, 106. 
110 Again, “the texts must translate us before we can translate them.” Fuchs, “The Hermeneutical 
Problem,” 277. 
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situations in human life.” To achieve this, Gadamer suggests careful reflection on the 
hermeneutical experience can transform philosophical abstract problems back into their 
germinal situational questions.111 
3. Traditional philosophy aims for factual certainty in knowledge using 
Descartes’s method of the autonomous individual wielding radical doubt upon the object 
of study; a practitioner of hermeneutical philosophy recognizes the inherited 
understanding of their community as an unavoidable starting point for uncovering the 
provisional meaning of the study matter which reflexively interprets the interpreting self 
and community.  
The following discussions arise from applying the hermeneutical methodology to 
the metaphysical world of meaning in the first verse of the Aqedah.112 The conversation 
will unpack the first verse of the Aqedah ontologically, epistemologically, and 
axiologically to follow those lines of thought as “opened up by the text.”113 As the reader 
                                                 
111 “Reflection on hermeneutical experience transforms problems back to questions that arise and 
that derive their source from this motivation.” Gadamer, Truth and Method, 377. Collingwood wrote that 
truth belongs “not to any single proposition, nor even . . . to a complex of propositions taken together; but 
to a complex of questions and answers.” Collingwood quoted by Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 309.   
112 Due to space limitations all nineteen verses of the Aqedah cannot be handled this way. 
113 Ricoeur, “What is a Text?” 162.  
 307 
 
will soon see, one verse is more than enough to initiate the reader into the worlds of 
meaning above and below the Aqedah text.  
Ontology of the Aqedah Event 
The first verse starts with (lit.)“After these things, it happened.” From micro-
hermeneutical exegesis we know this phrase is an idiom of speech which bookends the 
Aqedah (Gen 22:1, 20). As a grammatical idiom, it would be imprudent to dissect it 
minutely for philosophical insight. But the referential meaning of the phrase must be 
questioned. What exactly are these things?114 Inferring from its context, it seems to refer 
to previous events.115 Events are unitary clusters of entities, speech and actions in the 
shared common world. This initial hunch is corroborated later (Gen. 22:16) where God 
refers to Abraham’s test responses as one thing, “because you have done this thing . . .” 
This test event—“this thing”—is to be added to the previous events of Abraham’s life, 
referred to previously as “these things.”116 They are aligned linguistically. Because this 
idiom envelopes the Aqedah event, if the previous stories about Ishmael and the purchase 
                                                 
114 In Hebrew, the root term dābār can refer to things, matter, or words, depending on its context.  
Scholars have shown that it is false to claim a “close relationship between the vocabulary grids and 
morphological and syntactical structures of a language, on the one hand, and the thought structure and 
apprehension of reality of the users of language, on the other.” It is wiser to recognize language meaning 
from their functions within the “given tradition of language-uses” or, as Wittgenstein calls them, language 
games. Anthony Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 134-5. A cautionary debunking of the attempt to glean 
philosophical insight about Hebrew thought from the etymology alone of dābār is provided by James Barr, 
The Semantics of Biblical Language, 129-140. Here, I am staying within synchronic functionality for 
extracting ontological presuppositions.  
115 Abimelech also refers to Abraham’s deception as a thing (Gen 20:11). 
116 Only the passage of time can distinguish whether an experienced event turns out to a dream, a 
vision or actual reality. Meaning is context-dependent, but significance relies on criteria which requires 
some historical distance to apply appropriately. Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 74.   
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of a burial site in Hittite territory are accepted as historical facts in our same shared 
world, the narrator is placing the Aqedah event in the same category.117 Thus the 
perlocutionary force of the idiom, “after these things, it happened” is that the events 
flanking the phrase are to be taken as ontologically equivalent.118  
But even in our shared world, people can have consciously altered experiences. 
For instance, a dissociative fugue119 is a psychogenic event where a fully conscious 
person embarks on unplanned travel due to an altered symbolic state of mind about their 
identity and exhibits amnesia post-recovery. Could the Aqedah be a dissociative fugue of 
Abraham? Since there are no directly accessible traces or artifacts from that event outside 
the biblical text, the reader is left addressing this question to the text. The narrator’s 
                                                 
117 The appeal to personal experience as evidence for religious reality is not self-authenticating or 
decisive, but the conceptual scheme which this experience fits into, is what provides the comparative basis 
for rational belief. “A numinous experience, for example, justifies God exists only if E justifies the basic 
conceptual (or some conceptual) setting in which ‘God’ is referential and God exists an essential tenet. A 
conceptual scheme, I take it, is (roughly) a set of propositions relevant to explaining or interpreting a range 
of data, solving (or dissolving) a set of problems, or articulating a view of what there is.” Keith E. Yandell, 
“Religious Experience and Rational Appraisal,” Religious Studies 10 (May 1974): 185.   
118 Due to the assumption of truth in communication, when a story is read it is initially presumed 
to be factual until linguistic details appear which jar against our actual experience of the world. Only then 
do we project upon the text paradigms of fables, legend, or fiction to see what linguistic framework the text 
best fits into. This means the worldview of the reader (naturalistic or theistic) and the literary paradigms 
they are familiar with (literary genres) are the initial lens brought to the text.  
119 A dissociative fugue is a rare and limited psychogenic state where there is a sudden unexpected 
travel away from home or work that lasts hours, days or even months with a change of identity during it 
and associative amnesia post-recovery. The patient is conscious and highly purposeful during the trip 
unlike the confused aimless wandering that is associated with other forms of amnesia. The patient often 
assumes a different identity (partial or total) usually with symbolic value. As to the cause, “It is likely that 
family dynamics play a large role psychologically in its instigation.” Medical Factors and Psychological 
Disorders: A Handbook for Psychologists, eds. Alan S. Bellack and R. L. Morrison (New York: Plenum 
Press, 1987), 125; Donald W. Black and Jon E. Grant, DSM-5 Guidebook: The Essential Companion to the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2014), 195. 
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attestation120 doesn’t qualify it as altered consciousness121 but relates the plot in a matter-
of-fact manner: “God tested Abraham.” Narrative testimony does not match the level of 
Cartesian verifiable proof, but as with any claim for a unique occurrence in history, the 
way to ascertain factuality is to analyze the testimony itself or compare conflicting 
testimonies.122 At this juncture the reader faces an either/or quandary on whether to trust 
the everyday ordinary manner of the narrator’s personal testimony123 or to dismiss it. 
Because the hermeneutical approach is to listen receptively, suspending judgment 
until the end,124 a reader may search within the text for any externally referenced evidence 
for the Aqedah as a credible event. The metalepsis of Gen 22:14 claims the Aqedah event 
                                                 
120 Attestation is the kind of certainty expressed by “I believe in …” For example, a criterion of 
truth can be confidence in a testimony, “I believe in the explanation of the narrator of the Aqedah until I 
find reasons not to.” This is a level of mediated credence between absolute certainty as asserted by the 
Cartesian cogito and the shattered cogito of Nietzsche’s suspicion that sees all facts as unreliable private 
interpretations. Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 13-15.  
121 The Genesis narrator is capable of distinguishing and relating to the reader different mental 
conditions of previous divine revelations. Abraham heard and saw God (Gen 12:1,7; 17:1), had visions 
(Gen 15:1), experienced deep sleep or trances (Gen 15:12). Abimelech conversed with God in a dream 
(Gen 20:3). It is implied by the timing of Abraham arising early in the morning after the communication, 
that the test command of Gen 22:2 came to him during the night, though the modality (dream, vision, 
thought, auditory speech, etc.) isn’t specified in this case. The ensuing Aqedah journey to the mountain is 
relayed through concrete everyday-like details. 
122 It is too narrow-minded to accept as historically fact only those recorded events homologous to 
our personal experience, this would classify most literature of other historical eras and cultures as fiction. 
Facts are recognized by context and that context includes “thoughts,” “theology,” “cultural outlook,” and 
“the historical events which surround them.” Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 80. 
123 Ricoeur discriminatingly illuminates that a personal testimony does not appeal to the criteria of 
verifiability but submits to a question of veracity. In other words, is the speaker or source attested to be 
trustworthy based on previous interactions? Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 72.  
124 The strategy of holding judgment until the end of the story was fruitful for the micro and meso-
hermeneutical levels, for it was the ending of the Aqedah that provided the key to the rest. The 
hermeneutical stance is to avoid premature conclusions in order to allow honest open dialog between the 
personal and biblical worlds of meaning as normed by the whole text. 
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was the cause for a known proverb in the narrator’s own time, long after the original 
event. This community confession is independently verifiable by his readers for he 
appeals to their recognition of it, “as it is said to this day, ‘On the mount of the Lord it 
shall be provided’” (Gen 22:14). Widespread external credence buttresses the internal 
testimony that the Aqedah was accepted as a legitimate historical event by the 
community at large. In addition, the community proverb implies the Aqedah experience 
awaits anyone willing go up to the mountain of the Lord.  
This assertion of an ontological event satisfies Wolfhart Pannenberg’s claim that 
singular historical events believed to be “divine intervention in this-worldly events” are 
“fundamental to every religious understanding of the world.”125 Pannenberg embraces the 
historical particularity of such events as a positive for religion, because “what is 
historically unique is as far as anything possibly can be from myth.”126 Well attested 
events and words intertwined together become the embryonic nidus of religious 
traditions. As such religious traditions mature, they function like Wittgenstein’s 
                                                 
125 Pannenberg cited by Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 81-82. 
126 Pannenberg cited by Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 81-82.  
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language-games, a conceptual system that makes sense of its own parts, self-critiques 
inconsistencies, and judges new phenomenon for authenticity and orthodoxy.127  
Ontology of God 
Divine events of self-revelation anchor accurate and correct understanding of 
God, which is one of the goals of religious philosophy. Abraham Heschel carefully lays 
out, “The religious situation precedes the religious conception, and it would be a false 
abstraction for example to deal with the idea of God regardless of the situation in which 
such an idea occurs. Our first goal, then, is not to evolve the philosophy of a doctrine, 
interpretations of a dogma, but the philosophy of concrete events, acts, insights, of that 
which is a part of the man.”128 In fact, the fundamental theology of the Old Testament 
“goes directly back to ‘the fathers,’ springing full-blown as it were from them” for the 
theology of the patriarchs was largely inferential—not speculative.129  
“After these things” 
It comes as no surprise that the first phrase of the Aqedah, “After these things” (v. 
1) refers the reader to the shared history130 of Abraham and God. Memory is the “recipe” 
                                                 
127 Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 81. 
128 Heschel, God in Search of Man, 7.  
129 John N. Oswalt, “Abraham’s Experience of Yahweh: an Argument for the Historicity of the 
Patriarchal Narratives” in Perspectives on Our Father Abraham: Essays in Honor of Marvin R. Wilson, ed. 
Steven A. Hunt (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 34.  
130 “The veracity of what Confucius, or Buddha, or Muhammad taught about the nature of reality 
has nothing to do with whether those persons actually lived or not. . . . the teachings are entirely 
independent of whatever those formative experiences may have been or may have not been. But that is not 
so with Abraham. His experiences are the religious teachings of Genesis 12-24 and everything that follows 
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for identity.131 In terms of identity, the Abrahamic narratives offer almost no physical 
description about God or Abraham, even though we are told God incarnated and assumed 
human form and ate a homemade meal from Abraham (Gen 18). What is given instead in 
Genesis is an abundance of divine communication and deeds.  
If an ontological philosophy of God ought to be grounded in God’s self-revelatory 
events, the nature of that self-revelation should direct the inquiry. Since divine self-
revelations in the Abrahamic narratives are predominantly divine words and deeds,132 
identity questions of “who” is doing the creating, speaking, promising and testing, 
inferred from historical actions133 will be more fruitful than questions on “what” is God’s 
essence or substance, which necessitates descriptive explanations. Thus the Abrahamic 
cycle provides a functional profile of who God is. From the initial call to leave Haran 
                                                 
that block of material is dependent on it.” John N. Oswalt, “Abraham’s Experience of Yahweh,” 34. 
131 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 81. 
132 One of the clearest biblical instances of divine self-revelation was a verbal proclamation about 
the moral, functional aspects of Himself. See Exod 34:5-7.   
133 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 143. 
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(Gen 12:1-3) to the final provision of the ram in the Aqedah (Gen 22:13), God’s actions 
are those of a concrete promise-maker and promise-keeper for Abraham.134  
Without ignoring the larger picture of God as provided by the Christian canon, it 
is instructive to highlight the regional135 characteristics of divine ontology grounded in the 
Abrahamic narratives. The “necessary and self-existent being which is the God of the 
philosophers” communicated to Abraham multiple times, relating directly to him in a 
temporal, personal, powerful, yet everyday-like manner136 that built up trust. Unlike the 
philosophers who speculate about God as a possibility, Abraham’s story started with a 
                                                 
134 It is interesting that God’s initial promises to Abraham were, in John Oswalt’s opinion, “neither 
spiritual nor transcendent. They were almost crushingly mundane, a baby, a homeland, a reputation (Gen. 
12:1-3). There is nothing ‘religious’ here at all. There is no forgiveness of sin, or of special favor with the 
divine, no promise of a blissful after life. Nor is this promise made only once. As the narrative continues, 
those promises are repeated in one way or another seven more times.” John N. Oswalt, “Abraham’s 
Experience of Yahweh,” 34. Bollnow systematized this approach in his pedagogical anthropology as 
“appealing pedagogy,” a way to teach “which directly appeals to the aspirations of the human being.” Jani 
Koskela, “Discontinuity as Foundation to Pedagogy” (PhD dissertation, University of Oulu, Finland, 2012), 
46, accessed June 22, 2019, http://jultika.oulu.fi/files/isbn9789514298769pdf.  
135 This term regional is used here to describe the localized, specific scope of divine ontology 
limited to what is expressed in the Abrahamic narratives. Husserl differentiated between formal and 
regional ontology, regional referring to cognitive partitions of the whole. “Regional or material ontologies 
are synthetic a priori disciplines about particular regions of objects. Each region is constituted in one way 
or another in accordance with consciousness and thus delineates in advance (a priori) our modes of access 
to it (or, equivalently, its manner of presenting itself to scientific scrutiny). On this material or regional 
level, then, Husserl’s working hypothesis is that of an ontological pluralist.” Daniel O. Dahlstrom, 
“Hermeneutic Ontology,” Theory and Applications of Ontology: Philosophical Perspectives, eds. R. Poli, J. 
Sebt (New York: Springer, 2010), 397; see also Boris Hennig, “What is Formal Ontology?” 
(Heusenstamm, BRD: Ontos Verlag, 2008), 46, in Applied Ontology: An Introduction, accessed 31 March 
2019,  https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/90d2/d70dc86b2820d5e49c8aa54e38af67f66fbd.pdf.   
136 Keith Ward continues with the paradox: “After all, the One who is said to have walked and 
talked as a person with Abraham is also the one whom no man can see and live and of whom no image can 
be made.” Keith Ward, “The God of the Philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” The 
Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 8 (1999): 169. 
 314 
 
phenomenological confrontation of “overwhelming reality”137 that voiced Abraham’s 
deepest hidden wishes. Through history, philosophical concepts of God have 
continuously morphed, from first cause or True Being, to infinity, then to Being itself,138 
but for Abraham, God remained an interactive personal deity throughout his lifetime.  
The first time Abraham described his personal God to others, it was as Lord, God 
Most High, Possessor of Heaven and Earth (Gen 14:22). This evokes themes from the 
beginning of Genesis where God is the relational Creator of a good creation, including 
humans.139 Creation and the Abrahamic narratives share interesting parallels. In Genesis 
1-2, God created the physical world and all its inhabitants through His word, evaluated 
Adam and Eve as very good, then allowed them to be tested (Gen 3). At the end of their 
failed test God assessed them and made a covenant of redemption with humankind (Gen 
3:8-19). In the Abrahamic narratives, God creates a unique covenant partner, forging the 
identity of Abraham out of Abram through divine promises culminating in Isaac. Then, 
according to the Covenant Hypothesis, God tests Abraham to assess the degree of 
covenant integration in Abraham’s character which also ends with a divine assessment 
and re-establishment of the divine covenant (Gen 22:15-18). The divine assessment 
                                                 
137 Ward, “The God of the Philosophers,” 157. 
138 Wolfhart Pannenberg, “God of the Philosophers,” First Things, (June 2007), accessed 4 March 
2019, https://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/06/002-god-of-the-philosophers.   
139 “Creativeness comes before law, guilt, and even redemption . . . as radical as evil may be, it 
will never be more originary than goodness, which is the Ursprung in the field of ethics; the orientation to 
the good as being rooted in the structure of the human being, or in biblical terms: creation, created.” Paul 
Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought, eds. John Wall, William Schweiker, and W. David Hall (New 
York: Routledge, 2002), 283.  
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evokes the triumphant Seed of the Woman motif first encountered in Genesis 3:15 by the 
phrase “Your Seed shall possess the gates of his enemies” (Gen 22:18).140 The identity of 
God is recognized in the consistency of His actions and promises that link different 
events. 
What does a promise-maker/keeper accomplish? A promise-maker stabilizes an 
uncertain future in time by commiting themselves in a specifically reliable way or action 
to others. This carries ontological, epistemological and axiological implications. Ricoeur 
spells out what this role means through the ontology of identity in relation to time, 
“Keeping one’s promise, as was mentioned above, does indeed appear to stand as a 
challenge to time, a denial of change; even if my desire were to change, even if I were to 
change my opinion or my inclination, ‘I will hold firm.’”141 Epistemically, the promise-
keeper crystallizes assumed generalized expectations into definite verbal pledges. 
Ethically, a promise-keeper upholds ethical notions of communication truthfulness and 
fidelity to deposited confidence, in other words, they try to “safeguard the institution of 
                                                 
140 An examination of whether the seven covenant epiphanies of Abraham have any relation to the 
seven days of creation would be an interesting future study. 
141 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 124.  
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language” itself which is usually taken to be truthful at face value for they “respond to the 
trust that the other places in [their] faithfulness.”142  
“God tested Abraham” 
From what has just been explicated above, it now becomes startlingly clear that in 
issuing the test command to offer Isaac as a burnt offering, God jeopardized God’s own 
identity as a promise-keeper. Before Abraham risked his reputation as a father, before 
Isaac risked his life on the altar, God risked His own moral reputation, the foundation of 
faith for salvation, by commanding human sacrifice. The long-term magnitude of this risk 
cannot be fully measured but it has been devastating.143 As the divine Tester, God risked 
losing not just Abraham to whom this test was directed but all the ensuing generations of 
readers who read this recorded account but don’t have an immediate Abraham-like 
experience with God to fall back on. Why does God risk His moral reputation when 
consistency in promise-makers is absolutely necessary for human trust?  
The why question sends the readers to search the text for a test purpose valuable 
enough to rationally offset the magnitude of divine risk. If the term of affection in v.2 
“whom you love” is assumed to be the purpose for the test, then God’s need for undiluted 
                                                 
142 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 124. Of the two main speakers in the Aqedah, God is more 
trustworthy in truthfulness.  
143 Many have pointed to God’s role in the Aqedah as a reason for their rejection of the God of the 
Bible. Among them are Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 242; 
Christopher Hitchens, God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (New York, NY: Hachette 
Book Group, 2007), 51, 53, 207, and Carol Delaney who poignantly inquires, “Why is the willingness to 
sacrifice the child, rather than the passionate protection of the child, at the foundation of faith?” at the 
conclusion of her book Abraham on Trial (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 252-253.  
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affection is worth appearing jealous and self-centered. If the test conclusion is taken to be 
v. 12, then Abraham’s obedience or “Fear of God” is worth the risk of sounding like Baal 
and Molech in demanding child sacrifice. If the answer is the substitionary ram as the 
symbolic meaning for the test, then the banishment of child sacrifice or demonstrating a 
typology for the crucifixion is pedagogically worth the risk of emotional trauma and of 
God appearing to be blood-thirsty. The Covenant Hypothesis does not stop at any of 
these way stations144 but extends the search to God’s final words (vv. 16-18).  
God’s final speech bears the all the logical earmarks of a valid test evaluation: a 
credible test evaluation comes from the test’s Tester (“By myself I swear, says the 
Lord”), refers to the test performance of the testee (“because you have done this thing”), 
allocates credit in a specific manner (six covenant themes and blessings) relative to a 
norm previously accessible to the testee (seven covenant epiphanies), and ends with 
summary judgment (“because you obeyed My voice”). From all of this, it appears that 
covenant-defined145 character is the real reason for the test—of both divine and human 
entities. The Aqedah assessed Abraham’s character in a manner that leads us to assesses 
God’s character.146 The test imposed a challenge which risked Abraham’s covenant 
                                                 
144 A way station is a stopping point within a journey. 
145 Outside the moral boundaries of God’s covenant relationship, love can slip into manipulation 
and deception (Abraham convinces Sarah, because of her love for him, to deceive others and be taken 
away), compliance can breed discord (Abraham complies with Sarah’s need for children and control, 
leading to Hagar’s near death), and fear (or the lack of the fear) of God can be used to justify ethnic 
discrimination (Abimelech is morally disrespected, so lied to). Within the covenant framework, the virtues 
of love, obedience, fear of God, resurrection, and substitutionary atonement resides ethically. 
146 Some interpretations of the Aqedah point out that when  Abraham tries to literally carry out the 
test command by raising the knife, that action forced God to intervene. Thus, after God tested Abraham, 
Abraham tested God (v. 10). The Covenant Hypothesis proposes that God risked Himself first through the 
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identity and God risked his own covenant identity by issuing it. This was a mutual test 
with mutual risk. 
“and [God] said to him, ‘Abraham.’ And he said, ‘Here I am.’”  
Why did God put Himself at risk first? God chose to act out of character with His 
own covenant identity in order to elicit from Abraham a redemptive response from his 
covenant identity. By God’s speaking out of character, the meaning of the covenant bond 
that tied them together could be tested by Abraham’s hermeneutical response. But 
ultimately and redemptively, both the angel and the ram were at hand to save Abraham 
from slipping into well-intentioned murder. In the Covenant Hypothesis, God’s self-
sacrifice in two different ways, through the test command and the mature ram, begins and 
ends the test. In this test God is figuratively the Alpha and Omega, for the essence of the 
covenant character of God is self-sacrificial love for His creatures, even to the point of 
putting his moral reputation on the line. 
 
Ontology of Abraham 
“After these things” 
Who, then, is Abraham? Abraham struggled with the most basic fear of humans 
beings, the fear of death. Abram had been a seventy five year old man dealing with an 
                                                 
test command, laying His own reputation low in order to set Abraham up as the exemplary covenant father, 
radically different from pious fathers of other gods. However, when Abraham’s external actions mimicked 
those of other idolatrous fathers, God as the Perfect Father stepped in for him and demonstrated the essence 
of covenant fatherhood by saving Isaac and offering Himself through the representative ram to take Isaac’s 
place.   
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infertile wife and a dead end future when God called him to embark on a new journey of 
life. God’s call projected an incredible vision of him in the future as fertile, virile, 
generative, and a source of worldwide blessings (Gen 12:1-3). In subsequent years, 
Abram vacillated between fear and faith, his fear of being killed led to the Egypt debacle 
(Gen 12:12), but he was willing to risk his life to rescue Lot (Gen 14). God commended 
his martial bravery and tried to cure his paranoia of being killed with a personal 
prophecy, “As for you, you shall go to your fathers in peace; you shall be buried in a 
good old age” (Gen 15:15). But even after he was named Abraham with Isaac’s birth 
pending (Gen 17 & 18), Abraham risked losing the covenant son by giving Sarah away 
during Isaac’s gestational year to Abimelech because of Abraham’s irrepressible fear of 
death (Gen 20:11-13). Against this narrative backdrop the Aqedah is surely a limit-
situation147 crisis for Abraham, a trial that forced him to confront the extreme limits of his 
fear, hope, life, and meaning for living. 
Thus, though religious philosophy is pictured as mankind delving into the 
problem of God, what is really at stake in the center of that problem is the hidden but 
much more radical problem of humans. It is not God, but the problem of humanity (fear, 
                                                 
147 A limit situation is a condition where the limits of the human capacity for thinking, 
understanding, and consciousness is encountered. These kinds of situations may be marked by fear, change 
in self-awareness, suffering, sense of finitude, death or life decisions. They can also include occasions of 
sublime joy, peace, wholeness, creation and intense love. Great disintegration or new discoveries of life’s 
purpose or meaning can result. Karl Jaspers originally referred to these encounters as “boundary-
situations.” Karl Jaspers, Truth and Symbol, trans. Jean T. Wilde, William Kluback, William Kimmel (New 
York, NY: NCUP, 1956), 10; C. Mundt, “Jaspers Concept of ‘Limit Situation’: Extensions and Therapeutic 
Applications,” Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy and Psychopathology, eds. Fuchs T., Breyer T., Mundt C. (New 
York, NY: Springer, 2014), 169-178. 
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hope, life, meaning) that begs to be solved. Abraham Heschel believed the solution for 
the human problem could be found in worship: 
Man is the problem. His physical and mental reality is beyond dispute; his meaning, 
his spiritual relevance is a question that cries for an answer. And worship is an 
answer. For worship is the act of man’s relating himself to ultimate meaning. Unless 
man is capable of entering a relation to ultimate meaning, worship is an illusion. And 
if worship is meaningless, human existence is an absurdity.148 
But this prompts the basic question of what is a human being that it needs 
meaning to flourish? Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy of the human subject 
employed the terms idem (sameness) and ipse (selfhood)149 as a way to understand the 
nature of human identity. Ricoeur’s ipse referred to the agent aspect of selfhood that 
chooses and commits self. Idem was the physical self recognizable throughout life as 
itself from core character and unique mannerisms. These two concepts correlate with the 
biblical anthropology in the Abrahamic narratives where the same human being is tagged 
with two names. Abram correlates with idem, the recognizable physical entity of the main 
protagonist in these stories. This same sojourner in Canaan is later named Abraham, 
which correlates with ipse, the struggling, suffering, capable and learning self, who is 
trying to grow into the God’s vision of him150 as the covenant father and founder of God’s 
                                                 
148 Heschel, God in Search of Man, 119. 
149 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 3.  
150 The human being has the potential for envisioning a future possible self in the world for a 
desired purpose and then becoming it. “The disclosedness of the there in understanding is itself a mode of 
the potentiality-of-being of Da-sein. In the projectedness of its being upon the for-the-sake-of-which 
together with that upon significance (world) lies the disclosedness of being in general. An understanding of 
being is already anticipated in the projecting upon possibilities.” Heidegger, Being and Time, 138.  
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elect nation. At some point in the journey, “after these things,” it can be assumed that 
ipse has become the permanent identity recognizable as the new idem, but to what 
degree? Such a question can only be answered by testing, a test of how Abraham 
worships that will uncover who Abraham worships.   
“God tested Abraham” 
Testing is uncovering the true condition of something otherwise hidden. If the test 
of the Aqedah is understood through a Heideggerian lens, then God as the Divine Tester 
becomes the clearing151 for the accurate disclosure152 of Abraham’s authentic self.153 Like 
Ricoeur, Heidegger’s concept of beings utilized two concepts. Heidegger’s 
                                                 
151 Heidegger attributed the potential to be as a clearing, a site where “objectively present things 
become accessible in the light or concealed in darkness” as a unique aspect of sentient, self-aware human 
beings. He wrote, “To say that it is ‘illuminated’ means that it is cleared in itself as being-in-the-world, not 
by another being, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing.” Heidegger, Being and Time, 125. Yet, it is 
through the divine test that Abraham is brought to see himself more clearly—seeing himself through the 
eyes of God. Prior to the test, Abraham may not have realized to what lengths he would go. Thus, one 
clearing may require another.  
152 Heidegger used the Greek term ἀλήθεια (alētheia or disclosure) for the notion of uncovering 
the truth or making intelligible sense of things as themselves. “The alētheia which is equated by Aristotle 
with pragma and phainomena in the passages cited above signifies the “things themselves,” that which 
shows itself, beings in the how of their discoveredness. . . . What makes this discovering itself possible 
must necessarily be called ‘true’ in a still more primordial sense. The existential and ontological 
foundations of discovering itself first show the most primordial phenomenon of truth.” Heidegger, Being 
and Time, 202-203.   
153 The concept of the authentic self, according to Heidegger, is the opposite of the human that 
lives in horizontal conformity to society, a state of they-self. “The self of everyday Da-sein is the they-self 
which we distinguish from the authentic self, the self which has explicitly grasped itself.” Heidegger, Being 
and Time, 121. In addition to differentiating from others, Kierkegaard adds that one’s singular vertical 
relation to God is necessary for Christian authenticity. The Covenant Hypothesis expands the existential 
trajectory of Kierkegaard regarding Christian authenticity by insisting that absolute singular relation to God 
must be defined by the whole historical revelation-based covenant walk with God, which opens horizontal 
and vertical dimensions through time. Otherwise, an ahistorical non-propositional, non-contextual singular 
and absolute piety could easily mistake Molech as Yahweh and vice versa.  
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Vorhandenheit (presence-at-hand, of things as they are in themselves) corresponds to 
Ricoeur’s notion of idem (sameness, the same recognizable human entity through time) 
and Heidegger’s concept of Dasein154 (self-aware, caring, temporal, interpreting human 
being) to Ricoeur’s notion of ipse (selfhood, the human that relates to itself as an 
agent).155 The self is comprised of both a stable and dynamic identity.  
But what holds these two aspects of self together during transformation? Ricoeur 
recognizes Heidegger’s contribution here, “The connection between selfhood and Dasein, 
in its turn, occurs in Being and Time through the mediation of the notion of care (Sorge), 
which is the most fundamental existential capable of ensuring the thematic unity of the 
work.”156 At a very basic level human beings care, about themselves, their future, their 
world and what they encounter in the world.157 Care does not refer here to an emotional 
compassion or a feeling of anxious concern, care is meant in a primordial ontological 
sense as directed personal interest. In addition, when humans believe they possess an 
unrealized potential related to something that can be taken care of in the real world and 
catch a vision of themselves accomplishing it,158 the underlying human orientation of care 
                                                 
154 “Dasein is a being which is concerned in its being about that being.” Heidegger, Being and 
Time, 179. 
155 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 309. 
156 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 309. 
157 “The formal existential totality of the ontological structural whole of Da-sein must thus be 
formulated in the following structure: The being of Dasein means being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in (the 
world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered). This being fills in the significance of the 
term care, which is used in a purely ontological and existential way.” Heidegger, Being and Time, 180.  
158 God’s call in Gen 12:1-3 casts that initial vision for Abram. In Gen 15, Abram’s complaint 
demonstrated that Abram fully appropriated God’s vision and was frustrated that God hadn’t fulfilled His 
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is transformed into willingness.159 In Abraham’s case, at the beginning of the covenant 
journey, God came to him and cast a vision of a glorious, incredible future that would 
change the world by blessing all the families on earth. Abraham was given a dream to 
care about and it changed him. 
“and [God] said to him, ‘Abraham.’ And he said, ‘Here I am.’” 
Thus, Abraham’s ready response at the end of the first verse, “Here I am” 
(hinneni), is more than a spatial-temporal locator. It evinces an ontological readiness and 
openness toward God, inviting God to see him and know him for what he is. This hinneni 
anchors the three apices (vv. 1-2, 7-8, 11-12) of the chiastic literary structure of the 
Aqedah.160 The anchoring of the literary structure by Abraham’s consistent response 
indicates the stance of receptive, self-aware openness to the other is vital for human 
flourishing.  
In summary, God is the ontological source of life and meaning for humans as 
their creator, re-creator, visionary and promise-keeper, and the ontological role of the 
                                                 
promises yet. 
159 “In willing, a being that is understood, that is, projected upon its possibility, is grasped as 
something to be taken care of or to be brought to its being through concern. . . . If willing is to be possible 
ontologically, the following factors are constitutive for it: the previous disclosedness of the for-the-sake-of-
which in general (being-ahead-of-itself), the disclosedness of what can be taken care of (world as the 
wherein of already-being), and the understanding self-projection of Da-sein upon a potentiality-for-being 
toward a possibility of the being ‘willed.’ The underlying totality of care shows through in the phenomenon 
of willing.” Heidegger, Being and Time, 181.  
160 Other stories in Genesis also record a human response of hinneni. But in the Aqedah, it is in 
response to God calling him by his covenant name (Abraham!) and the narrator’s highlighting of it as 
critical in structural importance to the narrative. Though Jacob’s name was also changed to Israel (Gen 
32:28), God never called him by his covenant name Israel, God called him by his birthname Jacob (Gen 
32:11, 46:2).  
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human agent as the receptive and dynamic agent is exemplified by Abraham’s hinneni to 
God (as the ultimate Other) and to other humans (as true others). Abraham’s hinneni of 
receptivity anticipates learning from the other, which automatically changes the self. We 
now turn to the cognitive process of growing in knowledge. 
Epistemology of the Aqedah 
The discussion on epistemology of the Aqedah will proceed in a different manner 
from the ontological discussion above. The first verse of the Aqedah will trigger 
reflections on the epistemology of Abraham’s test. This will be followed by a 
hermeneutically reflexive shift to what the test reveals about God as the tester and 
Abraham as the testee. 
Epistemology of the Beginning Verse  
“After these things” 
From an epistemological viewpoint, “after these things” may appear an 
unnecessary flourish before the action phrase “God tested Abraham.” But time and 
knowledge are integrally related in Abraham’s test. Five points about the relationship 
between knowledge and time are worthy of consideration at this point on our spiral 
journey of macro-hermeneutics. First, the truth about Abraham’s epiphanies requires 
temporal distance for ontological clarity. Empirical senses cannot differentiate between a 
hallucination, a vision, a dream,161 or everyday reality from within an event. It requires 
                                                 
161 For instance, two kinds of doubts about dreams vs reality exist. Nagging doubt that questions 
whether I am awake in the present or now, can be labeled the “Now Dreaming Doubt.” Doubt that 
questions if I have ever been awake can be labeled the “Always Dreaming Doubt.” Descartes wrestled with 
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the distancing effect of time and alternative experiences to make sense of past events and 
delegate them properly into categories of existence. Second, once historical experiences 
are understood for what they are in themselves, they form the effective-history162 which a 
person inevitably carries as background patterns for understanding the next event. This is 
why the more one recalls and employs the biblical history between God and Abraham, 
the more deeply one will understand the test that follows. Third, if the Covenant 
Hypothesis is correct that the Aqedah is a test of Abraham’s developing covenant 
character, then time is necessary for allowing the ipse faith decisions of Abraham to 
sediment into his idem core of integrated character. Temporal distance from the last 
revelation (banishment of Ishmael in Gen 21) will minimize the possibility of mixed test 
results from triggered hyper-reactivity to the pending loss of another son. Fourth, since a 
comprehensive test of covenant character must evaluate love, faith, obedience, hope and 
morality (all the virtues of traditional interpretive hypotheses), the elicitation of multiple 
virtues from one test event requires time judiciously inserted into the test design.163 Fifth, 
                                                 
both of them in his efforts to ground certainty. “[E]very sensory experience I have ever thought I was 
having while awake I can also think of myself as sometimes having while asleep; and since I do not believe 
that what I seem to perceive in sleep comes from things located outside me, I did not see why I should be 
any more inclined to believe this of what I think I perceive while awake.” The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes, eds. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 2:53. Descartes offered no clear answer to these doubts. Temporal distance and 
other experiences that differ from a dream are necessary to correctly classify past memories as a dream or 
non-dream. 
162 Gadamer saw temporal distance as an important criterion for genuine understanding. Time is a 
“filtering process . . . . It not only lets those prejudices that are of a particular and limited nature die away, 
but causes those that bring about genuine understanding to emerge as such.” History tempered by temporal 
distance is “effective-history” (Wirkungsgeschichte)—"the actual operation of history on the process of 
understanding itself.” Gadamer wryly noted, “The power of effective-history does not depend upon its 
being recognized.” Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 306-307. 
163 The purpose of a text determines how much time is needed. If short term memory recall is the 
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the temporal placement of the test in the Abrahamic cycle of stories, which comes after 
seven divine revelations and is followed by only one more story, strongly suggests that 
this is a summative test of what precedes it. A summative test is an assessment “given at 
the end of units, mid-term and at the end of a course, which are designed to judge the 
extent of student’s learning.”164 However, the Covenant Hypothesis also reveals 
diagnostic, evaluative and formative functions of the Aqedah as we shall see.  
“God tested Abraham”  
The middle phrase, “God tested Abraham,” is the epistemological crux of the 
Aqedah. From the discussion of ontology, God’s identity as Creator-Tester means He is 
the Creator who re-creates Abram as the Divine Promise-Maker and Keeper. The testee’s 
identity is Abram who is willingly becoming Abraham by becoming more open to others, 
                                                 
object of the test—an immediate quiz will accomplish that. If the object is a complex skill done 
consistently, a series of tests spread out over time is appropriate. If the test goal is to assess maturation of 
character, a later, unexpected life situation requiring decisive action in a complex situation holds the 
potential to expose motives, intentions, willingness, resolve, and multiple character traits (Gen 22; 2 Sam 
11; 2 Sam 24 vs 1 Chr 21; 2 Chr 32:31).   
164 In assessment literature, summative refers to achieving the incorporation of past elements, 
formative refers to assessing for improvement in the future, diagnostic refers to pinpointing hidden 
problems or a flaw, and evaluative refers to the level of accountability to a standard. These are not different 
kinds of assessments but utility goals which affects methods and reflect the values of the participants. See 
B. S. Bloom, J. T. Hastings, and G. F. Madaus, Handbook on Formative and Summative Evaluation of 
Student Learning (New York: McGrall-Hill, 1971); Madelina Taras, “Assessment: Summative and 
Formative: Some Theoretical Reflections,” British Journal of Educational Studies 53, issue 4 (Dec 2005): 
466-478; Kathleen M. Cauley, James H. McMillan, “Formative Assessment Techniques to Support Student 
Motivation and Achievement,” The Clearing House: A Journal of Educational Strategies, Issues and Ideas 
83, no. 1 (July 8, 2010): 1-6. The timing of the test points to the summative aspect. The Covenant 
Hypothesis also recognizes the evaluative role of the Aqedah by seeing in God’s evaluation, the divine 
norm of past covenant epiphanies (pp. 328-329). The diagnostic function will be addressed in the section of 
Abraham as the Hermeneutical Testee (pp. 335-341) and the formative function of the Aqedah test will be 
discussed at the end of the Modified Virtue Ethics subsection of the Axiology of the Aqedah that 
incorporates Gen 23 as part of the evidence for this (pp. 348-349).   
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replying “hinneni.” This life-long conversion process will now be tested by the same 
instructor who brought it into fruition; once again (as in Genesis 1-3) the Creator will 
assess his creation and on that basis of divine knowledge (Now I know . . . because you 
have done this thing) judge it. But in testing, the Divine Tester is continuing to create, 
just through another method with duress.   
“and [God] said to him, ‘Abraham.’ And he said, ‘Here I am.’” 
The Aqedah does not dwell much on the internal thoughts or feelings of Abraham 
during the test or on God’s internal deliberations, rather, it focuses on external actions 
and speech. Therefore, our epistemological curiosity must ask the question that 
appropriates the nature of the revelation provided. The operational mode of the Aqedah 
suggests “How do we know what we know?” is the right kind of epistemic question. 
Because the Aqedah is functionally a test, the question hones down to “What about the 
design and execution of this test reveals what we can know about God and Abraham?” 
A well designed test skillfully integrates three kinds of knowledge: “knowing 
that” (knowing a concept), “knowing how” (understanding an operation), and 
“acquaintance knowledge” (knowing by relation).165 Recognizing these three kinds of 
                                                 
165 The first two kinds of knowledge are necessary for any test and the third kind of knowledge 
controls the aptness of the test. Knowing that (knowing a concept) refers to the purpose or goal of the test: 
the aspect or standard that the results will be assessed by. Knowing how (understanding an operation) refers 
to the design of the test, choosing a procedure that will produce results in a form relevant to the norm. But 
the most critical and sophisticated knowledge is the last of the three kinds of knowledge. Acquaintance 
knowledge (knowing by relation) refers to the tester’s previous knowledge or direct understanding of the 
test subject. For instance, testing how far a fish can climb a tree is inappropriate for most fish species due to 
their inability to do so. This is recognized by the quote: “If you judge a fish by its ability to climb a tree, it 
will live its whole life believing that it is stupid.” However, for the mangrove killifish and the climbing fish 
of India, such a test purpose and design would be appropriate when administered by scientists who are well 
acquainted with the capability of these species. Acquaintance knowledge should be the basis for the other 
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knowledge as the ground for good testing, hermeneutical philosophy mines the ore of 
epistemic reflexivity by asking two questions of the Aqedah test: What does the Aqedah 
test reveal about the hermeneutics of the Divine Tester and what does the Aqedah test 
reveal about the human hermeneutics of Abraham as the testee? 
God as the Hermeneutical Tester  
God’s testing of Abraham reveals reflexively what God already knows about the 
nature of the testing object (knowing that), how best to bring it out (knowing how), and 
what is possible through the relation between them (knowing by acquaintance). The 
Aqedah was a performance test of Abraham, requiring him to respond to a completely 
new situational threat which was imposed as a divine command, couched in covenant 
rhetoric and design, with divine guidance and divine assessment at the end. From this, the 
hermeneutical presuppositions divulged by the design and execution of the test seem to 
be: God sees Abraham as a historically-conditioned (use of covenantal rhetoric), 
faithfully contingent (further direction promised), integrative and self-organizing agent 
(same God that promised a future of descendents through Isaac now requires sacrifice of 
Isaac) capable of moral phronesis166 (the practiced practical wisdom that can apply 
                                                 
two kinds of knowledge. 
166 Phronesis was described by Socrates in Meno as moral understanding gained by growing 
understanding of oneself, a form of virtue. Aristotle distinguished between Sophia (theoretical knowledge), 
techne (technical knowledge), and phronesis (practical wisdom) in book IV of Nichomachean Ethics. The 
experienced, deliberative and judgmental aspects of choosing the right action is what Aristotle added to the 
Socratic mainly knowledge-based definition. W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Volume 6: 
Aristotle: An Encounter (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 348. 
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previous knowledge to a completely unexpected situation). This is what the Aqedah test 
design reveals about divine anthropology—that is, God’s understanding of humanity.167  
Phronesis appears to be what is being evaluated, for God’s list of commendations 
evokes past revelations, and rewards covenant blessings tied to Abraham’s test response 
(because you have done this thing). But since we have already established that the 
Aqedah test is on Abraham’s covenant identity, his character and being, how does 
phronesis relate to his being? Heidegger believed phronesis was the disposition or habit 
that reveals the being of action.168 The covenant journey changed an obedient Abram to 
Abraham, a new covenant identity, by faithfully learning and practicing the covenant 
lessons. The Aqedah tested the integration of those lessons into Abraham’s character and 
                                                 
167 God’s hermeneutic of what a human is, exceeds Descartes’s ahistorical, reductionistic, 
solipsistic cogito. It eclipses Hume’s unmixed aggregate bundle of physical sensations without a center and 
Nietzsche’s illusory perspectivist with abstract or non-existent truth. The test command reveals that the 
addressed human being is a temporal-historical, self-aware and self-organizing, dynamic agent with 
responsible phronesis that remains open (hinneni) to the other. Jane L. MacIntyre, “Personal Identity and 
the Passions,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 27, no. 4 (Oct. 1989): 545-557; Paul Ricoeur, Oneself 
as Another, 4-16; Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, eds. John J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd (Chicago: Open 
Court, 2001), xxv. 
168 Heidegger appropriates Aristotle’s phronesis as a praxis “movement of questioning which is 
concerned with the meaning of human existence in a way that is not wholly dependent on a cognitive 
comportment towards others, the world and ourselves but which is, rather, played out as a concern for the 
essence of the human in and as concrete and complex (situational) engagements.” McGuirk has concerns 
that Heidegger’s appropriation of phronesis as a way to understand the ontology of authentic being with its 
ownmost possibilities could misplace Aristotle’s concept of good (agathon) as the goal of phronesis with 
Heidegger’s authentic being as the goal. James McGuirk, “Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s Ethics: re-
appropriations, transformations and the spectre of Kierkegaard” p. 2, accessed 3 March 2019, 
https://www.academia.edu/36233148/Heideggers_reading_of_Aristotles_Ethics_re-
appropriations_transformations_and_the_spectre_of_Kierkegaard; Walter A. Brogan, Heidegger and 
Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005), 147; Leena 
Kakkori and Rauno Huttunen, “Aristotle and Pedagogical Ethics,” Paideusis 16, no. 1 (2007): 17-28. I 
understand McGuirk’s concern about authentic being as a worthy goal for phronesis, for what if one’s 
authentic being is sociopathic or evil? Is authenticity to be pursued then, regardless? Heidegger’s political 
leanings may serve as a warning here. 
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habits by challenging him with a completely new threatening situation which assessed his 
capacity for deliberation, experience and moral judgment at this stage of his life.  
What was God’s original goal or telos for Abraham’s phronesis? Kierkegaard 
posited God as the ultimate and final telos.169 Although I agree with Kierkegaard that God 
is the ultimate eternal telos for all believers, God Himself had clarified three aspects of an 
explicit telos for Abraham’s covenant journey in his initial call. It was for God to bless 
Abraham, to make him into a blessing, in order to bless the world through him (Gen 12:1-
3). All three aims dovetail into the telos of embodying divine blessing in interactions with 
others.  
Therefore, the Covenant Hypothesis understands God’s final list of covenant 
blessings as both reiteration and current recognition of how far Abraham has become a 
divine blessing by evaluating his test actions (the four verb clusters and speeches in the 
Aqedah). It is his integration of the covenant lessons and continuing responsiveness to 
divine correction by the angel of Yahweh (“you obeyed my voice”) that passed the test.  
From the Aqedah divine interpretation, the covenant identities of God and 
Abraham are seen to be grounded in function, in use: (1) God’s own being is the self-
                                                 
169 Kierkegaard did locate human telos in human authenticity but went beyond Heidegger’s 
authentic being which was defined by Heidegger as the opposite of being self-consciously determined by 
others’ expectations or “theyness.” Kierkegaard agreed that human authenticity, especially of a Christian, 
outpaced societal norms (the ethical or universal) but Kierkegaard then anchored it in “absolute relation” to 
the Absolute. John J. Davenport, “Towards an Existential Virtue Ethics: Kierkegaard and MacIntyre,” 
Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue, eds. John J. Davenport, Anthony 
Rudd (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 2001), xxvi, 274. The Covenant Hypothesis agrees with Kierkegaard that 
the telos of human authenticity is found in an absolute relation to God, while insisting that, unlike 
Kierkegaard, God must not be reduced to merely His most recent utterance, a divine verbal locution in 
isolation. All of God’s interactions over time must be embraced as revelatory of His being in order to 
authentically hear or understand the meaning of what God is saying now.  
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referential dynamic foundation (By Myself) and telos for certainty and truth in language 
(I have sworn, declares the Lord), (2) Abraham’s being (God-fearing and continuously 
obedient) has been uncovered by his test actions (because you have done this thing) as 
evaluated against his past covenant experience. To summarize, the divine hermeneutic is 
based on God’s own being as the source for truth and certainty and sees humans as 
integrative, active agents who reveal the state of their moral being by phronesis. This is 
what the Aqedah reveals about divine language, testing and anthropology.  
From hermeneutical assumptions undergirding the divine command and divine 
interpretation, we now turn to the issue of divine omniscience. In the Aqedah, God 
praised Abraham with the self-referential words “Now I know that you fear God” (Gen 
22:12). If this is means God did not know a propositional fact, but that now He knows 
it—this threatens the classic theistic concept of divine omniscience which asserts God 
knows every true proposition from eternity.170 Therefore, Augustine171 and Aquinas172 
                                                 
170 Classical Theism characterizes God as the metaphysical absolute being using scriptural proofs 
and the Anselmian conception of perfect being theology. In regard to divine knowledge, God is omniscient 
which means he has perfect actual knowledge of everything in the past, present and future. J. P. Moreland 
and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2003), 501. Biblical verses used to support this include: God knows the secrets of the 
heart (Ps 44:21), his understanding is infinite (Ps 147:5), his eyes are in every place (Prov 15:3); God 
knows all things (1 John 3:20); God knows the past, present and future (John 13:19; Acts 15:18; Isa 42:8-9; 
45:21; 46:10). See also Ps 139:1-8.   
171 Augustine explained that divine testing was to make Abraham more self-aware for this test “is 
not aimed at his [God] getting to know something he was ignorant of before but at bringing to light what 
was hidden in a person. . . . People are not as well known to themselves as they are to their creator.” 
Augustine, “Sermon 2: Abraham tested by God” in Sermons (1-19) on the Old Testament, trans. Edmund 
Hill, The Works of Saint Augustine, vol 3/1 (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1990), 177 
172 Aquinas believed it was for others, “The meaning is not that He who knows all things from 
eternity began to know at that moment, but that He made known Abraham’s devotedness by that 
declaration.” Aquinas cited in Beach and Powell, Interpreting Abraham, 52. 
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interpreted the self-revelatory locutionary content of this Aqedah announcement as a 
perlocutionary utterance directed at Abraham and others.  
But canonical context must be consulted to understand this self-revelatory divine 
pronouncement as intended to be heard by Abraham. Three events in their shared history 
provide relevant background for correct understanding. They are (1) Abraham’s own 
analogous phrase “now I know” in Genesis 12, (2) God’s reference to contingent divine 
knowledge in Genesis 18, and (3) God’s preventive interventions based on divine 
knowledge of inner motives in Genesis 20.  
(1) When Abraham used a similar phrase about his knowledge in Gen 12:11, 
literally, “Behold, now173 I know that you are a beautiful woman,” it did not 
indicate he was ignorant of Sarah’s beauty before the present moment. It 
indicated a new state of emotional concern arising from one aspect of his 
previous propositional knowledge in response to a new situation: “When he 
was about to enter Egypt, he said to Sarai his wife” (Gen 12:11). Abraham’s 
phrase indicated a change in his emotive and imaginative consciousness based 
on pre-existing propositional knowledge. 
(2) In Gen 18:21 God seemed to express a contingent state of divine knowledge 
when he told Abraham his mission was to “see whether they have done 
altogether according to the outcry that has come to me. And if not, I will 
know.” However, Abraham clearly assumed God already knew the moral 
                                                 
173 The Hebrew term na can be translated as now or please. BDB, s.v. “אנ.” 
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situation for Abraham interceded earnestly as if God was going to destroy 
Sodom and Gomorrah. Abraham’s assumption of God’s comprehensive 
propositional knowledge of the cities was not rebuked by God as presumption 
even though it contradicted God’s locutionary content about a yet undecided 
investigation. If this reading of God and Abraham’s interactions on the 
completeness of God’s propositional knowledge is correct, why would God 
speak in a contingent manner? One perlocutionary possibility is that God 
desired Abraham’s prophetic engagement by describing divine knowledge as 
unresolved. But a locutionary possibility also exists. 
      Perhaps God was truthfully exposing a deliberate divine process in 
suspending one form of divine temporal knowledge, that of divine judgment, 
until after a final face to face engagement with the sinful inhabitants of the 
cities. After Sodom’s mob attempted to abuse the angelic messengers and 
revealed their recalcitrant mindset against reason and Lot’s pleas, divine 
emotive-relational and factual propositional knowledge coalesced174 into a 
final comprehensive assessment, and the knowledge-event of divine judgment 
ensued with catastrophic consequences. God’s exhaustive propositional 
                                                 
174 The idea that God’s relational-emotive condition is not necessarily synonymous with his 
propositional knowledge is suggested by the prophet’s description of divine emotions in relation to divine 
propositional knowledge that modifies and results in final divine judgment. Hosea 11:7-9, “My people are 
bent on turning away from me; so they are appointed to the yoke, and none shall remove it. How can I give 
you up, O Ephraim! How can I hand you over, O Israel! How can I make you like Admah! How can I treat 
you like Zeboiim! My heart recoils within me, my compassion grows warm and tender. I will not execute 
my fierce anger, I will not again destroy Ephraim; for I am God and not man, the Holy One in your midst, 
and I will not come to destroy.” 
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foreknowledge of all the options possible is focused through God’s dynamic 
creation of opportunities for free human and divine interactive choices (a visit 
to Abraham and a final visitation to Sodom) which then fused into a historical 
actuality with real consequences.175 
(3) One last insight for the Aqedah issue of divine knowledge is provided by 
Genesis 20 where God’s awareness of Abimelech’s integrity was complete 
even as He threatened Abimelech’s life for his naïve procurement of Sarah as 
his wife. God’s perfect knowledge of Abimelech’s pure motives and 
incomplete comprehension was what spurred His divine intervention to 
prevent Abimelech from sinning unknowingly against God.  
Keeping in mind these events as provided literary context, God’s words, “Now I 
know that you fear God” did not necessarily communicate to Abraham that God didn’t 
know a certain proposition. Each of the three previous events presupposed full 
propositional knowledge of the matter by the speaker even as they spoke in a contingent 
manner. Instead, careful analysis of previous events offer more subtle and supple ways to 
understand God’s omniscience. The three events reveal (1) the phrase “now I know” may 
mean that a latent aspect of a known propositional fact has now become predominant due 
                                                 
175 Martin Hanna asserts, “God’s foreknowledge is exhaustive, definite, and dynamic.” As I 
understand his article, Hanna describes God’s propositional foreknowledge to be exhaustive of all existing, 
past and possible future options. God then chooses to create opportunities to facilitate free will choices 
which naturally delimits the range of exhaustive possible propositional options to those available to the 
participants within and from the event. Contingent on what humans and God interactively and freely 
choose to do within that event, God and human beings “co-create” the actual future (without adding any 
new propositions to the pre-existing propositional foreknowledge of God).  Martin Hanna, “Foreknowledge 
and the Freedom of Salvation” in Salvation: Contours of Adventist Soteriology (Berrien Springs, MI: 
Andrews University Press, 2018), 58.   
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to a new event or context (Gen 12), (2) before divine judgment is settled and enacted, 
God allows the judged to publicly exhibit their true moral condition through direct free 
interactions so His final integrated judgment can be seen as righteously accurate (Gen 
18), and (3) when a God-fearing servant with moral integrity is about to commit a grave 
mistake unknowingly, sometimes God intervenes to clarify confusion by thwarting their 
sinful intent while affirming their sinless motives (Gen 20). All three facets correspond to 
the Covenant Hypothesis explication of the angel of YHWH thwarting Abraham’s intent 
to sacrifice Isaac. When all three previous events are kept in mind, a plausible paradigm 
for a richer understanding of God’s reference to His dynamic divine knowledge in the 
Aqedah event begins to emerge.  
These findings suggest God’s omniscience may be multifaceted, confirmatory, 
relational and discretionary, including a “present omniscience” of human reality which 
correlates experientially with human changes through time.176 The topic of divine 
omniscience certainly requires its own dissertation, or multiple dissertations, but all I am 
                                                 
176 While in open theism, future libertarian free choices are not proper objects of knowledge for 
anyone including God (the future is open) and in Arminianism they are proper objects of knowledge, both 
groups agree that God’s knowledge is consequent to historical events and not on God’s pre-determining 
will (God foreordains all events) as Calvinism asserts. Some kinds of knowledge are inherently dynamic. 
Contextualized present knowledge such as “it is 1:23 pm on March 4, 2019 in Berrien Springs, Michigan” 
changes with every minute that passes. See Steven M. Studebaker, “The Mode of Divine Knowledge in 
Reformation Arminianism and Open Theism,” JETS 47, no. 3 (September 2004): 469-480; Michael 
Carasik, “The Limits of Omniscience,” JBL 119, no. 2 (2000): 221-232; Amos Yong, “Divine Omniscience 
and Future Contingents: Weighing the Presuppositional Issues in the Contemporary Debate,” ERT 26, no. 3 
(2002):240-264; and Martin Hanna, “Foreknowledge and the Salvation of Freedom,” 33-59. 
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suggesting at this point is that God’s Aqedah phrase “Now I know” must be understood 
and heard as Abraham might have heard it, heard through the filter of Abraham’s history.  
In summary, the hermeneutical insights from the epistemology of the Aqedah are: 
(1) divine anthropology sees the human being as a historical self-aware, self-integrating 
moral agent that can choose to be open to the other, (2) the meaning of God and 
Abraham’s covenant identity is functional, not material or substance-based, (3) the truth 
of the test assessment is grounded in God’s attestation of certainty based on His own 
Being (as the Divine Tester of the Aqedah), (4) God’s reference to His own present 
omniscience must be interpreted by the relevant context as Abraham might have 
understood it, in order to be unpacked correctly.  
Abraham as the Hermeneutical Testee 
From the subjective point of view, Abraham was faced with a cataclysmic 
covenant crisis. Existential philosophy emphasizes that crisis is inherent to life itself; 
“human life according to its essential nature and in every moment lies in crisis and can 
only be conceived through crisis.”177 But since the Aqedah was a divinely imposed test, 
this implies some learning was taking place. Otto Bollnow coined the term encounter to 
describe crisis-like situations that carry pedagogical implications. Jani Koskela explained 
encounter as “a fundamental experience in which the subject meets something new, 
strange, uncontrollable, and (to the subject) incomprehensible. It is a meeting with the 
                                                 
177 Otto Bollnow, Crisis and New Beginning: Contributions to a Pedagogical Anthropology, trans. 
Donald Moss and Nancy Moss (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987), 4-5.  
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irrational. . . . By no means is encounter necessarily a pleasant experience; it affects the 
subject profoundly, leading to self-examination or reflection and a change in one’s way 
of living or being.”178 The Aqedah test appears to be a classic encounter.  
But what would be the benefit of an encounter like the Aqedah? Koskela suggests 
that discontinuous education through an encounter may (or may not) lead to what 
Bollnow called an awakening of the self by peeling off “irrelevances to this existential 
level of description, [peeling them] out of the way of awakening to conscience and true 
self.”179 This means awakening to the true self can be a painful. Heidegger described the 
process of personal unconcealment as occasionally brutal: “This selftransparency is no 
self-evident starting point, but has to be wrested in explicit exertion from ambiguity, 
unclarity and vagueness.”180 Bollnow’s concept of awakening and Heidegger’s 
unconcealment complement each other.  
If the Aqedah was an existential encounter designed to awaken and unconceal the 
authentic core of Abraham by peeling off superficial layers, why was Isaac’s sacrifice 
chosen as the design of the test? It is because the true self is sometimes disguised under a 
layer of incapacitating fear. “Fear, thus as a mode in Dasein’s being, seems to remind or 
reveal this inherent ‘error’ or incapability in Dasein.”181 Hence, Koskela suggests an 
                                                 
178 Koskela, “Discontinuity,” 50-51.  
179 Jani Koskela, “Discontinuity,” 49. Of course, an encounter may also end in disintegration and 
despair. It is a risk-laden event.   
180 Jani Koskela, “Discontinuity,” 79. 
181 Jani Koskela, “Discontinuity,” 137. 
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effective encounter may choose to target the locus of a deep seated phobia, “one should 
not therefore overlook the epistemic possibilities of fear as unconcealment either in 
educational processes, as those processes are first and foremost processes of 
understanding” for “when one is in fear, one is considered to remain in a lie about oneself 
. . . .when one is fearful, he or she is not being true to all the capacities a person has, 
therefore is not being true to oneself. But when one is not fearful, one is able to live to the 
fullest of one’s capabilities.”182 From the events preceding the Aqedah it is clear that 
Abraham has one deep fear that drives him to relinquish family members without 
resistance to authority figures repeatedly. It is his fear of death. 
Abraham’s fear of death stems from a deeper innate sense of mortal finitude183 
which the long history of his wife’s barreness may have compounded. The sense of 
finiteness, commonly expressed as the fear of death, is the most basic universal and 
pervasive fear of humankind. Even after Abraham’s fear was mitigated by the birth of 
Isaac, as a life-long phobia, it may have affected Abraham’s hermeneutics in interpreting 
the test command. All physicians understand that the first time a patient is told they have 
cancer, the overwhelming fear of death often blocks their ability to hear the rest of the 
details and instructions must be repeated later or multiple times. This may explain why 
                                                 
182 Jani Koskela, “Discontinuity,” 137-139.   
183 “There is a ground of sadness that may be called the sadness of the finite. This sadness is 
nourished by all the primitive experiences which, to express themselves, have recourse to negation: lack, 
loss, dread, regret, deception, dispersion and irrevocability of duration. Negation is so obviously mixed in 
them that we can indeed hold this experience of finitude for one of the roots of negation.” Paul Ricoeur, 
“The Concept of Fallibility” in Contemporary European Ethics: Selected Readings, ed. Joseph J. 
Kockelmans (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), 117.  
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the enlightening rhetorical nuances in the divine test command were missed by 
Abraham.184 His mixture of crippling fear and growing faith185 was being tested so 
Abraham could realize the sober truth about himself.  
Two core concerns underlying the fear of death are the fear of powerlessness and 
the fear of meaninglessness.186 Those primarily afraid of the meaninglessness of life can 
face death and become willing martyrs if they discover a meaning more valuable than 
their individual lives. Those primarily afraid of powerlessness can also face death with 
courage if they find access to a power greater than death, either directly or through an all-
powerful being. Which is Abraham’s core concern? Abraham’s fear of death is 
specifically a fear of being violently killed (Gen 12:12; 20:11), not of dying from old age. 
This is why God tries to cure his fear with a prophecy of a peaceful death in Gen 15:15 
“As for you, you shall go to your fathers in peace; you shall be buried in a good old age.” 
But even God’s personalized prophecy did not dislodge Abraham’s phobia of a violent 
death, for it was after God’s assurance, during Sarah’s gestational year with Isaac,that 
this fear of being killed motivated Abraham to relinquish Sarah to Abimelech (Gen 20), 
                                                 
184 Similar fears may cause readers to miss or dismiss the nuances when they read the Aqedah test 
command.  
185 Ricoeur sees man as a mixture of “originating affirmation,” affirmation of goodness given at 
creation, and “existential difference,” the finiteness and fallibility of human existence. “This ‘mixture’ has 
appeared to us as the progressive manifestation of the fault which makes of man, mediator of the reality 
outside himself, a fragile mediation for himself.” Paul Ricoeur, “The Concept of Fallibility,” 118.  
186 Lisa Iverach, Ross G. Menzies, and Rachel E. Menzies, “Death Anxiety and its Role in 
Psychopathology: Reviewing the Status of a Transdiagnostic Construct,” Clinical Psychology Review 34, 
no. 7 (November 2014): 580-593.  
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giving away his chance to be Isaac’s father. Once again, God had to rescue his covenant 
seed. 
Clearly then, this unresolved issue is the lifelong hermeneutical mood187 that 
Abraham brings into the fearsome Aqedah event. Through God’s test command, 
Abraham is brought face to face with what he has been assiduously avoiding all his life, 
and is completely flooded by it. The violent test command makes explicit the exact nature 
of Abraham’s fear of a violent imposed death but it goes further, it infinitely expands it 
by requiring him to sacrifice Isaac. Abraham faces a possible future of absolute 
nothingness except boundless remorse. God’s required journey plunges him into a state 
of continual fearing for three days. Stripped of all the accumulated accoutrements of a 
powerful tribal prince down to a donkey and three oblivious adolescent boys, Abraham 
has only his own memories and godly faith to deal with his hidden fear, exposed raw by 
the test command. 
By the time he orders his servants to remain, Abraham’s words reveal his growing 
faith conviction that somehow, both he and Isaac will return. By the time Abraham 
answers Isaac’s question, perhaps Abraham hopes to find divinely provided animal at the 
altar site. But, according to the writer of Hebrews in the New Testament, by the time 
                                                 
187 Mood here does not refer to a passing feeling but to Heidegger’s usage of the term referring to 
the state of emotive attunement that an embodied human being has toward reality. It is the affective 
environment of our thinking, deliberating and choosing. Heidegger even puts the most rational endeavor, 
philosophy, within it: “Philosophy in each case happens in a fundamental attunement [ground mood]. 
Conceptual philosophical comprehension is grounded in our being gripped, and this is grounded in a 
fundamental attunement.” Martin Heidegger cited by Robert D. Stolorow, “Heidegger, Mood and the Lived 
Body: The Ontical and the Ontological,” Janus Head: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature, 
Continental Philosophy, Phenomenological Psychology, and the Arts 13, no. 2 (2014): 5-11.     
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Abraham grasps the knife to slay his son, Abraham has given up looking for the animal 
(which is behind him in a bush) because he has placed his faith in God’s absolute power 
to resurrect Isaac, since “from one man, and him as good as dead, were born 
descendants,” Abraham “considered that God was able even to raise him [Isaac] from the 
dead” (Heb 11:12, 19). Yet, when the angel of YHWH prohibits Abraham’s literal 
obedience, he instantly obeys, finds the waiting ram and exults in divine provision as the 
pre-ordained test solution. 
Abraham’s sense of powerlessness as expressed in his life-long phobia of being 
killed had found refuge in the resurrection power of the Almighty over death. This 
understandable move, extrapolated from his faith experience requires no divine chiding 
because it remained faithfully God-oriented (Now I know you fear God) but his grasping 
of the knife also revealed to himself who he was at the core, a violent paradox. Abraham 
was a God-fearing mortal gripped with an unresolved fear of being killed, this made him 
one that was willing to kill someone else in a religiously cultic setting. Though the 
theocentric trajectory of the Covenant Hypothesis points to the missed option of 
mediatory intercession for Isaac (which appeals to God’s character) over Abraham’s 
resurrection hope (which appeals to God’s power) what finally counts in the end is 
Abraham’s openness to divine prohibition and redirection as captured in the final 
judgment of Abraham—“you obeyed My voice.”  
Thus, epistemologically, the Aqedah test is now seen as a diagnostic test that 
reveals the hidden underlying condition of Abraham and generally of humankind. 
Abraham as the religious human archetype reveals the universal human condition of 
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being haunted by the fear of death. His phobia of being killed disclosed a core fear of 
powerlessness that drove him to grasp God’s absolute power over death. Unfortunately 
and ironically, it is precisely Abraham’s hope in the power of resurrection that caused 
him to take up the knife to kill his son. Resurrection requires prior death. Is faith in 
absolute power the moral lesson of the Aqedah? Thus, we cannot escape the ethical 
predicament in praising Abraham’s hope of resurrection as faith-filled moral justification 
for being willing to kill Isaac in the Aqedah. Clearly, the axiology of the Aqedah begs for 
our attention and we will do that next. 
Axiology of the Aqedah 
The discussion of axiology in the Aqedah will follow the pattern of the previous 
section on epistemology. This means a brief reflection on the axiology of the first verse 
of the Aqedah will be followed by two discourses. The first will be on the ethics of the 
Aqedah and the second will be on aesthetics. A brief summary will then conclude this 
section. 
Axiology of the Beginning Verse   
“After these things” 
The axiology of the first phrase of the Aqedah, “after these things,” may reach all 
the way back to the point where God separated Abraham from Haran, his birth culture, 
and clan. If this separation was intended to instill a new set of religious and moral 
values188 one would expect the ensuing divine revelations to be theological or moral 
                                                 
188 The covenant lessons can be seen as teaching Abraham parental virtues: (1) Envisioning—Gen 
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instruction. Instead, almost all of their encounters start with imperatives requiring action: 
leave your past, believe this land is yours, wander about, look around, look up at the stars 
and believe, prepare a covenant ritual, walk before me perfectly, believe you will get a 
son named Isaac, circumcise all men, expect a son, entrust Ishmael to me, go, walk, offer 
up Isaac as a sacrifice. This suggests that through continual practice, Abraham’s faith in 
God was not limited to knowing propositional tenets but was concretized into lifelong 
habits of practicing his faith, growing in covenant phronesis. 
“God tested Abraham” 
Near the end of this covenant journey “God tested Abraham.” From the 
perspective of various ethical theories, the ethical issue is that God demanded Isaac as a 
burnt sacrifice without providing moral justification. Divine Command Theory (DCT) 
defines the moral status of an act as good if it is in compliance with an explicit divine 
command; according to DCT, sacrificing Isaac in compliance to the divine command is 
not to be classed with murder but is by definition a righteous act.189 Deontological 
Kantianism would reason that sacrificing another cannot be universally realized as a 
rational rule for it doesn’t treat a person as an end and it is amendable to self-love 
because it appeases a deity for possible personal benefits; so sacrificing Isaac, even in 
                                                 
12:1-3, (2) Revealing—Gen 12:7, (3) Grounding—Gen 13:14-17, (4) Covenanting—Gen 15, (5) 
Branding—Gen 17, (6) Negotiating—Gen 18, (7) Releasing—Gen 21:12-13. 
189 Wyndy Corbin Reuschling, “Divine Command Theories and Ethics,” in Dictionary of Scripture 
and Ethics, ed. Joel B. Green (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011), 242-246. 
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compliance to a divine command would be wrong.190 Consequentialism holds the results 
of an action as the basis for deciding whether it is right or wrong; since the death of Isaac 
would result from the order, obedience to it would be wrong.191 Pragmatic ethics focuses 
on experiment and deliberation to discover which actions are beneficial and which are 
not; but for this individual situation, hope-filled experimentation could turn tragically 
irreversible, thus obedience is wrong.192 Finally, the focus of Virtue Ethics moves from 
external evaluation for the morality of an action, to the agent’s internal character as the 
basis for morality. A Virtue ethicist avoids prescribing any particular action but may offer 
the advice, “Act as a virtuous agent would act in this situation.”193 This only begs the 
question because what counts for virtue or which character is to be modeled in this 
                                                 
190 Joseph B. Onyango Okello, “Deontological Ethics,” in Dictionary of Scripture and Ethics, ed. 
Joel B. Green (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011), 214-216; Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 44; Craig G. Bartholomew and Michael W. Goheen, 
Christian Philosophy: A Systematic and Narrative Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 
2013), 145.   
191 Vladimir Ignatkov, “Consequentialism,” in Dictionary of Scripture and Ethics, ed. Joel B. 
Green (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011), 171-172. 
192 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922); Hugh 
LaFollete, “Pragmatic Ethics” in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, eds. Hugh LaFollette and Ingmar 
Persson (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 400-419. 
193 Nafsika Athanassoulis, “Virtue Ethics,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 2 
Aprili 2019, https://www.iep.utm.edu/home/about/; Nikki Coffey Tousley and Brad J. Kallenberg, “Virtue 
Ethics,” Dictionary of Scripture and Ethics, ed. Joel B. Green (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011), 
814-819. 
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situation is unclear. No current ethical model appears adequate to the ethical challenge of 
the Aqedah. 
“and [God] said to him, ‘Abraham.’ And he said, ‘Here I am.’” 
This last phrase of verse one suggests one direction for a trans-ethical norm or 
telos: “He [God] said to him, ‘Abraham!’” God’s words bookend the covenant journey of 
Abraham with the divine call and the divine test which remain consistent on the divine 
telos. The divine telos of the covenant journey was explicit in the initial call to 
Abraham—“And I will bless you and make your name great and you will be a blessing . . 
. . and in you all the families of the earth will be blessed.” The Aqedah echoes it; “And in 
your offspring shall all the nations of the earth be blessed.” God’s covenant telos was that 
everyone on earth would become blessed194 through Abraham and his seed. Divine 
blessing offers a trans-ethical norm and telos for assessing value in the Aqedah. 
Modified Virtue Ethics 
With the telos of blessing in mind, the arc of the Abrahamic narratives reveals the 
Creator-Promise-Keeper was molding the faithful and willing Abram into the covenant 
Abraham, the embodiment of God’s blessing (you will be a blessing, Gen 12:2). This 
                                                 
194 Blessedness is the final telos. This moves from the deontologist framing of blessing as the 
moral duty (as commanded by God) to bless others, to a consequentialist framing of results—that others 
will end up blessed. But God’s call also includes virtue theory for Abraham is to become a blessing 
himself, a covenant identity, from God working on Abraham via blessings. The final condition of passive 
blessedness parallels the pattern of creation days that end on the Sabbath. “Both accounts conclude with the 
seventh step describing a state of being resulting from the divine action: ‘all the families of the earth shall 
be blessed” (12:3) // “the heavens and the earth, and all the host of them were finished” (2:1). Doukhan, 
Genesis, 198. 
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covenant journey aligns with the developmental process of internalized morality assumed 
in Virtue Ethics, where an agent must accumulate experience and integrate virtues into a 
complex yet stable character that consistently demonstrates prudence and practical 
wisdom in ethically challenging situations. However, the Aqedah test seems to be a test 
of Divine Command Theory where divine commands define morality and Abraham’s 
exacting compliance is praised. If these two ethical paradigms are combined, the Aqedah 
appears to be a Divine Command Theory challenge within the narrative framework of a 
Virtue Ethics journey. This juxtaposition of two ethical models more fully captures the 
historical dynamics and unsettling legacy of Abraham’s journey and test choices better 
than either model does alone.  
From a Divine Command Theory point of view, Abraham’s compliance would be 
considered moral.195 However, even Virtue Ethics can be used to justify Abraham’s 
                                                 
195 Though I will not take the time to develop this fully, a modified Divine Command Theory 
could come closer to alignment with the Covenant Hypothesis. As it currently stands, Divine Command 
Theory (DCT) is a meta-ethical theory that claims the status of a human action as morally good is 
dependent on whether God clearly commands it. It is implicitly assumed that the most recent utterance of a 
divine command defines morality a-historically, i.e. previous divine commands are to be considered 
nullified if a later divine command clearly contradicts it. Now, if the norm for defining good actions 
included God’s past exemplary actions, divine affirmation of human behavior (even if the human act was 
not specifically commanded by God- such as Abraham’s sacrificing of the ram) and all of God’s previous 
commands, this broader base for morality would allow extrapolation from biblical paradigms to extra-
biblical situations. This wider base would include all their prior interactions including Abraham’s 
intercessions (Gen 18) to which God acceded. This expansion of the DCT approximates the contextually 
faithful Covenant Hypothesis base for morality. See also Ze’ev Levy, “On the Aqedah in Modern 
Philosophy” in Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy (2007), 85-105; Ansgar Santogrossi, “Scotus’ 
Method in Ethics: Not to play God—A Reply to Thomas Shannon” in Theological Studies 55 (1994), 314-
329; David Efird, “Divine Command Theory and the Semantics of Quantified Modal Logic” in New Waves 
in Philosophy and Religion, eds. Yujin Nagasawa and Erik J. Wielenberg (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), 102. 
Other modifications of Divine Command Theory have been proposed. Robert Adams modified 
divine command theory posits an act is wrong only if it defies the commands of a loving God, thereby 
appealing to divine omnibenevolence (as understood by humans) as the standard. Thus, he rejects the 
Aqedah. Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 290; Phillip Quinn moved the norm of good from God’s command to 
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choice to “kill his son” using historical context. Abraham’s test response could be 
justified as emulating the best contextual practices of religious cultures around him, 
exemplifying ideal religious servant characteristics by executing all religious orders with 
exemplary fidelity, loyalty, devotion and unmitigated love. The religious servant mode 
does not question or doubt, does not reason or challenge the master, does not integrate or 
petition, the perfect servant obeys literalistically with a positive attitude out of love (or 
fear, it doesn’t really matter which) for the master. This servant mode persists as a 
virtuous model in religious imagination to this day as an aspect of fideistic 
fundamentalism.  
However, Virtue Ethic justification for Abraham has three major inherent 
weakness. They are (1) because it is character-based, Virtue Ethics doesn’t offer direct 
guidance for action in a challenging or ambiguous situation, (2) because it is agent-
focused, the focus of action is not toward the other but toward the virtues of the self, and 
(3) because it is developmentally-oriented, it remains highly context-dependent on 
surrounding culture for defining what a virtue is, which virtues ought to be incorporated, 
and how to apply them. Thus, Abraham’s act of willingness to kill Isaac could be lauded 
                                                 
God’s will. He also rejects the Aqedah. Phillip L. Quinn, “Agamemnon and Abraham: The Tragic Dilemma 
of Kierkegaard’s Knight of Faith,” Journal of Literature and Theology 4, no. 2 (1990): 181-193; Linda 
Zagzebski moved the norm of good to God’s motive. Linda Zagzebski, Divine Motivational Theory (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 261; Christian Miller moved the norm of good to God’s 
desire. Christian Miller, “Divine Desire Theory and Obligation” in New Waves in Philosophy and Religion, 
eds. Yujin Nagasawa and Erik J. Wielenberg (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 105-124. The 
Covenant Hypothesis points out that humans can only surmise God’s desire, motive, will, and love from 
His historical actions, thus what defines actions as morally good depends on their alignment with the moral 
scope of God’s self-revelations.      
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as exemplary of a virtuous perfectly subservient servant but it clearly fails the explicit 
covenant telos of Abraham becoming a divine blessing to Isaac. 
God’s telos of making Abraham a divine blessing offers a biblical corrective to 
the three weaknesses of Virtue Ethics. The notion of divine blessing carries three 
connotations: a normative source in God’s revealed character, transcultural values 
extracted from participatory revelations both holy196 and good, and a bestowal of positive 
consequences for the recipients who are to be blessed as God’s equally beloved creatures. 
God’s promises to Abraham were to transform him through blessings into a physical 
agent embodying divine favor—a living, breathing divine blessing197 so that other 
families would end up blessed. Since God is the exemplar, Abraham must reflect God’s 
revealed covenant character.  
What becoming a blessing shares in common with Virtue Ethics is the 
developmental process of admiring, learning, integrating, and socially practicing virtues 
and practical wisdom. But becoming a blessing requires more than appropriation of 
observed or deliberated virtues. It requires God’s word and divine transformative power 
to infuse the believer’s perspectives, motives, and even subconscious drives as they 
willingly lek-lekha (walk-for/to/with-yourself) with God through life. The divine 
                                                 
196 Holy is used here in the attributive sense, recognized as belonging to God. Full holiness is 
exclusive to God, but God can separate something from the common, sanctify it and make it holy or 
religiously belonging to Himself. The Sabbath is an example (Gen 2:3). Abraham is another (Gen 12:1-3). 
Zondervan Illustrated Bible Dictionary, s.v., holiness. 
197 “Abraham is not just the passive object of God’s blessing, Abraham (and his spiritual children) 
should infer the duty to be a blessing to the nations. The result of being blessed is a missionary lesson: 
‘bringing salvation to all planet earth.’” Doukhan, Genesis, 200. 
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interpretation at the end of the Aqedah indicated that all but one covenant revelation was 
actualized by Abraham in the test. Only the covenant lesson of prophetic intercession was 
missing. Thus, Abraham fell short of being a divine blessing to Isaac when he picked up 
the knife in the Aqedah. Clearly, the Aqedah was a covenant evaluative test.  
 It would be natural to wonder at this point if Abraham learned from his test and 
incorporated the missing lesson of covenant intercession after the Aqedah. In other 
words, was the Aqedah test a formative test as well? I believe the Bible offers indirect 
evidence for that possibility. In the following and final narrative that properly belongs to 
the Abrahamic cycle, that of Abraham’s purchase of the Cave of Macpelah, we see a very 
different Abraham facing the Hittite council (Gen 23) than the Abraham that cowered 
behind defensive excuses in the Philistines court (Gen 20). This post-Aqedah Abraham is 
amazingly not afraid to publicly expose his political, social, emotional powerlessness 
before the natives of the land: “I am a sojourner and foreigner among you; give me 
property among you for a burying place, that I may bury my dead out of my sight” (Gen 
22:4). From this position of socio-politico-emotional weakness, in parallel manner to his 
previous intercession with God over Sodom and Gomorrah (“I, who am but dust and 
ashes” Gen 18:27), Abraham negotiates respectfully but persistently with the Hittites 
until he obtains a costly but legitimate legal foothold in God’s promised land.198 
 The patriarch who previously gave away his living wife and with her—the 
covenantal promise of her son, to Abimelech to save his own skin—now exposes his 
                                                 
198 Meir Sternberg, “Double Cave, Double Talk: The Indirections of Biblical Dialogue,” in Not in 
Heaven, eds. Jason P. Rosenblatt, Joseph C. Sitterson, Jr. (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 
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vulnerabilities while negotiating unrelentingly to honor her dead body in the land of 
God’s promise. The Aqedah was a test about the covenant son (19 verses), the Cave of 
Macpelah is a trial of similar duration about the covenant land (20 verses).199 In the first 
test Abraham was taciturn, in the second he cannot be silenced. In a public court before a 
tribunal of the people of the land, Abraham’s fear of being killed is absent and his 
fearless covenant-driven prophetic intercession shows he has incorporated the lesson 
missing from his response in the Aqedah. He has reclaimed his mantle as God’s prophet-
leader and faithfully procures the right to invest in God’s future vision for his 
descendants. 
 Sometimes the greatest learning comes after a test. With these two trials 
successfully passed, Abraham’s covenant identity and faith has been perfected by the 
incorporation of all seven covenant lessons. The Aqedah was a formative test. Now the 
narratives of Abraham’s covenant journey with God can finally come to a satisfying end. 
In this section, the Covenant Hypothesis’ core belief in the divine telos of 
Abraham, through comprehensive covenant actualization to become God’s blessing to the 
world, carries coherent implications for direct ethical application. This provides a 
superior coherent moral model for understanding the Aqedah test in a relevant ethical 
manner. Thus, the Covenant Hypothesis fulfills Imre Lakatos’ criteria of a robust 
progressive research paradigm.200 But since the Covenant Hypothesis is not an ethical 
                                                 
1991), 28-57. 
199 Sternberg, “Double Cave, Double Talk,” 57. 
200 Imre Lakatos proposed that theories or research programs were networks of related beliefs that 
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theory, but merely an interpretive theory, it can only point to modifications needed in 
Divine Command Theory and Virtue Ethics in order for them to rise to the ethical 
challenge of the Aqedah. More work needs to be done in this area. 
Aesthetics201 of Lek-lekha 
This dissertation has already demonstrated the untapped power of biblical literary 
aesthetics to intimate new meaning. The literary structure unearthed by the micro-
hermeneutical level in chapter three revealed the last divine speech in the Aqedah was a 
systematic test answer key that referred to the covenant lessons as the test norm for 
evaluation. The asymmetry in the literary chiasm of Abraham’s test actions in chapter 
four showed that prophetic intercession, the missed covenant lesson from the answer key, 
would have restored chiastic symmetry and aesthetic balance to Abraham’s actions in the 
                                                 
were robustly progressive if the core beliefs generated peripheral implications that were viable and 
validated. If a protective belt of “ad hoc hypotheses” was continually being generated to protect the core 
beliefs from new applications and implications (such as God will never put another through an Aqedah-like 
test, or you are not Abraham and cannot do what he did, or the Torah subsequently forbids what Abraham 
did), the theory was to be considered regressive. Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of 
Scientific Research Programmes,” Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, eds. Imre Lakatos and Alan 
Musgrave (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 91-196. See also Imre Lakatos, Proofs 
and Refutations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Nancey Murphy, A Philosophy of 
the Christian Religion for the Twenty-First Century (London, UK: Society for Promoting Christian 
Religion, 2018), 72-75; Anthony Rudd, “Reason in Ethics: MacIntyre and Kierkegaard” in Kierkegaard 
after MacIntyre, 141.     
201 Aesthetics is derived from the Greek term aisthetikos which means sensitive, sentient, related 
to sense perception. As a branch of philosophy, aesthetics falls under axiology for it deals with the 
valuation of beauty based on the senses.   
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narrative. That discovery from careful aesthetic analysis also aligns all three of God’s 
speeches in the Aqedah in ethical linear consistency. Art can birth truth. 
But to cap this dissertation’s axiological section, I want to reflect on the aesthetics 
of the unique and strikingly evocative term lek-lekha which marks the beginning and end 
of Abraham’s covenant journey in conversation with the insights of Doukhan, Heidegger 
and Bollnow. In the Aqedah after Abraham answered “Here I am,” Abraham’s ready 
response was followed by the divine order to lek-lekha (walk-for/to/with-yourself). 
Linguistically, the verb “walk” permeates the narratives of Abraham (12:1, 4, 5, 9, 19; 
13:3, 5, 17; 14:11, 24; 15:2 [Heb]; 16:8; 17:1; 18:16, 22 33; 19:2; 21:14-16, 19, 32; 22:2-
3, 5-6, 8, 13, 18).202 The most concentrated clusters are found in chapters 12 and 22 and 
the singular phrase lek-lekha that bookends Abraham’s covenant journey is found only in 
those chapters. Doukhan explains that this phrase  “does not just affect space, it also 
concerns time and the person of Abram.”203 He profoundly and beautifully translates lek-
lekha as “go in order to find yourself and thus fulfill yourself.”204 
In both chapters, God tied the divine imperative of lek-lekha to an unknown place 
contingent on His will: to a land that I will show you (Gen 12:1) and on one of the 
mountains of which I shall tell you (Gen 22:2). What kind of experience is created by 
                                                 
202 Doukhan, Genesis, 195.  
203 Doukhan, Genesis, 198. 
204 “In other words, the call to Abraham to ‘get out’ of his country and away from his roots should 
take him to himself—to establish his identity. It is not enough for Abram to get out of Babel; in order to 
find his real self, Abraham has to get rid of the Babel that is still in him, the idolatry of his fathers and the 
arrogant mentality of Babel.” Doukhan, Genesis, 198. 
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these instructions? Abraham was called to leave a settled, safe home in each case to 
journey a long distance for a clear purpose—without a clear end. The end was hidden in 
God. Not knowing the exact location of his destination, Abraham was freed from the 
temporal pressure of covering distance efficiently to concentrate instead on the moment-
by-moment experience of walking closely with God, awaiting further instruction from 
above.205  
 Because he was set up to be acutely aware of God’s abiding presence on his 
initial trek to Canaan, aesthetically, Abraham may have started to see the world through 
God’s eyes. Anticipation opens the senses. Every shade of a mountain, every rushing 
stream or wadi, every striking vista that confronted his vision and offered itself as a 
possibility for stopping would make him check internally for God’s promised signal to 
confirm it. The first lek-lekha (Gen 12) rendered Abraham hyper-attentive to what was 
outside and inside himself. The second lek-lekha (Gen 22) in the Abrahamic narratives 
started as the opposite of the first, a numbed walk toward the impending death of his son 
and the end of his covenant dream. But when the angel broke this tension at the top of the 
mountain and Abraham looked up from the knife, he saw God’s ram in the bush and 
                                                 
205 The emotive character of this journey depends on the relationship between God and Abraham. 
If they were relative strangers before now, anxiety and fear would mark this event. If they had already 
established mutual trust, confidence and hope would accompany them.   
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everything became right again. The walk back down the mountain gave him a new lease 
on life, it was the opposite of the deathwalk up Mt. Moriah. 
When a person attends to their walking, this basic awareness of moving through 
space that is “constitutive for being-in-the-world”206 seeps into bodily consciousness. For 
when humans initially encounter other objects in the world they may take for granted a 
sense of direction and distance but at some point, “on the basis of spatiality thus 
discovered, space itself becomes accessible to cognition.”207 Heidegger recognized that 
“the ‘subject,’ correctly understood ontologically, Da-sein, is spatial in a primordial 
sense.”208 Bollnow adds “that the human being is always and necessarily conditioned in 
his life by his behaviour in relation to a surrounding space.”209 In Kantian terms, space is 
definitely a “transcendental ideality” but stubbornly remains at the same time an 
“empirical reality.”210  
For instance, when walking, the human engages in forward projection through 
empirical space. Forward movement lends to ethical evaluative language figurative 
phrases like “striving forward,” referring to a general sense of progress, and “drawing 
                                                 
206 Heidegger, Being and Time, 103.  
207 Heidegger, Being and Time, 103. 
208 “Here, apriority means the previousness of encountering space (as region) in the actual 
encountering of things at hand in the surrounding world.” Heidegger, Being and Time, 103. 
209 O. F. Bollnow, Human Space, trans. Christine Shuttleworth, ed. Joseph Kohlmaier (London: 
Hyphen Press, 2011), 23. 
210 Bollnow, Human Space, 24. 
 355 
 
back,” expressing reproach for not finishing a task.211 The richly evocative term journey, 
then, is even more significant for 
  the journey is not some temporary or occasional resting-place, but describes a basic 
situation, perhaps the basic situation of man in the world, and thus becomes one of 
the great primal symbols of human life, which pervades its whole interpretation to 
such an extent that one can hardly draw a line between its ‘literal’ and ‘figurative’ 
meanings. Life is perceived as a lifelong journey, and man as a traveler on this 
journey, a ‘homo viator.’ In this journey, or movement, the concepts of front and back 
at the same time acquire a temporal meaning: in front of us is what lies before us in 
the future as a stretch of life still to be traversed, while behind us is the stretch of 
life’s journey already completed, the past.212 
 
Abraham’s intimate journey of lek-lekha with God, who bears the ultimate end of 
Abraham’s journey in Himself also evokes overlapping notions of space. Walking covers 
a distance; the opposite of distance is nearness—the intimate proximity of Abraham and 
God and the pairing of Abraham and Isaac. Abraham’s initial journey was spurred by a 
longing for a true homeland,213 which in humans is invariably linked with “the mysterious 
inward journey” for Bollnow explains, the inexpressible “longing for the distance is, in 
fact, a yearning for our lost origins, when life was still genuine.”214 Abraham obeyed 
God’s first command to lek-lekha to the promised land of Canaan, in which, ironically, he 
                                                 
211 Bollnow, Human Space, 51.  
212 Bollnow, Human Space, 52.  
213 The writer of Hebrews alludes to this longing. “For people who speak thus make it clear that 
they are seeking a homeland. . . . But as it is, they desire a better country, that is, a heavenly one. Therefore 
God is not ashamed to be called their God, for he has prepared for them a city.” Heb 11:14, 16.  
214 Bollnow, Human Space, 92.  
 356 
 
wandered about as an alien. God’s last lek-lekha brought Abraham by another journey to 
God’s home on earth, the future temple site on a mountain in the land of Moriah.  
On that dizzying sacred site, Abraham thought he had to choose between Isaac 
and God for space in his life. But when God’s already provided ram was discovered, 
Abraham experienced something experientially profound about God’s love. As Bollnow 
describes, love does not displace—love creates space, for “instead of the space clearing 
displacing of the ‘other’ from a given place and the occupation of this place by the 
displacer, there is the peculiar phenomenon that exactly where you are a place [for me] is 
created. . . . there is the peculiar phenomenon of ‘limitless’ increase of individual space 
through the surrender of individual space!”215 High sacred spaces may initially seem 
restrictive and fearsome but when the worshipper surrenders their deepest fears to God’s 
all encompassing prevenient love, they will experience the limitless horizon of expanding 
freedom in every direction. This is the existential promise of unbounded freedom and 
seeing/understanding promised to all through that ancient proverb, “On the mount of the 
Lord, there is vision.” 
Conclusion 
To summarize, the macro-hermeneutics of the Axial Model deals with the 
philosophical or metaphysical concepts in the biblical text. At the beginning of  this 
chapter it became apparent that the philosophical works of Kierkegaard and Derrida on 
the Aqedah did not rest directly on the text itself but on the unacknowledged assumption 
                                                 
215 Bollnow, Human Space, 242.  
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of a certain meso-hermeneutical interpretation of Abraham’s test. When a new 
interpretive hypothesis for the Aqedah, such as the Covenant Hypothesis was substituted 
instead, it changed their philosophical conclusions in unexpected and intriguing ways and 
new concepts emerged to fill in the assumed gaps. This phenomenon demonstrates the 
interdependent relationship between the meso-hermeneutical level of theological 
interpretation and macro-hermeneutical level of philosophy and reveals the integrative 
and generative power of the Covenant Hypothesis on the metaphysical level.  
The second section of this chapter depicted the metaphysical aspects of the Axial 
model. In the Axial model, the two permanent cores were the long axis of the biblical text 
and the punctate core of the interpreter. The core long axis of the text, on closer 
examination, turned out to be a filled straw: eternal transcendent deity wrapped lightly by 
temporal human language. In contrast to everlasting divinity, the fragile core of the 
interpreter was (by biblical description) dust temporally held together by divine breath, 
which was depicted as a dynamic network of connected knowledge nodes. The relation 
between the cores was then illustrated philosophically. Ontologically, a unidirectional 
flow of creative power and existence emanates from God to the interpreter through the 
biblical text. Epistemologically, because the intelligibility of any text requires the mental 
patterns and questions that the inquirer brings to it, the text often acts as a one-way 
mirror, revealing more of the interpreter back to him/her than details of God but remains 
reliably accurate on transmitting knowledge of both entities. Axiologically the text 
functions as a magnifying glass by transmitting God’s values as revealed by historical 
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interactions and inscribing them onto the receptive heart of a believing interpreter 
through the Holy Spirit.    
The third section directly analyzed the worlds of meaning above and below the 
Aqedah text. Using the first verse of the Aqedah as an initiating step, the philosophical 
presuppositions regarding God and Abraham were explored systematically through 
ontology, epistemology and axiology.  
Ontologically, the covenant journey was God’s re-creation process that 
transformed Abram into Abraham through covenant promises and walking (lek-lekha) 
together. Abraham’s developing covenant identity was then tested by the event of the 
Aqedah which exhibits all the earmarks of a historical event in the same time-space 
continuum of this current world. God’s covenant identity as a moral Promise-Keeper was 
risked in the Aqedah in order to elicit from Abraham a comprehensive covenant response 
to the posed crisis that endangered Isaac, then fulfilled through the representative ram. 
Abraham’s relational willingness and obedience toward God, as exemplified by his 
consistent reply of hinneni, enabled him to take the test, accept correction, recognize 
God’s test solution, and pass the test in faith.   
Epistemologically, the test design of the Aqedah reveals God understands human 
beings as historical integrative moral agents who are open to correction and revealed by 
phronesis. The kind of human obedience desired by God, as revealed by God’s test 
command and final evaluation, is not the blind and simplistic compliance of an animal 
but of an highly intelligent and synthesizing god-like creature. God’s personal reference 
to His own present omniscience (Now I know) in the Aqedah is dynamically supple yet 
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propositionally perfect, not an admission of divine ignorance or mere anthropomorphism. 
Hermeneutically, Abraham’s fear of powerlessness expressed by his persistent fear of 
being killed clarifies why he desperately clung to resurrection hope, missed the ram, and 
ultimately raised his knife to kill Isaac. Abraham’s phobia reveals the basic universal 
human condition, mortals haunted by their fear of death. This also explains the stubborn 
longevity of traditional interpretations of the Aqedah that are driven by the human fear of 
death and obsessed with hierarchical power in binary paradigms. 
The Axiological analysis of the Aqedah in the context of the Abraham cycle 
recognized the Aqedah as resembling a Divine Command challenge within a Virtue 
Ethics covenant journey. God’s test chillingly revealed what kind of person Abraham had 
become due to his unresolved fear of being killed. The Covenant Hypothesis suggested 
that a Modified Virtue Ethics that incorporated blessing, God’s telos for Abraham’s 
covenant journey, could correct the inherent weaknesses of traditional Virtue Ethics. It 
also hinted that a modified Divine Command Theory that includes the whole range of 
covenant experience as appropriate responses to God’s commands could also correspond 
to God’s final approval and definition of Abraham’s obedience.The final section reflected 
on the poignant phase of lek-lekha that led to a mountaintop where divine love created 
true freedom for Abraham by absorbing his core fear through the grace-filled solution of 
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the provided ram representing God. God releases the binding of Abraham and Isaac and  
demonstrates “on the mount of the Lord there is vision.”  
In conclusion, the macro-hermeneutical study of the Aqedah demonstrates that 
Abraham’s test as interpreted by the Covenant Hypothesis on the macro-hermeneutical 
level is productive for biblical philosophy and is rationally consistent with holy goodness. 
 Alasdair Macintyre’s meta-criteria for a successful theories is: “The criterion of a 
successful theory is that it enables us to understand its predecessors in a newly intelligible 
way. It, at one and the same time, enables us to understand precisely why its predecessors 
have to be rejected or modified and also why, without and before its illumination, past 
theory could have remained credible. It introduces new standards for evaluating the past. 
It recasts the narrative which constitutes the continuous reconstruction of the scientific 
tradition.”216 On the macro-hermeneutical level, the Covenant Hypothesis is (1) a new 
interpretive hypothesis for the Aqedah that resolves many of the philosophical problems 
(moral conundrums, binary oppositions, aporias) arising from traditional and 
philosophical interpretations of the Aqedah,217 (2) its core concept of covenant 
actualization for impending crisis reveals morally consistent implications for praxis,218 (3) 
                                                 
216 The Covenant Hypothesis is only a small part of the larger Judeo-Christian biblical tradition, 
but on the tiny scale of one interpretive theory for one biblical narrative, it coherently explains the strengths 
and weaknesses of rival interpretations and offers a new text-based divine assessment (vv. 15-18) that is 
philosophically productive for shifting hermeneutics on the Aqedah. Alasdair MacIntyre, “Epistemological 
Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science,” Monist 60, no. 4 (October 1977): 453-472, 
reprinted in Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones, eds., Why Narrative: Readings in Narrative Theology 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989), 146. 
217 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 206. 
218 Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” 91-
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is useful for evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of current philosophical approaches 
to the Aqedah by reclaiming the contextual paradigm of the Abrahamic covenant for 
rethinking Abraham’s test, and (4) it recasts the narrative by offering new conceptual 
lenses to see it in a new and productive light.
                                                 
196.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation has produced two conceptual products: The Axial Model1 for 
hermeneutics and the Covenant Hypothesis2 for the Aqedah. The name of the Axial 
Model comes from the innovation that the text is the central long axis of the 
hermeneutical spiral and functions both as the source and controlling norm for the 
interpretive process. When this textually normative model was applied to the biblical 
story of the Aqedah or the Sacrifice of Isaac, the new interpretation of the Covenant 
Hypothesis was seen. The Covenant Hypothesis interpreted the Aqedah test as a covenant 
crisis challenge divinely designed to elicit a comprehensive, integrated covenant response 
from Abraham.  
This chapter will first assess the Axial Model. Second, it will appraise the model’s 
application to the Aqedah that resulted in the Covenant Hypothesis. Third, it will describe 
                                                 
1 Spiral ramp, pp. 70-78; interpreter’s sphere, pp. 161-167; model cores, pp. 294-301.  
2 Page 224.  
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how continued progression through the spiral ramps would work. Finally, 
recommendations and directions for future studies will end this chapter. 
Assessment of the Axial Model 
The assessment of the Axial Model will summarize the description, function, and 
orientation for meaning in the model then evaluate whether it satisfies the purpose of the 
dissertation as stated in the preface. 
By description, the Axial Model is a tri-level, text-anchored, spiral model for 
theological hermeneutics that situates the four principles of Sola, Tota, Prima and Viva 
Scriptura in relation to the five biblical worlds of meaning (in, behind, in front of, above 
and below the text).3 The three levels are micro (textual exegesis), meso (theological), 
and macro (philosophical) hermeneutics which are anchored by the biblical text as the 
norming long axis of the spiral model. The interpreter rolls in a circular pattern on the 
continuous spiral ramp of the model, the ramps represent the accessible parts of the 
worlds of meaning for that interpreter.4  
Functionally, the Axial Model integrates three circular processes of 
understanding. (1) Parts to a Whole—The interpreter’s looping path on the ramp’s 
surface links the parts to the whole, the text to its five worlds of meaning (in, behind, in 
front of, above, and below). This circuit can be a disciplined method geared toward a 
                                                 
3 Pages 70-74, figure 3.4 on p. 74.   
4 Pages 161-167,  figure 4.1 on p. 163 and figure 4.2 on p. 165.  
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theological goal.5 (2) Fusion of Horizons—Immediate synchronic understanding requires 
the back and forth movement of questions and answers or overlay of patterns from 
previous experience to make sense of the text. This engaged harmonizing fuses the 
horizons of the interpreter with the text’s worlds of meaning.6 (3) Projective-
Integration—Diachronic understanding refers to projected fore-structures of 
understanding (micro-meso-macro hermeneutics) tested by the text then integrated into 
previously acquired knowledge as the interpreter spirals through the three levels of the 
Axial Model.7 These three circular processes characterizing three methods of 
understanding have been incorporated into the Axial Model. 
In regard to the orientation of textual meaning, the Axial Model connects the three 
foci of textual interpretation (author-text-reader) but remains unabashedly theo-centric 
and text-anchored for worlds of actual but latent meaning that is appropriated by the 
competent interpreter. Ontologically, God is the central emanating source, norm, and 
enabler of meaning through the biblical text.8 Traversing the spiral ramps and 
                                                 
5 Pages 164-165.   
6 Pages 165-166. 
7 Page 166.  
8 Pages 298-300.  
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appropriating the findings turns meaning into transformative power that converts the core 
of the interpreter.9  
Finally, the original purpose of this dissertation was “to respond to the works of 
Jon Levenson and Terrence Fretheim by applying a hermeneutical model that institutes 
the text of the Aqedah as the norm for a comprehensive interpretive paradigm. The goal 
of this model is to elucidate the test of the Aqedah and to illuminate its multiple worlds of 
meaning which are figuratively described as in the text, behind the text, above the text, 
below the text and in front of the text.”10 The Axial Model has integrated the biblical text 
as a controlling norm for all three levels of hermeneutics and related the multiple worlds 
of textual meaning in a logical and schematic manner. This complex sounding model can 
also be described simply as a ball rolling down (or up) a Biblically anchored spiral ramp.  
Assessment of the Covenant Hypothesis 
When the Axial Model was applied to the Aqedah of Genesis 22, the premises for 
the interpretive Covenant Hypothesis were seen. How did the Axial Model help to bring 
about these results? The Axial Model’s orientation of text-normed meaning led to a 
normative theocentric approach11 to interpreting the text of the Aqedah, which had been 
historically dominated by anthropocentric interpretations.12 The model also encouraged 
                                                 
9 Pages 163-167, 299-301.  
10 This is the Purpose Statement found in chapter one on page 9.   
11 Pages 178-214. 
12 Pages 214-223. 
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the integration of personal worlds of meaning as experimental patterns with the biblical 
worlds of meaning13 to be normed by the text. In my case, this added scientific problem 
solving, performance testing, comprehensive diagnosis and treatment of patients, and test 
design as personal resources for understanding God’s test.14 Finally, the conjunctive 
nature of the three hermeneutical levels embraced the whole pericope, the complete 
canon and the metaphysical commitments of my faith community for integrating the 
contextual worlds of meaning surrounding the text. To demonstrate how this worked, a 
snippet from each hermeneutical level is reviewed below.  
The micro-hermeneutical level of the Axial Model recommends repetitive 
analysis of the entire pericope as a method to discern authorial intention from text 
direction and to hear the stress points that the text places on itself. Hearing the Aqedah 
text speak through its own voice was critical because an overwhelming load of extra-
biblical interpretations have become attached to the Aqedah through the centuries and 
they can drown out the subtle emphases of the Aqedah’s own telling of the tale. Through 
careful analysis, shifts in literary structure and delineation of the linguistic details of 
God’s last speech indicated a hidden pattern of allusions to Abraham’s preceding 
                                                 
13 Pages 171-172.  
14 Pages 183-192. 
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covenant journey that appeared final, deliberate, systematic, and incomplete.15 This was a 
new intriguing finding. 
The meso-hermeneutical level fuses personal worlds of meaning with the biblical 
worlds of meaning behind and in front of the text with textual norming and canonical 
testing. Many of the existing interpretations in Aqedah literature either ignored the 
biblical literary context or didn’t address the last divine speech in a systematic manner. 
Divine testing in the biblical canon usually demanded law-abiding ethical behavior from 
the testee, but the Aqedah test was unique in that it demanded unethical, immoral 
behavior which contradicted God’s previous revelations. Combining my test experiences 
in the sciences that were solution-oriented with performance-based tests from the field of 
medicine that required comprehensive ethical-pragmatic decisions in life-and-death 
situations, I hypothesized that the divinely provided incomplete list of evoked covenant 
revelations implied that God wanted to elicit an integrative problem-solving approach 
from Abraham in the Aqedah test. This possibility, called the Covenant Hypothesis 
satisfied the internal literary criteria of coherence and correspondence for the Aqedah and 
employed the Principles of Charity, Humanity and Occam’s Razor in formulation.16 But 
since a “vicious” hermeneutical circle of self-fulfilling bias within the text is a real 
possibility for any hypothesis, the Covenant Hypothesis was tested externally by the 
                                                 
15 Pages 145-153.  
16 Pages 175-176.   
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canon using hypothetico-deductive and falsification methods.17 After passing canonical 
testing, the Covenant Hypothesis appeared to be a viable interpretive option.  
On the macro-hermeneutical level, the Covenant Hypothesis was compared to two 
philosophical treatments of the Aqedah, Kierkegaard’s existential work, Fear and 
Trembling, and Derrida’s deconstructive “Literature in Secret.” The Covenant Hypothesis 
was able to engage with their philosophical insights and generate new relationships 
between their concepts, even adding to their findings.18 This indicated the integrative and 
generative power of the theory. After the metaphysical aspects of the cores of the model 
was clarified, direct Aqedah-based hermeneutical philosophy was attempted through a 
hermeneutical philosophical methodology. What emerged from this exploration was that 
the Covenant Hypothesis shifted the monochromatic interpretation of the Aqedah as a test 
of uncomprehending literalistic obedience into a comprehensive assessment, diagnosis 
and treatment of Abraham’s deepest beliefs and fears.19 The Covenant Hypothesis even 
integrated the following story (Gen 23- Cave burial purchase) to the Abrahamic cycle by 
                                                 
17 Pages 236-256.  
18 Pages 272-278, 288-294.  
19 Pages 335-341. 
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recognizing that its unusually detailed faith-driven negotiations actualized the missed 
covenant lesson in the Aqedah test.20  
Progress through the Axial Model 
What would progression through the Axial Model look like if done again? 
Spiraling forward in time, current metaphysical findings provide a new biblical 
framework of questions for a re-examination of the micro-hermeneutical details in the 
Aqedah. The conceptual filter changes made at the macro-hermeneutical level may bring 
out unrealized nuances of some linguistic details and may dampen other characteristics as 
less significant. Because it will be a second look at a familiar text, a wider scope of 
relevant meanings for terms, more intertextual allusions, or deeper immersion into 
relevant archeological history can now be incorporated and enhance the conceptual lens.  
On the meso-hermeneutical level, the enriched conceptual lens and added micro-
hermeneutical insights may choose to explore one of the seven other theological tasks 
with the expanded repertoire of perceptual patterns of meaning. Perhaps typology in 
relation to Sanctuary or Christology will lead the theological exploration this second 
time. Systematics or pastoral application can be pursued on future rounds through the 
model. 
From the meso-hermeneutical fruits, new directions may open and the existing 
biblical metaphysical framework will be filled. It is expected that existing philosophical 
frameworks will be continually corrected by new insights from the text. On this level, the 
                                                 
20 Pages 348-349.  
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quality of the interpreter’s questions and discrimination brought to the text is critical for 
fruitfulness.  
To be sure, whenever an interpreter returns to a familiar text and attempts to 
understand it again, some of these processes will occur. What the Axial Model of 
hermeneutics brings to the process is systematic discipline by demarcating levels of 
theological complexity, self-conscious clarification of the task and methods, and reflexive 
insight into how transformative understanding works. The Axial model is a historically 
conscious realist approach that is naturally self-critical by accepting the long axis of 
Scripture as both the basis and norm for every hermeneutical level.  
Recommendations 
The Axial Model can be improved and adjusted. Two immediate needs come to 
mind. They are (1) to incorporate more fully the trinitarian nature of God into the model 
and (2) to extend the model’s applicability to the preaching function. The challenge of the 
first task is how to depict Jesus as God who fills the inside of the straw-like long axis but 
at the same time embodies the Word of God. Is there a way to trace how the Holy Spirit 
aids in the looping path of the interpreter’s sphere and aids appropriation and 
transformation beyond what readers experience through engaging in  secular literature? 
 The second task might envision the interpreter/preacher fusing their horizons 
with the congregation’s horizons as conjoined spiritual allies spiraling together by 
encountering the text and the biblical worlds of meaning on the same spiral model. The 
current models of a congregation linked to the pastor/theologian but not connected 
directly to the biblical text leaves room for improvement. But since the listener or another 
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interpreter carries their own personal worlds of meaning and will differ in accessibility to 
the worlds of meaning, how can two spheres on different ramps truly understand each 
other? This is the critical challenge of hermeneutical consensus. 
Many other questions have not been covered in this study. These questions could 
be addressed on future rounds of the Axial Model. How does God speak to Abraham? 
How do divine words re-create human beings (Abram-Abraham)? What is the science of 
hermeneutical understanding that changes humans? Why does God utilize promises, 
questions, commands and testing, instead of comprehensive explanations (as theologians 
do) to develop mature believers? How does action and performance affect the 
understanding of the agent? Through the Aqedah, what other hermeneutical insights has 
God uncovered about the universal human condition? What might Isaac have learned 
about God, Abraham, and himself had Abraham responded perfectly to the test according 
to all the covenant lessons and what did Isaac learn from this actual experience? Is there 
any indication that God wanted Sarah along on this test, and if so, why would He? Was 
Abraham’s secrecy about the test command the right choice or was this test meant to be a 
communal test as the first command was? Does the fact that the whole community was 
circumcised mean they were to participate in the Aqedah? What sociological ripples did 
the Aqedah tradition have? Did it scar the psyche of the faith community? Moses, who 
had requested a three-day journey for sacrifices, was repeatedly accused by the liberated 
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Israelites of bringing them to the wilderness to kill them—was this an aftereffect of the 
Aqedah?  
In conclusion, the Covenant Hypothesis happens to be one first fruit of the Axial 
Model of hermeneutics as applied to the Aqedah. It shows that the Axial Model as a 
comprehensive, integrative, and text-based hermeneutical model fulfills the original 
purpose of this study. Yet only God, who is depicted as the center of the Axial Model, 
can lead the inquiring interpreter to the full and final truth, to Himself. To that blessed 
hope, I submit these dissertation products as tentative helps to hear God’s Word better.
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